Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2001-02-14-Speech-3-016"
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"en.20010214.2.3-016"2
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".
Mr President, Mr President-in-Office of the Council, Commissioner, after lengthy pronouncements and promises, the European Union – or to be more precise, the Helsinki European Council – has formally recognised Turkey as a candidate for membership of the European Union. And the purpose of our debate and vote today is also to bring Turkey closer to this membership, or, more precisely, to the possibility of opening negotiations.
Fourthly, there are regional problems to be resolved: improving relations with Greece, and especially the Cyprus issue. I should like to come back to this point in a moment. Turkey must understand that we demand every candidate country's absolute willingness to maintain good relations with its neighbours. A key element of the preparations for negotiations with Turkey is that it regulates its relations with Greece in a positive way and contributes significantly to the resolution of the Cyprus issue. It is a difficult issue. All sides, and everyone concerned, must play their part in settling the Cyprus issue; this naturally includes the representatives of the Turkish community and especially Turkey itself.
Let me conclude with two further brief comments. Firstly, on the Kurdish issue: it goes without saying that resolving the problems with the Kurdish community in Turkey also features on the agenda. We have stated quite clearly that the use of the Kurdish language – also in the media – and the fostering of, and the opportunity to express, Kurdish identity are key factors in changing the political conditions in Turkey as well.
As far as the Armenia issue is concerned, I personally am opposed to the notion that foreign parliaments should seek to judge history and events which took place a hundred years ago. But I am also opposed to the exploitation of this issue for nationalist purposes in Turkey. A more relaxed and, above all, a more active role in the Armenia issue would be helpful. If Turkey were to take steps to invite its own historians and those from Armenia and third countries to come together to discuss this issue, this would also be a step forward towards a sensible debate about this question.
In this spirit, ladies and gentlemen, I would ask you to adopt my proposal in order to give Turkey the opportunity to prove that it wishes to follow the path towards Europe.
If, as I would hope, we adopt my report here today and the Council reaches a decision along similar lines, the ball will be well and truly in the Turkish half of the pitch. Turkey will then have to act. The time for reaction – as has happened all too often with Turkey – will have passed, and Turkey will have to take the crucial steps. For it must be clear, ladies and gentlemen – and I include our colleagues from Turkey who may be following this debate today – that the Copenhagen criteria must be fulfilled prior to the opening of negotiations. We have not negotiated with any candidate before the political criteria were fulfilled.
So in this sense, we are demanding that Turkey meet the same conditions as all the other candidates. Turkey is neither privileged nor disadvantaged. That is the essence of my report, and it is also the essence of those paragraphs – which, however, have apparently now been called into question – which aim to ensure that Turkey has the same status as all the other candidates. After all, it makes little sense to talk about equal treatment for Turkey, and impose the same obligations on Turkey, if we are not prepared to grant it the same rights as well. And of course it will be a very difficult path – in Turkey, and for Turkey – to fulfil the criteria.
There are at least three significant trends in Turkey: those who are pro-Europe because they support democracy, transparency and respect for human and minority rights; those who are pro-Europe but have substantial doubts about adopting European values and fundamental rights; and those who are fundamentally opposed to Europe, largely because they are sceptical about the adoption of the basic rights and values to which we in Europe are committed.
But it is up to Turkey to take the domestic policy decisions. Certainly, I believe that we – this Parliament – should send out a clear signal that the forces in Turkey which want to follow the path towards Europe and full democracy have our support. And that is the essence of my report as well.
We hope that Turkey will make substantial progress in the coming years. Some people harbour the illusion that negotiations could begin in one or two years' time. I don't want to discourage or disappoint anyone, but it will take several years. But one thing must also be clear, in my view: if it genuinely proves impossible to open negotiations within a specific period – which in my personal opinion should be around five years – because the political criteria have not been fulfilled, the European Union and Turkey must consider another form of partnership. For we are Turkey's partners anyway, and we must be good partners.
Firstly – I would not wish to deny this – Turkey is a key economic factor. And indeed, we should not deny this.
Secondly, Europe has a significant interest in ensuring that there is at least one stable major country in this crisis-torn region.
Thirdly, we have no interest in abandoning Turkey to the Islamic fundamentalists, for we are opposed to all religious or other forms of fundamentalism on principle."@en1
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