Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-12-12-Speech-2-051"

PredicateValue (sorted: default)
rdf:type
dcterms:Date
dcterms:Is Part Of
dcterms:Language
lpv:document identification number
"en.20001212.4.2-051"2
lpv:hasSubsequent
lpv:speaker
lpv:spoken text
"Madam President, Mr President-in-Office and Mr President of the Commission, colleagues, my group welcomes the fact of the Treaty at Nice. That is my point of departure, because without a Treaty at Nice we would be in a significant political and institutional crisis; without a Treaty at Nice we would send a clear signal to candidate states that there were indeed serious obstacles in our path. Therefore the outcome is to be welcomed. With regard to the content of the Treaty of Nice, as others have said here today, we must reflect, we must see the texts, we must form a considered judgment. Finally, to contemplate the next phase 2004. I am pleased to hear President Chirac remark it will not be an obstacle to enlargement. I believe it will be an opportunity and we must grasp the opportunity also to raise the questions of reforming the Council, of reforming the method that we bring to these important tasks and to make sure that the Charter on Fundamental Rights becomes meaningful as law and not simply as a proclamation. This will give us a real opportunity to address the perceived shortcomings of Nice. I have listened carefully to what Romano Prodi has said. He said we must be ambitious but temper our ambition with reality. It is an important message and it is understood. I can say that there are parts we like and much about which we are concerned. The ambition which was taken to Nice was the greatest European ambition for a summit meeting now for many years. It was the ambition to prepare the way for a continental-scale enlargement in Europe and that is the test by which we must judge the content at Nice. Is it capable of delivering an effective operational continental-scale enlargement? That was the ambition, and many in this House fear that it may have fallen short of what was required. My group has nonetheless reached one definitive conclusion which others have also referred to today. That is that the current intergovernmental model of deciding these things reached and passed its sell-by date with Nice. After nine months, more than 330 hours of preparation in formal sessions, thousands of hours of preparation surrounding those sessions, it ended up in the spectacle of the extraordinary difficulty of the negotiators being stuck at the end still having to try to resolve everything because in all that had gone before, nothing of substance had been decided. That is not the way to do business for Europe, nor, in fairness to the French presidency, is it the way to ask any presidency to have to conclude such a complex process. We believe the time for change has come. I should also like to comment, albeit at second-hand having followed in the media the detail of what happened at Nice, about the general atmosphere surrounding the discussions. When we look at the progress which has been made on the reweighting of votes, clearly it is complex and difficult to explain, but the emphasis that was coming out of Nice in reports to the media from the various national delegations was how things could be blocked rather than how things could be promoted. The atmosphere had more to do with the negative aspects of a great European project and vision than a positive promotion of what is deep and good about the European dream, and that is a disappointing feature of Nice. ( ) I want to salute the work of the European Commission. I want to salute the European fortitude of Romano Prodi. I want to salute the detailed work of Commissioner Barnier. I want to salute the European spirit of Mr Verhofstadt, the Belgian Prime Minister which held up to the very end at four or half past four in the morning. But those who stood up most for Europe, I think found it rather a thankless task and that is greatly to be regretted. I want to say for my group that when it comes to dealing with the European Commission, when it comes to the model that has made Europe achieve what we want to see, when we look at the dual legitimacy of the European process based on a Monnet method with a strong intergovernmental input, we do not see the European Commission and their advisers as . They are central to our European politicians' mission and they are essential to that task. There are tensions now. There is a creeping tendency towards intergovernmentalism. But the Schuman-Monnet method has helped us not only to create but to deliver the European dream. I would say to those who trample on that: do so with great caution because you trample on our dreams when you break up a method which has worked so well. I know some sceptics do not like it but they never will. The substantial majority in this House, however, believe in it and the substantial majority in this House appreciate why it has worked."@en1
lpv:spokenAs
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata
"petits fonctionnaires"1

Named graphs describing this resource:

1http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/English.ttl.gz
2http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/Events_and_structure.ttl.gz
3http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/rdf/spokenAs.ttl.gz

The resource appears as object in 2 triples

Context graph