Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-11-29-Speech-3-108"
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"Mr President, given our late start and my commitments afterwards, I shall try to make the speech that I had prepared a little shorter. It was to be quite long, but I shall endeavour not to omit anything crucial.
I now wish to say a few words about the new instruments established by the Treaty of Amsterdam and about interinstitutional relations, which are both subjects on which, I noted, your reports expressed some concern. Three common strategies have been adopted since May 1999, on Russia, on Ukraine and on the Mediterranean region. The Presidency has now asked the Secretary-General – the High Representative – to draw up a preliminary assessment report on how these common strategies are functioning and on their optimal use. This report is due to be presented at the debate at the beginning of next year that I mentioned.
I should like briefly to talk about interinstitutional relations. I am aware of the discussion to which Mr Brok alluded just now, according to which the duties of the High Representative ought to have been allocated to a Vice-President of the Commission. But, as you yourself make the point, Mr Brok, since taking office and in the spirit that the various presidencies have sought to maintain, Mr Solana’s way of working has been fully compliant with the rules and procedures laid down by the Treaty. There has been coordination, no major difficulties have arisen and, to put it in plain terms, things are going well. We have shown on several major problems that we have faced in this period that we have achieved close and constructive cooperation between all the institutions. If we take the events in the Balkans as an example, it can be said that everyone played their role to the full. We are definitely seeing a real policy in this region of south-eastern Europe, which is furthermore beginning to bear fruit.
I come now to a quick preliminary and, of course, still provisional assessment of the actions undertaken under the French Presidency in order to ensure a higher profile for the European Union in the international arena. I shall therefore quickly look at a few regions and a few events. I shall continue with the Balkans, since I was speaking about that region a moment ago. The situation there has altered radically with the change of power in Belgrade, even if, of course, much remains to be done. We had a genuine European strategy, which consisted of sending at the right time, in other words before the elections, a message to the Serbian people which had been drafted at Evian, announcing that if democracy won the day, European policy would be radically revised.
Democracy did win the day, after all the ups and downs, with which we are all familiar. We have therefore kept our promise and the leaders of today’s Yugoslavia tell us that the message from the European Union played a genuine role in that affair at that time. We are therefore part of that course of events, which was entirely logical. We have undertaken to re-establish relations in all areas with Yugoslavia. This does not mean that we consider all the problems to have been solved. We are fully aware that with regard to Kosovo and Montenegro, with regard to Yugoslavia’s relations with its neighbouring countries and to its obligations to the International Court of Justice, much remains to be done or resolved. What it does mean, however, is that the European Union did consider it to be crucial to commit fully itself to supporting this movement towards democracy until it has completely achieved its objectives, until it is consolidated and can then wholeheartedly commit itself to redefining a new policy for Yugoslavia, particularly with regard to its neighbours.
This is the context that explains why the summit held recently in Zagreb was so important. It had been devised against a different backdrop, in order to send a message to the Serbian people, bypassing their then leaders. The changes that have taken place enabled us to make the Zagreb Summit a first real democratic meeting of the whole European Union and all the representatives of the Western Balkan countries.
We also applied ourselves to the issue of regional cooperation, an idea that met with a degree of resistance from the countries in the region that do not wish to be locked into a past from which they have broken free, and I think I can say that, as a result of this summit, they understood that there was no contradiction between regional cooperation and their progress and rapprochement in relation to the European Union, largely through the stabilisation and association process which was confirmed and laid down on that occasion.
This summit, which was an initiative by the French Presidency, also enabled us to restate our commitment to that region, as, shortly before the summit, we had taken the necessary decisions on the major programmes for both the Mediterranean and the Balkan regions. The summit also gave us the opportunity to confirm that the new Balkans programme, which is known as “CARDS”, has been allocated EUR 4.15 billion for the 2000-2006 period. Much then remains to be done, both in terms of consolidating democracy and in terms of regional cooperation, but we now have a framework and a sense of direction and I think that the European Union now knows where it is going in this area.
In parallel and at the same time, the European Union has continued to develop relations with major strategic partners such as Russia. Consequently, an EU-Russia Summit was held on 30 October, under the partnership and cooperation agreement. Our policy is quite clear: we want, on the basis of principles of democracy, human rights, the rule of law and the market economy, to provide the most useful incentives and support for the huge changes undertaken by Russia, for it to become, eventually – and it will take as long as necessary – a great country, which is developing, which is modernising at every level and which is peace-loving, in short, the kind of country that we would be happy to have as our neighbour. All instruments for cooperation with Russia, both Community and national, must be directed towards this.
An EU-Ukraine Summit also took place, on 15 September, and the fruitful political dialogue that resulted is now being extended to issues of conventional arms exports, security and disarmament, a subject highlighted by the OSCE as being a problem where Ukraine is concerned. It is therefore desirable that this country should be included in this dialogue. I wish to say to Mr Brok, who expressed concern at this, that the issue of more tangible cooperation with Ukraine, under the CFSP for example, will be addressed in the report to be presented at Nice on the arrangements that will enable our partners to contribute to military crisis management led by the European Union. Moreover, Ukraine is making a special effort with regard to this issue as, since 1 July, it has acted on 15 declarations made by the presidency on behalf of the European Union.
We have also been maintaining transatlantic dialogue on the Balkans, in which the whole policy implemented by the European Union has been the subject of constant information passing in both directions between the United States and Europe. We have also maintained dialogue on Russia and on the Middle East peace process, even if my comments apply more to the period preceding the tragic events that have taken place since the end of September than to the most recent events.
Ladies and gentlemen, the publication of the reports by Mrs Lalumière and Mr Brok gives me the opportunity to present you with a preliminary assessment of the major developments that have taken place over the last few months in these areas. First of all, in the field of foreign and security policy, I shall assess the main institutional developments and more specifically issues relating to the European defence system and Mr Alain Richard, Minister for Defence, will speak in greater detail about all the aspects to do with military capabilities. I shall then give a summary of the main results of the CFSP over the last six months. I shall also answer, or I shall try to answer, Mr Brok’s oral question on Afghanistan.
During this period we have also kept the United States fully informed of developments in European security and defence policy, which is essential if this policy is to develop harmoniously, as is the case at the moment. Dialogue under this presidency has not yet finished as a summit is scheduled to take place in Washington on 18 December and in Ottawa the following day.
We encountered a problem with the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Marseilles, as many of our Arab partners found it difficult to take part in the meeting in the current climate. Nevertheless, we did hold the meeting and they did eventually take part, with two exceptions. I think that the way in which the work was carried out and the intensity of the debates that were held on this very sensitive issue justified holding the meeting. What was at stake, and this was the reason for insisting on holding the meeting, was the continuation of the Barcelona process, which remains so important, even though it has suffered as a result of the situation in the Middle East. Nevertheless, it remains a powerful concept for the future, a long-term strategic idea that we must not allow to be undermined by the current tragedies, however heartrending they may be. The meeting did, therefore, take place and at this meeting we announced the budgetary appropriations for MEDA II for the period 2000-2006, which come to EUR 5.35 billion. To this figure we can add the loans that the EIB has planned to set aside, making a total of around EUR 13 billion. This demonstrates the substantial reality of the European Union’s commitment to this region.
With regard to the Middle East, the Presidency remains in constant contact with all the key players, even through the most difficult times. We managed to ensure, for the first time, that Javier Solana was allowed to participate in the Sharm El-Sheikh Summit, held on 17 October. We spoke on behalf of the Fifteen in Marseilles, though this was not the main purpose of the Marseilles meeting, which was to save the framework of Euro-Mediterranean cooperation. On 20 November, the European Union once again expressed its views on the situation in the Middle East, in harsher terms which the deteriorating situation on the ground called for. We remain fully committed and we can achieve a number of things in the coming days and weeks. The most urgent issue remains the one you are concerned about, which is first and foremost an end to the violence and for both sides to be able to resume discussions on the basic issues directly.
Moreover, Javier Solana is a member of the fact-finding committee that is meeting in New York on Sunday, which we hope will set to work very quickly. I plan to go there myself, on behalf of the presidency, after Nice, in connection with the work to be undertaken by this fact-finding committee.
The French Presidency has striven to develop relations between the Union and the other great regional blocs and has held many meetings with Asian countries. There has been the third ASEM Summit, the summit with Japan and the one with China. Previously, a summit was held with India, under the Portuguese Presidency, and a ministerial meeting will be taking place with ASEAN.
We encountered a small problem with the issue of North Korea, but I wish to state here that we must make a distinction between the issue of establishing diplomatic relations, which may have appeared rather confused at times, but which is not the real underlying issue, since some countries have maintained relations for a long time while others have not. We decided to work on the content of our policy towards North Korea and, on 20 November, we adopted guidelines for that country and the European troika has been able to visit North Korea on the basis of this approach.
Our dialogue with Africa has been very active at all levels, at ministerial level too, particularly with CDAO, but also with SADC. This is moreover the case at this very moment. Dialogue with Latin America has continued both in New York, on the sidelines of the UN General Assembly, and on more specific points, such as the support provided by the European Union for the peace process initiated by President Pastrana of Columbia, and for his social, economic and institutional programmes.
I would not want to conclude this summary without mentioning the Union’s action on what are today known as the great global or cross-sectoral dossiers, particularly in the field of human rights, where work is still necessary to improve the coherence of European policy in international bodies and to involve civil society more closely. We have continued with the effort that was started previously. The second edition of the European Union’s annual report on human rights has been presented to the European Parliament and a human rights forum will be held in Paris on 13 December.
Furthermore, the French Presidency has continued with the policy of promoting and upgrading disarmament and non-proliferation treaties and has played an active role in the conference on the illegal trade in light and small-calibre weapons to be held in 2001. The Presidency has also drafted the second annual report on the implementation of the European code of conduct on arms exports, which has led to real progress and is due to be adopted by the General Affairs Council on 4 December.
As you see – and I have simplified this presentation considerably – European Union activity in these fields is developing apace and all of our partners throughout the world attach a great deal of importance to this fact.
First of all, enhancing the common foreign and security policy. As Mr Brok pointed out a moment ago, the European Union has asserted its position over the last year and this has been backed up by developments that will prove to be extremely important for the future. I feel that the best example of this is the very rapid development of a European defence system. Following the German, Finnish and Portuguese Presidencies, the French Presidency has sought to fulfil the mandate given to it at Feira. Nice will, I think, mark a major stage and achievement in this field, in large part through the creation of permanent structures for a European defence system which should enable the European Union, in the course of 2001, to declare itself operationally capable of managing a crisis. The issue of military capabilities will be dealt with by Mr Richard, in a moment.
I shall finish with a few words to the effect that the Council shares the concerns expressed by Mr Brok about Afghanistan. I would remind you that the Union is implementing measures on the basis of a common position of January 2000, which are as follows: a complete ban on arms supplies, pressure to be exerted on all sides, support for the attempts by the international community and individuals within Afghanistan to provide mediation, the fight against drugs and aid for the civil population. The Commission would certainly have something to say about these matters if we had the time, but to put it simply, all the efforts that we are actively making, because it truly is a long-suffering country, will never be effective unless all of the neighbouring countries, or the countries that are involved in some way or another and have some influence in Afghanistan, decide once and for all to stop intervening and interfering.
Since this has yet to happen, the Taliban regime remains immune to the arguments and pressure applied from abroad. I wish I could say that our pressure and our action are having some effect on the current situation, but unfortunately the Afghan situation appears to remain somehow self-sufficient and resistant to all such action. This is not, however, going to put us off. We must continue with these actions and I know that many Members of this Parliament here today are very aware of this. We shall therefore continue our work in this area. This is a specific point, Mr President but a specific question was asked, and so I wished to provide this type of answer.
The institutional aspects are also extremely important, because they will allow the Union to make plans, to take decisions and to act; in other words, to take political control and maintain strategic leadership of a crisis management operation. At Nice, the European Council is due to adopt several decisions, which I shall now discuss. First of all, the creation of permanent political and military structures, a political and security committee, a military committee and a European Union defence staff. The mechanism created as a result of these decisions will be complemented by establishing procedures for crisis management and the establishment of an operations centre in the Secretariat-General. As was laid down at Feira, these new structures will be put in place as soon as possible following the Nice Council.
The next issue is ongoing arrangements with third countries and NATO. You all know how important these agreements are and we therefore need to establish relationships of trust and cooperation with NATO, with the candidate countries and with allied countries, whilst fully respecting the autonomy of the European Union. These relationships will, in particular, take the form of meetings between the North Atlantic Council and the iPSC and of meetings between the European Union and the fifteen European candidate and/or ally countries. We have also worked on enhancing civilian crisis management capabilities, in order especially to enable the European Union to achieve the objective that it has set for itself in the field of policing.
I would also like to mention, in response to the comments made by Mrs Lalumière in her report on the need to improve our research into conflict prevention, that recommendations have been drawn up by the High Representative and by the Commission on improving the coherence and effectiveness of action in this field, and I know that the Swedish Presidency will continue to work towards this goal.
I also noted, in Mr Brok’s report, a number of questions and remarks on increasing the effectiveness of the European Union’s external action. This is one of the dossiers into which I personally put in a great deal of work. I hoped that we would make progress in this field, because the situation was clearly unsatisfactory. That was also the reason why, at the informal meeting of Ministers of Foreign Affairs at Evian at the beginning of September, I put this issue on the agenda and why we devoted a whole sitting to it, on the basis of Commissioner Patten’s proposals and plans.
We have made considerable progress since then. On 9 October, the General Affairs Council adopted conclusions on increasing coordination and improving management and the instruments necessary for decision-making. The Council decided to hold an annual debate on these issues and the first such debate will take place after the January or February session. We will then assess the issue of when these new measures are to be first implemented. I would emphasise that this whole process has been carried out with full cooperation and perfect agreement between the Council in general, the High Representative, the Commission, and particularly, Commissioner Patten.
As Mr Brok hopes in his report, the Council will have files summarising all of the relationships between the Union and each partner country, in order to gain greater benefit from the Union’s overall effort, to increase its efficiency and to provide better preparation for its discussions on external action. For the first debate, at the beginning of next year, the Commission will draw up a scoreboard, country by country, for the past budgetary year, which will show the current state of commitments, payments, and outstanding amounts for the main programmes funded by the Community budget and by the EDF. In this work, therefore, we have been very aware of the need for the Commission and the Member States to achieve greater complementarity in their aid actions for third countries whilst preserving, of course, the specific competences of the Commission. This applies to the actions of the traditional Member State administrations as well as to the specialist agencies."@en1
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