Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-10-24-Speech-2-054"
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"en.20001024.3.2-054"2
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".
Mr President, Commissioner, rapporteurs, ladies and gentlemen of the House, you wanted us to have a debate, this morning, on those issues regarding which this House thought it necessary to add to the opinion on the Intergovernmental Conference that was issued in April.
This is a question which Parliament, to give credit where it is due, asked very early in the day, as soon as it took office, in fact, in July 1999. It is a response to the real requirements which I have just listed. It is also true, however, that we must as a Presidency take account of the fact that the Member States have so far indicated that they are not yet ready to discuss a constitution, even if an illustrious list of political representatives has raised the issue.
The fact is, it is easy to see why Member States are not yet at that point. While a constitution can provide a response, at least in part, to the questions I listed, it is a project which in real terms goes a lot farther than that. A constitution, by definition, is a fundamental act of immense political scope, in the best sense of the term. It cannot be seen as simply an exercise in tidying up the wording or even in assigning competences. In my opinion, a constitution goes a lot farther than that, and this future development, the precise shape of our future in Europe, is something that we have not yet clearly decided between ourselves. I feel we cannot talk properly about a constitution and plan ways to draw it up until we know what we want to put in it. As you know full well, that presupposes our taking certain political decisions, with a scope that goes much farther than meeting the three requirements which I have just mentioned. I note, moreover, that among the Heads of State and Government who did declare an opinion on this, not all were equally as approving of the idea, far from it.
Let me come back to the three matters I mentioned. Firstly, simplification of the Treaties. Yes, it is a laudable objective, and some brilliant legal minds have tried their hand at it. In particular the European Institute in Florence, at the Commission’s request – and I expect Michel Barnier will mention this – did so with a result which I would describe as extremely honourable, despite the particularly arid aspect of the exercise, but I do not have the impression that the authors of the report, to which Mr Duhamel refers, indeed – managed to avoid a certain contradiction between the objective of clarity and the objective of legal certainty.
Treaties are not rewritten without affecting existing legislation. That is understandable. It is extremely difficult to rewrite treaties which have been negotiated, sometimes down to the last comma, and the next item in our debate provides an eloquent example of this. Next, there is – and once again it is inevitable, yet questionable – an element of randomness, which is understandable, in the decisions made by the European Institute of Florence. I am thinking, for instance, of the way in which the authors of the report attach equal importance to each of the common policies, even though their respective importance is obviously very different, and this is expressed by provisions which are also very different in nature.
I shall not continue, as we are not here, or I, at least, am not here, to discuss the Institute’s report. In any case, I noted that your rapporteur was actually proposing an alternative solution which would involve, if I understand correctly, making a distinction between, firstly, the provisions that would be part of a framework treaty and, secondly, the other provisions, particularly the common policies, which would form part of a protocol to be appended. What I wish to suggest is that, whatever the option selected, being personally not only open but also favourable to the idea of a constitution, this approach raises fundamental questions. This is neither a technical nor an innocuous exercise and we must ask fundamental questions before doing anything.
The second matter is the distribution of competences. It is a question often raised, but less often debated. There has not, to date, been any conclusive outcome to this debate, but that should certainly not deter us from making some improvements. It is a complex exercise. We must take care not to destroy the aspect which has made the Community so special since the very beginning, this blend, which varies according to sector, but always very subtle, of shared competences. An exercise of this type must not upset the balance or cause us to regress, in the name of the principle of subsidiarity, as some parties seem to wish.
That is what I wanted to express at this stage. Speaking on behalf of the Presidency-in-Office, it would be inappropriate for me to say more, for as you know we have taken a decision to focus until December on the four key questions on the agenda. We are not unaware that other questions are being raised. A number of honourable Members have raised these questions, as have the Commission and Parliament. Theses issues, or at least some of them, will no doubt come up for discussion very shortly. The Nice meeting is going to be held, the conclusions of that gathering will be made public, and then we will have the situation after Nice. This will not necessarily be in the form desired by your rapporteur because, as I said earlier, not all Member States will necessarily be ready, but an extremely useful contribution will have been made. I think we will see matters more clearly in Nice, and I think it is the results of the IGC – for we must not underestimate the impact that the outcome of the IGC will have on our ability to go further – which will determine whether we shall be able to look into the opportuneness of opening up new working areas and, if appropriate, of defining working methods and a work schedule.
One last brief word on the way in which a text of this type would be drawn up, when the time comes. You rapporteur proposes adopting the method of the Convention. Why not, indeed? This method has, it is true, demonstrated its worth in drawing up the Charter of Fundamental Rights. Several Members of this House, but also representatives of Member States have already pointed out that the traditional method of the Intergovernmental Conference was certainly not the best method. I myself stressed that the method adopted for the Charter was an avenue worth exploring. Do we need a Convention or do we need some other method? That remains to be seen, including, moreover, the process of adopting, ultimately, the future European constitution which, I am convinced, will one day come to exist.
And now, one very quick word about the island regions. As usual, the Committee on Constitutional Affairs, with its chairman, and yourself, Mr Segni, brought up questions that were both extremely pertinent but also extremely complex. I shall attempt to respond as precisely as possible to one question. To tell the truth, I do not know the answer at the present time. I understand that our Italian friends, for the most part, have found some discrepancies between the different language versions of Article 158(2) of the Treaty, some shades of meaning and outright differences, which may give rise to differing interpretations. This question was raised as early as 1997, I believe, after the new Treaty was adopted but before it was signed.
According to the information available to the Presidency, forgive me if I have to be technical at this point, it appears that the clear majority of the language versions, unlike the Italian version, as far as the implementation of cohesion policy is concerned, refer only to the less favoured islands and not to islands in general. It is clear, however, as you have stated so clearly, that this question is not just a matter of linguistic or semantic debate, but instead concerns an extremely important and sensitive issue, which is the handling of island issues within the European Union and the policies which may be set up and implemented within these territories. As I said, given the lack of information available to us, I am not in a position to deliver a definitive opinion on this matter today, but the Presidency is, of course, willing to help clarify the matter by, for instance, referring the matter to the Council’s legal department within the Council and even within the Intergovernmental Conference. I think we might then have more relevant information so as to be able to clarify the matter and, at that time, to give you a comprehensive answer.
Initially, you planned three reports: constitutionalisation of the Treaties, reinforced cooperation, and the ceiling on the number of Members of the European Parliament. I note, at any rate, that for today, the last matter has not been referred to us, and I am in complete agreement with Commissioner Barnier. The Presidency takes note of this, but the situation must be noted. It is one we regret. Who better than this House to give an informed opinion on this issue of major importance in view of the imminent enlargement? Finally, one last point of a quite different sort, which Mr Segni, backed by Chairman Napolitano, wished to bring up, and which I noted, the question of islands.
That is all the information I wished to give you. I shall now end in order to leave the floor open for the debate.
I shall now return to each of these points, but only briefly in order to leave time for the debate. With your permission, I shall begin – and I would ask Olivier Duhamel not to hold it against me, I am not overlooking him – with the issue of reinforced cooperation which is actually on the agenda for the IGC, unlike the issue of constitutionalisation, which will come afterwards.
Let me go to the heart of the matter, focussing on the salient points of Mr Gil-Robles’ report, which I shall simply describe as excellent in my view. This is a point I already made in presenting the results of the informal Council meeting in Biarritz. I think it is safe to say that the conclusions of your rapporteur – as indeed he noted – for the most part echo the concerns expressed by the Member States in Biarritz.
First of all, Mr Chairman, I note your agreement as to the reasons justifying making this mechanism more flexible so than it can be properly implemented within an enlarged Europe. I note your concern that the institutional framework of the Union be respected and the need to design an accessible instrument, as well as your wish to eliminate the veto within the Council. All these are principles which met with general approval in Biarritz. I also understand your determination to prevent any interference with what you term the ‘institutional indivisibility’ of the European Parliament or the Commission. We are, once again, all agreed that the institutional framework of the European Union should be respected. There is no case for going beyond the Treaties or challenging the existing framework.
Nonetheless, we have here a special instrument of an exceptional nature which is, of necessity, somewhat specific in relation to the civil law. Let me stress that there is absolutely no question of using this instrument in order to compensate for failing to introduce qualified majority voting in some areas. Qualified majority voting is indeed the prime objective at the Intergovernmental Conference. Nor is there any question of creating an
Europe. However, in spite of the clear guarantees which must surround reinforced cooperation, such cooperation is nonetheless exceptional in nature, and shows that it was not possible, at a given time, for the fifteen Member States to come to an agreement on stepping up cooperation in a specific sector. Hence, it will not be easy to say that everything is going ahead just as if the fifteen Member States were involved, if you will forgive me belabouring such an obvious point.
And so, while respecting the existing constitutional framework, I must say I think it would be difficult to envisage more than a procedure for an advisory opinion from Parliament when such measures are adopted. As for the arrangements for implementing reinforced cooperation, these present another, more complex problem. I do realise the value that Parliament places on its own indivisibility, and indeed I understand it perfectly, but then, for that very reason, how is it possible to justify Parliament’s issuing a legitimate opinion as if it were a conventional codecision or consultation situation when in fact probably half, or perhaps two thirds of all the Member States might not be involved in this reinforced cooperation? In such circumstances, what legitimacy would Parliament’s vote have, if expressed by a majority of Members of Parliament representing States that were not involved in such reinforced cooperation? Would this not be another way of reintroducing, by the back door, the veto which you yourselves wanted us to get rid of?
Objectively speaking, this is a real matter of principle which makes it impossible, in my view, to adopt exactly the same rules within each area of reinforced cooperation as within the European Union, and this is all the more true in the very specific and delicate area of foreign security and defence policy. I think we must clearly keep in mind what specific situations this arrangement is intended to deal with. It must not become the norm, and it must be given a degree of flexibility, within the limits of a number of principles.
I now come to the constitutionalisation of the Treaties. I could confine myself to thanking Mr Duhamel, and to simply pointing out that his text contains a quite unwarranted attack on President Prodi – his were, of course, humorous comments – or even observing that he has not said exactly how he wants this constitution to be arrived at. Fortunately, his report is available, and the term ‘constitution’ unites, or covers, a number of requirements. Firstly, simplification and clarification of the Treaties. Next, the creation of a proper reference text clearly establishing the principles and objectives of the European Union and, finally, the distribution of competences between the various decision-making levels within the European Union."@en1
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