Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-06-14-Speech-3-077"

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"Mr President, I would like to start by congratulating our rapporteur, Mrs Lalumière, on the report which she produced for our Parliament and in which she managed to strike a fine balance. Cologne and Helsinki have added substance to the common European security and defence policy. With unusual drive, the European Council has taken a number of important decisions, of which we have taken note and for which we have given due credit. The aim is to develop our own capacity in order to be able to implement the so-called Petersberg tasks. A decision has been made on the extent of the troops required in this respect. A draft of the necessary decision-making mechanisms is in place. A small-scale NATO is emerging. In this context, I would like to emphasise two incisive questions, which are a small selection from a long series of matters which are being discussed here today. The European Union must be able to act autonomously. This may sound obvious, but this statement also touches upon an enormous problem. What does autonomous mean in relation to NATO? There is some confusion surrounding this on both sides of the Atlantic and this should be resolved soon. Autonomy should certainly not culminate in a political exchange between the common European security and defence policy and the national missile defence, as was suggested recently by an American senator during the NATO Assembly in Budapest. In summary, the question which I would like to put to the Council is: what is autonomy in this context? Is action within a NATO context always the first option, as the Americans claim? Should NATO be given first refusal before the European Union can act autonomously or will the European Union allow itself more room for manoeuvre? I have the impression that this question is being avoided on both sides of the Atlantic, which will compromise future cooperation. The second point is about democratic control. In the Netherlands, there has been a lot of discussion recently about who was involved in what decisions in Bosnia and Kosovo. This mainly relates to the government. But if some kind of policy of faits accomplis is already mentioned sometimes at this level, then what about parliamentary control? Will the common European security and defence policy turn into a cosy intergovernmental get-together or will national parliaments and the European Parliament be truly involved? Here too, the pertinent question arises as to whether the Council pays any attention to this at all? Operating at an informal level has its advantages but not if issues of war or peace are involved. The support base required for using the EU military instrument needs to be more extensive than that required for creating it. Mrs Lalumière’s resolution contains a relevant proposal for tackling the threat of a democratic deficit in this connection. The government conference can benefit from this. The least the European Parliament could ask for is to be considered a fully-fledged partner in this very important debate."@en1

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