Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-04-12-Speech-3-261"

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"Mr President, ladies and gentlemen, supplementary pension schemes in the internal market are taking up more and more of the political institutions’ time, both at national and European level. The long run-up to this debate on a communication from the Commission is proof enough of how high feelings are running on this issue. Equal treatment of products that do not cover biometric risks and those that do is completely at variance with our intention to introduce supplementary pensions for the European internal market. Clearly then, the Commission’s main concern is to boost the European capital market. I would take issue with this on several counts: the implementation of taxation during the pension payout period in all Member States would not just make supplementary pensions more favourable, it is a fundamental prerequisite to resource-saving, cross-border membership. In other words, companies, be they large or small, will no longer have to put fifteen different systems in place for their employees; one pensions provider will suffice. Yet taxation during the pension payout period will entail loss of income for Member States. It will only be possible to reach a consensus on taxation policy amongst the Member States if the EU provides a clearly defined legal framework – using whatever directive is appropriate – and keeps the loss of income to the Member States within bounds. Hence our demand for two directive packages: one governing pensions with obligatory coverage of biometric risks, and one for old-age provisions. Using both of these, we can attempt to achieve full European integration. When it comes to pensions, we have a good chance of finding the solution we need in the very near future. Therefore we should not allow banks and the investment industry to talk us into short-term or short-sighted decisions. I have this request to make of you, ladies and gentlemen. Let us, as participants in codecision on future directives, use tomorrow’s vote to send the right signal to the Commission, with a view to bringing stability to old-age provisions in Europe and providing future supplementary pensions in the internal market that are in every sense worthy of the name. The issue of ‘supplementary pensions’ is a complex one and has implications for social policy, company policy, taxation policy and the capital markets. Since the publication of the Green Paper, the Commission has been concentrating on the capital market aspect and working towards the short-term aim of harmonising the prudential rules governing pension providers under the heading of “supplementary pensions in the internal market”. As such, it has already defined, in an ill-considered manner, what pensions are, thereby establishing a definition that points the way for further legislative initiatives in the taxation or social sphere, and, what is more, has initiated European legislation that will influence national legislation. It is precisely this short-sightedness, this search for a quick fix solution, with no thought for setting long-term objectives, that the Commission is guilty of, for the goal, and what constitutes European added value from the point of view of the European citizen, companies, employees, and pensions recipients and providers, is for pension providers to have cross-border membership, which will ensure that pensions are properly integrated into the internal market. It is this European added value that we have our sights on when we urge the Commission to draw a distinction between pure capital formation and pensions in its future legislative proposals, in other words, to distinguish between providers that cover biometric risks and those that only place capital. In common with the legislators in many Member States, our position is that one can only talk in terms of pensions if life risks such as invalidity, longevity and surviving dependants are covered. What exactly does that mean? By “covering longevity” I mean that the pensions provider is obliged to pay me a fixed pension until I die. Therefore, they can neither fob the individual entitled to receive the pension off with a fixed amount, nor reduce their pension because the person concerned is getting too old by their reckoning. Provisions for surviving dependants cover those of the surviving dependants – i.e. family members – that are entitled to receive the pension of the deceased, and are dependent on this. In its turn, invalidity cover provides for a pension in the event of complete or partial inability to practise one’s profession. If we are serious about reinforcing the statutory pensions schemes with supplementary pensions in the internal market then pensions must provide cover for these risks. If we fail to take biometric risks into account, then what we will have is not provisions but ‘previsions’ for old-age. But this is not just about the quality of pensions in Europe. In calling for different legal bases to be established for products and product providers that are defined in different ways, the main aim is to achieve legal certainty in Europe and to afford better opportunities for future integration into the internal market."@en1
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