Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-03-29-Speech-3-102"
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"en.20000329.7.3-102"2
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"Mr President, in November, five years will have passed since the signing of the Barcelona Declaration. The moment has therefore arrived to make an assessment of the Euro-Mediterranean policy, an assessment of the results achieved and also of this policy’s delays and shortcomings. In this respect, this debate and the motions for resolutions tabled by the Groups in this Parliament are very appropriate initiatives.
This assessment certainly includes some positive aspects. On the one hand – and this is no small thing – the process has continued, despite the negative factors that have affected the Middle East peace process. The summits and meetings have always been held with the presence of all the countries involved, including Syria, Lebanon and Israel. Secondly, although progress has been slow, we have seen the signing, ratification and implementation of a series of association agreements. Thirdly, we have been developing a permanent routine for intergovernmental cooperation and we have been implementing the different financial aid projects of the MEDA programme.
However, these results cannot lead us to ignore the delays and shortcomings which, in part, have frustrated the hopes and expectations raised at the first Euro-Mediterranean Conference of November 1995. Firstly, there has been no decisive political thrust when we really needed it. Strictly speaking, it could be said that, in political terms, Mediterranean policy should today be the main priority of European Union foreign policy. Enlargement towards the East, in strategic and historic terms, leads to a scenario in which the only uncertainties are the timetable, pace, cost and means for achieving it. Even allowing for possible new regional conflicts, it is difficult to imagine any outcome other than the culmination of the enlargement process. On the other hand, there is no certainty whatsoever when it comes to the future of the Mediterranean. It will depend to a large extent on the policy of the European Union as to whether this region becomes a ‘sun belt’ with a new economic and social balance in a context of security, development and peace, or a ‘slum belt’ where the norm will be an increasing imbalance between north and south, galloping poverty in the south and the progressive emergence – forgive the repetition – of every type of emergency: violence, instability, terrorism and uncontrollable migratory pressures.
Secondly, I believe that, as a result of this lack of political direction, the economic and financial dimension has experienced obstacles and delays. In this respect, we should point out the difficulties involved in launching the MEDA programmes, the excesses of centralisation, the heterogeneous nature of aid criteria, the lack of joint reflection on the possibility of a common Mediterranean agricultural policy and, thirdly, and as a consequence the tiny amount of direct investment in the south: just 2% of the total of the European Union’s direct foreign investments. This is an illustration of what could be described as the “strategic blindness” of the European system as a whole.
In conclusion, a new phase is necessary, with the Portuguese and French presidencies, a brand new start for Euro-Mediterranean policy, which could promote a ‘virtuous’ circle encompassing the objectives which were correctly drawn up at the Euro-Mediterranean Conference in Barcelona in November 1995."@en1
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