Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-02-16-Speech-3-272"

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"Mr President, I congratulate the rapporteur on her report. I must add that it is a welcome change to see Mrs Frassoni in such a conciliatory mood and willing to reach compromises with the other institutions. When it comes to the IGC, she is one of what the French call “ ”: no compromise, no deals with the other institutions; we would rather see the whole thing blocked than compromise our positions. Yet here she is willing to accept the steps forward that have been achieved, which are far from matching Parliament’s original position on the issue of comitology. Let us remember what is at stake here. Parliament had four main criticisms of the comitology system as it existed prior to the new Council decision supplemented by this interinstitutional agreement. Firstly, the whole system is obscure. It is not transparent with hundreds of committees meeting with secret agendas and nobody knowing who is on the committees. Here is a real step forward, in the new system that has been agreed. We are to know who is on each committee. We are to know when they meet. We are to get the agendas. We are to get the documents that are sent to them. The whole system will be more open and transparent – if still rather complex. So that is at least a step forward. Our second criticism is that the system was very restrictive of the Commission. We adopt legislation in the European Union. We expect the Commission to implement it. And then we have a system designed to hinder the Commission and make it more difficult – especially what was called the “contre-filet” system, under which the Council could block the Commission by a simple majority even when the Council was not capable of finding an alternative to the implementing measure concerned. Here too there is at least some progress. The Council will no longer be able to block implementing measures indefinitely beyond the three-month period unless it has a qualified majority to block it, in other words, unless there is substantial opposition among the Member States represented in the Council. That is a more reasonable system. That, too, is a step forward. But on our other two criticisms, we are less satisfied. The first criticism is of the system whereby the Commission is monitored, scrutinised, controlled if you like, only by a committee appointed by Member States or the Council not by Parliament. The legislative authority, Council and Parliament, should be equal. We confer implementing powers on the Commission, but then it is only a Council or Member State appointed body that can blow the whistle and say no to the Commission and stop the implementing measure. Parliament has no equivalent power. True, we are now given the beginning of such a power in this new system. We are to receive all the draft implementing measures forwarded to a committee at the same time as it is sent to the committee. We will have the chance to scrutinise, to debate, to question. But we will only have the right to formally challenge the Commission if we think it has gone beyond the delegation that we have given to the Commission in the legislation. In other words, we can challenge the measure for being but not on its content. And in a democracy, Parliament should be able to challenge the content. Not that we do so every week. We are not seeking to immerse ourselves in implementing decisions, but it is a democratic safeguard that we should be able to do so on those few occasions when it really would be necessary. That is lacking in this new system, or at least is only there in embryonic form. Finally, our fourth criticism is that if an implementing measure is blocked through the comitology system it is referred back, not to both branches of the legislative authority, but to the Council alone, which has the right possibly to take an alternative measure. That is not correct. Both branches adopt the legislation – Council and Parliament – that confers implementing powers on the Commission. If such implementing measures are referred back, it should be to both branches, not to one branch alone. Overall we have a system which has made some progress. The supplementary aspects that arise from the interinstitutional agreement with the Commission are welcome, but that could not change the basic decision of the Council. Even here, we have renounced voluntarily – because this did not happen automatically – the Plumb-Delors agreement as part of the overall compromise. We have been willing to relinquish the provisions in that. We shall have to be very vigilant on what used to be covered by that agreement and is not fully covered by the new decision. We must be very vigilant. So it is a step forward. My group reluctantly accepts it as a step forward. We are not as enthusiastic about compromising as Mrs Frassoni. We recognise that there are limitations and the issue will no doubt come back in a few years’ time. If we want a Union that is democratic and transparent to the fullest degree we will have to revisit this subject."@en1
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