Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2000-02-16-Speech-3-180"

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"en.20000216.10.3-180"2
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"This is obviously a question which really has to be seen in a NATO context, but, as the European Union shares NATO’s view of these issues, it is not difficult for us to associate ourselves with this. I would like to make this clear on behalf of the Council, so that there can be no doubt. Mr Marset Campos, you will be aware, first of all, of how difficult it is to select targets during a military operation, particularly an air-based one, and you will also be aware that there is a category of targets that, whilst they are not military targets as such, are infrastructure targets selected with a view to hindering the smooth running of the military machine. We are of course entering a grey area here, and you may say, Mr Marset Campos, that these are civilian targets, such as bridges and road and rail infrastructure, whilst others will tell me that they are military targets, because they are targets which support military structures in aggressive campaigns such as those carried out by Mr Milosevic’s forces in Kosovo. So we do not see eye to eye on how we view certain targets. Unfortunately, and as everyone recognised during the military action in Kosovo, there were civilian sectors, and in particular infrastructural sectors directly affecting the general public, and even inhabited areas, which were directly affected by NATO air attacks. This is generally recognised and this happens in all wars, and the Kosovo war was not a clean war, nor a model war, but a war based on the art of the possible. And, above all, it was a necessary war, and it was not only about what was possible, it was necessary to put an end to an absolutely unacceptable form of aggression which was utterly rejected by the entire international community. Mr Marset Campos, regardless of how we may see things with hindsight – and it is easy to see things with the benefit of hindsight, if you take no action yourself – I believe that, if we look at what happened in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and at the impunity that the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina led to, and the continuation of that impunity, then we might perhaps see the NATO military action in Kosovo in a somewhat less catastrophic light."@en1

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