Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-07-06-Speech-3-293"

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". Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him. On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation. On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia. Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts. Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts. I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back. I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century. I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it. Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe. What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now. Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security. By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically. The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down. Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players. We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@en1
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