Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-03-31-Speech-3-236"
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"en.20040331.9.3-236"2
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".
Madam President, with regard to this Fisheries Agreement with Greenland, perhaps the first thing we should remember is that it is the second most expensive agreement signed by the European Union, after the Agreement with Mauritania. Furthermore, there is a difference between the two agreements I have mentioned, which we call the difference between the ‘northern agreements’ and the ‘southern agreements’. The northern agreements have a whole series of characteristics, which I will explain during my speech, which differentiate them from the southern agreements.
I say this from the standpoint of somebody who has worked on this Agreement for a long time and who I believe has a thorough knowledge of it. Furthermore, Greenland is entirely in favour of the approach I have just expressed here – in fact, it has already reached an agreement with the Commission – and I believe this would be a good signal for us to send to two Community fleets: to let them fish – not everything, but at least a bit – in those waters.
A lot has been said about this Fisheries Agreement with Greenland, all kinds of things have been said and almost all of it is true. For example, the Court of Auditors emphasised that the Fisheries Agreement with Greenland did not respect certain basic budgetary rules, fishing opportunities, for example. Of the EUR 42.8 million this agreement costs, just 28 were spent on fishing opportunities and furthermore this included paper fish, so called because they were fish that, although they were paid for, did not exist in Greenland’s waters because they had disappeared long ago.
As well as the fact that the use of fishing quotas was very low and was far from achieving the value expected for fishing opportunities, only four Member States could and can fish within the framework of this Agreement: the United Kingdom, Germany, France and Denmark. The other Member States were and continue to be excluded from these waters.
It should be pointed out that this exclusion and this non-use of fishing quotas paid for caused and continues to cause a series of distortions such as, for example, the case of certain Member States benefiting from the agreement having tried to re-sell unused quotas, because they are not of interest to the consumer market of that Member State, but they are of interest for consumption in other States. In addition to this distortion (the attempt to re-sell something already paid for), there has been and there still is fishing of unused quotas by vessels flying the flags of those Member States, but which in reality are not from those Member States or any other Member State, but which are third-country vessels.
The fact is that there is a desire to acquire these unused quotas, or at least to begin fishing, though of an experimental nature, on the part of certain Member States which are not included as beneficiaries of this agreement or which were excluded – such as the Iberian fleets: the Spanish and the Portuguese – at the time of our accession to the European Community, despite the fact that we have been fishing in those waters for centuries.
The Commission recognised all these distortions in its document and proposed a mechanism according to which the Commission could temporarily transfer unused fishing opportunities to another Member State, only during that particular year and without prejudice to the allocation of quotas in future years.
We thought this was a good mechanism, above all because it was a trial mechanism and it would be possible to verify whether it worked or not as time passed. However, in the Committee on Fisheries an amendment was approved, presented by nationals of certain Member States involved, to the effect that the Commission could establish consultation procedures between the Member States, but that it would be the States which had the quotas who could determine or decide on their distribution or allocation to other Member States which are not beneficiaries but which have an interest in fishing in that area.
I believe that, in reality, the central debate in relation to this issue is whether the Commission only plays a facilitating role or whether, since we are talking about a Community fisheries agreement, it must ensure the best possible level of use of fishing opportunities which, as I have said, have been acquired and paid for from Greenland by the Community, within the framework of this Fisheries Agreement.
I believe we are talking essentially not about national issues – because, in the fisheries agreements, in general – and those of us who are here are well aware of this – national issues are always very prevalent and they always cause many tensions – but about the principle of good financial management, the Gordian knot of this issue. It is a question of defining this principle in relation to principles of economy, efficiency and effectiveness, and ensuring compliance, by means of the monitoring of performance indicators, which are established by activity and which furthermore are measurable, so that the results achieved can be observed."@en1
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