Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2002-03-12-Speech-2-207"
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"en.20020312.10.2-207"2
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"The question concerns the impact of the WTO disputes settlement procedure on small- and medium-sized undertakings.
As you know, the WTO disputes settlement procedure is essential in ensuring that the multilateral trade system is secure and predictable. The suspension of trade concessions, which are sometimes wrongly referred to as sanctions, is the last resort for a State which uses the dispute settlement procedure where the State that is at fault has breached either the agreements or the decisions taken under the WTO dispute settlement procedure.
From our point of view, the main benefit of the system for European businesses, including SMUs, is that it applies great pressure to respect the rules of the World Trade Organisation. This is the main benefit for our businesses, and therefore for SMUs too.
There are, without doubt, cases where the international agreements have been breached and these must, of course, continue to be the exception. On this point, we believe that compensation must be preferable to the withdrawal of trade concessions and, within the framework of the WTO, compensation, which is a voluntary measure agreed by the plaintiff State, is a better option. In addition, this measure is only provisional. Otherwise, the system would not be as secure and predictable.
I should like to give you two examples. Firstly, in the case of hormone-treated beef, we effectively lost a case at the WTO. The Commission submitted a proposal for a directive in 2000. We also hope, and I want to make this clear to the House, that the co-legislators are going to take a close interest in this. We regret that this is not the case at the moment. In the meantime, we are conducting negotiations with the United States to find an interim solution which, broadly speaking, would enable them to export greater quantities of hormone-free beef. This is a case where, temporarily, compensation may enable a solution to be found.
Secondly, as part of the reform of the disputes settlement procedure, we recently submitted a proposal to the WTO in order to facilitate recourse to seeking compensation, as a real alternative to the retaliatory measures, in particular by providing for an arbitration mechanism on the amount of compensation. This would have the huge advantage of enabling all parties involved in a dispute to negotiate on the basis of a figure set by a third party.
Mr Rübig, this is the information that I can give you on the solution that is sometimes envisaged of possibly establishing such a supranational punitive system at the WTO. We do not believe in such a system. It would involve a fundamental change in international relations. That is why we do not feel that the international fine option is, at this stage, the correct course of action, if only because it does not provide an answer to the question of what coercive measures to implement in order to force parties to pay a fine that they wish to avoid.
In contrast, we prefer the current system and the compensation system, which – and this will be my final point – is always provisional since the underlying objective of any system that imposes discipline and respect for these disciplines is to force the State at fault to toe the line. That is our guiding principle."@en1
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