Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2007-03-14-Speech-3-323"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20070314.23.3-323"6
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spoken text |
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@en4
|
| lpv:translated text |
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@cs1
"Hr. formand! Jeg tror ikke, at jeg tidligere er blevet bedt om at besvare et åbningsspørgsmål eller en tale i noget parlament, hvor jeg har haft formandskabet, som jeg har været mere enig i end den tale, jeg netop har lyttet til. Jeg må indrømme, at det ærede medlem på alle områder meget præcist og rigtigt har opfanget tanken bag, formålet med og indholdet af denne øvelse, vi er i gang med.
EU-processen er baseret på klager. Vi griber kun ind, når EU's industri kan tilvejebringe tilstrækkelig dokumentation for, at den er truet af uretfærdig handelspraksis, men vi forsvarer kun den europæiske produktion imod uretfærdig handelspraksis, og vi er lovgivningsmæssigt forpligtet til at sikre, at alle handelspolitiske beskyttelsesforanstaltninger er fuldt ud forenelige med EU's økonomiske interesser i bred forstand. Vi er forsigtige, og vi er tilbageholdende, men vi er frem for alt objektive og lidenskabsløse. En række af spørgsmålene vedrører direkte, hvordan vi sikrer, at de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesforanstaltninger er effektive og et redskab til fremme af Europas vækst og konkurrenceevne.
Som bekendt er denne revision led i den globale europæiske rammepolitik, som jeg iværksatte sidste år, der udtrykkeligt har til formål at gøre EU's handelspolitik til et redskab for denne vækst- og beskæftigelsesstrategi. Derudover mener jeg, at de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesforanstaltninger kan og bør indgå i vores overordnede strategi, der skal sikre, at de europæiske virksomheder konkurrerer på lige vilkår internationalt. Jeg mener, at de berørte aktører bør redegøre for, hvordan systemet fungerer i så henseende, og det er formålet med denne revision.
Spørgsmålet om foranstaltningernes effektivitet er relevant. Det er altid muligt at revidere de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesforanstaltninger, og foranstaltningerne kan ikke udvides, hvis der ikke foreligger klare indicier for, at de fungerer efter hensigten. Kommissionen gennemfører også interne analyser for at sikre, at den arbejder effektivt. GD Handel har for nylig påbegyndt en analyse af de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesforanstaltningers indvirkning på visse selskaber og sektorer. Troværdige handelspolitiske beskyttelsesforanstaltninger skal være baseret på denne form for analyse.
Der blev stillet et spørgsmål om oplysning af offentligheden og offentliggørelse af resultaterne af høringsproceduren. Som bekendt har Kommissionen meget klare regler om gennemsigtighed i beslutningsprocessen. Nogle af medlemmerne deltog måske i seminaret om grønbogen, der blev afholdt i går i Bruxelles. Dette seminar var åbent for offentligheden og blev transmitteret via webstedet. Med mindre en bidragsyder ønsker at være anonym, offentliggør vi alle reaktioner på grønbogen på GD Handels websted. Hele processen har været fuldstændig åben.
Med hensyn til samarbejde og dialog med Parlamentet har jeg som bekendt altid forelagt alle vigtige handelspolitiske spørgsmål for Parlamentet, og det vil jeg også gøre fremover. Parlamentet spiller en meget vigtig rolle i forbindelse med overvejelserne om de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesforanstaltninger. Parlamentets betænkning vil være af afgørende betydning for den igangværende revision, og jeg vil studere de anførte henstillinger meget nøje.
Jeg takker for Deres opmærksomhed i dag og ser frem til snarlige drøftelser af andre handelspolitiske spørgsmål, som jeg med glæde vil redegøre for her i Parlamentet.
Jeg bliver dog nødt til at sige, at jeg ikke er helt med på et enkelt punkt, nemlig når han spørger, hvorfor vores tjenestegren - GD Handel - anvender nye regler forud for høringens afslutning. Jeg er overhovedet ikke klar over, hvilke situationer eller spørgsmål, han henviser til, og jeg vil meget gerne have det at vide, da jeg ikke er bekendt hermed.
Den 29. maj sidste år meddelte jeg Parlamentet, at det var nødvendigt at revidere vores handelspolitiske beskyttelsesinstrumenter. Det glæder mig at kunne redegøre for udviklingen på dette område her i dag. Vi nærmer os afslutningen af den høring, vi iværksatte i december. Høringen omfattede medlemsstater, virksomheder, ngo'er, enkeltpersoner og naturligvis Parlamentet. Der er ikke på nogen måde sat spørgsmålstegn ved de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesinstrumenters betydning. Disse instrumenter er nødvendige i forbindelse med bekæmpelsen af uretfærdig handel på internationalt niveau, hvor der ikke er internationale regler, der svarer til de konkurrenceregler, vi tager for givet i vores egne nationale økonomier. Jeg mener, at disse instrumenter er bagsiden af en åben økonomi. De garanterer, at andre ikke vil misbruge denne åbenhed gennem uretfærdig handel. Det drøftes i denne grønbog, om vi kan bruge disse handelspolitiske beskyttelsesinstrumenter mere hensigtsmæssigt, om vores redskaber er blevet tilpasset en ændret global økonomi, og om vores regler kunne gøres klarere og mere gennemsigtige.
Jeg mener, at begrundelsen for en sådan øvelse er temmelig åbenlys. Den seneste ændring af de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesinstrumenter går tilbage til 1996, og der er sket store ændringer med hensyn til de europæiske selskabers arbejdsvilkår og de globale forsyningskæders betydning i vores globale økonomi. I dag producerer langt flere europæiske virksomheder varer uden for EU, der herefter importeres til EU. Denne nye udvikling er en udfordring for den traditionelle forståelse af, hvad der ligger i begrebet EU-produktion og EU's økonomiske interesser. Det er vanskeligere at fastlægge de europæiske arbejdstageres interesser, da situationen er meget kompleks. Da de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesforanstaltninger generelt tager udgangspunkt i disse interesser, er der god grund til at se nærmere på, hvordan vi arbejder, og hvordan reglerne fungerer.
Formålet med grønbogen var at iværksætte en høring, og den indeholder således ingen anbefalinger vedrørende reformer, hvilket heller ikke er hensigten. Der rejses en række spørgsmål. Jeg har gentagne gange understreget, at der er tale om en åben proces, og jeg har ingen forudfattede holdninger. Jeg blev spurgt om hensigten bag de seks kategorier af spørgsmål i høringsdokumentet. De er udformet med henblik på at indsætte de forskellige emner i en kontekst. Visse spørgsmål vedrører globaliseringens indvirkning på vores handelspolitiske beskyttelsesinstrumenter. Andre, især spørgsmålene vedrørende gennemsigtighed, blev rejst af aktører og eksperter, som jeg havde uformelle drøftelser med i juli sidst år.
Den eneste hensigt er således ønsket om en intelligent debat og om at genskabe den konsensus og solidaritet, som har dannet grundlag for de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesinstrumenter, og som for nylig er kommet under pres i visse tilfælde. Jeg bakker fuldt ud op om det ærede medlems indledende bemærkning om, at vi er nødt til at erstatte national egoisme med europæisk solidaritet, og det håber jeg at genskabe i løbet af denne revision.
Jeg vil ikke forelægge omfattende forslag her i dag, da det ikke er min rolle på nuværende tidspunkt. I øjeblikket lytter vi. Omfanget af vores forslag til ændringer afhænger af den feedback, vi får. Jeg blev spurgt om sammenhængen mellem denne revision og vores forsøg på at ændre antidumpingreglerne i WTO. Det ærede medlem reflekterede over dette spørgsmål. Det er rent faktisk et vældig godt spørgsmål. Det er afgørende at trænge igennem i WTO-regi for at sikre, at andre lande anvender de samme standarder som os. Det arbejder vi på i øjeblikket, og det vil vi fortsat gøre under forhandlingerne inden for rammerne af Doha-udviklingsdagsordenen.
EU-lovgivningen om de handelspolitiske beskyttelsesinstrumenter er på mange områder mere vidtrækkende end WTO-kravene. De mest åbenlyse eksempler er den obligatoriske regel om mindste told og prøvningen af Fællesskabets interesser, som finder anvendelse i forbindelse med alle undersøgelser. Vi indførte disse regler, fordi systemet således fungerer bedre i forhold til EU's overordnede interesser. Vi vil naturligvis forsøge at få andre lande til at anvende lignende regler, men det er vanskeligt at gennemføre reformer på internationalt niveau, og nogle af vores vigtigste partnere er helt ærligt stædige. Hvorfor skal vi ikke gennemføre yderligere reformer, i det omfang reformerne ikke forværrer vores konkurrencestilling, og i det omfang de er i overensstemmelse med EU's økonomiske interesser?
Dette spørgsmål hænger sammen med spørgsmålet om EU's generelle holdning til antidumping. Fører vi en protektionistisk politik eller en reaktions- og forsvarspolitik? Jeg mener, at formålet med protektionisme er at beskytte en hjemlig industri mod udenlandsk konkurrence, mod retfærdig konkurrence - hård, men ikke desto mindre retfærdig konkurrence. Det er ikke formålet med EU's handelspolitiske beskyttelsesinstrumenter, og det vil jeg naturligvis holde fast ved. Vores handelspolitiske beskyttelsesinstrumenter vil ikke blive omdannet til foranstaltninger, der skal beskytte EU's industri mod retfærdig, lovlig konkurrence. Tilhængere af protektionisme anerkender ikke forskellen mellem hård konkurrence og uretfærdig konkurrence. Det gør vi, og det gør vores system. Det er forskellen mellem beskyttelse og protektionisme."@da2
".
Herr Präsident! Ich denke, ich wurde noch nie in einem Parlament, dessen Vorsitz ich bekleidet habe, um Antworten auf eine einleitende Frage gebeten, mit der ich mehr übereingestimmt habe als mit der Rede, der ich soeben lauschen durfte. Der Abgeordnete hat in seiner Beschreibung meines Erachtens Geist, Zweck und Inhalt unserer Aufgabe in jeder Hinsicht zutreffend und erstklassig erfasst.
Der Gemeinschaftsprozess ist an Beschwerden gebunden. Wir reagieren lediglich, wenn uns aus der Wirtschaft ausreichende Nachweise geliefert werden können, dass eine Gefahr durch unlautere Handelspraktiken besteht, doch wir schützen die europäischen Hersteller ausschließlich vor unlauteren Handelspraktiken, und wir sind gesetzlich dazu verpflichtet sicherzustellen, dass die handelspolitischen Schutzmaßnahmen nicht dem allgemeinen wirtschaftlichen Interesse Europas zuwiderlaufen. Wir gehen umsichtig und vorsichtig, aber vor allem objektiv und unparteiisch vor. Einige Fragen haben sich genau auf diese Erwägung bezogen, nämlich zu gewährleisten, dass die handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumente wirksam sind und der europäischen Agenda für Wachstum und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit dienen.
Wie Sie wissen, fügt sich diese Reform in die europäische Rahmenstrategie ein, die ich im vergangenen Jahr eingeleitet habe und die ausdrücklich dazu bestimmt ist, die EU-Handelspolitik in den Dienst dieser Wachstums- und Beschäftigungsstrategie zu stellen. Darüber hinaus bin ich der Auffassung, dass die handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumente Teil unserer allgemeineren Strategie sein können und sollten, für Unternehmen gleiche Ausgangsbedingungen im internationalen Wettbewerb zu schaffen. Ich denke, die Akteure sollten sich dazu äußern, wie gut das System diesem Ziel gerecht wird, und dies ist der Zweck dieser Reform.
Die Frage nach der Wirksamkeit unserer Maßnahmen ist angebracht. Es besteht immer die Möglichkeit, die handelspolitischen Schutzmaßnahmen zu überarbeiten, und die Maßnahmen können nur dann ausgedehnt werden, wenn der eindeutige Nachweis erbracht wird, dass sie ihre Funktion erfüllen. Zudem führt die Kommission interne Studien durch, um die Wirksamkeit ihrer Arbeit zu gewährleisten. Die GD Handel hat kürzlich eine Untersuchung eingeleitet, um die Folgen handelspolitischer Schutzmaßnahmen für einige Unternehmen und Sektoren zu analysieren. Ein zuverlässiges System handelspolitischer Schutzmaßnahmen muss sich auf eine solche Untersuchung stützen können.
Es wurde die Frage nach der Information der Öffentlichkeit und nach den Ergebnissen des Konsultationsprozesses gestellt. Wie Sie wissen, verfügt die Kommission über eindeutige Vorschriften für die Transparenz der Entscheidungsfindung. Einige von Ihnen haben womöglich gestern in Brüssel an dem Seminar zum Grünbuch teilgenommen. Diese Veranstaltung war öffentlich und wurde auf der Website angekündigt. Sofern ein Teilnehmer nicht wünscht, anonym zu bleiben, werden wir alle Reaktionen auf das Grünbuch auf der Webseite der GD Handel veröffentlichen. Der Prozess ist in jeder Phase völlig transparent verlaufen.
Abschließend noch ein Wort zur Zusammenarbeit und zum Dialog mit dem Parlament: Sie wissen, dass ich mich in allen wichtigen handelspolitischen Fragestellungen immer wieder an Sie gewandt habe, und dies werde ich auch weiterhin tun. Dem Parlament fällt in dieser Reflexionsphase zu den handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumenten eine entscheidende Rolle zu. Ihr Bericht wird im Mittelpunkt des laufenden Reformprozesses stehen, und ich werde die darin enthaltenen Empfehlungen gründlich prüfen.
Ich danke Ihnen dafür, dass ich mich heute erneut zu Wort melden konnte, und ich freue mich auf meinen nächsten Besuch, um alle erdenklichen Fragen der Handelspolitik mit Ihnen zu erörtern, denen ich mich in diesem Hohen Haus stets bereitwillig stelle.
Lediglich in einem Punkt kann ich ihm nicht folgen, und zwar wenn er mich fragt, warum unsere Dienststellen in der GD Handel bereits neue Vorschriften umsetzen, bevor die Reform abgeschlossen ist. Es ist mir ein Rätsel, auf welche Vorfälle oder Fragen er sich damit bezieht, und ich würde mich freuen, wenn er mich darüber in Kenntnis setzen könnte, denn mir ist in dieser Hinsicht nichts bekannt.
Am 29. Mai des vergangenen Jahres habe ich das Europäische Parlament über die Notwendigkeit unterrichtet, unsere handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumente zu überarbeiten. Es freut mich, nun wieder hier zu sein und Sie über den aktuellen Stand dieses Prozesses zu informieren. Die Konsultation, die wir im Dezember eingeleitet haben, steht kurz vor dem Abschluss. Im Rahmen dieser Konsultation wurden die Stellungnahmen von Mitgliedstaaten, Unternehmen, NRO, Einzelpersonen und natürlich dem Europäischen Parlament eingeholt, in keiner Weise jedoch die Bedeutung der handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumente in Frage gestellt. Diese Instrumente sind notwendig, um missbräuchlichen Praktiken in einer Weltwirtschaft entgegenzuwirken, in der es keine internationale Entsprechung zu den Wettbewerbsvorschriften gibt, die wir in unseren eigenen nationalen Wirtschaftssystemen für selbstverständlich erachten. Meines Erachtens bilden diese Schutzinstrumente das notwendige Gegenstück zu einer offenen Wirtschaft und stellen sicher, dass diese Offenheit nicht von anderen durch missbräuchliche Handelspraktiken ausgenutzt wird. Im Grünbuch wird die Frage gestellt, ob wir diese handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumente besser einsetzen könnten, ob wir unsere Instrumente an die Veränderungen im globalen Wirtschaftssystem angepasst haben und ob unsere Vorschriften eindeutiger verfasst und transparenter umgesetzt werden könnten.
Ich denke, die Beweggründe für ein solches Vorgehen liegen auf der Hand. Wir haben unsere handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumente zum letzten Mal im Jahr 1996 überarbeitet, und seitdem hat sich mit Blick auf die Geschäftstätigkeit der Gemeinschaftsunternehmen und die Bedeutung der weltweiten Zulieferketten für unsere Wirtschaft viel geändert. Eine weitaus höhere Zahl von EU-Unternehmen produziert vollständig oder teilweise außerhalb der Union für die Einfuhr in die EU. Diese Veränderungen stellen das gängige Verständnis der EU-Produktion und der wirtschaftlichen Interessen der EU in Frage. Sie erschweren eine Definition der Interessen der europäischen Arbeitnehmer, da die Fälle vielschichtiger geworden sind. Doch gerade weil die handelspolitischen Schutzmaßnahmen auf diesen Interessen beruhen, gibt es gute Gründe, unser Vorgehen und die Funktionsweise dieser Vorschriften zu überprüfen.
Allerdings wurde mit dem Grünbuch eine Konsultation eingeleitet; es enthält keinerlei Reformempfehlungen. Dies ist auch nicht sein Zweck. Es wirft eine Reihe von Fragen auf. Ich habe wiederholt darauf hingewiesen, dass es sich um einen offenen Vorgang handelt und ich keinerlei vorgefasste Meinungen vertrete. Ich wurde gefragt, welche Absichten sich hinter den sechs Fragenkategorien im Konsultationspapier verbergen. Sie wurden lediglich vorgesehen, um die unterschiedlichen Fragestellungen miteinander in Zusammenhang zu bringen. Einige beziehen sich auf die Folgen der Globalisierung für unser System handelspolitischer Schutzmaßnahmen. Andere, insbesondere im Zusammenhang mit der Transparenz, wurden von Akteuren und Fachleuten aufgeworfen, mit denen ich im Juli des vergangenen Jahres informelle Gespräche geführt habe.
Abgesehen von dem Wunsch nach einer intelligenten Debatte und der Wiedererlangung des Konsenses und der Solidarität, auf denen die Schutzinstrumente beruhten und die in einigen aktuellen Fällen unter Druck geraten sind, verbergen sich hier also keinerlei Absichten. Der einleitenden Anmerkung des Abgeordneten, dass wir nationalen Egoismus durch europäische Solidarität ersetzen müssen, schließe ich mich uneingeschränkt an, und diesen Status können wir hoffentlich mit dieser Überarbeitung wieder herstellen.
Ich will Ihnen heute keine grundlegenden Vorschläge unterbreiten, weil dies in diesem Stadium nicht meiner Aufgabe entspricht. Im Moment hören wir noch zu. Wie weit unsere vorgeschlagenen Änderungen gehen, hängt davon ab, was wir hören. Es wurde die Frage gestellt, wie sich diese Überarbeitung mit unseren Bemühungen vereinbaren lässt, die Antidumpingregeln in der WTO zu reformieren. Dies ist in der Tat eine gute Frage, die mein Vorredner noch einmal wiederholt hat. Wir müssen die WTO unbedingt dazu bewegen, dafür Sorge zu tragen, dass unsere Standards auch von anderen eingehalten werden. Darum bemühen wir uns und werden es auch weiterhin in den Verhandlungen über die Entwicklungsagenda von Doha tun.
Allerdings gehen die Gemeinschaftsvorschriften zu den handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumenten bereits in vielerlei Hinsicht über die Erfordernisse im Rahmen der WTO hinaus. Zu den offenkundigsten Beispielen gehören der zwingende Grundsatz des niedrigeren Zolls sowie die Prüfung des Gemeinschaftsinteresses, die wir in allen Untersuchungen durchführen. Wir haben diese Regeln eingeführt, weil damit das System im allgemeinen Interesse der Gemeinschaft besser funktioniert. Natürlich werden wir auch andere dazu drängen, vergleichbare Vorschriften einzuführen, doch eine Reform auf internationaler Ebene ist kein leichtes Unterfangen und einige unserer Schlüsselpartner zeigen sich offen gestanden ausgesprochen unerbittlich. Warum sollten wir eine Reform nicht weiterverfolgen, so lange mit unseren Verbesserungen keine Wettbewerbsnachteile verbunden sind und sie die Wirtschaftsinteressen der Gemeinschaft widerspiegeln?
Dieser Punkt steht in Zusammenhang mit der Frage nach der allgemeinen Haltung der EU zu Antidumpingmaßnahmen. Verhalten wir uns protektionistisch oder verfolgen wir eine „Strategie der Reaktion und des Schutzes“? Meines Erachtens ist Protektionismus die Abschirmung eines einheimischen Wirtschaftszweigs vom ausländischen Wettbewerb, von einem fairen Wettbewerb – der Wettbewerb kann hart, muss jedoch auch fair sein. Dieser Zweck wird mit der Gemeinschaftsstrategie der handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumente nicht verfolgt, und darüber werde ich natürlich auch weiterhin wachen. Wir werden nicht zulassen, dass sich unsere handelspolitischen Schutzinstrumente zu Maßnahmen entwickeln, mit denen die Wirtschaft in der Gemeinschaft vor fairem, lauteren Wettbewerb geschützt wird. Ein Protektionist macht keinen Unterschied zwischen harter Konkurrenz und unlauterem Wettbewerb. Wir schon, und auch unser System sieht diese Unterscheidung vor. Dies ist der Unterschied zwischen Schutz und Protektionismus."@de9
".
Κύριε Πρόεδρε, δεν νομίζω ότι μου ζητήθηκε ποτέ να απαντήσω, σε οποιοδήποτε κοινοβούλιο του οποίου προήδρευσα, σε μια αρχική ερώτηση ή ομιλία με την οποία να συμφωνούσα περισσότερο από ό,τι με την ομιλία την οποία μόλις παρακολούθησα. Όσον αφορά την περιγραφή του πνεύματος, του σκοπού και του πλαισίου αυτού του εγχειρήματος, οφείλω να ομολογήσω ότι θεώρησα ότι ο αξιότιμος βουλευτής περιέγραψε λεπτομερώς και ακριβέστατα όλες τις πτυχές των ενεργειών μας.
Η κοινοτική διαδικασία στηρίζεται στις συγκεκριμένες καταγγελίες. Αναλαμβάνουμε δράση μόνον όταν η κοινοτική βιομηχανία μπορεί να αποδείξει ότι απειλείται από αθέμιτες εμπορικές πρακτικές, όμως υπερασπιζόμαστε την ευρωπαϊκή παραγωγή μόνον απέναντι στο αθέμιτο εμπόριο, ενώ έχουμε νομική υποχρέωση να διασφαλίζουμε ότι κάθε μέτρο εμπορικής άμυνας εξυπηρετεί πραγματικά τα ευρύτερα ευρωπαϊκά οικονομικά συμφέροντα. Είμαστε συνετοί και συγκρατημένοι, αλλά κυρίως αντικειμενικοί και νηφάλιοι. Ορισμένα ερωτήματα άγγιξαν την ουσία ακριβώς του πώς διασφαλίζεται ότι τα μέσα εμπορικής άμυνας είναι αποτελεσματικά και εξυπηρετούν τους στόχους της Ευρώπης για την ανάπτυξη και την ανταγωνιστικότητα.
Όπως γνωρίζετε, αυτή η αναθεώρηση είναι τμήμα της πολιτικής πλαισίου για την παγκόσμια Ευρώπη την οποία ξεκίνησα πέρυσι και η οποία αποσκοπεί ρητώς στο να τεθεί η εμπορική πολιτική της ΕΕ στην υπηρεσία της στρατηγικής για την ανάπτυξη και την απασχόληση. Εκτός αυτού, θεωρώ ότι τα μέσα εμπορικής άμυνας μπορούν και πρέπει να αποτελούν τμήμα της ευρύτερης στρατηγικής μας με σκοπό να διασφαλιστεί ότι οι επιχειρήσεις της ΕΕ ανταγωνίζονται υπό ίσους όρους σε διεθνές επίπεδο. Νομίζω ότι είναι τώρα καιρός να κρίνουν οι ενδιαφερόμενοι πόσο καλά λειτουργεί το σύστημα για την επιδίωξη των στόχων που προανέφερα, και αυτός είναι και ο σκοπός αυτής της αναθεώρησης.
Το ερώτημα σχετικά με την αποτελεσματικότητα των μέτρων μας ήταν εύστοχο. Η δυνατότητα αναθεώρησης των μέτρων εμπορικής άμυνας υφίσταται ανά πάσα στιγμή και τα μέτρα δεν μπορούν να επεκταθούν χωρίς σαφείς αποδείξεις ότι λειτουργούν σύμφωνα με τις προβλέψεις. Η Επιτροπή πραγματοποιεί επίσης εσωτερικές αναλύσεις για να διερευνήσει την αποτελεσματικότητα των προσπαθειών της. Η Γενική Διεύθυνση Εμπορίου ξεκίνησε πρόσφατα την ανάλυση του αντικτύπου αυτών των μέτρων εμπορικής άμυνας σε ορισμένες εταιρείες και τομείς. Ένα αξιόπιστο σύστημα μέσων εμπορικής άμυνας πρέπει να στηρίζεται σε τέτοιου τύπου αναλύσεις.
Τέθηκε ένα ερώτημα σχετικά με την ενημέρωση του κοινού και τα αποτελέσματα της διαδικασίας διαβούλευσης. Όπως γνωρίζετε, η Επιτροπή εφαρμόζει πολύ σαφείς κανόνες ως προς τη διαφάνεια των διαδικασιών με τις οποίες λαμβάνει τις αποφάσεις τις. Ορισμένοι βουλευτές ίσως να παρακολούθησαν το σεμινάριο σχετικά με την Πράσινη Βίβλο που διοργανώθηκε μόλις εχθές στις Βρυξέλλες. Αυτή η εκδήλωση ήταν ανοικτή για το κοινό και μεταδόθηκε μέσω της ιστοσελίδας μας. Εκτός από περιπτώσεις στις οποίες κάποιος από τους μετέχοντες ζητεί να διαφυλαχθεί η ανωνυμία του, δημοσιεύουμε όλες τις απαντήσεις στην Πράσινη Βίβλο στον δικτυακό τόπο της Γενικής Διεύθυνσης Εμπορίου. Η όλη διαδικασία υπήρξε απολύτως διαφανής.
Τέλος, όσον αφορά τη συνεργασία και τον διάλογο με το Κοινοβούλιο: γνωρίζετε ότι έχω παρουσιαστεί επανειλημμένα ενώπιόν σας για όλα τα σημαντικά θέματα εμπορικής πολιτικής, και θα συνεχίσω να το πράττω. Το Κοινοβούλιο μπορεί να διαδραματίσει πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο στη διαδικασία εξέτασης των μέσων εμπορικής άμυνας. Η έκθεσή σας θα έχει κεντρική σημασία στη διαδικασία αναθεώρησης που βρίσκεται σε εξέλιξη και θα μελετήσω πολύ προσεκτικά τις συστάσεις που θα περιλαμβάνει.
Σας ευχαριστώ που με ακούσατε ξανά σήμερα και ανυπομονώ να επιστρέψω εδώ σύντομα για να συζητήσουμε το σύνολο των θεμάτων εμπορικής πολιτικής, για τα οποία παραμένω ευχαρίστως υπόλογος σε αυτό το Σώμα.
Το μόνο σημείο στο οποίο οφείλω να εκφράσω τη διαφωνία μου είναι η ερώτηση σχετικά με τους λόγους για τους οποίους οι υπηρεσίες μας –η Γενική Διεύθυνση Εμπορίου– εφαρμόζουν νέους κανόνες πριν από την ολοκλήρωση της αναθεώρησης. Δεν έχω την παραμικρή ιδέα σε ποιες ακριβώς περιπτώσεις ή θέματα αναφέρεται, και τον παρακαλώ να μου τα επισημάνει, διότι εγώ δεν γνωρίζω καμία τέτοια περίπτωση.
Στις 29 Μαΐου του περασμένου έτους, ενημέρωσα το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο για την ανάγκη αναθεώρησης των μέσων εμπορικής άμυνας της ΕΕ. Με μεγάλη ευχαρίστηση επιστρέφω στο Σώμα για να σας ενημερώσω σχετικά με την πρόοδο σε αυτόν τον τομέα. Πλησιάζουμε τώρα την ολοκλήρωση της διαδικασίας διαβούλευσης που ξεκινήσαμε τον Δεκέμβριο. Στην εν λόγω διαβούλευση ζητήθηκαν οι απόψεις κρατών μελών, επιχειρήσεων, μη κυβερνητικών οργανώσεων, ατόμων και, βεβαίως, του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου. Αυτό που σε καμία περίπτωση δεν επιδιώχθηκε είναι η αμφισβήτηση της σημασίας των μέσων εμπορικής άμυνας. Τα μέσα εμπορικής άμυνας είναι αναγκαία για την καταπολέμηση του αθέμιτου εμπορίου σε μια διεθνή οικονομία στην οποία δεν υφίσταται διεθνές αντίστοιχο των κανόνων ανταγωνισμού τους οποίους θεωρούμε δεδομένους στις εσωτερικές μας οικονομίες. Τα μέσα εμπορικής άμυνας είναι, κατά τη γνώμη μου, η άλλη πλευρά μιας ανοικτής οικονομίας. Είναι η εγγύηση ότι οι άλλοι δεν θα καταχραστούν αυτό το άνοιγμα εφαρμόζοντας αθέμιτες εμπορικές πρακτικές. Στην Πράσινη Βίβλο τίθεται το ερώτημα αν μπορούμε να χρησιμοποιήσουμε καλύτερα τα μέσα εμπορικής άμυνας, αν τα μέσα που διαθέτουμε έχουν προσαρμοστεί στη μεταβαλλόμενη παγκόσμια οικονομία και κατά πόσον οι κανόνες μας πρέπει να είναι σαφέστεροι και να λειτουργούν με μεγαλύτερη διαφάνεια.
Θεωρώ ότι το σκεπτικό στο οποίο στηρίζεται ένα τέτοιο εγχείρημα είναι προφανές. Η τελευταία αναθεώρηση των μέσων εμπορικής άμυνάς μας διεξήχθη το 1996, οπότε έχουν επέλθει πολλές αλλαγές όσον αφορά τους τρόπους λειτουργίας των επιχειρήσεων της ΕΕ και τον ρόλο των διεθνών αλυσίδων εφοδιασμού στην οικονομία μας. Πολύ περισσότερες επιχειρήσεις της ΕΕ παράγουν πλέον προϊόντα τα οποία παράγονται στο σύνολό τους ή εν μέρει εκτός της ΕΕ και στη συνέχεια εισάγονται στην ΕΕ. Οι αλλαγές αυτές θέτουν υπό αμφισβήτηση τις παραδοσιακές αντιλήψεις σχετικά με την κοινοτική παραγωγή και τα κοινοτικά οικονομικά συμφέροντα. Δυσχεραίνουν περισσότερο τη διατύπωση ενός ορισμού των συμφερόντων των ευρωπαίων εργαζομένων, καθώς οι καταστάσεις είναι πιο σύνθετες. Δεδομένου ότι τα συμφέροντα αυτά είναι εν γένει τα συμφέροντα στα οποία θεμελιώνεται η εμπορική άμυνα, είναι εύλογο να επιδιώξουμε την αξιολόγηση του τρόπου λειτουργίας μας και του τρόπου εφαρμογής αυτών των κανόνων.
Η Πράσινη Βίβλος, όμως, ξεκίνησε τη διαβούλευση· δεν περιλαμβάνει συστάσεις για μεταρρυθμίσεις και δεν είναι αυτός ο ρόλος της. Προβάλλει μια σειρά ερωτημάτων. Έχω επανειλημμένα υπογραμμίσει ότι η διαδικασία αυτή είναι ανοικτή και δεν έχω έτοιμες απαντήσεις. Μου τέθηκε ένα ερώτημα σχετικά με τις προθέσεις οι οποίες υποκρύπτονται πίσω από τις έξι κατηγορίες θεμάτων στο έγγραφο διαβούλευσης. Σκοπός αυτών των κατηγοριών είναι απλώς η τοποθέτηση των διαφόρων θεμάτων σε συγκεκριμένο πλαίσιο. Ορισμένα συνδέονται με τον αντίκτυπο της παγκοσμιοποίησης στο ευρωπαϊκό σύστημα εμπορικής άμυνας. Άλλα, ιδίως αυτά που αφορούν τη διαφάνεια, εθίγησαν από ενδιαφερόμενους παράγοντες και εμπειρογνώμονες με τους οποίους διεξήγαμε άτυπες συνομιλίες τον περασμένο Ιούλιο.
Δεν υπάρχουν, λοιπόν, άλλες προθέσεις πέρα από την επιθυμία να διεξαχθεί μια λογική συζήτηση και να αποκατασταθούν η συναίνεση και η αλληλεγγύη που αποτέλεσαν τα στηρίγματα των μέσων εμπορικής άμυνας και υπέστησαν πλήγματα σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις προσφάτως. Συμφωνώ πλήρως με την αρχική επισήμανση του αξιότιμου βουλευτή: ο εθνικός εγωισμός πρέπει να παραχωρήσει τη θέση του στην ευρωπαϊκή αλληλεγγύη, και αυτό ελπίζω να μπορέσω να επιτύχω μέσω της διαδικασίας αυτής της αναθεώρησης.
Δεν σας παρουσιάζω σήμερα προτάσεις επί της ουσίας διότι δεν είναι αυτός ο ρόλος μου στο παρόν στάδιο. Τώρα, ακούμε τις απόψεις των άλλων. Το εύρος των όποιων αλλαγών προταθούν θα εξαρτηθεί από τις απόψεις που θα ακούσουμε. Κάποιος έθεσε το ερώτημα πώς συνδέεται αυτή η αναθεώρηση με τις προσπάθειές μας για αναθεώρηση των κανόνων αντιντάμπινγκ στον ΠΟΕ. Ο αξιότιμος βουλευτής επανέλαβε αυτό το ερώτημα, το οποίο είναι πραγματικά πολύ εύλογο. Επιβάλλεται να προωθήσουμε αυτό το θέμα στον ΠΟΕ, προκειμένου να διασφαλίσουμε ότι οι άλλες χώρες θα εφαρμόζουν τα ίδια πρότυπα που εφαρμόζουμε και εμείς. Αυτό επιδιώκουμε και θα συνεχίσουμε να το επιδιώκουμε στις διαπραγματεύσεις για την αναπτυξιακή ατζέντα της Ντόχα.
Όμως, η κοινοτική νομοθεσία σχετικά με τα μέσα εμπορικής άμυνας υπερβαίνει ήδη τις απαιτήσεις του ΠΟΕ με πολλούς τρόπους. Τα προφανέστερα παραδείγματα είναι ο υποχρεωτικός κανόνας του ήσσονος δασμού και η εξέταση του κοινοτικού συμφέροντος την οποία εφαρμόζουμε σε όλες τις έρευνες. Αυτούς τους κανόνες τους θεσπίσαμε επειδή συμβάλλουν στην καλύτερη λειτουργία του συστήματος για την εξυπηρέτηση του ευρύτερου συμφέροντος της ΕΕ. Βεβαίως, θα πιέσουμε και άλλους παράγοντες να υιοθετήσουν παρόμοιους κανόνες, όμως η μεταρρύθμιση στο διεθνές επίπεδο είναι δύσκολη και ορισμένοι από τους βασικούς εταίρους μας, για να είμαστε ειλικρινείς, είναι ισχυρογνώμονες. Στον βαθμό που οι ρυθμίσεις μας δεν δημιουργούν ανταγωνιστικό μειονέκτημα για εμάς, στον βαθμό που ανταποκρίνονται στα οικονομικά συμφέροντα της ΕΕ, γιατί να μην επιδιώξουμε την περαιτέρω μεταρρύθμισή τους;
Αυτή η επισήμανση σχετίζεται με το ζήτημα της γενικότερης στάσης της ΕΕ κατά του ντάμπινγκ. Εφαρμόζουμε πρακτικές προστατευτισμού ή μήπως ακολουθούμε μια προσέγγιση του τύπου «αντίδραση και άμυνα»; Κατά τη γνώμη μου, προστατευτισμός είναι η προάσπιση μιας εγχώριας βιομηχανίας από τον εξωτερικό ανταγωνισμό, από τον θεμιτό ανταγωνισμό – τον σκληρό μεν, αλλά θεμιτό ανταγωνισμό. Δεν είναι αυτός ο σκοπός της πολιτικής της ΕΕ ως προς τη χρήση των μέσων εμπορικής άμυνας και θα παραμείνω, φυσικά, σε εγρήγορση επ’ αυτού. Δεν θα επιτρέψουμε τη μετατροπή των ευρωπαϊκών μέσων εμπορικής άμυνας σε μέτρα προστασίας της βιομηχανίας της ΕΕ από τον θεμιτό, νόμιμο ανταγωνισμό. Οι υποστηρικτές του προστατευτισμού δεν αναγνωρίζουν τη διαφορά μεταξύ του σκληρού ανταγωνισμού και του αθέμιτου ανταγωνισμού. Εμείς την αναγνωρίζουμε. Το σύστημά μας την αναγνωρίζει. Αυτή είναι η διαφορά μεταξύ της προστασίας και του προστατευτισμού."@el10
".
Señor Presidente, creo que en ningún Parlamento del que yo haya sido Presidente en ejercicio se me ha pedido que responda a una pregunta o intervención inicial con la que yo haya estado más de acuerdo que con la que acabo de escuchar. Desde el punto de vista de su descripción del espíritu, el objeto y el contexto de este ejercicio, debo decir que he pensado que su Señoría ha captado en todos los aspectos de la forma más precisa y correcta lo que estamos haciendo.
El proceso de la UE viene impulsado por las reclamaciones. Solamente actuamos cuando una industria de la UE puede proporcionar pruebas suficientes de que está amenazada por la competencia desleal, pero nosotros solamente defendemos la producción europea frente al comercio desleal y la ley nos obliga a garantizar que toda medida de defensa comercial redunde realmente en el interés económico europeo más amplio. Somos prudentes y comedidos, pero sobre todo somos objetivos y desapasionados. Varias preguntas se han referido precisamente a esta cuestión de garantizar que los instrumentos de defensa comercial sean efectivos y estén al servicio de los planes de competitividad y crecimiento de Europa.
Como saben, esta revisión forma parte de la política marco europea global que lancé el pasado año y que está explícitamente destinada a poner la política comercial comunitaria al servicio de su crecimiento y su estrategia de empleo. Dicho esto, creo que los instrumentos de defensa comercial pueden y deberían formar parte de nuestra estrategia más amplia para garantizar que las empresas de la UE compitan en igualdad de condiciones a escala internacional. Creo que depende de las partes interesadas sugerir lo bien que funciona el sistema en este sentido, y ese es el objeto de la revisión.
La pregunta sobre la efectividad de nuestras medidas es buena. Siempre existe la posibilidad de revisar las medidas de defensa comercial y las medidas no pueden ampliarse sin una prueba clara de que funcionan tal como se pretendía. La Comisión también realiza análisis internos para garantizar la efectividad de su trabajo. La DG de Comercio ha comenzado a analizar recientemente el impacto de las medidas de defensa comercial en determinadas empresas y sectores. Un sistema de instrumentos de defensa comercial creíble debe basarse en esta clase de análisis.
Se ha planteado una pregunta sobre información pública y sobre los resultados de los procesos de consulta. Como saben, la Comisión tiene normas muy claras sobre la transparencia de la toma de decisiones. Puede que algunos de ustedes hayan asistido al seminario sobre el Libro Verde celebrado ayer en Bruselas. Este acto estaba abierto al público y se transmitió a través de la página web. Salvo que el autor solicite el anonimato, publicamos todas las respuestas al Libro Verde en el sitio web de la DG de Comercio. Todo el proceso ha sido plenamente transparente.
Por último, respecto a la cooperación y el diálogo con el Parlamento: sus Señorías saben que he comparecido regularmente ante ustedes para hablar de todas las cuestiones de política comercial importantes, y seguiré haciéndolo. El Parlamento desempeña un papel muy importante en el proceso de reflexión sobre los instrumentos de defensa comercial. Su informe será fundamental para el proceso de revisión en curso, y estudiaré sus recomendaciones con mucho detenimiento.
Quisiera darles las gracias una vez más por escucharme y ansío volver pronto para debatir todas y cada una de las cuestiones de política comercial, sobre las que me complace responder ante esta Asamblea.
La única fase en la que debo decir que difiero es en la que me pregunta por qué nuestros servicios –la Dirección General de Comercio– están aplicando nuevas normas antes de que concluya la revisión. No tengo ni idea de los casos o cuestiones a que se refiere, por lo que me complacería escucharle, ya que no tengo conocimiento de ninguno.
El 29 de mayo del año pasado informé al Parlamento Europeo de la necesidad de revisar nuestros instrumentos de defensa comercial. Me complace estar de nuevo aquí para mantenerles al tanto sobre este proceso. Actualmente estamos llegando al final de la consulta que iniciamos en diciembre. En dicha consulta se solicitó la opinión de los Estados miembros, empresas, ONG, particulares y, por supuesto, el Parlamento Europeo. Lo que no se hizo en modo alguno fue cuestionar la importancia de los instrumentos de defensa comercial. Estos instrumentos son necesarios para combatir el comercio desleal en una economía internacional que no tiene un equivalente internacional a las reglas de la competencia que damos por descontadas en nuestras economías nacionales. Desde mi punto de vista, los instrumentos de defensa comercial son la otra cara de una economía abierta. Es la garantía de que otros no abusarán de esa apertura mediante un comercio desleal. El Libro Verde plantea si podríamos emplear mejor los instrumentos de defensa comercial, si nuestras herramientas se han adaptado a una economía global en proceso de cambio y si nuestras normas podrían ser más claras y funcionar de forma más transparente.
Creo que la justificación de un ejercicio de este tipo es muy evidente. La última revisión de nuestros instrumentos de defensa comercial se hizo en 1996 y desde entonces muchos aspectos han cambiado en el modo en que operan las empresas de la UE y con respecto al papel de las cadenas de suministro global en nuestra economía. Muchas más empresas de la UE producen actualmente bienes total o parcialmente fuera de la UE para importarlos a esta. Estos cambios cuestionan la idea tradicional de lo que constituye la producción de la UE y los intereses económicos de esta. Dificultan la definición de los intereses de los trabajadores europeos, ya que los casos son más complejos. Debido a que estos intereses son en general donde arraiga la defensa comercial, es un buen motivo para evaluar el modo en que trabajamos y la forma en que funcionan estas normas.
Pero el Libro Verde ha lanzado una consulta; no contiene recomendaciones de reforma ni pretende tenerlas. Plantea una serie de preguntas. He destacado en numerosas ocasiones que se trata de un proceso abierto y que no tengo ideas preconcebidas. En una de las preguntas se me consultaba sobre las intenciones subyacentes a las seis categorías de preguntas del documento de consulta. Simplemente están diseñadas para situar los distintos aspectos en su contexto. Algunas están relacionadas con el efecto de la globalización en nuestro sistema de defensa comercial. Otras, específicamente las relacionadas con la transparencia, las plantearon partes interesadas y expertos con los que tuve discusiones informales en julio del pasado año.
Así que no existen intenciones más allá del deseo de un debate inteligente y de reconstruir el consenso y la solidaridad que han respaldado los instrumentos de defensa comercial y han sido cuestionados en algunos casos recientes. Suscribo plenamente la observación inicial de su Señoría: tenemos que sustituir el egoísmo nacional por la solidaridad europea, y esto es lo que espero reconstruir con el proceso de esta revisión.
Hoy no me presento ante ustedes con propuestas sustanciales, ya que esa no es mi labor en esta fase. Actualmente estamos escuchando. El alcance de todo cambio propuesto dependerá de lo que oigamos. Alguien me preguntó cómo encaja esta revisión con nuestros esfuerzos por reformar las normas antidumping en la OMC. Su Señoría ha reflexionado sobre esta cuestión. Realmente se trata de una buena pregunta. Es esencial convencer a la OMC para garantizar que otros cumplan el tipo de normas que nosotros mismos nos aplicamos. Estamos haciendo eso y seguiremos haciéndolo en las negociaciones de la Agenda de Desarrollo de Doha.
Pero la legislación de la UE sobre instrumentos de defensa comercial va más allá de los requisitos de la OMC en numerosos aspectos. Los ejemplos más claros son la norma obligatoria del derecho inferior y la prueba de interés comunitario que aplicamos en todas las investigaciones. Se trata de normas que introdujimos porque hacen que el sistema funcione mejor en interés de la UE en sentido amplio. Por supuesto que presionaremos a otros para que adopten normas similares, pero la reforma a escala internacional es difícil y algunos de nuestros socios principales son francamente obstinados. Siempre y cuando nuestros refinamientos no nos coloquen en una desventaja competitiva y reflejen los intereses económicos de la UE, ¿por qué no deberíamos seguir impulsando la reforma?
Este punto tiene que ver con la pregunta sobre la postura general de la UE respecto al antidumping. ¿Somos proteccionistas o seguimos un planteamiento de «respuesta y defensa»? Desde mi punto de vista, el proteccionismo es la defensa de una industria nacional frente a la competencia extranjera, a la competencia justa; dura pero justa. Esta no es la intención de la política de la UE en materia de instrumentos de defensa comercial y yo, por supuesto, seguiré alerta a este respecto. No veremos cómo nuestros instrumentos de defensa comercial se convierten en medidas para proteger la industria de la UE frente a la competencia justa y legítima. Un proteccionista no reconoce la diferencia entre la competencia dura y la competencia desleal. Nosotros sí y nuestro sistema también. Esa es la diferencia entre protección y proteccionismo."@es21
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@et5
"Arvoisa puhemies, en usko, että minua on pyydetty vastaamaan kertaakaan parlamentissa, jossa olen ollut neuvoston puheenjohtajana, johdantokysymykseen tai puheeseen, josta olisin ollut enemmän samaa mieltä kuin juuri kuulemastani puheesta. Siinä kuvattiin aloitteen henkeä, tarkoitusta ja sisältöä siten, että voin vain todeta, että parlamentin jäsen on mielestäni kaikilta osin erittäin täsmällisesti ja hyvin perillä siitä, mitä oikein aiomme.
EU:n prosessi on valituslähtöinen. Toimimme vasta, kun EU:n yrityksillä on esittää riittävästi näyttöä siitä, että niitä uhkaa epäreilu kilpailu. Puolustamme eurooppalaista tuotantoa vain epäreilua kilpailua vastaan, ja lain mukaan meidän on varmistettava, että käytettävä kaupan suojakeino on todella EU:n taloudellisen edun mukainen laajassa mielessä. Toimimme varovaisesti ja maltillisesti ja ennen kaikkea objektiivisesti ja puolueettomasti. Useissa kysymyksissä on käsitelty juuri sitä, että on varmistettava, että kaupan suojakeino on tehokas ja eduksi Euroopan kasvulle ja kilpailukyvylle.
Kuten tiedätte, tämä tarkastelu on osa viime vuonna käynnistämääni kokonaisvaltaista EU:n puitepolitiikkaa, jonka nimenomaisena tarkoituksena on tehdä EU:n kauppapolitiikasta kasvu- ja työllisyysstrategiaa tukevaa. Tämän ohella olen sitä mieltä, että kaupan suojakeinot voivat olla ja niiden olisi oltava osa laajempaa strategiaa, jolla varmistetaan, että EU:n yritykset voivat kilpailla kansainvälisesti tasavertaisin edellytyksin. Mielestäni on sidosryhmien tehtävä esittää, miten hyvin järjestelmä toimii tältä kannalta, ja tämä onkin tarkastelun tarkoitus.
Kysymys toimenpiteidemme tehokkuudesta on mainio. Kaupan suojatoimenpiteiden tarkastelumahdollisuus on aina olemassa, eikä toimenpiteitä voi jatkaa ilman selvää näyttöä siitä, että ne toimivat tarkoitetulla tavalla. Komissio tekee myös sisäisen analyysin varmistaakseen toimintansa tehokkuuden. Kauppapolitiikan pääosasto aloitti vastikään analyysin kaupan suojatoimenpiteiden vaikutuksesta tiettyihin yrityksiin ja aloihin. Uskottavan kaupan suojakeinojärjestelmän on perustuttava tällaiseen analyysiin.
Julkisesta tiedottamisesta ja kuulemisprosessin tuloksista esitettiin myös kysymys. Kuten tiedätte, komissiolla on hyvin selkeät säännöt päätöksenteon avoimuudesta. Jotkut teistä osallistuivat ehkä vihreästä kirjasta järjestettyyn seminaariin, joka pidettiin eilen Brysselissä. Tilaisuus oli avoin yleisölle, ja se välitettiin verkkosivuilla. Kaikki vihreään kirjaan tulevat vastaukset julkaistaan kauppapolitiikan pääosaston verkkosivuilla, ellei osallistuja vaadi saada pysyä nimettömänä. Koko prosessi on ollut täysin avoin.
Lopuksi totean yhteistyöstä ja vuoropuhelusta parlamentin kanssa, että te tiedätte, että olen tullut tänne monta kertaa puhumaan tärkeistä kauppapolitiikan kysymyksistä ja teen niin myös jatkossa. Parlamentilla on erittäin tärkeä asema kaupan suojakeinojen tarkasteluprosessissa. Mietintöänne tullaan pitämään keskeisenä meneillään olevassa tarkastelussa, ja tutkin siinä esitettävät suositukset hyvin tarkkaan.
Kiitos, että kuuntelitte minua jälleen tänään. Odotan innolla pääseväni tänne taas pian keskustelemaan kaikista kauppapolitiikan kysymyksistä, joista minulla on ilo vastata parlamentille.
Minun on todettava olevani hieman eri mieltä ainoastaan siitä, kun hän kysyy, miksi yksikköni – kauppapolitiikan pääosasto – soveltaa uusia sääntöjä ennen tarkastelun päättymistä. Minulla ei ole aavistustakaan siitä, mitä hän tällä tarkoittaa. Kuulisin tämän mielelläni, sillä en tiedä asiasta mitään.
Ilmoitin Euroopan parlamentille viime vuonna 29. toukokuuta, että kaupan suojakeinoja on tarkasteltava uudelleen. Minulla on ilo palata tänne ja saattaa teidät ajan tasalle prosessin suhteen. Joulukuussa aloitettu kuulemisvaihe on päättymässä. Kuulemisissa pyydettiin mielipiteitä jäsenvaltioilta, yrityksiltä, kansalaisjärjestöiltä, yksittäisiltä henkilöiltä ja tietenkin myös Euroopan parlamentilta. Niissä ei millään tapaa kyseenalaistettu kaupan suojakeinojen merkitystä. Kaupan suojakeinot ovat välttämättömiä, jotta voidaan torjua epäreilua kauppaa kansainvälisessä taloudessa, jossa ei sovelleta kotimaidemme talouksissa itsestään selvinä pidettyjen kilpailusääntöjen kaltaisia sääntöjä. Kaupan suojakeinot ovat mielestäni avoimen talouden nurjapuoli. Niillä taataan, etteivät muut käytä avoimuutta väärin käymällä kauppaa epäreiluin tavoin. Vihreässä kirjassa pohditaan, voitaisiinko kaupan suojakeinoja käyttää paremmin, ovatko välineemme mukautuneet muuttuvaan maailmantalouteen ja voisivatko sääntömme olla selkeämpiä ja voisiko niiden käyttö olla avoimempaa.
Perusteet tälle aloitteelle ovat mielestäni ilmeiset. Kaupan suojakeinoja tarkasteltiin viimeksi vuonna 1996, ja paljon muutoksia on tapahtunut EU:n yritysten toimintatavoissa ja globaalien hankintaketjujen asemassa taloudessamme. Useammat EU:n yrityksistä tuottavat nyt tavaroita kokonaan tai osittain EU:n ulkopuolella EU:hun tuotaviksi. Muutokset haastavat perinteisen näkemyksemme siitä, mikä on EU:n tuotantoa ja mitä ovat EU:n taloudelliset edut. Niiden takia eurooppalaisten työntekijöiden etuja on hankalampi määritellä, sillä tapaukset ovat monimutkaisia. Kaupan suojakeinot perustuvat kaikkiin näihin etuihin, mikä antaa hyvän syyn arvioida tapaamme toimia ja kyseisten sääntöjen käyttöä.
Vihreällä kirjalla käynnistettiin kuitenkin kuuleminen. Siihen ei sisälly uudistuksia koskevia suosituksia, eikä se ole tarkoituskaan. Siinä esitetään joukko kysymyksiä. Olen painottanut toistuvasti, että tämä on avoin prosessi eikä minulla ole ennakkoasenteita. Minulta kysyttiin, mikä tarkoitus oli kysymysten luokittelulla kuuteen ryhmään kuulemisasiakirjassa. Se tehtiin yksinkertaisesti asiayhteyksien selventämiseksi. Osa kysymyksistä liittyy kaupan suojajärjestelmään kohdistuviin globaalistumisen vaikutuksiin. Osan kysymyksistä, etenkin avoimuuteen liittyvät kysymykset, ottivat esille sidosryhmät ja asiantuntijat, joiden kanssa kävin epävirallisia keskusteluja viime vuoden heinäkuussa.
Mitään muita tarkoitusperiä ei siis ole kuin halu käydä intellektuellia keskustelua ja palauttaa ennalleen kaupan suojakeinoja pönkittänyt yksimielisyys ja solidaarisuus, joka on joutunut lujille parissa äskettäisessä tapauksessa. Yhdyn täysin parlamentin jäsenen alkuhuomautukseen: kansallinen itsekkyys on korvattava eurooppalaisella solidaarisuudella. Juuri tämän toivon saavani aikaan tällä tarkasteluprosessilla.
Minulla ei ole esittää teille tänään todellisia ehdotuksia, sillä se ei ole tehtäväni tässä vaiheessa. Juuri nyt me kuuntelemme. Mahdollisten muutosehdotusten laajuus riippuu siitä, mitä saamme kuulla. Joku kysyi, miten tarkastelu sopii pyrkimyksiimme uudistaa polkumyynnin vastaisia sääntöjä WTO:ssa. Parlamentin jäsen toisti tuon kysymyksen. Se on itse asiassa oikein hyvä kysymys. On elintärkeää saada asia läpi WTO:ssa, jotta muutkin noudattavat varmasti samoja normeja, joita EU:ssa sovellamme. Pyrimme tähän jo nyt sekä myös jatkossa Dohan kehitysohjelmaa koskevissa neuvotteluissa.
Kaupan suojakeinoja koskevassa EU:n lainsäädännössä mennään kuitenkin jo nyt monella tapaa WTO:n vaatimuksia pidemmälle. Ilmeisimmät esimerkit ovat pakollinen alhaisemman tullin sääntö ja yhteisön edun tarkastelu, jota sovelletaan kaikissa tutkimuksissa. Säännöt on otettu käyttöön, koska niiden ansiosta järjestelmä toimii paremmin EU:n edun mukaisesti sen laajassa mielessä. Painostamme tietenkin muita ottamaan käyttöön vastaavat säännöt, mutta kansainvälisellä tasolla on vaikeaa tehdä uudistuksia ja osa tärkeimmistä kumppaneistamme on suoraan sanottuna jääräpäisiä. Niinpä niin kauan kuin uudistuksemme eivät aseta meitä kilpailullisesti epäedulliseen asemaan ja vastaavat EU:n taloudellisia etuja, miksemme jatkaisi uudistuksia?
Tämä seikka liittyy kysymykseen EU:n yleisestä kannasta polkumyyntitoimenpiteisiin. Pitäisikö olla protektionisti vai pikemminkin reagoida ja puolustautua? Protektionismi tarkoittaa mielestäni kotimaan yritysten suojaamista ulkomaiselta kilpailulta – reilulta kilpailulta, joka on tietysti kovaa mutta joka tapauksessa reilua. Tämä ei ole EU:n kaupan suojakeinoja koskevan politiikan tarkoitus, ja olen tämän suhteen tietysti valppaana. Kaupan suojakeinoista ei saa tehdä toimenpiteitä, joilla EU:n yrityksiä suojataan reilulta ja lailliselta kilpailulta. Protektionisti ei tunnusta eroa kovan kilpailun ja epäreilun kilpailun välillä. Me tunnustamme. Järjestelmämme tunnustaa. Tämä on ero suojelun ja protektionismin välillä."@fi7
".
Monsieur le Président, je pense que c’est la première fois que l’on me demande de répondre, dans n’importe quel parlement où j’ai été président en exercice, à une question ouverte ou à un discours avec lequel je sois plus en accord que celui que je viens d’écouter. S’agissant de la description de l’esprit, de l’objectif et du contexte de cet exercice, je dois dire que je pense que l’honorable député a parfaitement saisi ce que nous faisons d’une manière extrêmement précise et juste.
Le processus communautaire fonctionne à la plainte. Nous n’agissons que lorsque les industries de l’UE peuvent suffisamment prouver qu’elles sont sous la menace d’un commerce inéquitable, mais nous ne défendons la production européenne que contre le commerce inéquitable, et nous sommes contraints par la loi à garantir que toute mesure de défense commerciale est vraiment dans l’intérêt économique européen élargi. Nous sommes prudents et mesurés, mais, plus que tout, nous sommes objectifs et impartiaux. Certaines questions se sont focalisées sur ce problème qui est de s’assurer que les instruments de défense commerciale soient efficaces et servent la croissance de l’Europe et le programme de compétitivité.
Comme vous le savez, cette révision s’inscrit dans la politique-cadre européenne globale que j’ai lancée l’année passée, qui est explicitement destinée à mettre la politique commerciale de l’UE au service de cette croissance et de la stratégie d’emploi. En plus de cela, je pense que les instruments de défense commerciale peuvent et doivent faire partie de notre stratégie élargie visant à garantir que les sociétés de l’UE peuvent rivaliser équitablement au niveau international. Je pense qu’il revient aux parties prenantes d’indiquer à quel point le système est efficace à cette fin, et c’est l’objectif de cette révision.
La question de l’efficacité de nos mesures est pertinente. La possibilité de révision des mesures de défense commerciale existe toujours et celles-ci ne peuvent être étendues sans une preuve claire qu’elles fonctionnent comme prévu. La Commission entreprend également des analyses internes afin d’assurer l’efficacité de son travail. La DG Commerce a récemment commencé à analyser l’impact des mesures de défense commerciale sur certains secteurs et entreprises. Pour être crédible, un système d’instruments de défense commerciale doit être fondé sur ce type d’analyse.
Une question a été posée à propos de l’information publique et des résultats du processus de consultation. Comme vous le savez, la Commission a des règles très claires sur la transparence du processus décisionnel. Certains d’entre vous ont peut-être assisté au séminaire sur le livre vert qui a eu lieu hier à Bruxelles. Cet évènement était ouvert au public et retransmis sur le site internet. À moins qu’un participant souhaite garder l’anonymat, nous publions toutes les réponses au livre vert sur le site de la DG Commerce. Tout le processus a été parfaitement transparent.
Enfin, en ce qui concerne la coopération et le dialogue avec le Parlement, vous savez que je me suis toujours présenté devant vous pour tous les problèmes de politique commerciale majeurs, et je continuerai à le faire. Le Parlement a un rôle très important à jouer dans le processus de réflexion sur les instruments de défense commerciale. Votre rapport sera essentiel pour le processus de révision en cours, et j’étudierai très attentivement ses recommandations.
Je vous remercie de m’avoir entendu à nouveau aujourd’hui et j’attends avec impatience de revenir bientôt afin de discuter de toute question concernant la politique commerciale, dont je suis ravi d’être responsable devant cette Assemblée.
Le seul point sur lequel, je dois dire, je ne suis pas tout à fait d’accord est quand il me demande pourquoi nos services - la DG Commerce - appliquent de nouvelles règles avant la conclusion de l’examen. Je ne sais pas du tout à quelles occurrences ou questions il fait allusion, et j’aimerais beaucoup les entendre car je n’en ai pas connaissance.
Le 29 mai de l’année dernière, j’ai informé le Parlement européen de la nécessité de revoir nos instruments de défense commerciale. Je suis content de pouvoir revenir ici et de vous mettre au courant de l’avancée de ce processus. Nous arrivons actuellement au terme de la consultation que nous avons lancée en décembre. Cette consultation sollicitait l’opinion des États membres, des entreprises, des ONG, des particuliers et, bien sûr, du Parlement européen. Elle ne remettait aucunement en question l’importance des instruments de défense commerciale. Des instruments de défense commerciale sont nécessaires pour combattre le commerce non équitable dans une économie internationale qui n’a pas d’équivalent international aux règles de concurrence que nous considérons comme acquises dans nos économies nationales. À mes yeux, les instruments de défense commerciale sont l’envers d’une économie ouverte. Ils sont la garantie que les autres n’abuseront pas de cette ouverture en faisant du commerce de façon inéquitable. Le livre vert demande si nous pourrions utiliser de manière plus efficace les instruments de défense commerciale, si nos outils ont été adaptés à une économie mondiale en changement et si nos règles pourraient être plus claires et être utilisées de manière plus transparente.
Je pense que la justification d’un tel exercice est assez évidente. La dernière révision de nos instruments de défense commerciale a eu lieu en 1996, et beaucoup de choses ont changé dans la façon dont les sociétés de l’UE fonctionnent et en ce qui concerne le rôle des chaînes d’approvisionnement mondiales dans notre économie. De nombreuses autres sociétés communautaires produisent désormais entièrement ou en partie à l’extérieur de l’UE des biens destinés à être importés dans l’UE. Ces changements contestent la compréhension traditionnelle de ce qui constitue la production et les intérêts économiques de l’UE. Ils rendent une définition des intérêts des travailleurs européens plus difficile à formuler, étant donné que les cas sont plus complexes. Vu que la défense commerciale a pour origine ces intérêts en général, c’est une bonne raison pour évaluer notre façon de travailler et le fonctionnement de ces règles.
Toutefois, le livre vert a ouvert une consultation; il ne contient aucune recommandation de réforme et n’y est pas destiné. Il a avancé une série de questions. À plusieurs reprises, j’ai souligné qu’il s’agit d’un processus ouvert et que je n’ai pas d’idées préconçues. On m’a posé une question à propos des intentions sous-jacentes aux six catégories de question dans le document de consultation. Elles visent simplement à situer les différentes questions dans un contexte. Certaines sont liées à l’impact de la mondialisation sur notre système de défense commerciale. D’autres, en particulier celles relatives à la transparence, ont été soulevées par des parties prenantes et des experts avec lesquels j’ai eu des discussions informelles en juillet de l’année passée.
Donc, il n’y a aucune intention au-delà de la volonté d’instaurer un débat intelligent et de reconstruire le consensus et la solidarité qui sont à la base des instruments de défense commerciale et qui ont été mis sous pression dans certaines affaires récentes. Je me range entièrement derrière l’observation initiale de l’honorable député: nous devons remplacer l’égoïsme national par une solidarité européenne, et c’est ce que j’espère rebâtir grâce au processus de cette révision.
Je ne me présente pas devant vous aujourd’hui avec des propositions importantes, car ce n’est pas mon rôle à ce stade. Pour l’instant, nous écoutons. La portée de toute proposition de changement dépendra de ce que nous entendons. Quelqu’un a demandé en quoi cette révision s’inscrit dans nos tentatives de réforme des règles antidumping de l’OMC. L’honorable député a reposé cette question. En fait, il s’agit d’une question assez pertinente. Il est vital de réussir à faire pression à travers l’OMC afin de s’assurer que d’autres égalent le type de normes que nous nous appliquons à nous-mêmes. C’est ce que nous faisons et nous continuerons à le faire lors des négociations du PDD.
Toutefois, la législation de l’UE sur les instruments de défense commerciale va déjà au-delà des exigences de l’OMC à bien des égards. Les exemples les plus évidents sont la règle contraignante du droit moindre et le test d’intérêt communautaire que nous appliquons lors de toute enquête. Ce sont des règles que nous avons introduites parce qu’elles permettent au système de mieux fonctionner dans l’intérêt élargi de l’UE. Bien sûr, nous pousserons d’autres à adopter des règles similaires, mais une réforme au niveau international est difficile et certains de nos partenaires clés sont, il faut le dire, entêtés. Tant que nos perfectionnements ne nous handicapent pas au niveau compétitif, tant qu’ils reflètent les intérêts économiques de l’UE, pourquoi ne poursuivrions-nous pas d’autres réformes?
Ce point se rapporte à la question concernant la position générale de l’UE sur l’antidumping. Sommes-nous protectionnistes ou poursuivons-nous une approche de «réponse et défense»? À mes yeux, le protectionnisme est la protection d’une industrie nationale contre la concurrence étrangère, contre la concurrence équitable - une concurrence rude, il est vrai, mais néanmoins équitable. Ce n’est pas l’intention de la politique des instruments de défense commerciale de l’UE, et bien sûr, je resterai vigilent sur ce point. Nous n’allons pas laisser nos instruments de défense commerciale être transformés en mesures visant à protéger l’industrie de l’UE de la concurrence équitable et fondée. Un protectionniste ne voit pas la différence entre la concurrence rude et la concurrence inéquitable. Nous, oui. Notre système fait cette distinction. Il s’agit de la différence entre la protection et le protectionnisme."@fr8
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@hu11
".
Signor Presidente, in tutti i parlamenti di cui sono stato Presidente in carica non mi è mai stato chiesto di rispondere a una domanda o discorso di apertura da me condiviso più dell’intervento che ho appena ascoltato. Nella descrizione dello spirito, dello scopo e del contesto di tale esercizio, devo ammettere che l’onorevole deputato ha colto in ogni aspetto ciò che stiamo facendo, in maniera accurata e precisa.
Il processo comunitario è alimentato dai reclami. Interveniamo solamente quando l’industria comunitaria fornisce prove sufficienti della minaccia di commercio sleale, ma difendiamo la produzione europea soltanto dagli scambi sleali, e la legge ci impone di garantire che tutte le misure di difesa commerciale siano veramente nell’interesse economico europeo generale. Siamo prudenti e moderati e, soprattutto, siamo obiettivi e imparziali. Molte domande sono andate al cuore della questione che consiste nel garantire che i TDI siano efficaci e utili per l’agenda europea della crescita e della competitività.
Come sapete, la revisione fa parte della politica quadro globale dell’Europa da me avviata lo scorso anno, espressamente tesa a mettere la politica commerciale comunitaria al servizio della strategia della crescita e dell’occupazione. Inoltre, ritengo che i TDI possano e debbano essere parte di una strategia più ampia volta a garantire che le società comunitarie competano in condizioni di parità a livello internazionale. Spetta alle parti interessate indicare se il sistema sta funzionando in tal senso, ed è questo lo scopo della revisione.
La domanda sull’efficacia delle nostre misure è pertinente. C’è sempre la possibilità di rivedere le misure di difesa commerciale, e tali provvedimenti non possono essere prorogati senza le prove concrete del loro funzionamento adeguato. La Commissione svolge inoltre analisi interne per assicurare l’efficacia del proprio operato. La DG Commercio ha recentemente iniziato ad analizzare l’impatto delle misure di difesa commerciale su determinate aziende e settori. Un sistema di TDI credibile deve basarsi su analisi del genere.
Mi è stata rivolta una domanda sul fatto di rendere pubbliche le informazioni e sui risultati della consultazione. Come saprete, la Commissione dispone di norme molto chiare sulla trasparenza del processo decisionale. Alcuni di voi avranno presenziato al seminario sul Libro verde svoltosi ieri a Bruxelles, un evento aperto al pubblico e riportato sul sito
. A meno che non venga chiesto l’anonimato, pubblichiamo tutte le risposte al Libro verde sul sito della DG Commercio. L’intero processo si è svolto all’insegna della trasparenza.
Infine, sulla cooperazione e il dialogo con il Parlamento: sapete che mi sono presentato dinanzi alla vostra Assemblea in occasione di tutte le questioni importanti di politica commerciale, e continuerò a farlo. Il Parlamento ha un ruolo molto importante da svolgere nel processo di riflessione sui TDI. La vostra relazione sarà cruciale per il processo di revisione in corso, e studierò con attenzione le raccomandazioni in essa contenute.
Vi ringrazio per aver ascoltato nuovamente le mie parole e spero di poter tornare presto a trattare con voi tutte le eventuali questioni di politica commerciale sulle quali sono lieto di rendere conto alla vostra Assemblea.
L’unico punto sul quale ammetto di essere lievemente in disaccordo è quando egli mi chiede il motivo per cui i nostri servizi – la DG Commercio – stanno applicando le nuove norme prima della conclusione della revisione. Non ho assolutamente idea delle questioni o degli esempi a cui fa riferimento, e mi piacerebbe saperlo visto che non ne ho presente nessuno.
Il 29 maggio dello scorso anno ho informato il Parlamento europeo della necessità di rivedere i nostri strumenti di difesa commerciale. Sono lieto di essere qui e di potervi aggiornare sul processo. Siamo alle battute finali della consultazione avviata in dicembre. Tale consultazione chiedeva l’opinione dei paesi membri, delle imprese, delle ONG, di singoli cittadini e, ovviamente, del Parlamento europeo. La consultazione non ha mai messo in dubbio, neanche lontanamente, l’importanza degli strumenti di difesa commerciale (TDI). I TDI sono necessari per combattere le pratiche commerciali sleali in un’economia internazionale che non dispone di un equivalente internazionale delle norme sulla concorrenza che noi diamo per scontate nelle nostre economie nazionali. I TDI, a mio avviso, sono l’altra faccia di un’economia aperta. Sono la garanzia che gli altri non abuseranno di tale apertura commerciando in maniera iniqua. Il Libro verde ci chiede se sia possibile utilizzare meglio i TDI, se i nostri strumenti si siano adeguati a un’economia globale in via di cambiamento, e se le nostre norme possano essere più chiare e funzionare in maniera più trasparente.
La giustificazione di un esercizio del genere è piuttosto ovvia, secondo me. L’ultima revisione dei nostri strumenti di difesa commerciale risale al 1996, e sono cambiate molte cose nel modo in cui operano le aziende comunitarie e per quanto riguarda il ruolo delle catene di approvvigionamento globali nella nostra economia. Molte più imprese comunitarie ora producono le loro merci interamente o in parte al di fuori dei confini dell’Unione, per poi importarle nell’UE. Tali cambiamenti mettono in discussione l’idea tradizionale di ciò che costituisce la produzione e gli interessi economici comunitari. Rendono più difficile una definizione degli interessi dei lavoratori europei, in quanto i casi sono più complessi. Poiché in generale su tali interessi si fonda la difesa commerciale, è un ottimo motivo per valutare come operiamo e come funzionano tali norme.
Il Libro verde ha tuttavia avviato una consultazione; non contiene raccomandazioni di riforme né è questo il suo scopo. Solleva una serie di interrogativi. Ho sottolineato ripetutamente che si tratta di un processo aperto e che non ho idee preconcette. Mi è stato chiesto di chiarire le intenzioni che si celano dietro le sei categorie di questioni di cui si occupa il documento di consultazione. Servono semplicemente a inserire in un contesto le diverse questioni. Alcune sono correlate all’impatto della globalizzazione sul nostro sistema di difesa commerciale. Altre, soprattutto quelle relative alla trasparenza, sono state sollevate dalle parti interessate e dagli esperti con i quali ho avuto colloqui informali nel luglio dello scorso anno.
Non vi sono pertanto ulteriori motivazioni a parte il desiderio di intraprendere un dibattito intelligente e di ricostruire il consenso e la solidarietà che hanno sempre sostenuto i TDI e che recentemente sono stati messi a dura prova. Condivido appieno l’osservazione iniziale dell’onorevole deputato: dobbiamo sostituire l’egoismo nazionale con la solidarietà europea, ed è quello che spero di conseguire con il processo della revisione.
Non mi presento oggi da voi con proposte sostanziali, perché non è mio compito nello stato attuale delle cose. In questo momento siamo in fase di ascolto. La portata di ogni cambiamento proposto dipenderà da quello che ci verrà detto. Qualcuno ha chiesto in che modo la revisione in questione si inserisca nei nostri tentativi di riformare le norme
nell’OMC. L’onorevole deputato ha ribadito tale domanda, che effettivamente è molto pertinente. E’ essenziale servirsi dell’OMC per assicurarci che gli altri siano conformi al tipo di
che noi applichiamo a noi stessi. Nei negoziati DDA lo stiamo già facendo e continueremo a farlo.
Tuttavia, la legislazione comunitaria sui TDI si spinge oltre i requisiti dell’OMC sotto molti punti di vista. Gli esempi più ovvi sono la norma del dazio inferiore obbligatorio e il
sull’interesse comunitario, da noi applicati in tutti gli studi. Si tratta di norme da noi introdotte per far funzionare meglio il sistema nell’interesse comunitario più ampio. Ovviamente ci adopereremo per indurre altri ad adottare norme simili, ma la riforma a livello internazionale è difficile e alcuni nostri
chiave sono francamente molto ostinati. Finché le nostre modifiche non ci porranno in una posizione di svantaggio competitivo e finché rifletteranno gli interessi economici comunitari, perché non dovremmo portare avanti le riforme?
Quest’ultimo punto si riferisce alla domanda sulla posizione generale dell’UE circa l’
. Siamo protezionisti o seguiamo una politica di “risposta e difesa”? A mio parere, il protezionismo è una difesa dell’industria nazionale dalla concorrenza estera, dalla concorrenza leale – una concorrenza spietata, certo, ma cionondimeno equa. Non è questa l’intenzione della politica comunitaria sui TDI e io continuerò a vigilare in tal senso. I nostri strumenti di difesa commerciale non dovranno diventare misure di tutela dell’industria comunitaria dalla concorrenza leale e legittima. Un protezionista non riconosce la differenza tra concorrenza dura e concorrenza sleale. Noi sì, e anche il nostro sistema: è la differenza che intercorre tra protezione e protezionismo."@it12
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@lt14
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@lv13
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@mt15
"Mijnheer de Voorzitter, ik geloof niet dat ik ooit in enig Parlement waar ik fungerend voorzitter was, gevraagd ben om op een openingsvraag of een speech te reageren waarmee ik het zo hartgrondig mee eens ben als de speech die ik zojuist heb gehoord. Wat betreft de beschrijving van de geest, het doel en de context van het Groenboek, moet ik zeggen dat de geachte afgevaardigde onze activiteiten op alle punten zeer accuraat en goed heeft omschreven.
Het communautaire proces functioneert op basis van klachten. Wij kunnen pas handelend optreden indien het bedrijfsleven in de EU ons afdoende bewijzen verschaft dat zij door oneerlijke handelspraktijken worden bedreigd. Wij kunnen de Europese productiesector uitsluitend tegen oneerlijke handelspraktijken beschermen. De wet schrijft ook voor dat alle handelsbeschermende maatregelen daadwerkelijk een breder Europees economisch belang moeten dienen. Wij zijn voorzichtig en terughoudend, maar wij zijn vooral objectief en onpartijdig. Een aantal vragen had betrekking op het feit dat wij ervoor moeten zorgen dat de handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten niet alleen effectief zijn, maar ook het belang van de Europese groei en de mededingingsagenda dienen.
Zoals u weet, maakt deze herziening deel uit van het overkoepelende Europese kaderbeleid dat ik vorig jaar heb geïntroduceerd. Dat kaderbeleid is expliciet bedoeld om het handelsbeleid van de EU in dienst te stellen van deze groei- en werkgelegenheidsstrategie. Daarnaast denk ik dat handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten onderdeel kunnen en moeten uitmaken van onze bredere strategie om te waarborgen dat Europese ondernemingen internationaal op een
kunnen concurreren. Naar mijn idee dienen de betrokken parijen aan te geven hoe goed het systeem op dat punt functioneert. Deze herziening is bedoeld om daar inzicht in te krijgen.
De vraag over de effectiviteit van onze maatregelen is terecht gesteld. De mogelijkheid voor een herziening van handelsbeschermende maatregelen is altijd aanwezig. Wij mogen maatregelen niet uitbreiden als er geen duidelijk bewijs is dat zij ook functioneren zoals oorspronkelijk de bedoeling was. De Commissie voert daarnaast interne analyses uit om de effectiviteit van haar werkzaamheden te waarborgen. Het DG Handel is bovendien onlangs begonnen met een analyse van de impact van handelsbeschermende maatregelen op bepaalde bedrijven en sectoren. Een geloofwaardig stelsel van handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten dient op een dergelijke analyse gebaseerd te zijn.
Er is ook een vraag gesteld over openbare informatie en over de resultaten van het raadplegingsproces. Zoals u weet, hanteert de Commissie bijzonder duidelijke regels met het oog op de transparantie van de besluitvorming. Wellicht dat een aantal van u het seminar over het Groenboek heeft bijgewoond dat gisteren in Brussel heeft plaatsgevonden. Dit seminar was toegankelijk voor het publiek en kon via de website worden gevolgd. Wij publiceren alle reacties op het Groenboek op de website van het DG Handel, tenzij degene die een bijdrage heeft geleverd om anonimiteit heeft verzocht. Het gehele proces is tot nu toe volledig transparant verlopen.
Tot slot de samenwerking en dialoog met het Parlement: u weet dat ik continu hier mijn opwachting heb gemaakt om u op de hoogte te stellen van alle belangrijke kwesties op het gebied van het handelsbeleid en dat zal ik ook blijven doen. Het Parlement speelt een zeer belangrijke rol bij het evaluatieproces rondom de handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten. Uw verslag zal een centrale rol vervullen in het lopende herzieningsproces en ik zal de betreffende aanbevelingen zeer nauwkeurig bestuderen.
Ik dank u wederom voor de spreektijd vandaag en ik kijk ernaar uit om hier binnenkort weer aanwezig te zijn om alle aspecten van het handelsbeleid te bediscussiëren. Ik zal met alle plezier daarover verantwoording aan dit Parlement afleggen.
Het enige aspect waar ik het niet helemaal met hem eens ben, heeft betrekking op de vraag waarom onze diensten – van het DG Handel – al nieuwe regels toepassen voordat deze herziening is afgerond. Ik heb absoluut geen idee aan welke voorbeelden of kwesties hij refereert en ik zou daar graag meer over horen, omdat mij geen enkel voorbeeld bekend is.
Op 29 mei vorig jaar heb ik het Europees Parlement meegedeeld dat het noodzakelijk was om onze handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten te herzien. Ik ben blij dat ik u hier vandaag weer op de hoogte kan brengen van de laatste stand van zaken. Wij naderen thans het einde van de openbare raadpleging die in december in gang is gezet. Via die raadpleging is getracht om inzicht te krijgen in de standpunten van de lidstaten, het bedrijfsleven, NGO’s, individuele burgers en uiteraard het Europees Parlement. Die raadpleging heeft echter nimmer de intentie gehad om het belang van de handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten in twijfel te trekken. Die instrumenten zijn namelijk noodzakelijk om een onrechtvaardige handel tegen te gaan in een internationale economie die geen internationaal equivalent kent van de mededingingsregels die wij op onze eigen thuismarkten zo vanzelfsprekend vinden. Handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten vormen naar mijn idee de keerzijde van een open economie. Het is de waarborg dat andere partijen niet door oneerlijke handel misbruik van die openheid kunnen maken. In het Groenboek worden de volgende vragen opgeworpen: Kunnen wij die instrumenten op een betere manier gebruiken? Zijn onze handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten afgestemd op een veranderende wereldeconomie? Kunnen onze voorschriften duidelijker geformuleerd worden en transparanter functioneren?
Ik denk dat de redenen voor een dergelijke herziening nogal voor de hand liggen. De laatste herziening van onze handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten heeft immers in 1996 plaatsgevonden. Sindsdien is er veel veranderd in de wijze waarop bedrijven in de EU functioneren en in de rol van de mondiale toeleveringsketens in onze economie. Op dit moment produceren veel meer Europese bedrijven goederen geheel of gedeeltelijk buiten de Unie om deze vervolgens weer in de EU in te voeren. Door deze veranderingen wordt de definitie van wat nu precies de EU-productie en de economische belangen van de EU zijn, op de helling gezet. Daardoor wordt het ook moeilijker om de belangen van de Europese werknemers te definiëren, aangezien de potentiële conflictsituaties ingewikkelder van aard zijn geworden. Omdat de bescherming van die belangen in het algemeen juist de aanleiding zijn om onze handel te beschermen, vormt dat een goede aanleiding om te evalueren wat wij nu precies doen en hoe onze regels functioneren.
Met het Groenboek is alleen maar een openbare raadpleging in gang gezet; het bevat geen aanbevelingen voor hervormingen en dat is ook nimmer de bedoeling geweest. In het Groenboek wordt een aantal vragen opgeworpen. Ik heb herhaaldelijk benadrukt dat het om een open proces gaat en dat ik geen vooropgezette ideeën heb. Er is mij gevraagd wat de intentie is achter de zes categorieën vragen in het raadplegingsdocument. Die categorieën zijn alleen maar bedoeld om de verschillende aspecten in een context te plaatsen. Een aantal categorieën houdt verband met de gevolgen van de globalisering voor ons handelsbeschermingsstelsel. Andere categorieën, met name de categorieën die betrekking hebben op transparantie, zijn door belanghebbenden en deskundigen voorgesteld tijdens de informele discussies die ik in juli vorig jaar met hen heb gevoerd.
Er zitten dus geen verborgen intenties achter het streven om een intelligent debat te voeren en om de consensus en solidariteit opnieuw op te bouwen die altijd de basis hebben gevormd van onze handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten, maar die de laatste jaren in sommige gevallen onder druk zijn komen te staan. Ik sluit mij van ganser harte aan bij een van de opmerkingen van de geachte afgevaardigde: wij moeten het nationaal egoïsme vervangen door Europese solidariteit en die solidariteit is precies datgene wat ik door dit herzieningsproces weer opnieuw wil opbouwen.
Ik kom hier vandaag niet met concrete voorstellen, aangezien dat in dit stadium niet mijn taak is. In deze fase is het onze taak om te luisteren. De reikwijdte van alle voorgestelde veranderingen is afhankelijk van wat ons ter ore komt. Iemand vroeg hoe deze herziening past bij onze pogingen om de antidumpingmaatregelen binnen de WTO te hervormen. De geachte afgevaardigde bracht deze vraag eveneens te berde. Eigenlijk is het een heel goede vraag. Het is essentieel dat wij dit in de WTO erdoor drukken om te zorgen dat anderen dezelfde normen als wij gaan hanteren. Daar zijn wij mee bezig en dat zullen wij ook in het kader van de ontwikkelingsagenda van Doha voortzetten.
De communautaire wetgeving inzake de handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten gaat echter al op velerlei wijze verder dan de vereisten van de WTO. Tot de meest duidelijke voorbeelden behoren de zogeheten “lagere invoerrechten”-regel (
) en de communautaire belangentest die wij bij elk onderzoek toepassen. Uiteraard zullen wij bij anderen erop aandringen om soortgelijke regels aan te nemen, maar hervormingen op internationaal niveau zijn moeilijk door te voeren en sommige van onze belangrijkste partners zijn eerlijk gezegd nogal koppig. Zolang onze verbeteringen geen concurrentienadelen met zich meebrengen en zolang zij een weerspiegeling vormen van de economische belangen van de EU zie ik niet in waarom wij geen verdere hervormingen zouden doorvoeren.
Dit punt heeft betrekking op de algemene houding van de EU ten opzichte van antidumping. Zijn wij protectionistisch of hanteren wij een “reactie- en beschermings”-aanpak? Naar mijn mening is protectionisme het afschermen van de eigen binnenlandse industrie voor buitenlandse concurrentie. Het gaat daarbij weliswaar om zware, maar wel om eerlijke concurrentie. Bij het beleid van de EU op het gebied van de handelsbescherming wordt er niet naar protectionisme gestreefd en ik zal er uiteraard nauwlettend op toezien dat dit ook zo blijft. Wij zullen ervoor zorgen dat onze handelsbeschermingsinstrumenten niet gebruikt worden als maatregelen om de industrie in de EU te vrijwaren van eerlijke, legitieme concurrentie. Een protectionist herkent het verschil niet tussen zware concurrentie en oneerlijke concurrentie. Wij wel. Ons stelsel ook. Dat is het verschil tussen bescherming en protectionisme."@nl3
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@pl16
"Senhor Presidente, penso que nunca me foi pedido que respondesse, em qualquer Parlamento em que tenha sido Presidente em exercício, a uma pergunta ou intervenção de abertura com a qual tenha concordado mais do que com o discurso que acabei de ouvir. No que se refere à descrição que faz do espírito, objectivo e contexto deste exercício, devo dizer que considero que o senhor deputado captou bem e com toda a correcção, em todos os aspectos, aquilo que estamos a fazer.
O processo da UE é determinado pela queixa. Só actuamos quando a indústria da UE pode disponibilizar provas de estar ameaçada por comércio desleal, porém, defendemos a produção europeia apenas contra o comércio desleal, e estamos obrigados por lei a assegurar que qualquer medida de defesa comercial seja tomada efectivamente a bem do mais amplo interesse europeu. Somos prudentes e comedidos, mas, acima de tudo, somos objectivos e desapaixonados. Uma série de perguntas prende-se directamente com esta questão de garantir que os IDC sejam eficazes e sirvam a agenda de crescimento e competitividade da Europa.
Como sabem, esta revisão faz parte da política europeia global que lancei no ano passado, que se destina explicitamente a colocar a política comercial da UE ao serviço da sua estratégia de crescimento e de emprego. Para além de afirmar isso, penso que os IDC podem e devem fazer parte da nossa estratégia mais alargada com vista a garantir que as empresas da UE concorram em pé de igualdade a nível internacional. Penso que caberá às partes interessadas dizer se o sistema funciona bem para esse fim, e é esse o objectivo desta revisão.
A questão relativa à eficácia das nossas medidas é muito positiva. Existe sempre a possibilidade de se reverem as medidas de defesa comercial, e estas medidas não podem ser alargadas sem que existam provas claras de que estão a funcionar como previsto. A Comissão também leva a cabo uma análise interna para assegurar a eficácia do seu trabalho. A DG Comércio começou recentemente a analisar o impacto das medidas de defesa comercial em determinadas empresas e sectores. Um sistema IDC credível terá de assentar neste tipo de análise.
Foi formulada uma pergunta sobre a informação ao público e sobre os resultados do processo de consulta. Como sabem, a Comissão dispõe de regras muito claras sobre a transparência do processo decisório. É possível que alguns dos presentes tenham assistido ao seminário sobre o Livro Verde que teve lugar ainda ontem em Bruxelas. Este acontecimento era aberto ao público e foi transmitido no
. A menos que um participante solicite o anonimato, publicamos todas as respostas ao Livro Verde no
da DG Comércio. Todo o processo foi totalmente transparente.
Por último, no que respeita à cooperação e ao diálogo com o Parlamento: como sabem, tenho comparecido perante esta Assembleia a respeito de todas as questões políticas importantes, e assim continuarei a fazer. O Parlamento desempenha um papel muito importante no processo de reflexão sobre os IDC. O vosso relatório será central para o processo de revisão em curso, e estudarei criteriosamente as suas recomendações.
Agradeço por me terem ouvido mais uma vez hoje, e aguado com expectativa poder regressar aqui, em breve, para discutir todo e qualquer assunto ligado à política comercial, relativamente à qual é um prazer prestar contas a esta Assembleia.
A única fase em que, devo dizê-lo, me afasto um pouco do senhor deputado é quando este me pergunta por que razão os nossos serviços – a DG Comércio – aplicam as novas regras antes de estar concluída a consulta. Desconheço em absoluto a que instâncias ou questões se refere, e ficaria grato se me elucidasse, porque eu não tenho esse conhecimento.
Em 29 de Maio do ano passado, informei o Parlamento Europeu da necessidade de revisão dos nossos instrumentos de defesa comercial. É com satisfação que aqui regresso para fazer o ponto da situação sobre este processo. Estamos a chegar ao fim do processo de consulta que lançámos em Dezembro. Nesta consulta solicitou-se a opinião dos Estados-Membros, empresas, ONG, indivíduos e, evidentemente, do Parlamento Europeu. O que não se fez, de forma, alguma, foi questionar a importância dos instrumentos de defesa comercial (IDC). Os IDC são essenciais para combater o comércio ilegal numa economia internacional, na qual não existe um equivalente internacional das regras de concorrência que tomamos por garantidas nas nossas economias domésticas. A meu ver, os IDC, são reverso da moeda de uma economia aberta. É a garantia de que outros não utilizarão indevidamente essa abertura para um comércio desleal. O Livro Verde coloca a questão de saber se podemos utilizar os IDC de forma mais correcta, se os nossos instrumentos se adaptaram a uma economia global em mutação e se as nossas regras poderão ser mais claras e funcionar de forma mais transparente.
Penso que a justificação para este exercício é bastante óbvia. A última análise que fizemos aos nossos instrumentos de defesa comercial foi realizada em 1996, e muito mudou na forma como as empresas da UE operam e no papel das cadeias globais de abastecimento da nossa economia. São hoje mais numerosas as empresas da UE que produzem bens total ou parcialmente fora da UE para posterior importação para a UE. Estas mudanças põem em causa os conceitos tradicionais de produção da UE e de interesses económicos da UE. Tornam mais difícil consagrar os interesses dos trabalhadores, pois os casos tornam-se mais complexos. Visto que esses interesses são, em geral, aqueles em que se enraíza a defesa comercial, essa é uma boa razão para avaliar a forma como trabalhamos e a forma como essas regras funcionam.
Mas o Livro Verde lançou uma consulta; não contém recomendações para reforma, nem é esse o seu objectivo. Apresenta uma série de questões. Salientei reiteradamente que se trata de um processo aberto e que não tenho ideias pré-concebidas. Inquiriram-me sobre as intenções subjacentes às seis categorias de perguntas no documento de consulta. Destinam-se simplesmente a inserir alguns aspectos no seu contexto. Algumas prendem-se com o impacto da globalização no nosso sistema de defesa comercial. Outras, especialmente as relacionadas com a transparência, foram suscitadas pelas partes interessadas e por especialistas como quem mantive discussões informais em Julho do ano passado.
Não há quaisquer intenções por trás do desejo de realização de um debate inteligente e de restauração do consenso e solidariedade que têm caracterizado os IDC, que, nalguns casos recentes, têm estado sob grande pressão. Faço totalmente eco da observação inicial do senhor deputado: é preciso substituir o egoísmo nacional pela solidariedade europeia, e é isso que pretendo reconstruir através deste processo de revisão.
Não venho aqui hoje com propostas substantivas, porque não é esse o meu papel nesta fase. Neste momento, estamos a ouvir. O âmbito de quaisquer propostas dependerá do teor do que ouvirmos. Houve quem me perguntasse como se insere esta revisão nas nossas tentativas de reforma das regras anti
na OMC. O senhor deputado reflectiu essa pergunta. Na verdade, é uma boa questão. É vital que se pressione a OMC, no sentido de assegurar que os outros se conformem com as normas que a nós próprios aplicamos. É isso que estamos a fazer, e que continuaremos a fazer nas negociações ADD.
Mas a legislação da UE em matéria de IDC, em muitos aspectos, já vai mais além do que as normas da OMC. Os exemplos mais óbvios são a regra da obrigatoriedade do direito inferior e da averiguação do interesse comunitário que aplicamos em todas os inquéritos. Trata-se de regras que introduzimos porque tornam o sistema mais eficaz no mais amplo interesse da UE. Evidentemente, pressionaremos outros a adoptar regras semelhantes, porém, uma reforma a nível internacional é difícil, e alguns dos nossos parceiros chave são, francamente, teimosos. Por conseguinte, desde que as nossas melhorias não nos coloquem em posição de desvantagem concorrencial, desde que reflictam os interesses económicos da UE, por que não haveremos nós de prosseguir com as reformas?
Este aspecto relaciona-se com a questão da posição geral da UE em matéria de anti
. Somos proteccionistas, ou seguimos uma abordagem de “resposta e defesa”? A meu ver, o proteccionismo é um escudo que protege a indústria nacional da concorrência externa, da concorrência leal – concorrência forte, sim, mas, ainda assim, leal. Não é essa a intenção da política de IDC da UE, e, evidentemente, permaneço vigilante a esse respeito. Recusamo-nos a ver os nossos instrumentos de defesa comercial transformados em medidas de protecção da indústria europeia contra a concorrência leal e legítima. Um proteccionista não reconhece a diferença entre concorrência forte e concorrência desleal. Nós fazemos essa distinção. O nosso sistema reconhece essa diferença. É essa a diferença entre protecção e proteccionismo."@pt17
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@ro18
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@sk19
"Mr President, I do not think I have ever been asked to reply, in any Parliament in which I have been President-in-Office, to an opening question or a speech with which I have agreed more than the speech I have just listened to. In terms of its description of the spirit, purpose and context of this exercise, I must say I thought the honourable Member captured in every respect what we are doing most accurately and well.
The EU process is complaint driven. We act only when EU industry can provide sufficient evidence that they are threatened by unfair trade, but we defend European production only against unfair trade, and we are bound by law to ensure that any trade defence measure is truly in the wider European economic interest. We are prudent and we are restrained but, above all, we are objective and dispassionate. A number of questions have gone right to this issue of making sure that TDI is effective and serves Europe’s growth and competitiveness agenda.
As you know, this review is part of the global Europe framework policy that I launched last year, which is explicitly intended to put EU trade policy at the service of this growth and job strategy. Beyond saying that, I think TDI can and should be part of our wider strategy for ensuring that EU companies compete on a level playing field internationally. I think it is for stakeholders to suggest how well the system is working to that end, and that is the purpose of the review.
The question about the effectiveness of our measures is a good one. The possibility of review of trade defence measures always exists and measures cannot be extended without clear evidence that they are functioning as intended. The Commission also undertakes internal analysis to ensure the effectiveness of its work. DG Trade has recently started to analyse the impact of trade defence measures on certain companies and sectors. A credible TDI system has to be based on this sort of analysis.
A question was asked about public information and about the results of the consultation process. As you know, the Commission has very clear rules on the transparency of decision-making. Some of you may have attended the seminar on the Green Paper that took place only yesterday in Brussels. This event was open to the public and relayed on the website. Unless a contributor requests anonymity, we are publishing all responses to the Green Paper on the website of DG Trade. The whole process has been totally transparent.
Finally, on cooperation and dialogue with Parliament: you know that I have constantly appeared before you on all important trade policy matters, and I will continue to do so. Parliament has a very important role in the TDI reflection process. Your report will be central to the ongoing review process, and I will study its recommendations very closely.
I thank you for hearing me again today and I look forward to being back here again soon to discuss any and every issue of trade policy, on which I delight in remaining answerable to this House.
The only stage at which, I have to say, I somewhat part company is when he asks me why our services – DG Trade – are applying new rules before the conclusion of the review. I have absolutely no idea what instances or issues he is referring to, and I would be pleased to hear because I do not know of any.
On 29 May last year, I informed the European Parliament of the necessity to review our trade defence instruments. I am pleased to be able to be back here and to update you on this process. We are now coming to the end of the consultation that we launched in December. That consultation solicited opinion from Member States, business, NGOs, individuals and, of course, the European Parliament. What it did not do in any way was question the importance of trade defence instruments. TDI is necessary to combat unfair trade in an international economy that has no international equivalent to the competition rules we take for granted in our own domestic economies. TDI, in my view, is the flip side of an open economy. It is the guarantee that others will not abuse that openness by trading unfairly. The Green Paper asks if we could use TDI better, if our tools have adapted to a changing global economy and whether our rules could be clearer and operate more transparently.
I think the justification for such an exercise is pretty obvious. The last review of our trade defence instruments was in 1996, and a lot has changed in the ways EU companies operate and as regards the role of global supply chains in our economy. Many more EU companies now produce goods wholly or partially outside the EU for import into the EU. These changes challenge traditional understanding of what constitutes EU production and the EU’s economic interests. They make a definition of European workers’ interests harder to write, as cases are more complex. Because these interests overall are those in which trade defence is rooted, that is good reason to assess the way we work and the way those rules operate.
But the Green Paper launched a consultation; it contains no recommendations for reform and is not intended to. It puts forward a set of questions. I have repeatedly emphasised that this is an open process and I have no preconceived ideas. There was a question asked of me about the intentions behind the six categories of question in the consultation paper. They are designed simply to put the various issues in context. Some are linked to the impact of globalisation on our trade defence system. Others, especially those related to transparency, were raised by stakeholders and experts with whom I had informal discussions in July last year.
So there are no intentions beyond the desire for intelligent debate and to rebuild the consensus and solidarity that has underpinned TDI and has come under strain in some recent cases. I fully echo the honourable Member’s initial observation: we need to replace national selfishness with European solidarity, and that is what I hope to rebuild through the process of this review.
I do not come to you today with substantive proposals because that is not my role at this stage. Right now, we are listening. The scope of any proposed changes will depend on what we hear. Somebody asked how this review fits with our attempts to reform anti-dumping rules in the WTO. The honourable Member reflected that question. Actually, it is a rather good question. It is vital to push through the WTO to ensure others match the kind of standards we apply to ourselves. We are doing that and we will keep doing that in the DDA negotiations.
But EU legislation on TDI already goes beyond WTO requirements in many ways. The most obvious examples are the compulsory lesser duty rule and the Community interest test which we apply in all investigations. These are rules we introduced because they make the system work better in the wider EU interest. Of course we will push others to adopt similar rules, but reform at the international level is difficult and some of our key partners are, frankly, stubborn. So long as our refinements do not put us at a competitive disadvantage, so long as they reflect the EU’s economic interests, why should we not pursue further reform?
That point relates to the question about the EU’s general posture on anti-dumping. Are we protectionist or do we follow a ‘response and defence’ approach? In my view, protectionism is the shielding of a domestic industry from foreign competition, from fair competition – tough competition, yes, but fair nonetheless. That is not the intention of EU TDI policy and I will, of course, remain vigilant on that. We are not going to see our trade defence instruments turned into measures to protect EU industry from fair, legitimate competition. A protectionist does not recognise the difference between tough competition and unfair competition. We do. Our system does. That is the difference between protection and protectionism."@sl20
"Herr talman! Jag tror inte att jag i något parlament där jag har varit rådsordförande någonsin har blivit ombedd att svara på en inledande fråga eller ett anförande som jag instämmer mer med än det anförande som jag just har hört. När det gäller beskrivningen av andan, syftet och sammanhanget i den här processen måste jag säga att jag tycker att ledamoten på alla sätt lyckades fånga vad vi gör mest rätt och bra.
EU-processen drivs framåt av klagomål. Vi agerar först när industrin i EU kan tillhandahålla tillräckliga bevis på att de hotas av orättvis handel, men vi försvarar europeisk produktion enbart mot orättvis handel och måste enligt lag se till att alla eventuella handelsskyddsåtgärder verkligen verkar för EU:s större ekonomiska intressen. Vi är försiktiga och vi är behärskade, men framför allt är vi objektiva och opartiska. Ett flertal frågor har precis om den här frågan handlat om att se till att handelsskyddsåtgärderna är effektiva och gagnar EU:s tillväxt- och konkurrensplan.
Som ni vet är den här översynen en del av EU:s globala rampolitik som jag startade förra året och som har som uttalat syfte att göra EU:s handelspolitik till ett redskap för den här tillväxt- och jobbstrategin. Förutom det tycker jag att handelsskyddsåtgärderna kan och bör vara en del av vår bredare strategi för att se till att företag i EU konkurrerar på lika villkor internationellt. Jag tycker att det är intressenternas sak att tala om hur väl systemet fungerar för det syftet, och det är målet med översynen.
Frågan om våra åtgärders effektivitet är bra. Möjligheten till översyn av handelsskyddsåtgärder finns alltid, och åtgärderna kan inte förlängas utan klara bevis på att de fungerar som tänkt. Kommissionen genomför även en intern analys för att garantera effektiviteten i dess arbete. Generaldirektoratet för handel har nyligen börjat analysera vilken inverkan handelsskyddsåtgärderna har på vissa företag och områden. Ett trovärdigt handelsskyddsåtgärdssystem måste grundas på den här sortens analys.
Det ställdes en fråga om information till allmänheten och om resultaten från samrådsprocessen. Som ni vet har kommissionen mycket tydliga regler om insynen i beslutsfattandet. Vissa av er kanske har deltagit vid seminariet om grönboken som ägde rum så sent som i går i Bryssel. Denna tillställning var öppen för allmänheten och sändes på webbplatsen. Om inte en bidragsgivare begär anonymitet publicerar vi alla svar om grönboken på generaldirektoratet för handels webbplats. Hela processen har varit fullständigt öppen.
Slutligen, när det gäller samarbete och dialog med parlamentet vet ni att jag alltid har talat med er om alla viktiga handelspolitiska frågor, och det kommer jag att fortsätta göra. Parlamentet har en mycket viktig roll i diskussionerna om handelsskyddsåtgärderna. Ert betänkande kommer att ha en central plats i den fortgående översynsprocessen, och jag kommer att studera rekommendationerna i det mycket noga.
Tack för att ni har lyssnat på mig igen i dag. Jag ser fram emot att komma tillbaka hit igen snart för att diskutera varenda handelspolitisk fråga. Jag gläder mig åt att även i fortsättningen stå till tjänst och svara på parlamentets frågor på detta område.
Det enda tillfälle då jag måste säga att vi delvis har olika uppfattning är när han frågar mig varför de som sköter våra tjänster, generaldirektoratet för handel, tillämpar nya regler innan översynen har avslutats. Jag har ingen aning överhuvudtaget vilka instanser eller vilka frågor han menar, men jag skulle gärna höra det eftersom jag inte känner till några.
Den 29 maj förra året informerade jag Europaparlamentet om behovet av att se över våra handelsskyddsåtgärder. Det gläder mig att kunna vara tillbaka här och informera er om den här processen. Vi närmar oss nu slutet av samrådsförfarandet som vi inledde i december. Under samrådsförfarandet bad man medlemsstater, frivilligorganisationer, privatpersoner och självklart även Europaparlamentet att bidra med sina åsikter. Vad man inte på något sätt gjorde var att ifrågasätta vikten av handelsskyddsåtgärder. Handelsskyddsåtgärderna är nödvändiga för att bekämpa orättvis handel i en internationell ekonomi som saknar internationell motsvarighet till de konkurrensregler som vi tar för givet i våra egna inhemska ekonomier. Som jag ser det, är handelsskyddsåtgärder den andra sidan av en öppen ekonomi. De garanterar att andra inte missbrukar den öppenheten genom att bedriva orättvis handel. I grönboken ställs frågan om vi skulle kunna använda handelsskyddsåtgärderna bättre, om våra åtgärder har anpassats till en föränderlig global ekonomi och om våra regler skulle kunna vara tydligare och fungera med mer insyn.
Jag tycker att berättigandet för ett sådant tillvägagångssätt är ganska uppenbart. Den senaste översynen av våra handelsskyddsåtgärder gjordes 1996, och mycket har förändrats i sättet på vilket företag i EU verkar och när det gäller rollen för globala leveranskedjor i vår ekonomi. Många fler företag i EU producerar nu varor helt eller delvis utanför EU för import till EU. Dessa förändringar utmanar den traditionella uppfattningen av vad som utgör EU-produktion och EU:s ekonomiska intressen. De gör det svårare att skriva en definition av EU-arbetstagarnas intressen, eftersom fallen är mer invecklade. Eftersom dessa intressen på det stora hela finns där handelsskyddet tillämpas sedan länge är det en bra anledning att bedöma vårt arbetssätt och sättet på vilket de reglerna fungerar.
Men grönboken gav upphov till ett samråd. Den innehåller inga rekommendationer för reformer och det är inte heller meningen. Den förmedlar många frågor. Jag har flera gånger betonat att detta är en öppen process och jag har inga förutfattade idéer. Det ställdes en fråga till mig om avsikterna bakom de sex kategorierna i samrådsdokumentet. De är enbart tänkta att sätta de olika frågorna i sitt sammanhang. Vissa är kopplade till globaliseringens inverkan på vårt handelsskyddssystem. Andra, särskilt de som har med öppenhet att göra, togs upp av intressenter och experter som jag höll informella samtal med i juli förra året.
Det finns alltså inga avsikter mer än en önskan om en intelligent debatt och om att återskapa det samförstånd och den solidaritet som har legat till grund för handelsskyddsåtgärderna och som har satts under press i vissa fall nyligen. Jag instämmer till fullo med ledamotens första iakttagelse: vi måste ersätta nationell själviskhet med europeisk solidaritet, och det är vad jag hoppas kunna återskapa under arbetet med den här översynen.
Jag kommer inte hit till er i dag med konkreta förslag, eftersom det inte är min roll att göra det vid detta stadium. Just nu lyssnar vi. Omfattningen av eventuella föreslagna ändringar kommer att vara beroende av vad vi får höra. Någon frågade hur den här översynen passar in i våra försök att reformera antidumpningsreglerna i WTO. Ledamoten tog upp den frågan. Det är faktiskt en ganska bra fråga. Det är viktigt att vi trycker på WTO för att se till att andra motsvarar den sorts standard som vi tillämpar på oss själva. Vi gör det och vi kommer att fortsätta att göra det under Dohaförhandlingarna.
Men EU:s lagstiftning om handelsskyddsåtgärder går redan längre än vad WTO kräver på många sätt. De mest tydliga exemplen är de obligatoriska reglerna om lägsta tull och gemenskapens intressetest som vi tillämpar vid alla utredningar. Det är regler som vi införde för att de får systemet att fungera bättre i ett vidare EU-sammanhang. Självklart kommer vi att trycka på andra om att anta liknande regler, men reformer på internationell nivå är svåra och vissa av våra viktigaste partners är ärligt talat envisa. Varför skulle vi inte sträva efter ytterligare reformer så länge våra förbättringar inte ställer oss i en sämre konkurrensmässig ställning och så länge de avspeglar EU:s ekonomiska intressen?
Den punkten har koppling till frågan om EU:s generella inställning till antidumpning. Är vi protektionister eller följer vi en ”svars- och försvarstaktik”? Som jag ser det är protektionism att skydda en inhemsk industri från utländsk konkurrens – från rättvis konkurrens. Det må vara hård konkurrens, men den är likväl rättvis. Det är inte tanken med EU:s handelsskyddsåtgärdspolitik och jag kommer självklart att fortsätta att vara vaksam på detta. Vi kommer inte att se våra handelsskyddsåtgärder förvandlas till åtgärder för att skydda industrin i EU:s från en rättvis och berättigad konkurrens. En protektionist ser ingen skillnad på hård konkurrens och orättvis konkurrens. Det gör vi. Det gör vårt system. Det är skillnaden mellan skydd och protektionism."@sv22
|
| lpv:unclassifiedMetadata |
"Member of the Commission"18,5,20,15,1,19,14,16,11,11,13,4
"Peter Mandelson,"18,5,20,15,1,19,14,16,11,13,4
"test"12
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples