Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2006-10-24-Speech-2-289"

Predicate	Value (sorted: none)
lpv:translated text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@et⁵
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@sl¹⁹
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@mt¹⁵
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@cs¹
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@sk¹⁸
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@lt¹⁴
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@pl¹⁶
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@hu¹¹
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	"Hr. formand! Den 5. september 2006 afgav jeg en omfattende redegørelse til Parlamentet om den aktuelle situation for Doha-udviklingsprogrammet. Jeg er ked af at måtte sige, at der ikke er gjort væsentlige fremskridt siden da. Forhandlingerne er fortsat suspenderede. Det er imidlertid vigtigt at bemærke, at alle vigtige aktører under alle drøftelser siden da - f.eks. på G-20-mødet i Rio, som jeg deltog i, eller på Cairns-gruppens møde i Australien, hvor jeg var repræsenteret - har gentaget deres bekendelse til Doha-udviklingsrunden samt deres vilje til at genoptage forhandlingerne, så snart de politiske omstændigheder tillader det. Det vil imidlertid kræve mere end som så at få Doha-udviklingsdagsordenen tilbage på rette spor. Alle parter skal udvise fleksibilitet og realisme og give tilbud, der repræsenterer en reel indsats i alle områder af forhandlingerne. Der er en lille mulighed for at få genoptaget forhandlingerne mellem midtvejsvalgene i USA den 7. november og det tidlige forår 2007, hvor Kongressen i USA indleder arbejdet med en ny landbrugslov. Jeg besøgte Washington sidst i september for at undersøge den amerikanske holdning til Doha-udviklingsdagsordenen, for at komme i dybden med Kongressens politik på området samt for at forklare vores holdning. Jeg mødtes med regeringens politiske beslutningstagere, med en række betydningsfulde lovgivere i Capitol Hill samt med vælgergrupperinger som f.eks. National Farm Bureau og National Association of Manufacturers. Den politiske situation i USA er vanskelig. Jeg blev imidlertid opmuntret af mine kontakter med regeringen, hvor jeg fornemmede en ægte vilje til at afslutte Doha-udviklingsrunden i hr. præsident Bushs embedstid, selv om det vil kræve en betydelig politisk kapital blot at få Kongressens udvidelse af præsidentens handelsfremmebemyndigelse. I de kommende uger må vores strategi derfor være at afklare de politiske betingelser for at forny forhandlingerne og bane vejen for en indsats - i lyset af de manglende nye tilbud. Vi sigter også fortsat efter at bevare udviklingsspørgsmålene i nuværende fase i forbindelse med princippet om samlet tilsagn. Hvis Doha-udviklingsdagsordenen slår fejl, eller hvis afbrydelsen varer for længe, er det min klare overbevisning, at vi løber alvorlige økonomiske og politiske risici. Der er fortsat meget på spil i Doha-udviklingsdagsordenen i form af reducerede landbrugssubsidier, reduceret told for landbrugs- og industriprodukter, forbedrede regler og forbedret udvikling. Derfor er der også meget at tabe, hvis forhandlingerne slår fejl. Vi skal ikke undervurdere de bredere systemiske følger af et fejlslagent multilateralt system i almindelighed. Doha-udviklingsdagsordenen skal derfor forblive vores primære fokusområde, og EU er villigt og rede til at gå tilbage til WTO-forhandlingsbordet, så snart det realistisk set er muligt."@da²
lpv:translated text	". Jag gav parlamentet den 5 september 2006 en fullständig och ingående lägesrapport om utvecklingsagendan från Doha. Därefter har tyvärr inga större framsteg gjorts, och förhandlingarna är fortfarande uppskjutna. Det är emellertid viktigt att komma ihåg att samtliga huvudaktörer i samtalen, såväl under G20-mötet i Rio de Janeiro där jag deltog, som vid mötet med Cairnsgruppen i Australien där jag var företrädd – båda ägde rum i september – därefter har upprepat att engagemanget i rundan står fast, liksom viljan att återuppta förhandlingarna så snart det är politiskt möjligt. Det kommer emellertid att krävas mer än så för att utvecklingsagendan från Doha ska återupptas. Alla sidor måste visa sig flexibla och verklighetsförankrade och komma med konkreta erbjudanden på samtliga områden som berörs av förhandlingarna. Det finns en liten möjlighet att förhandlingarna kan återupptas någon gång mellan kongressvalet i Förenta staterna den 7 november och början av våren 2007, när Förenta staternas kongress inleder arbetet med en ny jordbrukslagstiftning. Jag besökte Washington i slutet av september i syfte att dels pejla Förenta staternas inställning till utvecklingsagendan från Doha, dels sätta mig in i den amerikanska kongressens politik i ämnet och klargöra vår inställning. Jag träffade såväl politiker inom administrationen som ett flertal lagstiftare i nyckelställning i den amerikanska kongressen på Capitol Hill samt intresseorganisationer som National Farm Bureau, den nationella jordbruksbyrån, och National Association of Manufacturers, den nationella producentsammanslutningen. Det politiska läget i Förenta staterna är komplicerat. Jag kände emellertid en viss tillförsikt vid mina kontakter med administrationen, där det enligt min åsikt fanns en uppriktig vilja att avsluta Doha-utvecklingsrundan under president George W. Bushs ämbetsperiod, trots att detta kommer att kräva att en hel del politiskt kapital förbrukas för att över huvud taget få kongressen att förlänga presidentens Trade Promotion Authority, det vill säga tillståndet för honom att självständigt besluta om handelsfrämjande åtgärder. Strategin under de kommande veckorna måste följaktligen, i brist på nya erbjudanden, inriktas på att dels undersöka om det är politiskt möjligt att återuppta samtalen, dels planera nya åtgärder. Vi är dessutom fortfarande fast beslutna att stå fast vid utvecklingsfrågorna, i nuläget inom ramen för den slutliga helhetslösningen. Om utvecklingsagendan från Doha blir ett misslyckande eller om det dröjer alltför länge innan förhandlingarna kan återupptas är jag fast övertygad om att vi löper allvarliga ekonomiska och politiska risker. Det återstår fortfarande mycket att förhandla om i utvecklingsagendan från Doha när det gäller en minskning av stödet till jordbruket, sänkningar av tullavgifterna för jordbruks- och industriprodukter, förbättrade bestämmelser och ökad utveckling, vilket betyder att vi riskerar att förlora en hel del om samtalen blir resultatlösa. Vi bör inte underskatta de omfattande konsekvenser för det multilaterala systemet i stort som ett misslyckande kommer att få. Vår uppmärksamhet bör och kommer därför huvudsakligen att inriktas på utvecklingsagendan från Doha, och EU står berett att återuppta förhandlingarna med Världshandelsorganisationen (WTO) så snart det över huvud taget är möjligt."@sv²¹
lpv:translated text	"Annoin parlamentille 5. syyskuuta 2006 täydellisen ja kattavan lausunnon Dohan kehitysohjelman tilasta. Minun on valitettavasti todettava, ettei sen jälkeen ole saavutettu merkittävää edistystä. Neuvottelut ovat edelleen jäissä. On kuitenkin tärkeää panna merkille, että sen jälkeen niin Riossa järjestetyssä G-20-maiden kokouksessa, jossa olin mukana, kuin Australiassa kokoontuneessa Cairns-ryhmässäkin, jossa olin edustettuna – ja nämä molemmat tilaisuudet järjestettiin syyskuussa – kaikki keskusteluihin osallistuneet avaintoimijat toistivat olevansa sitoutuneita neuvottelukierrokseen ja ilmaisivat halukkuutensa jatkaa neuvotteluja, heti kun poliittiset olosuhteet sen sallivat. Se ei kuitenkaan yksistään riitä Dohan kehitysohjelman saattamiseksi takaisin raiteilleen. Kaikkien osapuolten on osoitettava joustavuutta ja realismia ja esitettävä tarjouksia, jotka merkitsevät todellisia toimia kaikissa neuvottelukysymyksissä. On vielä pieni mahdollisuus, että neuvotteluja jatketaan Yhdysvalloissa 7. marraskuuta järjestettävien virkakauden puolivälin vaalien ja vuoden 2007 alkukevään välisenä aikana, jolloin Yhdysvaltain kongressi alkaa käsitellä maataloutta koskevaa uutta lakiehdotusta. Vierailin Washingtonissa syyskuun lopussa selvittääkseni Yhdysvaltain kantaa Dohan kehitysohjelmaan, tunnustellakseni Yhdysvaltain kongressin lähestymistapaa kysymyksessä ja selventääkseni omaa kantaamme. Tapasin hallinnon poliittisia päättäjiä, Capitol Hillin keskeisiä lainsäätäjiä sekä National Farm Bureau - ja National Association of Manufacturer -etujärjestöjen kaltaisia valitsijayhdistyksiä. Yhdysvaltain poliittinen tilanne on vaikea. Rohkaistuin kuitenkin tavattuani hallinnon edustajia, sillä aistin, että he olivat aidosti halukkaita saattamaan neuvottelukierroksen päätökseen Bushin presidenttikaudella, vaikka se edellyttääkin huomattavan poliittisen pääoman käyttöä, jopa presidentin kauppasopimuksia koskevan neuvotteluvaltuutuksen (Trade Promotion Authority) laajentamista kongressissa. Tulevina viikkoina meidän on siten selvennettävä poliittisia ehtoja neuvottelujen uudistamiseksi ja maaperän valmistelemiseksi tälle liikkeelle – joka kaipaa uusia tarjouksia. Tässä vaiheessa pakettineuvotteluja painopisteemme on edelleen vakaasti kehityskysymyksissä. Jos Dohan kehitysohjelma epäonnistuu tai jos neuvottelut keskeytetään liian pitkäksi aikaa, vakaa arvioni on se, että kohtaamme vakavia taloudellisia ja poliittisia riskejä. Dohan kehitysohjelmalla on paljon tarjottavaa maataloustukien alentamisen, maatalous- ja teollisuustuotteiden tullitariffien alentamisen, parempien sääntöjen ja kehityksen näkökulmasta, ja jos neuvottelut epäonnistuvat, sen myötä hävitään paljon. Meidän ei pitäisi aliarvioida epäonnistumisen laajempia järjestelmällisiä vaikutuksia monenväliseen järjestelmään kokonaisuudessaan. Dohan kehitysohjelman pitäisi siten olla huomiomme keskipiste – ja näin onkin – ja EU on halukas ja valmis palaamaan WTO:n neuvottelupöytään heti, kun se on realistisesti mahdollista."@fi⁷
lpv:translated text	". Στις 5 Σεπτεμβρίου 2006, έκανα πλήρη και εκτενή δήλωση στο Κοινοβούλιο σχετικά με την κατάσταση της Αναπτυξιακής Ατζέντας της Ντόχα. Με λύπη μου λέω ότι από τότε δεν έχει σημειωθεί καμία σημαντική πρόοδος · οι διαπραγματεύσεις εξακολουθούν να τελούν υπό διακοπή. Ωστόσο, είναι σημαντικό να σημειώσουμε ότι από τότε, δηλαδή από τη συνάντηση της ομάδας G-20 στο Ρίο, στην οποία παρέστην, ή τη συνάντηση της Ομάδας Cairns στην Αυστραλία, όπου είχα εκπροσωπηθεί –και οι δύο πραγματοποιήθηκαν τον Σεπτέμβριο– όλοι οι βασικοί παράγοντες των συνομιλιών επανέλαβαν την προσήλωσή τους στον Γύρο και την προθυμία τους για επανάληψη των διαπραγματεύσεων μόλις το επιτρέψουν οι πολιτικές συνθήκες. Ωστόσο, αυτό δεν αρκεί για να ενεργοποιηθεί εκ νέου η Αναπτυξιακή Ατζέντα της Ντόχα. Όλες οι πλευρές θα πρέπει να επιδείξουν ευελιξία και ρεαλισμό και οι προτάσεις τους να συνιστούν πραγματική προσπάθεια σε όλους τους τομείς των διαπραγματεύσεων. Υπάρχει μια μικρή ευκαιρία για επανάληψη των συνομιλιών ανάμεσα στις ενδιάμεσες εκλογές των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών στις 7 Νοεμβρίου και στις αρχές της άνοιξης του 2007, όταν το Κογκρέσο των ΗΠΑ θα ξεκινήσει να επεξεργάζεται έναν νέο αγροτικό νόμο. Επισκέφθηκα την Ουάσιγκτον στα τέλη Σεπτεμβρίου για να βολιδοσκοπήσω τη θέση των ΗΠΑ σχετικά με την Αναπτυξιακή Ατζέντα της Ντόχα, να διερευνήσω τις πολιτικές θέσεις του Κογκρέσου των ΗΠΑ στο θέμα και να εξηγήσω τη θέση μας. Συναντήθηκα με παράγοντες διαμόρφωσης πολιτικής στην Κυβέρνηση, με ορισμένους βασικούς νομοθέτες στο Καπιτώλιο και με φορείς όπως το και η Εθνική Ένωση Κατασκευαστών. Η πολιτική κατάσταση στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες είναι δύσκολη. Ωστόσο, οι επαφές μου με την Κυβέρνηση ήταν ενθαρρυντικές, καθώς αισθάνθηκα μια γνήσια προθυμία για ολοκλήρωση του Γύρου κατά τη θητεία του Προέδρου Μπους, αν και αυτό θα απαιτήσει σημαντικό πολιτικό κεφάλαιο, ακόμα και την παράταση από το Κογκρέσο της εξουσίας του Προέδρου για την προώθηση του εμπορίου. Έτσι, στις επόμενες εβδομάδες η στρατηγική μας πρέπει να είναι η αποσαφήνιση των πολιτικών συνθηκών για την ανανέωση των συνομιλιών και η προετοιμασία του εδάφους για κίνηση – ελλείψει νέων προτάσεων. Η προσοχή μας είναι, επίσης, σταθερά στραμμένη στην προστασία των θεμάτων της ανάπτυξης, στο παρόν στάδιο στο πλαίσιο της ενιαίας δέσμευσης. Αν η Αναπτυξιακή Ατζέντα της Ντόχα αποτύχει ή αν η διακοπή διαιωνιστεί, πιστεύω ακράδαντα ότι εκτιθέμεθα σε σοβαρό οικονομικό και πολιτικό κίνδυνο. Υπάρχουν ακόμα πολλά να προταθούν στην Αναπτυξιακή Ατζέντα της Ντόχα όσον αφορά τη μείωση των αγροτικών επιδοτήσεων, τις μειώσεις δασμών για αγροτικά και βιομηχανικά προϊόντα, τη βελτίωση των κανόνων και την ανάπτυξη· και, συνεπώς, οι απώλειες θα είναι μεγάλες αν αποτύχουν οι συνομιλίες. Δεν θα πρέπει να υποτιμούμε τις ευρύτερες συστημικές συνέπειες της αποτυχίας στο πολυμερές σύστημα γενικά. Η Αναπτυξιακή Ατζέντα της Ντόχα θα πρέπει, συνεπώς, να παραμείνει στο επίκεντρο της προσοχής μας –όπως και θα παραμείνει– και η ΕΕ είναι πρόθυμη και διατεθειμένη να επιστρέψει στο τραπέζι των διαπραγματεύσεων του ΠΟΕ όσο πιο γρήγορα είναι ρεαλιστικά δυνατόν."@el¹⁰
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"National Farm Bureau"^10,12,8
lpv:translated text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@lv¹³
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	"Op 5 september heb ik een volledige en uitgebreide verklaring voor dit Parlement afgelegd over de stand van zaken met betrekking tot de ontwikkelingsagenda van Doha. Helaas kan ik niets anders zeggen dan dat er sindsdien geen grote vooruitgang is geboekt; de onderhandelingen zijn nog steeds opgeschort. Het is wel van belang om hierbij op te merken dat alle belangrijke betrokkenen bij die onderhandelingen sindsdien hebben onderstreept dat zij nog steeds een groot belang hechten aan de Doha-ronde en bereid blijven om de onderhandelingen te hervatten zodra de politieke omstandigheden dat toestaan. Dat heb ik zowel gemerkt tijdens de G-20-bijeenkomst in Rio, die ik persoonlijk heb bijgewoond, als tijdens de bijeenkomst in Australië van de Cairns-groep, waar ik vertegenwoordigd was; beide bijeenkomsten vonden in september plaats. Er is echter meer voor nodig om de ontwikkelingsagenda van Doha weer op de rails te krijgen. Alle partijen zullen zich flexibel en realistisch op moeten stellen en zoveel water bij de wijn moeten doen dat er op alle gebieden van de onderhandelingen echt vooruitgang kan worden geboekt. De deur staat op een kier om de onderhandelingen te kunnen hervatten in de periode tussen de tussentijdse verkiezingen in de Verenigde Staten op 7 november en het vroege voorjaar van 2007, wanneer het Amerikaanse Congres zich gaat buigen over een nieuwe landbouwwet. Ik heb eind september een bezoek aan Washington gebracht om meer inzicht te krijgen in het standpunt van de VS over de ontwikkelingsagenda van Doha, om de uitgangspunten van het Congres over dit onderwerp nader te onderzoeken en om ons eigen standpunt toe te lichten. Ik heb gesproken met beleidsmakers van de regering, met een aantal belangrijke “wetgevers” op Capitol Hill en met organisaties als het National Farm Bureau (het nationale landbouwbureau) en de National Association of Manufacturers (de nationale vereniging van producenten). De politieke situatie in de Verenigde Staten is gecompliceerd. Ik heb echter moed geput uit mijn contacten met de regering omdat ik gemerkt heb dat de bereidwilligheid wel degelijk aanwezig is om de Doha-ronde tijdens de ambtstermijn van president Bush af te ronden. Hiervoor dient dan wel een behoorlijke dosis politiek kapitaal geïnvesteerd te worden, zoals de verlenging door het Congres van de bevoegdheid van de president om de handel te bevorderen (de zogeheten “Trade Promotion Authority”). In de komende weken moet onze strategie dan ook gericht zijn op het in kaart brengen van de politieke voorwaarden voor het hervatten van de onderhandelingen en op de voorbereidingen om – bij gebrek aan nieuwe toezeggingen – toch vooruitgang te boeken. In het kader van het single-undertaking-principe, d.w.z. het principe dat er pas een akkoord is wanneer àlle partijen het over àlle onderwerpen met elkaar eens zijn, moeten wij er ook voor zorgen dat de ontwikkelingskwesties absoluut niet uit het oog verloren worden. Ik ben er vast van overtuigd dat wij, als de ontwikkelingsagenda van Doha mislukt of de opschorting te lang duurt, grote economische en politieke risico’s lopen. Er is veel te winnen bij deze ontwikkelingsagenda, bijvoorbeeld op het vlak van lagere landbouwsubsidies, lagere tarieven voor industriële en landbouwproducten en een betere regelgeving en meer ontwikkelingsmogelijkheden; dat betekent echter ook dat er veel te verliezen is als de onderhandelingen mislukken. Wij mogen de bredere structurele gevolgen van een mislukking voor het multilaterale stelsel in het algemeen niet onderschatten. De ontwikkelingsagenda van Doha moet en zal dan ook ons belangrijkste aandachtspunt blijven. De EU is bereid om, zodra zich een reële mogelijkheid voordoet, terug te keren naar de onderhandelingstafel van de WTO."@nl³
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:spoken text	"On 5 September 2006, I gave a full and comprehensive statement to Parliament on the state of play of the Doha Development Agenda. I am sorry to say that no major progress has been achieved since then; the negotiations remain suspended. However, it is important to note that since then, be it at the G-20 meeting in Rio, which I attended, or the Cairns Group meeting in Australia, where I was represented – both in September – all key players in the talks have reiterated their commitment to the Round and their willingness to resume negotiations as soon as the political circumstances allow. However, it will take more than that to get the DDA back on track. All sides will have to show flexibility and realism and make offers that represent real efforts in all areas of the negotiations. There is a narrow window of opportunity for resuming the talks between the United States mid-term elections on 7 November and early in the spring of 2007, when the US Congress starts working on a new farm bill. I visited Washington at the end of September to explore the US position on the DDA, to probe US congressional politics on the subject and to explain our position. I met with policymakers in the Administration, with a number of key law-makers on the Hill, and with constituencies like the National Farm Bureau and the National Association of Manufacturers. The political situation in the United States is difficult. However, I was encouraged by my contacts with the Administration, where I sensed a genuine willingness to conclude the Round during President Bush’s tenure, although this will require the use of considerable political capital, even to get Congressional extension of the President’s Trade Promotion Authority. So in the coming weeks our strategy must be to clarify the political conditions for renewing the talks and prepare the ground for movement – short of new offers. Our sights also remain firmly set on preserving the development issues, at this stage in the context of the Single Undertaking. If the DDA fails, or if the suspension is extended for too long a period of time, my firm judgement is that we run serious economic and political risks. There remains a lot on offer in the DDA in terms of agricultural subsidy reduction, tariff reductions for agricultural and industrial products, improved rules and development; and hence a great deal to lose if the talks fail. We should not underestimate the broader systemic implications of failure for the multilateral system at large. The DDA should therefore remain our main focus of attention – as it will – and the EU is willing and prepared to go back to the WTO negotiating table as soon as realistically possible."@en⁴
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Member of the Commission"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4}
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Peter Mandelson,"^{5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4}
lpv:translated text	". Am 5. September 2006 habe ich hier im Parlament eine umfassende Erklärung zum aktuellen Stand der Entwicklungsagenda von Doha, der DDA, abgegeben. Bedauerlicherweise sind seitdem keine weiteren wesentlichen Fortschritte zu verzeichnen; die Verhandlungen sind nach wie vor ausgesetzt. Dabei muss jedoch angemerkt werden, dass sich alle Schlüsselteilnehmer der Gespräche, ob beim G-20-Treffen in Rio, an dem ich teilgenommen habe, oder der Tagung der Cairns-Gruppe in Australien, wo ich vertreten war – beide im September –, zum Abschluss der Runde bekannt und bereit erklärt haben, die Verhandlungen wieder aufzunehmen, sobald die politischen Umstände dies zulassen. Das wird allerdings kaum ausreichen, um die DDA wieder in Gang zu bringen. Alle Seiten müssen Flexibilität und Realismus zeigen und Angebote unterbreiten, die von einem echten Bemühen in allen Bereichen der Verhandlungen zeugen. Es besteht ein schmales Zeitfenster für eine mögliche Wiederaufnahme der Gespräche ab den Zwischenwahlen in den USA am 7. November bis zum Frühjahr 2007, wenn der Kongress mit der Arbeit an einem neuen Landwirtschaftsgesetz beginnt. Ich war Ende September in Washington, um den Standpunkt der USA zur DDA zu erkunden, um herauszufinden, welche Politik der Kongress in dieser Sache vertritt, und um unseren Standpunkt zu erläutern. Dabei bin ich mit Entscheidungsträgern der Regierung zusammengetroffen, mit einer Reihe wichtiger Vertreter des Gesetzgebers auf dem Capitol Hill sowie Wählergemeinschaften wie „National Farm Bureau“ und „National Association of Manufacturers“. Die politische Lage in den USA ist schwierig. Meine Kontakte mit der Regierung haben mich ermutigt. Es war eine echte Bereitschaft zu spüren, die Runde noch während der Amtszeit von Präsident Bush abzuschließen, obwohl dazu erhebliche politische Anstrengungen erforderlich sein werden und es möglicherweise sogar einer Ausweitung der Trade Promotion Authority, der Befugnis des Präsidenten zum Abschluss von Handelsabkommen, durch den Kongress bedarf. In den kommenden Wochen muss unsere Strategie also darin bestehen, die politischen Bedingungen für die Wiederaufnahme der Gespräche zu klären und die Voraussetzungen für Bewegung in der Sache zu schaffen – solange keine neuen Angebote vorliegen. Außerdem ist es nach wie vor unser Ziel, an der Entwicklungsproblematik festzuhalten, und zwar zum jetzigen Zeitpunkt im Rahmen der Gesamtverpflichtung. Sollte die Entwicklungsagenda fehlschlagen oder die Aussetzung der Verhandlungen zu lange dauern, dann, das ist meine feste Überzeugung, kann es zu ernsthaften wirtschaftlichen und politischen Gefahren kommen. Die DDA hat in Bezug auf die Senkung von Agrarsubventionen, die Senkung der Zölle auf Agrar- und Industrieerzeugnisse, die Verbesserung der Regeln und Entwicklung noch eine Menge zu bieten, und folglich haben wir viel zu verlieren, wenn die Gespräche scheitern. Wir sollten die weiter reichenden systemischen Implikationen eines Scheiterns für das multilaterale System insgesamt nicht unterschätzen. Die Entwicklungsagenda von Doha sollte und wird daher im Mittelpunkt unserer Aufmerksamkeit stehen, und die EU ist in jeder Beziehung bereit, an den WTO-Verhandlungstisch zurückzukehren, sobald dies realistisch möglich ist."@de⁹
lpv:translated text	"Em 5 de Setembro de 2006, fiz uma declaração completa e exaustiva sobre a situação da Agenda de Doha para o Desenvolvimento. Lamento dizer que não se alcançaram grandes progressos desde então; as negociações continuam suspensas. Contudo, é importante notar que desde então, seja na reunião do G-20 no Rio, em que estive presente, ou na reunião do Grupo Cairns na Austrália, onde estive representado – ambas em Setembro – todos os principais actores nas conversações reiteraram o seu compromisso para com a Ronda e a sua disponibilidade de reiniciar as negociações mal as circunstâncias políticas o permitam. No entanto, será preciso mais do que isso para retomar a ADD. Todas as partes terão de mostrar flexibilidade e sentido de realidade e fazer propostas que representem verdadeiros esforços nas várias áreas de negociação. É estreita a janela de oportunidades que se desenha para reiniciar as conversações entre as eleições intercalares dos Estados Unidos a 7 de Novembro e o início da Primavera de 2007, quando o Congresso norte-americano começa a trabalhar no novo projecto-lei agrícola. Eu visitei Washington no final de Setembro para auscultar a posição dos EUA sobre a ADD, para conhecer as políticas norte-americanas no Congresso sobre a matéria e para explicar a nossa posição. Avistei-me com políticos na Administração, com vários dos principais legisladores no Capitólio, e com entidades como o National Farm Bureau e a National Association of Manufacturers. A situação política nos Estados Unidos é difícil. Contudo, fui encorajado pelos meus contactos com a Administração, onde me apercebi de uma vontade genuína de concluir a Ronda durante o mandato do Presidente Bush, muito embora esta vontade requeira um capital político considerável, mesmo para conseguir a prorrogação no Congresso da Autoridade de Promoção Comercial do Presidente. Assim sendo, nas próximas semanas a nossa estratégia tem de ser clarificar as condições políticas para renovar as conversações e preparar o terreno para prosseguir – com falta de propostas novas. A nossa ideia continua firmemente ancorada na preservação das questões ligadas ao desenvolvimento, nesta fase, no quadro do Compromisso Único. Se a ADD fracassar, ou se a suspensão se prolongar por um período de tempo demasiado longo, a minha firme convicção é de que corremos sérios riscos económicos e políticos. Continua a haver muito para negociar na ADD em termos de redução de subsídios à agricultura, reduções pautais para os produtos agrícolas e fabricados, melhoria de normas e desenvolvimento; e daí, muito a perder se as conversações fracassarem. Não devemos subestimar as grandes implicações sistémicas de um fracasso do sistema multilateral em geral. A ADD deve pois continuar a ser o nosso principal foco de atenção – como continuará – e a UE não só está disposta como quer voltar à mesa das negociações da OMC assim que for realisticamente possível."@pt¹⁷
lpv:translated text	". El 5 de septiembre de 2006 realicé una declaración completa y detallada al Parlamento acerca de la situación de la Agenda de Desarrollo de Doha. Lamento decir que no se han hecho grandes progresos desde entonces; las negociaciones continúan interrumpidas. No obstante, es importante señalar que desde entonces, tanto en la reunión del G-20 de Río, a la que asistí, como en la reunión del Grupo Cairns en Australia, donde estuve representado –ambas en septiembre–, todos los principales participantes de las conversaciones han reiterado su compromiso con la Ronda y su deseo de reanudar las negociaciones tan pronto como las circunstancias políticas lo permitan. No obstante, se tardará más que eso en poner de nuevo en marcha la Agenda del Desarrollo de Doha. Todas las partes tendrán que demostrar flexibilidad y realismo y hacer ofertas que representen esfuerzos reales en todos los ámbitos de las negociaciones. Existe una estrecha ventana de oportunidad de reiniciar las conversaciones entre las elecciones provisionales de los Estados Unidos del 7 de noviembre y comienzos de la primavera de 2007, cuando el Congreso de los Estados Unidos comience a trabajar en un nuevo proyecto de ley agrícola. Estuve en Washington a finales de septiembre para averiguar la postura de los Estados Unidos con respecto a la Agenda de Desarrollo de Doha, para sondear la política del Congreso de los Estados Unidos con respecto al tema y explicar nuestra postura. Me reuní con responsables de la Administración, con algunos importantes legisladores del Capitolio y con organismos como la Oficina Nacional de Agricultores y la Asociación Nacional de Fabricantes. La situación política en los Estados Unidos es difícil. No obstante, me alentaron mis contactos con la Administración, donde noté una verdadera voluntad de concluir la Ronda durante el mandato del Presidente Bush, a pesar de que esto exigirá el uso de bastante capital político, incluso para conseguir la prórroga por el Congreso de la autoridad de promoción del comercio otorgada al Presidente. Por lo tanto, en las próximas semanas, nuestra estrategia deberá consistir en aclarar las condiciones políticas para reanudar las conversaciones y preparar el terreno para el cambio, a falta de nuevas ofertas. Tampoco perdemos de vista, ni mucho menos, la preservación de las cuestiones de desarrollo, en esta fase en el contexto del Compromiso Único. Si fracasa la ADD o si la interrupción de las conversaciones se prolonga demasiado, opino firmemente que corremos graves riesgos económicos y políticos. Quedan muchas cosas pendientes en la ADD en términos de reducción de los subsidios agrícolas, reducción de los aranceles para los productos agrícolas e industriales, mejora de las normas y el desarrollo; y, por lo tanto, tenemos mucho que perder si las conversaciones fracasan. No deberíamos subestimar las implicaciones sistémicas más amplias del fracaso para el sistema multilateral en general. Por lo tanto, deberíamos seguir centrando nuestra atención en la ADD –y así será– y la Unión Europea desea y está dispuesta a regresar a la mesa de negociaciones de la OMC tan pronto como exista una posibilidad realista."@es²⁰
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Cairns Group"¹²
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"National Farm Bureau"^10,12,8
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Round"¹²
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"National Association of Manufacturers"^12,8
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Trade Promotion Authority"¹²
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Doha Round"¹²
lpv:translated text	". Il 5 settembre 2006, ho pronunciato una dichiarazione completa ed esaustiva dinanzi al Parlamento sullo stato di avanzamento dell’agenda di sviluppo di Doha. Mi rincresce affermare che non si sono registrati particolari sviluppi da allora; i negoziati sono ancora sospesi. Tuttavia, è importante rilevare che da allora, sia al Vertice dei G-20 di Rio, a cui ho partecipato, che al Vertice del in Australia, in cui ero rappresentato, tenutisi entrambi a settembre, tutti gli attori fondamentali delle trattative hanno ribadito il loro impegno nei confronti del e la loro volontà di riprendere i negoziati appena le circostanze politiche lo permettano. Nondimeno, verranno presi ulteriori provvedimenti al fine di rilanciare la DDA. Tutte le parti dovranno dimostrare flessibilità e realismo e avanzare proposte che rappresentino sforzi effettivi in tutti i settori nel quadro dei negoziati. Esiste una finestra esigua di opportunità per riprendere le trattative tra le elezioni americane di metà mandato del 7 novembre e l’inizio della primavera 2007, quando il Congresso statunitense inizierà i lavori relativi alla nuova legge sull’agricoltura. Sono andato a Washington a fine settembre per esplorare la posizione americana riguardo all’agenda di sviluppo di Doha, per sondare le politiche statunitensi del Congresso in materia e spiegare il nostro punto di vista. Ho incontrato responsabili politici del governo, diverse autorità di regolamentazione centrali del Congresso, e gruppi locali quali il e la . La situazione politica degli Stati Uniti appare difficile. Tuttavia, i miei contatti con l’Amministrazione mi hanno fatto ben sperare, in quanto vi ho percepito una volontà reale di concludere il nel corso del mandato del Presidente Bush, sebbene questo richiederà l’impiego di notevole capitale politico, anche per ottenere la proroga del Congresso dell’autorità competente per la promozione del commercio del Presidente, la . Pertanto, nelle prossime settimane la nostra strategia dovrà chiarire le condizioni politiche per il rinnovo delle consultazioni e preparare il terreno per il movimento – che manca di nuove proposte. Inoltre, i nostri obiettivi rimangono saldamente radicati al mantenimento delle questioni relative allo sviluppo, per il momento nel contesto dell’impresa unica. Se l’agenda di sviluppo di Doha dovesse fallire, o se la sospensione si protrarrà per un periodo di tempo eccessivamente lungo, il mio giudizio definitivo è che andiamo incontro a seri rischi politici ed economici. Nella DDA sussistono molte proposte in termini di riduzione delle sovvenzioni all’agricoltura, riduzioni delle tariffe sui prodotti agricoli ed industriali, norme migliori e sviluppo, per cui sarebbe una grave perdita nel caso in cui le trattative dovessero arenarsi. Non dobbiamo sottovalutare le ampie implicazioni strutturali di un fallimento del sistema multilaterale nel suo insieme. L’agenda di sviluppo di Doha deve pertanto continuare a essere la nostra principale area di attenzione – come sarà – e l’UE intende ed è pronta a ritornare al tavolo dei negoziati dell’OMC in tempi realisticamente più brevi possibili."@it¹²
lpv:translated text	". Le 5 septembre 2006, j’ai prononcé une déclaration très détaillée devant ce Parlement sur l’état d’avancement du programme de Doha pour le développement. Je regrette d’avoir à dire qu’aucun progrès majeur n’a été réalisé depuis lors; les négociations restent suspendues. Force est toutefois de noter que, depuis lors, que ce soit à la réunion du G-20 à Rio, à laquelle j’ai assisté, ou à la réunion du groupe de Cairns en Australie, où j’ai été représenté - toutes deux ayant eu lieu en septembre -, les principaux acteurs des pourparlers ont tous réitéré leur engagement envers le cycle et leur disposition à reprendre les négociations dès que les circonstances politiques le permettront. Il faudra néanmoins plus que cela pour remettre le programme de Doha pour le développement sur les rails. Toutes les parties devront faire preuve de flexibilité et de réalisme et avancer des propositions qui constituent de réels efforts dans tous les domaines de négociation. Il existe une maigre possibilité de renouer le dialogue entre les élections américaines à mi-parcours du 7 novembre et le début du printemps 2007, lorsque le Congrès américain commencera à se pencher sur une nouvelle loi agricole. Je me suis rendu à Washington fin septembre pour sonder la position des États-Unis à l’égard du programme de Doha pour le développement, pour découvrir la politique du Congrès américain sur la question et pour leur expliquer notre position. J’ai rencontré les décideurs politiques au sein du gouvernement, plusieurs des principaux législateurs du Capitole et des forces politiques telles que le et la . La situation politique aux États-Unis est difficile. J’ai toutefois été encouragé par mes contacts avec le gouvernement, où j’ai ressenti une véritable volonté de conclure le cycle au cours du mandat du président Bush, mais il faudra pour ce faire utiliser une bonne partie du capital politique, même pour obtenir l’extension, par le Congrès, de l’autorité du président en matière de promotion des échanges commerciaux. Ainsi, dans les prochaines semaines, notre stratégie devra être de clarifier les conditions politiques pour la reprise des pourparlers et de préparer le terrain pour l’action - avant de nouvelles offres. De même, nous gardons fermement pour objectif de préserver les questions liées au développement, à ce stade dans le contexte de l’engagement unique. Si le programme de Doha pour le développement échoue ou si la suspension est prolongée pour trop longtemps, je suis convaincu que nous courrons de sérieux risques économiques et politiques. Il reste beaucoup à faire dans le cadre du programme de Doha en termes de réduction des subventions agricoles, de réductions des droits de douane pour les produits agricoles et industriels, d’amélioration des règles et de développement, et, par conséquent, beaucoup à perdre si les pourparlers échouent. Ne sous-estimons pas les conséquences systémiques plus vastes d’un tel échec pour le système multilatéral au sens large. Le programme de Doha pour le développement devrait donc continuer à occuper toute notre attention - et ce sera le cas. En outre, l’UE est disposée et préparée à retourner à la table de négociation de l’OMC dès que possible."@fr⁸
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"National Farm Bureau"^10,12,8
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"National Association of Manufacturers"^12,8
rdf:type	lpv_eu:Speech⁶
dcterms:Date	"2006-10-24"^^xsd:date⁶
dcterms:Is Part Of	lp_eu:Infotund (küsimused Euroopa Komisjonile)⁶
dcterms:Language	"en"^^xsd:language⁶
lpv:document identification number	"en.20061024.33.2-289"⁶
lpv:hasSubsequent	lp_eu:2006-10-24-Speech-2-290⁶
lpv:speaker	lp:Peter Mandelson⁶