Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-12-14-Speech-3-320"
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Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@en4
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"Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@cs1
"Hr. formand, jeg vil gerne begynde med at sige til det, som hr. Casaca sagde, at når Kommissionen forbereder tildeling af bevillinger, ser den på de anmodninger, der er kommet fra medlemsstaterne, og tager hensyn til de behov og den effektivitet, der findes i de enkelte medlemsstater, hovedsagligt på basis af det nationale program og den tidligere rapport om kontrolaktiviteter, som hver medlemsstat må sende til Kommissionen. Vi prioriterer de investeringer, der bliver anset for at være mest omkostningseffektive, idet vi tager hensyn til den generelle interesse i at nå et højt niveau af kontrol i hele Fællesskabet. Derfor kan prioriteterne skifte i årenes løb og være forskellige for forskellige medlemsstater.
Kommissionen har igangsat en høringsproces om en forbedring af kvaliteten af de data, der indsamles og rapporteres, og af analysen af disse data for at kunne sammenligne situationen i de forskellige medlemsstater. Desuden agter Kommissionen at foreslå et katalog af sanktioner, der skal indføres i tilfælde af alvorlige overtrædelser, og som skal vedtages af Rådet, som det nævnes i artikel 25, stk. 4, i Rådets forordning (EF) 2371/2002. Kataloget bør hjælpe med at forøge niveauet af sanktioner og bidrage til etablering af mere lige konkurrencevilkår. Det er meningen, at kataloget skal forelægges af Kommissionen i anden halvdel af 2007.
Som jeg allerede har sagt, er uoverensstemmelserne derfor store, og vi foretrækker administrative sanktioner, eftersom de er mere effektive og kan gennemføres hurtigt.
Som svar på en særlig ting, der blev nævnt, vil jeg sige, at vores forslag om harmonisering af sanktionerne for alvorlige overtrædelser vil blive fremlagt i 2007. Vi håber, at det vil skabe mere lige konkurrencevilkår og samtidig gøre noget ved spørgsmålet om proportionalitet.
Med hensyn til det sidste punkt, der blev nævnt af hr. Casaca vedrørende ændringsforslag 2 og 6, vil jeg bede om undskyldning. De oplysninger, jeg har, er, at disse ændringsforslag ikke blev støttet af udvalget. Men jeg vil se på det, og kontakte ham i morgen inden afstemningen.
Jeg er helt enig med hr. Kindermann om, at kontrol og håndhævelse er en hjørnesten for effektiviteten af den fælles fiskeripolitik. Jeg er engageret i fortsat at styrke kontrol- og håndhævelsesaktiviteterne. Etableringen af kontrolagenturet i år vil bestemt yde et vigtigt bidrag på dette område.
Med hensyn til de ting, fru Attwooll, hr. Crowley og andre talere har nævnt vedrørende hele spørgsmålet om sanktioner, så lad mig sige, at hovedtendensen, sådan som den offentliggøres i meddelelsen, viser, at det samlede antal af alvorlige overtrædelser har varieret betydeligt fra det ene år til det andet - fra 4.180 i 2000 til 9.502 i 2003. Det er vanskeligt at vide, om denne forøgelse af opdagede overtrædelser betyder, at opdagelsesprocenten for alvorlige overtrædelser er forbedret, eller om antallet af overtrædelser faktisk er forøget.
Et væsentligt fremskridt med hensyn til afskrækkelse er, at det gennemsnitlige beløb for pålagte bøder er vokset fra 1.757 euro i 2002 til 4.664 euro i 2003 - dvs. en forøgelse på et år på 165 %. Men det, at bøder, der blev udskrevet i 2003, kun andrager 0,004 % af værdien af landingerne i 2002, får os til at mene, at bøderne fortsat er for lave til at udgøre en reel afskrækkelse for dem, der bryder reglerne. Når det er sagt, så er dette en generel udtalelse, og det kunne blive nødvendigt at se på de forskellige undersektorer og overtrædelser, for hvilke disse bøder er blevet pålagt.
Nogle konklusioner fra de tidligere meddelelser er, for det første, at der er væsentlige forskelle mellem de gennemsnitlige bøder, der benyttes - som et antal medlemmer har gjort klart i aften - og at bødernes samlede beløb stadig er for lavt til at udgøre en effektiv afskrækkelse over for folk, der bryder reglerne i den fælles fiskeripolitik.
Med hensyn til spørgsmålet om, hvorvidt straffesager eller administrative procedurer er bedst, lægges der i artikel 25 i forordning (EF) 2371/2002 op til, at medlemsstaterne skal træffe passende foranstaltninger mod de ansvarlige, når den fælles fiskeripolitik ikke er blevet respekteret.
Medlemsstaterne kan forfølge overtrædelser gennem strafferetlige eller administrative procedurer, forudsat at disse foranstaltninger er effektive og står i forhold til overtrædelsernes alvor. Kommissionen kan ikke på andre måder gribe ind i de enkelte medlemsstaters valg af instrument. Det kunne berøre det følsomme spørgsmål om statslig suverænitet.
Når det er sagt, gentager jeg, at det er Kommissionens opfattelse, at administrative procedurer - og således administrative sanktioner - er at foretrække. Det er de, fordi de kan pålægges hurtigt af en administrativ myndighed, da det ikke kræver den langsommelige proces, der følger med at fastslå skyld, før sanktioner kan pålægges via en straffesag. De er mindre bekostelige end retssager. Ikke-strafferetlige sanktioner kan hurtigt indføres og har vist sig at være mere effektive end alvorligere straffeforanstaltninger. F.eks. kan en administrativ sanktion, såsom suspension af en fisketilladelse, være en effektiv måde, hvorpå man kan tilskynde til overholdelse af reglerne, da den kan anvendes hurtigt. Jeg beklager, at flertallet af medlemsstaterne ikke bruger dette redskab noget tiere.
Sanktionen - hvad enten den er strafferetlig eller administrativ - må tilpasses grovheden af den overtrædelse, der har fundet sted. Blandt formildende eller skærpende faktorer kan nævnes en negativ indvirkning af overtrædelsen på fiskeriressourcerne eller typer af fisk, overtrædernes tidligere adfærd, gentagelse af den samme overtrædelse og de anslåede økonomiske fordele, som overtrædelsen medfører."@da2
".
Herr Präsident, ich möchte zunächst zu der von Herrn Casaca angesprochenen Frage sagen, dass die Kommission bei der Vorbereitung der Aufteilung der Beteiligungen die von den Mitgliedstaaten eingereichten Anträge prüft. Dabei berücksichtigt sie die Bedürfnisse und die Effizienz jedes Mitgliedstaats im Wesentlichen auf der Grundlage seines nationalen Programms und des vorangegangenen Berichts über Überwachungsaktivitäten, den jeder Mitgliedstaat an die Kommission übersenden muss. Priorität haben dabei solche Investitionen, denen ein besseres Kosten-Nutzen-Verhältnis unter Beachtung des allgemeinen Interesses an einem hohen Überwachungsniveau in der gesamten Gemeinschaft bescheinigt wird. Daher kann sich die Priorität mit den Jahren ändern und für die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten unterschiedlich sein.
Die Kommission hat ein Konsultationsverfahren zur Verbesserung der Qualität der erhobenen und gemeldeten Daten sowie der Analyse dieser Daten eingeleitet, um einen Vergleich der Situation zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten anstellen zu können. Darüber hinaus beabsichtigt die Kommission, zur Verabschiedung durch den Rat – wie in Art. 25(4) der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2371/2002 des Rates vorgesehen – einen Katalog von Sanktionen vorzuschlagen, die bei schweren Verstößen anzuwenden sind. Der Katalog sollte dazu beitragen, das Strafmaß anzuheben und einheitlichere Bedingungen zu schaffen. Die Kommission will diesen Katalog im zweiten Halbjahr 2007 vorlegen.
Wie ich bereits sagte, sind also die Unterschiede groß, und wir geben Sanktionen auf dem Verwaltungsweg den Vorzug, da sie wirksamer und rascher durchsetzbar sind.
In Beantwortung einer speziellen Frage möchte ich sagen, dass unser Vorschlag zur Harmonisierung von Sanktionen bei schweren Verstößen 2007 veröffentlicht wird. Wir hoffen, damit einheitlichere Voraussetzungen zu schaffen und gleichzeitig die Frage der Verhältnismäßigkeit zu klären.
Was den von Herrn Casaca angesprochenen letzten Punkt – die Änderungsanträge 2 und 6 – betrifft, möchte ich mich entschuldigen. Nach meinen Informationen fanden diese Änderungsanträge im Ausschuss keine Unterstützung. Ich werde das jedoch prüfen und mich morgen vor der Abstimmung mit ihm in Verbindung setzen.
Ich stimme Herrn Kindermann voll und ganz darin zu, dass Überwachung und Durchsetzung Eckpfeiler der Effektivität der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik sind. Ich bin dafür, die Aktivitäten auf dem Gebiet der Überwachung und Durchsetzung weiterhin zu stärken. Die Bildung der Überwachungsagentur in diesem Jahr wird gewiss ein wichtiger Beitrag in diesem Bereich sein.
Zu den von Frau Attwooll, Herrn Crowley und weiteren Rednern aufgeworfenen Fragen zum ganzen Bereich der Sanktionen möchte ich Folgendes sagen: Der Haupttrend, wie er in der Mitteilung dargestellt ist, zeigt, dass die Gesamtzahl schwerer Verstöße von Jahr zu Jahr erheblich geschwankt hat – von 4 180 im Jahr 2000 bis 9 502 im Jahr 2003. Es ist schwer zu sagen, ob diese Zunahme der festgestellten Verstöße bedeutet, dass sich die Rate ihrer Entdeckung verbessert oder sich die Zahl der begangenen Verstöße erhöht hat.
Bemerkenswert bei den Fortschritten in der Abschreckung ist, dass sich die durchschnittliche Geldbuße von 1 757 Euro im Jahr 2002 auf 4 664 Euro im Jahr 2003 erhöht hat. Das ist eine Zunahme von 165 % in einem Jahr. Die Tatsache jedoch, dass die im Jahr 2003 verhängten Geldbußen nur 0,004 % der Werts der Anlandungen des Jahres 2002 ausmachen, veranlasst uns zu der Annahme, dass die Geldbußen für eine echte Abschreckung für Gesetzesübertreter noch immer zu bescheiden ausfallen. Nun ist dies eine allgemeine Feststellung, und man müsste jetzt die verschiedenen Subsektoren und Verstöße, die diesen Geldbußen vorausgingen, untersuchen.
Zu den Schlussfolgerungen aus den vorangegangenen Mitteilungen gehört erstens, dass bei den durchschnittlich verhängten Geldstrafen – wie mehrere Abgeordnete heute Abend deutlich gemacht haben – wesentliche Unterschiede bestehen und dass die Strafhöhe zu gering ist, als dass sie eine wirksame Abschreckung gegen die Nichteinhaltung der Vorschriften der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik darstellen würde.
In der Frage, ob Strafverfahren oder Verwaltungsverfahren die beste Option sind, sieht Artikel 25 der Verordnung (EG) Nr. 2371/2002 vor, dass die Mitgliedstaaten geeignete Maßnahmen gegen die Verantwortlichen zu ergreifen haben, wenn die Vorschriften der Gemeinsamen Fischereipolitik nicht eingehalten werden.
Die Mitgliedstaaten können Verstöße durch Straf- oder Verwaltungsverfahren ahnden, sofern diese Maßnahmen wirksam und der Schwere der Verstöße angemessen sind. Ansonsten kann die Kommission nicht eingreifen, wenn es um die Wahl des Instruments durch die einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten geht. Das könnte die heikle Frage der staatlichen Souveränität berühren.
Ich wiederhole also: Nach Auffassung der Kommission sind Verwaltungsverfahren – und somit Sanktionen auf dem Verwaltungsweg – vorzuziehen. Sie sind deshalb vorzuziehen, weil eine Verwaltungsbehörde sie rasch auferlegen kann, denn das setzt nicht wie bei Strafverfahren ein langwieriges Verfahren zur Feststellung der Haftung voraus, ehe Sanktionen verhängt werden können. Sie sind weniger kostenaufwändig als Gerichtsverfahren. Außerhalb von Strafverfahren können Sanktionen rasch verhängt werden, und sie haben sich als wirksamer erwiesen als schwerere gerichtliche Strafen. Eine Sanktion auf dem Verwaltungsweg, wie der Entzug der Fangerlaubnis, kann zum Beispiel auf wirksame Weise zur Einhaltung der Vorschriften beitragen, und sie kann rasch angewendet werden. Ich bedaure, dass die Mitgliedstaaten dieses Mittel nicht häufiger nutzen.
Die Sanktion – sei sie nun gerichtlich oder auf dem Verwaltungsweg veranlasst – muss der Schwere des Verstoßes entsprechen. Zu den mildernden oder verschärfenden Faktoren gehören: eine nachteilige Auswirkung des Verstoßes auf die Fischereiressourcen oder die Fischart, bisheriges Verhalten der Gesetzesübertreter, wiederholter Verstoß und die mutmaßlichen wirtschaftlichen Vorteile aus dem Verstoß."@de9
".
Κύριε Πρόεδρε, θέλω καταρχάς να δηλώσω –σχετικά με την προηγούμενη επισήμανση του κ. Casaca– ότι, κατά την προετοιμασία της κατανομής των χρηματοδοτήσεων, η Επιτροπή εξετάζει τα αιτήματα που υποβάλλουν τα κράτη μέλη, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη τις ανάγκες και τις ικανότητες κάθε κράτους μέλους, όπως προκύπτουν κυρίως από το εθνικό του πρόγραμμα και από προηγηθείσα έκθεσή του σχετικά με τις δραστηριότητες ελέγχου, τις οποίες κάθε κράτος μέλος πρέπει να διαβιβάσει στην Επιτροπή. Προτεραιότητα δίνεται στις επενδύσεις οι οποίες θεωρούνται πιο αποδοτικές από πλευράς κόστους, λαμβάνοντας υπόψη το γενικό ενδιαφέρον για την επίτευξη υψηλού επιπέδου ελέγχου στο σύνολο της Κοινότητας. Ως εκ τούτου, οι προτεραιότητες ενδέχεται να αλλάζουν με την πάροδο των ετών και να είναι διαφορετικές για κάθε κράτος μέλος.
Η Επιτροπή έχει ξεκινήσει διαδικασία διαβουλεύσεων για τη βελτίωση της ποιότητας των στοιχείων που συλλέχθηκαν και ανακοινώθηκαν καθώς και της ανάλυσης των εν λόγω στοιχείων, προκειμένου να συγκρίνουμε την κατάσταση μεταξύ των κρατών μελών. Επιπλέον, η Επιτροπή σκοπεύει να προτείνει προς έγκριση από το Συμβούλιο έναν κατάλογο κυρώσεων που θα επιβάλλονται σε περιπτώσεις σοβαρών παραβάσεων, όπως προβλέπεται στο άρθρο 25, παράγραφος 4, του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2371/2002 του Συμβουλίου. Ο κατάλογος αναμένεται να συμβάλει στην αύξηση του επιπέδου των κυρώσεων και στην εμπέδωση ίσων όρων ανταγωνισμού. Αυτός ο κατάλογος πρόκειται να παρουσιαστεί από την Επιτροπή κατά το δεύτερο εξάμηνο του 2007.
Όπως ήδη ανέφερα, οι ανισότητες είναι, ως εκ τούτου, σοβαρές και προτιμούμε τις διοικητικές κυρώσεις, καθώς είναι περισσότερο αποτελεσματικές και μπορούν να εφαρμοστούν άμεσα.
Απαντώντας σε ένα συγκεκριμένο ζήτημα που τέθηκε, θέλω να αναφέρω ότι η πρότασή μας για εναρμόνιση των κυρώσεων στις περιπτώσεις σοβαρών παραβάσεων θα δημοσιευθεί το 2007. Ελπίζουμε ότι αυτό θα ενισχύσει την προσπάθεια δημιουργίας ίσων όρων ανταγωνισμού, διευθετώντας συγχρόνως το θέμα της αναλογικότητας.
Αναφορικά με το τελευταίο ζήτημα, το οποίο έθιξε ο κ. Casaca, σχετικά με τις τροπολογίες 2 και 6, ζητώ συγγνώμη, όμως, σύμφωνα με τις πληροφορίες που έχω στη διάθεσή μου, οι τροπολογίες αυτές δεν έτυχαν της στήριξης της αρμόδιας επιτροπής. Ωστόσο, θα ερευνήσω το θέμα και θα επικοινωνήσω μαζί του αύριο πριν από την ψηφοφορία.
Συμφωνώ απόλυτα με τον κ. Kindermann ότι ο έλεγχος και η επιβολή αποτελούν τον ακρογωνιαίο λίθο της αποτελεσματικότητας της κοινής αλιευτικής πολιτικής. Δεσμεύομαι να συνεχίσω να ενισχύω τις δραστηριότητες ελέγχου και επιβολής. Η σύσταση φέτος της υπηρεσίας ελέγχου θα συμβάλει σίγουρα σημαντικά σε αυτόν τον τομέα.
Όσον αφορά τα θέματα που έθεσαν η κ. Attwooll, ο κ. Crowley και άλλοι ομιλητές σχετικά με το όλο ζήτημα των κυρώσεων, επιτρέψτε μου να αναφέρω ότι η κύρια τάση, όπως δημοσιεύθηκε στην ανακοίνωση, δείχνει ότι ο συνολικός αριθμός των σοβαρών παραβάσεων ποικίλλει σημαντικά από χρόνο σε χρόνο – από 4 180 το 2000 έως 9 502 το 2003. Είναι δύσκολο να διαπιστωθεί κατά πόσον αυτή η αύξηση των παραβάσεων που εντοπίστηκε σημαίνει ότι βελτιώνεται το ποσοστό του εντοπισμού σοβαρών παραβάσεων ή ότι έχει αυξηθεί ο αριθμός των παραβάσεων που διαπράττονται.
Ένα αξιοσημείωτο στοιχείο προόδου σχετικά με την πτυχή της αποτροπής είναι το γεγονός ότι το μέσο ύψος των προστίμων που επιβάλλονται έχει αυξηθεί από 1 757 ευρώ το 2002 σε 4 664 ευρώ το 2003 – πρόκειται δηλαδή για αύξηση της τάξης του 165% εντός ενός έτους. Το γεγονός, ωστόσο, ότι τα πρόστιμα που επιβλήθηκαν το 2003 ανήλθαν σε μόλις 0,004% της αξίας των εκφορτώσεων το 2002 μας κάνει να θεωρούμε ότι τα πρόστιμα παραμένουν εξαιρετικά περιορισμένα ώστε να αποτελέσουν πραγματικό αποτρεπτικό παράγοντα για τους παραβάτες. Εντούτοις, η δήλωση αυτή είναι γενικού χαρακτήρα, και πρέπει κανείς να μελετήσει τους διάφορους επιμέρους τομείς και αδικήματα που αφορούν αυτά τα πρόστιμα.
Κάποια συμπεράσματα από τις προηγούμενες ανακοινώσεις είναι, πρώτον, ότι υπάρχουν ουσιαστικές διαφορές μεταξύ των μέσων προστίμων που εφαρμόζονται –όπως μια σειρά βουλευτών κατέστησε απόψε σαφές– και ότι ο αριθμός των προστίμων παραμένει υπερβολικά χαμηλός για να συνιστά αποτελεσματικό αποτρεπτικό παράγοντα για την αντιμετώπιση της μη συμμόρφωσης με τους κανόνες της κοινής αλιευτικής πολιτικής.
Σχετικά με το εάν οι ποινικές διαδικασίες ή οι διοικητικές διαδικασίες αποτελούν την καλύτερη επιλογή, στο άρθρο 25 του κανονισμού (ΕΚ) αριθ. 2371/2002 προβλέπεται ότι τα κράτη μέλη οφείλουν να λαμβάνουν κατάλληλα μέτρα κατά των υπευθύνων όταν δεν τηρούνται οι κανόνες της ΚΑΠ.
Τα κράτη μέλη μπορούν να διώκουν παραβάσεις μέσω ποινικών ή διοικητικών διαδικασιών, αρκεί τα μέτρα αυτά να είναι αποτελεσματικά και ανάλογα της σοβαρότητας των παραβάσεων. Η Επιτροπή δεν μπορεί κατά τα λοιπά να παρεμβαίνει στην επιλογή των μέσων που χρησιμοποιούν τα ανεξάρτητα κράτη μέλη. Αυτό μπορεί να αγγίξει το ευαίσθητο θέμα της κρατικής κυριαρχίας.
Τούτου λεχθέντος, επαναλαμβάνω ότι η Επιτροπή υποστηρίζει την άποψη ότι οι διοικητικές διαδικασίες –και ως εκ τούτου οι διοικητικές κυρώσεις– είναι προτιμότερες. Είναι προτιμότερες διότι μπορούν να επιβληθούν άμεσα από μια διοικητική αρχή, καθώς δεν απαιτείται η μακρά διαδικασία που περιλαμβάνει την τεκμηρίωση της ευθύνης πριν από την επιβολή κυρώσεων στις ποινικές διαδικασίες. Είναι λιγότερο δαπανηρές από τις δικαστικές διαδικασίες. Οι μη ποινικές κυρώσεις μπορούν να επιβληθούν αμέσως και έχουν αποδειχθεί περισσότερο αποτελεσματικές σε σχέση με πιο αυστηρές ποινικές κυρώσεις. Για παράδειγμα, ορισμένες διοικητικές κυρώσεις, όπως η αναστολή της άδειας αλιείας, μπορούν να αποτελέσουν αποτελεσματικούς τρόπους ενθάρρυνσης της συμμόρφωσης, καθώς μπορούν να εφαρμοστούν εύκολα. Λυπάμαι που τα περισσότερα κράτη μέλη δεν χρησιμοποιούν πιο συχνά αυτό το μέσο.
Οι κυρώσεις –είτε ποινικές είτε διοικητικές– πρέπει να προσαρμόζονται στη σοβαρότητα της παράβασης. Μεταξύ των ελαφρυντικών ή επιβαρυντικών παραγόντων περιλαμβάνονται: ο αρνητικός αντίκτυπος της παράβασης στους αλιευτικούς πόρους ή στο είδος του αλιεύματος, η πρότερη συμπεριφορά των παραβατών, η επανάληψη της ίδιας παράβασης και τα εκτιμώμενα οικονομικά οφέλη από την παράβαση."@el10
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Señor presidente, deseo comenzar diciendo, con respecto a la cuestión planteada por el señor Casaca, que al tramitar la concesión de ayudas la Comisión examina las solicitudes presentadas por los Estados miembros teniendo en cuenta las necesidades y eficiencias de cada Estado miembro, tal como se derivan principalmente del programa nacional y del informe más reciente sobre las actividades de control que cada Estado miembro debe transmitir a la Comisión. Se concede prioridad a aquellas inversiones que se consideran más rentables teniendo en cuenta el interés general por lograr un alto nivel de control en toda la Comunidad. Por consiguiente, la prioridad puede cambiar con el paso de los años y diferir de un Estado miembro a otro.
La Comisión ha iniciado un proceso de consulta sobre la mejora de la calidad de los datos recopilados y comunicados y el análisis de estos datos con el fin de comparar la situación entre los Estados miembros. Además, la Comisión tiene previsto proponer un catálogo de sanciones que deben imponerse en casos de infracción grave para que lo apruebe el Consejo conforme al apartado 4 del artículo 25 del Reglamento del Consejo (CE) nº 2371/2002. El catálogo debería ayudar a aumentar el nivel de sanciones y a asegurar la igualdad de condiciones. Está previsto que la Comisión presente este catálogo en la segunda mitad de 2007.
Como ya he dicho, las discrepancias son, por tanto, grandes y nuestras preferencias se decantan por las sanciones administrativas, pues son más eficaces y pueden aplicarse rápidamente.
En respuesta a una pregunta concreta que se ha formulado, diría que nuestra propuesta de armonización de las sanciones por infracciones graves se publicará en 2007. Esperamos que esto asegure una mayor igualdad de condiciones y, al mismo tiempo, ayude a afrontar el tema de la proporcionalidad.
Con respecto al último asunto indicado por el señor Casaca, relativo a las enmiendas 2 y 6, pido disculpas. La información que tengo es que estas enmiendas no fueron apoyadas en comisión. Sin embargo, revisaré esto y me pondré en contacto con él mañana antes de la votación.
Estoy totalmente de acuerdo con el señor Kindermann en que el control y las sanciones son una piedra angular de la efectividad de la Política Pesquera Común. Tengo la firme voluntad de seguir reforzando las actividades de control y sanción. La creación de la agencia de control este año supondrá sin duda una importante contribución en este terreno.
En las cuestiones planteadas por la señora Attwooll, el señor Crowley y otros oradores, con respecto a todo el tema de las sanciones, permítanme decirles que la tendencia principal, tal como se ha publicado en la comunicación, muestra que la cifra total de incumplimientos graves ha variado considerablemente de un año a otro, de 4 180 en 2000 a 9 502 en 2003. Es difícil saber si este aumento de los incumplimientos detectados significa que la tasa de detección de incumplimientos graves está mejorando o que el número de incumplimientos cometidos ha aumentado.
Un importante elemento de progreso en relación con la disuasión es el hecho de que la cantidad media de multas impuestas ha aumentado de 1 757 euros en 2002 a 4 664 en 2003, lo que implica un aumento del 165 % en un año. Sin embargo, el hecho de que las multas impuestas en 2003 supongan solamente el 0,004 % del valor de los desembarques de 2002 nos hace pensar que las multas siguen siendo demasiado modestas como para representar un medio disuasorio real para los infractores. Dicho esto, se trata de una afirmación general, y deberíamos examinar los diversos subsectores e infracciones con respecto a los cuales se han impuesto estas multas.
Algunas conclusiones de las comunicaciones anteriores son, primero, que existen diferencias sustanciales en el promedio de sanciones aplicadas, tal como han explicado esta noche una serie de diputados, y que la cantidad de sanciones sigue siendo demasiado baja como para representar un medio disuasorio eficaz contra el incumplimiento de las normas de la Política Pesquera Común.
Respecto a la elección entre el procedimiento penal o el administrativo, el artículo 25 del Reglamento (CE) nº 2371/2002 prevé que los Estados miembros adopten las medidas apropiadas contra las personas responsables cuando no se respeten las normas de pesca comunes.
Los Estados miembros pueden iniciar acciones legales por infracción mediante procedimientos penales o administrativos, siempre que estas medidas sean efectivas y proporcionales a la gravedad de las infracciones. La Comisión no puede interferir de otra forma en la elección del instrumento por parte de cada Estado miembro. Esto podría afectar a la delicada cuestión de la soberanía estatal.
Dicho esto, repito que la opinión de la Comisión es que los procedimientos administrativos, y por tanto las sanciones administrativas, son preferibles. Son preferibles porque una autoridad administrativa puede imponerlas rápidamente, al no requerir el lento proceso que implica la determinación de responsabilidades antes de imponer una sanción en un procedimiento penal. Son más baratos que los procedimientos judiciales. Las sanciones no penales pueden imponerse rápidamente y se ha visto que son más eficaces que las sanciones penales más graves. Por ejemplo, una sanción administrativa como la suspensión de un permiso de pesca puede ser una forma eficaz de promover el cumplimiento de la ley, puesto que puede aplicarse rápidamente. Lamento que la mayoría de los Estados miembros no utilicen esta herramienta más a menudo.
La sanción, ya sea penal o administrativa, debe adaptarse a la gravedad de la infracción. Entre los factores atenuantes o agravantes se incluyen: un impacto negativo de la infracción en los recursos pesqueros o el tipo de pescado; los antecedentes de los infractores; la reincidencia y los teóricos beneficios económicos que se derivan de la infracción."@es20
"Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@et5
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Arvoisa puhemies, haluan aluksi todeta jäsen Casacan äsken mainitseman seikan osalta, että avustusten myöntämistä valmistellessaan komissio tutkii jäsenvaltioiden esittämät pyynnöt ja ottaa huomioon jokaisen jäsenvaltion tarpeet ja tehokkuuden sellaisina kuin ne käyvät ilmi lähinnä kansallisesta ohjelmasta ja valvontaa koskevasta aiemmasta selvityksestä, joka jokaisen jäsenvaltion on toimitettava komissiolle. Etusijalle asetetaan kaikkein kannattavimmat investoinnit. Samalla otetaan myös huomioon yleinen hyöty, joka saadaan tehokkaan valvonnan toteuttamisesta kaikkialla EU:ssa. Näin ollen painopisteet saattavat vuosien kuluessa muuttua ja olla erilaisia eri jäsenvaltioissa.
Komissio on aloittanut kuulemiskierroksen kerättyjen ja ilmoitettujen tietojen laadun ja niiden analysoinnin parantamiseksi. Tarkoituksena on verrata eri jäsenvaltioiden tilanteita toisiinsa. Komissio aikoo lisäksi laatia ehdotuksen, joka koskee luetteloa vakavien rikkomusten yhteydessä määrättävistä seuraamuksista. Ehdotus menee neuvoston hyväksyttäväksi neuvoston asetuksen (EY) N:o 2371/2002 25 artiklan 4 kohdan mukaisesti. Luettelon on määrä auttaa lisäämään seuraamusten määrää. Se edistää myös osaltaan tasavertaisempien toimintaedellytysten luomista. Komission on määrä tehdä luettelosta esitys vuoden 2007 jälkipuoliskolla.
Kuten jo totesin, jäsenvaltioiden väliset erot ovat suuria, ja me pidämme parempana ratkaisuna hallinnollisia seuraamuksia, koska ne ovat tehokkaampia ja voidaan panna nopeasti täytäntöön.
Edellä esitetyn erityisseikan osalta totean, että vakavista rikkomuksista määrättävien seuraamusten yhdenmukaistamisehdotuksemme julkistetaan vuonna 2007. Toivomme, että näin saadaan luotua tasavertaisemmat toimintaedellytykset ja samalla ratkaistua suhteellisuusperiaatteeseen liittyvä kysymys.
Haluan esittää anteeksipyyntöni jäsen Casacan esiin tuomasta viimeisimmästä asiakohdasta, joka koskee tarkistuksia 2 ja 6. Minun tietojeni mukaan näitä tarkistuksia ei kannatettu valiokunnassa. Tutkin kuitenkin asiaa ja otan jäsen Casacaan yhteyttä huomenna ennen äänestystä.
Olen jäsen Kindermannin kanssa täysin samaa mieltä siitä, että valvonta ja täytäntöönpano ovat yhteisen kalastuspolitiikan tehokkuuden kannalta perustavan tärkeitä. Olen sitoutunut vastedeskin tehostamaan valvonta- ja täytäntöönpanotoimia. Valvontaviraston perustaminen tänä vuonna edistää varmastikin osaltaan merkittävästi tätä asiaa.
Jäsenet Attwool ja Crowley sekä muutkin puhujat ovat kommentoineet koko seuraamusasiaa. Heille haluaisin todeta tiedonannossa julkistetun pääsuuntauksen osoittavan, että vakavien rikkomusten kokonaismäärä on vaihdellut merkittävästi eri vuosina – 4 180 rikkomuksesta vuonna 2000 yhteensä 9 502 rikkomukseen vuonna 2003. On vaikea tietää, merkitseekö ilmi tulleiden rikkomusten lukumäärän lisääntyminen sitä, että yhä useampi vakava rikkomus tulee ilmi vai sitä, että itse rikkomusten lukumäärä on kasvanut.
Eräs ennaltaehkäisyä merkittävästi edistänyt seikka on se, että sakkojen määrä on noussut keskimäärin 1 757 eurosta vuonna 2002 aina 4 664 euroon vuonna 2003 – mikä merkitsee 165 prosentin korotusta yhden vuoden aikana. Se, että vuonna 2003 määrättyjen sakkojen osuus on vain 0,004 prosenttia vuoden 2002 saaliin arvosta saa meidät ajattelemaan, että sakot ovat liian pieniä, jotta niistä muodostuisi todellinen pelote sääntöjen rikkojille. Tämän yleisluonteisen kommentin jälkeen meidän on tarkasteltava eri osasektoreita ja rikoksia, joista kyseisiä sakkoja on määrätty.
Aiempien tiedonantojen perusteella voidaan tehdä joitakin päätelmiä. Ensimmäinen on se, että keskimäärin sovelletuissa rangaistuksissa on merkittäviä eroja – minkä useat parlamentin jäsenet ovat tänä iltana selkeästi tuoneet esiin – ja että rangaistusten määrä on yhä liian pieni, jotta niistä muodostuisi tehokas pelote yhteisen kalastuspolitiikan sääntöjen vastaisille toimille.
Mietittäessä sitä, ovatko rikosoikeudelliset seuraamukset parempi vaihtoehto kuin hallinnolliset seuraamukset, on muistettava, että asetuksen (EY) N:o 2371/2002 25 artiklan mukaisesti jäsenvaltioiden on ryhdyttävä asianmukaisiin toimenpiteisiin yhteisen kalastuspolitiikan sääntöjen rikkomisesta vastuussa olevia henkilöitä vastaan.
Jäsenvaltiot voivat käsitellä rikkomukset joko rikosoikeudellisissa tai hallinnollisissa menettelyissä edellyttäen, että kyseiset toimenpiteet ovat tehokkaita ja oikeassa suhteessa rikkomusten vakavuuteen. Komissio ei voi muutoin sekaantua siihen, mitä keinoja yksittäisissä jäsenvaltioissa valitaan. Tällöin saatettaisiin puuttua hienotunteisuutta vaativaan valtion suvereeniuteen.
Tämän jälkeen haluan toistaa, että komission mielestä hallinnolliset menettelyt – ja näin ollen hallinnolliset seuraamukset – ovat parempi ratkaisu. Ne ovat parempia sen vuoksi, että hallintoviranomainen voi määrätä niitä nopeasti, sillä ne eivät edellytä vastuuvelvollisuuden määrittämistä, joka on pitkällinen prosessi ja edellytyksenä seuraamusten määräämiselle rikosasiain oikeudenkäyntimenettelyssä. Ne ovat halvempia kuin oikeudenkäynnit. Muut kuin rikosoikeudelliset seuraamukset voidaan määrätä nopeasti, ja niiden on havaittu olevan tehokkaampia kuin ankarammat rikosoikeudelliset seuraamukset. Esimerkiksi hallinnollinen seuraamus, kuten kalastusluvan peruuttaminen, saattaa olla tehokas kannustinkeino sääntöjen noudattamiseksi, koska siihen voidaan turvautua nopeasti. Valitettavasti suurin osa jäsenvaltioista ei käytä tätä keinoa useammin.
Niin rikosoikeudellinen kuin hallinnollinenkin seuraamus on mitoitettava rikkomuksen vakavuuteen. Lieventäviä tai raskauttavia tekijöitä voivat olla muun muassa seuraavat: rikkomuksen haitallinen vaikutus kalavaroihin ja kalalajiin, rikkomusten tekijöiden aiemmat teot, saman rikkomuksen toistuminen ja se taloudellinen hyöty, joka rikkomuksesta arvioidaan saatavan."@fi7
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Monsieur le Président, je veux commencer en disant - sur le sujet mentionné par M. Casaca - qu’en préparant l’allocation des crédits, la Commission examine les demandes présentées par les États membres, en tenant compte des besoins et de l’efficience de chaque État membre, tels qu’ils résultent principalement du programme national et du rapport antérieur sur les activités de contrôle que chaque État membre doit transmettre à la Commission. La priorité est donnée aux investissements qui sont estimés les plus rentables, en gardant à l’esprit l’intérêt général qui consiste à atteindre un niveau élevé de contrôle dans toute la Communauté. Par conséquent, la priorité peut changer au fil des ans et varier d’un État membre à l’autre.
La Commission a lancé un processus de consultation sur l’amélioration de la qualité des données collectées et rapportées et de l’analyse de ces données, pour comparer la situation entre les États membres. En outre, la Commission a l’intention de proposer un catalogue de sanctions à infliger en cas d’infractions graves, à adopter par le Conseil, comme prévu à l’article 25, paragraphe 4, du règlement (CE) n° 2371/2002 du Conseil. Ce catalogue devrait favoriser l’augmentation du niveau des sanctions et contribuer à l’établissement de conditions plus équitables. Ce catalogue devrait être présenté par la Commission au deuxième trimestre de 2007.
Comme je l’ai déjà dit, les écarts sont donc importants et notre préférence va aux sanctions administratives, car elles sont plus efficaces et sont immédiatement applicables.
En réponse au point spécifique qui a été soulevé, je voudrais dire que notre proposition d’harmonisation des sanctions pour infraction grave sera publiée en 2007. Nous espérons qu’elle établira des conditions plus équitables et, en même temps, qu’elle résoudra la question de la proportionnalité.
En ce qui concerne le dernier point, qui a été soulevé par M. Casaca au sujet des amendements 2 et 6, je m’excuse. Selon les informations dont je dispose, ces amendements n’ont pas été soutenus en commission. Toutefois, je vais examiner cette question et je le contacterai demain avant le vote.
Je suis entièrement d’accord avec M. Kindermann pour dire que le contrôle et l’exécution sont la pierre angulaire de l’efficacité de la politique commune de la pêche. Je me suis engagé à continuer à renforcer les activités de contrôle et d’exécution. L’établissement de l’agence de contrôle cette année apportera certainement une importante contribution dans ce domaine.
Sur les points soulevés par Mme Attwooll, M. Crowley et d’autres orateurs en ce qui concerne l’ensemble de la question des sanctions, permettez-moi de dire que la tendance principale, telle qu’elle apparaît dans la communication, montre que le nombre total d’infractions graves varie considérablement d’une année à l’autre - de 4 180 en 2000 à 9 502 en 2003. Il est difficile de savoir si cette augmentation des infractions détectées signifie que la capacité de détection des infractions graves s’améliore ou si le nombre d’infractions commises a augmenté.
Un élément notable de progrès en matière de dissuasion est le fait que le montant moyen des amendes imposées a augmenté, passant de 1 757 euros en 2002 à 4 664 euros en 2003, soit une augmentation de 165 % en un an. Toutefois, le fait que les amendes imposées en 2003 ne représentent que 0,004 % de la valeur des prises débarquées en 2002, indiquent que les amendes restent trop modestes pour être réellement dissuasives pour les contrevenants. Ceci dit, il s’agit d’une remarque générale et il faudrait examiner les divers sous-secteurs et délits pour lesquels ces amendes ont été imposées.
Certaines conclusions des précédentes communications indiquent, premièrement, qu’il y a des différences substantielles entre les sanctions moyennes appliquées - ainsi que plusieurs députés l’ont fait clairement remarquer ce soir - et que le montant des sanctions reste trop faible pour représenter un véritable moyen de dissuasion du non-respect des règles de la politique commune de la pêche.
Quant à savoir lesquelles des procédures pénales ou administratives sont les meilleures, l’article 25 du règlement (CE) n° 2371/2002 prévoit que les États membres doivent prendre des mesures appropriées contre les responsables si les règles de la politique commune de la pêche n’ont pas été respectées.
Les États membres peuvent sanctionner les infractions par des procédures pénales ou administratives, pourvu que ces mesures soient efficaces et proportionnées à la gravité des infractions. La Commission ne peut interférer dans le choix de l’instrument par chaque État membre, car elle risquerait de toucher à la question délicate de la souveraineté des États.
Ceci dit, je répète que la Commission est d’avis que les procédures administratives - donc les sanctions administratives - sont préférables. Elles sont préférables parce qu’elles peuvent être imposées rapidement par une autorité administrative, puisqu’on évite la procédure interminable nécessaire pour établir les responsabilités avant qu’une sanction puisse être imposée lorsqu’il y a une action en justice. Elles sont moins chères que les procédures judiciaires. Les sanctions non pénales peuvent être appliquées rapidement et l’on a constaté qu’elles étaient plus efficaces que les autres. Ainsi, une sanction administrative, telle que la suspension d’un permis de pêche, peut être un moyen efficace d’encourager la conformité, car elle peut être appliquée rapidement. Je regrette que la majorité des États membres n’utilisent pas cet outil plus souvent.
La sanction, qu’elle soit criminelle ou administrative, doit être adaptée à la gravité de l’infraction. Les facteurs atténuants ou aggravants incluent: l’impact négatif de la violation sur les ressources de pêche ou une espèce de poisson, le comportement antérieur des contrevenants, la répétition de la même infraction, les bénéfices économiques estimés découlant de l’infraction."@fr8
"Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@hu11
"Signor Presidente, vorrei innanzi tutto osservare – in merito all’osservazione fatta in precedenza dall’onorevole Casaca – che, nel preparare la distribuzione dei fondi, la Commissione esamina le richieste presentate dagli Stati membri, tenendo conto delle esigenze e dei punti di efficienza di ogni Stato membro, secondo quanto emerge essenzialmente dai programmi nazionali e dalla precedente relazione sulle attività di controllo, che ogni Stato membro deve trasmettere alla Commissione. Si attribuisce la priorità agli investimenti che sembrano presentare un miglior rapporto costi/benefici, tenendo presente l’interesse generale di conseguire un alto livello di controllo in tutta la Comunità. Le priorità quindi possono mutare nel corso degli anni, ed essere diverse per i vari Stati membri.
La Commissione ha avviato un processo di consultazione per migliorare la qualità dei dati raccolti e riferiti, nonché l’analisi dei dati stessi, e costruire quindi un quadro comparativo della situazione degli Stati membri. La Commissione intende inoltre proporre al Consiglio l’adozione di un elenco di sanzioni da imporre in caso di violazione grave, come previsto dall’articolo 25, paragrafo 4, del regolamento (CE) n. 2371/2002 del Consiglio; tale elenco dovrebbe contribuire a innalzare il livello delle sanzioni e a creare un sistema di regole più uniforme. Secondo le scadenze attualmente previste, l’elenco verrà presentato dalla Commissione nella seconda metà del 2007.
Come ho già detto, esistono vistose discrepanze, e la nostra preferenza va alle sanzioni amministrative, che sono più efficaci e di più rapida applicazione.
In risposta a una specifica osservazione, dirò che la nostra proposta, relativa all’armonizzazione delle sanzioni per le violazioni gravi, verrà pubblicata nel 2007. Ci auguriamo di contribuire in tal modo alla creazione di un sistema di norme più uniformi, nonché alla soluzione del problema della proporzionalità.
Per quanto riguarda l’ultimo intervento dell’onorevole Casaca, in merito agli emendamenti nn. 2 e 6, devo scusarmi; mi risulta che questi emendamenti non siano stati approvati in sede di commissione parlamentare. Farò tuttavia un controllo in merito, e mi rimetterò in contatto con l’onorevole Casaca domani prima delle votazioni.
Sono del tutto d’accordo con l’onorevole Kindermann: controllo ed applicazione sono un requisito essenziale per l’efficacia della politica comune della pesca. Sono impegnato a potenziare costantemente le attività di controllo e applicazione; quest’anno l’istituzione dell’Agenzia di controllo recherà sicuramente un’importante contributo da tale punto di vista.
Per quanto riguarda le argomentazioni degli onorevoli Attwooll e Crowley, nonché di altri oratori, sulla questione delle sanzioni, permettetemi di osservare che la tendenza di fondo – secondo i dati pubblicati nella comunicazione – indica una sensibile variazione da un anno all’altro del numero totale di infrazioni gravi: si passa da 4 180 nel 2000 a 9 502 nel 2003. E’ difficile stabilire se l’incremento delle infrazioni scoperte dipenda da un miglioramento dei metodi di indagine, oppure se sia stato effettivamente commesso un maggior numero di infrazioni.
Dal punto di vista della deterrenza si registra un importante progresso. L’importo medio delle ammende comminate è aumentato dai 1 757 euro del 2002 ai 4 664 del 2003: nel giro di un anno si è registrato un incremento del 165 per cento. Tuttavia, il fatto che il totale delle ammende comminate nel 2003 equivalga appena allo 0,004 per cento del valore degli sbarchi effettuati nel 2002 ci induce a ritenere che le ammende siano ancora troppo modeste per rappresentare un effettivo deterrente per coloro che infrangono le norme. Questa è una premessa di carattere generale; occorre poi analizzare i vari sottosettori e le diverse infrazioni per cui sono state comminate le ammende.
Dalle comunicazioni precedenti si possono comunque trarre alcune conclusioni: in primo luogo – come alcuni deputati hanno chiaramente ribadito stasera – esistono forti differenze nelle medie delle sanzioni applicate, e l’importo complessivo delle sanzioni resta troppo basso per costituire un efficace elemento di dissuasione contro la violazione delle norme della politica comune della pesca.
Si discute se siano preferibili le procedure penali oppure quelle amministrative; a tale proposito l’articolo 25 del regolamento (CE) n. 2371/2002 prevede che gli Stati membri debbano prendere misure adeguate contro i responsabili, quando le norme della politica comune della pesca non vengono rispettate.
Gli Stati membri possono perseguire le infrazioni per via penale oppure amministrativa, purché le misure prese siano efficaci e proporzionate alla gravità dell’infrazione. La Commissione non può interferire in altra maniera nella scelta dello strumento da parte dei singoli Stati membri; ciò significherebbe entrare nel delicato campo della sovranità statale.
Premesso tutto questo, ripeto che la Commissione ritiene preferibili le procedure amministrative, e quindi le sanzioni amministrative. Sono preferibili in quanto possono essere imposte con rapidità da un’autorità amministrativa, evitando in tal modo le lungaggini connesse all’accertamento della responsabilità che deve precedere l’imposizione di sanzioni in un procedimento penale; le sanzioni amministrative sono meno costose dei procedimenti giudiziari. Le sanzioni non penali si possono imporre rapidamente e si sono dimostrate più efficaci di sanzioni penali più severe. Una sanzione amministrativa, come ad esempio la sospensione del permesso di pesca, può incoraggiare efficacemente a rispettare le regole, in quanto può essere applicata con rapidità. Mi rammarico che la maggioranza degli Stati membri non faccia ricorso con maggiore frequenza a tale strumento.
La sanzione – penale o amministrativa che sia – deve essere adeguata alla gravità dell’infrazione. Tra le attenuanti e le aggravanti bisogna considerare l’eventuale impatto negativo delle violazioni sulle risorse di pesca o sulla specie ittica, il comportamento precedente dei trasgressori, la ripetizione della medesima infrazione e i vantaggi economici prevedibilmente derivanti dall’infrazione stessa."@it12
"Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@lt14
"Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@lv13
"Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@mt15
".
Mijnheer de Voorzitter, inzake het punt dat de heer Casaca aan de orde stelde, wil ik allereerst verklaren dat de Commissie ter voorbereiding op de toekenning van subsidies de verzoeken bestudeert die door de lidstaten zijn ingediend. Zij kijkt daarbij naar de behoeften en effectiviteitsaspecten van de lidstaten, zoals die voornamelijk naar voren komen in het nationale programma en het eerdere verslag over controleactiviteiten dat elke lidstaat bij de Commissie moet indienen. Er wordt prioriteit gehecht aan kostenbesparende investeringen met inachtneming van het algemeen belang, dat gediend is bij de verwezenlijking van een hoog controleniveau in de gehele Gemeenschap. De prioriteiten kunnen door de jaren heen dus verschuiven en voor elke lidstaat weer anders zijn.
De Commissie heeft een raadplegingsprocedure in gang gezet inzake kwaliteitsverbetering van de verzamelde en gerapporteerde gegevens en de analyse van deze gegevens, teneinde de situatie tussen de lidstaten te vergelijken. Daarnaast is de Commissie voornemens een voorstel in te dienen bij de Raad voor een reeks van sancties die in geval van ernstige inbreuken moeten worden opgelegd ingevolge artikel 25, lid 4, van Verordening (EG) nr. 2371/2002 van de Raad. Deze reeks dient bij te dragen aan een verhoging van het sanctieniveau en het scheppen van gelijkere concurrentievoorwaarden. Het voorstel dient door de Commissie in het tweede halfjaar van 2007 te worden ingediend.
Zoals ik al zei, zijn de verschillen groot. Hoe het ook zij, onze voorkeur gaat uit naar administratieve maatregelen, omdat die sneller zijn op te leggen en doeltreffender zijn.
In antwoord op een specifieke vraag die is gesteld, kan ik zeggen dat ons voorstel voor de harmonisatie van sancties in geval van ernstige inbreuken in 2007 wordt uitgebracht. We hopen dat daarmee een gelijker speelveld wordt gecreëerd en tegelijkertijd het vraagstuk van evenredigheid wordt behandeld.
Over het punt dat de heer Casaca aan de orde stelde betreffende de amendementen 2 en 6 bied ik mijn excuses aan. Volgens de informatie waarover ik beschik, vonden deze amendementen geen steun in de commissie. Ik ga uitzoeken hoe dit precies zit en zal hem daar morgen vóór de stemming over aanspreken.
Ik ben het volledig eens met de heer Kindermann dat controle en handhaving de hoekstenen zijn van een doeltreffend gemeenschappelijk visserijbeleid. Ik ben vastbesloten de controle- en handhavingsactiviteiten te blijven verbeteren. De oprichting van het Controlebureau dit jaar is ongetwijfeld een grote stap voorwaarts op dit terrein.
In antwoord op de punten die mevrouw Attwooll, de heer Crowley en andere sprekers aansneden met betrekking tot sancties wil ik zeggen dat de trend zoals die blijkt uit de gepubliceerde gegevens in de mededeling laat zien dat het totale aantal ernstige inbreuken van jaar tot jaar erg verschilt – van 4 180 in 2000 tot 9 502 in 2003. Valt hieruit op te maken dat het aantal ernstige inbreuken toeneemt of worden er meer ernstige inbreuken opgespoord? Dat is moeilijk om vast te stellen.
Een vermeldenswaardige verbetering op het gebied van afschrikking is het feit dat het gemiddelde opgelegde boetebedrag gestegen is van 1 757 euro in 2002 naar 4 664 euro in 2003 – een toename in één jaar van 165 procent. Echter, het feit dat de opgelegde boetes in 2003 slechts 0,004 procent bedroegen van de waarde van de lossingen in 2002 doet ons vermoeden zij die de regels aan hun laars lappen, zich niet door deze boetes laten afschrikken. Dit is een vaststelling van algemene aard; de verschillende subsectoren waaraan en de overtredingen waarvoor deze boetes zijn opgelegd zullen nader onderzocht moeten worden.
Enkele conclusies uit de voorgaande mededelingen zijn om te beginnen dat er sprake is van aanzienlijke verschillen tussen de gemiddelde opgelegde sancties – een aantal afgevaardigden wees hier vanavond al op – en dat de straffen te laag zijn om de overtreders van de voorschriften van het gemeenschappelijk visserijbeleid voldoende af te schrikken.
Aangaande de vraag wat de beste optie is: administratieve maatregelen of strafvervolging, stipuleert artikel 25 van Verordening (EG) nr. 2371/2002 in ieder geval dat wanneer de regels van het gemeenschappelijk visserijbeleid niet zijn nageleefd, de lidstaten erop toezien dat tegen de verantwoordelijke personen passende maatregelen worden getroffen.
Lidstaten kunnen bij inbreuken overgaan tot administratieve maatregelen of strafvervolging, mits de maatregelen doeltreffend zijn en evenredig aan de ernst van de overtredingen. De Commissie is niet bevoegd zich te mengen in de keuze van het instrument door afzonderlijke lidstaten. Daarmee zou zij zich begeven op het gevoelige terrein van de staatssoevereiniteit.
Dit gezegd hebbende, herhaal ik dat de Commissie van mening is dat administratieve procedures – leidende tot administratieve maatregelen – de voorkeur verdienen, omdat ze in korte tijd door een bestuurlijk orgaan kunnen worden opgelegd. Zo worden slepende strafrechtelijke procedures vermeden waarin eerst de aansprakelijkheid moet worden vastgesteld voordat sancties kunnen worden opgelegd. Voorts zijn administratieve procedures minder geldverslindend dan gerechtelijke procedures. Ze kunnen in korte tijd worden opgelegd en zijn effectiever gebleken dan zware strafrechtelijke sancties. Het opleggen van een administratieve maatregel, zoals de schorsing van een vergunning, kan bijvoorbeeld een doeltreffende manier zijn om naleving te bevorderen, omdat deze maatregel snel kan worden opgelegd. Ik betreur het dat de meeste lidstaten dit instrument niet vaker toepassen.
Een administratieve maatregel of strafvervolging dient in verhouding te staan tot de ernst van het vergrijp. Verzachtende of verzwarende omstandigheden zijn: een negatief effect van de inbreuk op visbestanden of een vissoort, eerder gedrag van de overtreders, recidive en de geraamde economische voordelen die de overtreding oplevert."@nl3
"Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@pl16
"Senhor Presidente, gostaria de começar por dizer – acerca do ponto anterior abordado pelo Deputado Casaca – que, ao preparar-se para a atribuição de subsídios, a Comissão examina os pedidos apresentados pelos Estados-Membros tendo em conta as necessidades e eficiências de cada Estado-Membro, uma vez que estas resultam sobretudo do programa nacional e do relatório preliminar sobre actividades de controlo que cada Estado-Membro deve transmitir à Comissão. É dada prioridade aos investimentos que são considerados mais eficazes em termos de custos, tendo em conta o interesse geral em alcançar um elevado nível de controlo em toda a Comunidade. Por conseguinte, a prioridade pode mudar ao longo dos anos e diferir consoante os vários Estados-Membros.
A Comissão lançou um processo de consultas sobre a melhoria da qualidade dos dados recolhidos e comunicados e a sua respectiva análise, de forma a comparar a situação nos Estados-Membros. Além disso, a Comissão tenciona propor uma lista de sanções a aplicar em casos de infracções graves, para aprovação pelo Conselho, tal como previsto no nº 4 do artigo 25º do Regulamento (CE) nº 2371/2002 do Conselho. A lista deverá ajudar a aumentar o nível das sanções e contribuir para a criação de uma maior igualdade de oportunidades. Está prevista a apresentação desta lista pela Comissão no segundo semestre de 2007.
Como já disse, as discrepâncias são, por conseguinte, grandes e a nossa preferência vai para as sanções administrativas, uma vez que são mais eficazes e podem ser aplicadas rapidamente.
Em resposta a uma questão específica levantada eu diria que a nossa proposta de harmonização das sanções relativas a infracções graves será publicada em 2007. Esperamos que isso crie uma maior igualdade de oportunidades e, ao mesmo tempo, permita resolver a questão da proporcionalidade.
No que se refere ao último ponto mencionado pelo Deputado Casaca, relativamente às alterações 2 e 6, apresento as minhas desculpas. A informação de que disponho é de que estas alterações não foram apoiadas no seio da comissão. Irei, no entanto, examinar a questão e contactá-lo-ei amanhã antes da votação.
Concordo plenamente com o Deputado Kindermann que o controlo e a supervisão são uma pedra angular da eficácia da política comum da pesca. Estou empenhado em continuar a reforçar as actividades de controlo e supervisão. A criação da Agência Comunitária de Controlo das Pescas este ano irá certamente dar um importante contributo nesta área.
No que respeita aos pontos abordados pela Deputada Attwooll, o Deputado Crowley e outros oradores relacionados com toda a questão das sanções, deixem-me dizer-vos que a principal tendência, tal como refere a comunicação, é uma considerável variação do número total de infracções graves de um ano para outro, que passou de 4 180 em 2000 para 9 502 em 2003. É difícil saber se este aumento das infracções detectadas significa que a percentagem de detecção de infracções graves está a melhorar ou se o número de infracções cometidas aumentou.
Um elemento notável de progresso no que respeita à dissuasão é o facto de o valor médio das multas aplicadas ter aumentado de 1 757 euros, em 2002, para 4 664 euros, em 2003 – o que representa um aumento de 165% no período de um ano. No entanto, o facto de as multas aplicadas em 2003 terem constituído apenas 0,004% do valor das capturas desembarcadas em 2002 leva-nos a pensar que as multas continuam a ser demasiado modestas para serem verdadeiramente dissuasoras da infracção. Devo aqui acrescentar que isto é uma declaração de cariz geral e que se deveria analisar os vários subsectores e infracções a que as multas aplicadas dizem respeito.
Algumas das conclusões retiradas das comunicações anteriores são, em primeiro lugar, que existem diferenças substanciais entre o valor médio das penalizações aplicadas – como vários Deputados deixaram aqui claro esta noite – e que o valor das penalizações continua a ser demasiado baixo para constituir uma dissuasão eficaz para o não cumprimento das regras da política comum da pesca.
No que se refere a saber se os procedimentos penais ou administrativos são a melhor opção, o artigo 25º do Regulamento (CE) nº 2371/2002 prevê que os Estados-Membros tomem medidas adequadas contra as pessoas singulares ou colectivas responsáveis sempre que se verificar que não foram respeitadas as regras da política comum da pesca.
Os Estados-Membros podem intentar processos por infracção de cariz penal ou administrativo, desde que estas medidas sejam eficazes e proporcionais à seriedade das infracções. A Comissão não pode interferir de outro modo na escolha do instrumento por parte de cada Estado-Membro. Trata-se de uma eventualidade que podia tocar na questão sensível da soberania dos Estados.
Posto isto, repito que a Comissão entende que são preferíveis os processos administrativos e, logo, as sanções administrativas. São preferíveis porque podem ser aplicadas rapidamente por uma autoridade administrativa, não requerendo um processo moroso para apuramento das responsabilidades antes de poderem ser aplicadas sanções no âmbito de processos penais. São menos dispendiosas do que os processos judiciais. As sanções não penais podem ser aplicadas rapidamente e têm-se revelado mais eficazes do que sanções penais mais severas. Uma sanção administrativa como a suspensão de uma licença de pesca, por exemplo, pode ser uma forma eficaz de encorajar o cumprimento, uma vez que pode ser rapidamente aplicada. Lamento que a maioria dos Estados-Membros não utilize esta ferramenta com mais frequência.
A sanção – quer seja penal ou administrativa – deve ser ajustada à gravidade da infracção. Os factores atenuantes ou agravantes incluem um impacto negativo da infracção nos recursos haliêuticos ou na espécie piscícola, o comportamento anterior dos infractores, a reincidência na mesma infracção e os custos económicos estimados da infracção."@pt17
"Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@sk18
"Mr President, I wish to begin by saying – on the previous point made by Mr Casaca – that when preparing the allocation of grants, the Commission examines the requests submitted by Member States, taking into account the needs and efficiencies of each Member State, as they result mainly from the national programme and from the earlier report on control activities, which each Member State must transmit to the Commission. Priority is given to those investments which are deemed more cost-effective, bearing in mind the general interest in achieving a high level of control throughout the Community. Therefore, priority may change over the years and be different for different Member States.
The Commission has launched a consultation process on improving the quality of data collected and reported and the analysis of this data, in order to compare the situation between Member States. Furthermore, the Commission intends to propose a catalogue of sanctions to be imposed in cases of serious infringements, for adoption by the Council, as foreseen in Article 25(4) of Council Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002. The catalogue should help to increase the level of sanctions and contribute to the establishment of a more level playing field. This catalogue is scheduled to be presented by the Commission in the second half of 2007.
As I have already said, the discrepancies are, therefore, large and our preference is for administrative sanctions, since they are more effective and can be implemented quickly.
In reply to a specific point that was made, I would say that our proposal for the harmonisation of sanctions for serious infringements will be published in 2007. We hope that this will create a more level playing field and, at the same time, address the issue of proportionality.
With regard to the last point, which was raised by Mr Casaca, concerning Amendments 2 and 6, I apologise. The information that I have is that these amendments were not supported in committee. However, I will look into this and contact him tomorrow before the vote.
I totally agree with Mr Kindermann that control and enforcement is a cornerstone of the effectiveness of the common fisheries policy. I am committed to continuing to strengthen control and enforcement activities. The establishment of the control agency this year will certainly make an important contribution in this area.
On the points raised by Mrs Attwooll, Mr Crowley and other speakers with regard to the whole question of sanctions, let me say that the main trend, as published in the communication, shows that the total number of serious infringements has varied considerably from one year to another – from 4 180 in 2000 to 9 502 in 2003. It is difficult to know if this increase in the infringements detected means that the rate of detection of serious infringements is improving or if the number of infringements committed has increased.
One notable element of progress with regard to deterrence is the fact that the average amount of fines imposed has increased from EUR 1 757 in 2002 to EUR 4 664 in 2003 – that is an increase in one year of 165%. However, the fact that fines imposed in 2003 amount to only 0.004% of the value of landings in 2002, makes us think that fines remain too modest to represent a real deterrent for rule breakers. Having said that, this is a general statement, and one would have to look into the various subsectors and offences with regard to which these fines have been imposed.
Some conclusions from the previous communications are, firstly, that there are substantial differences between the average penalties applied – as a number of Members have made clear tonight – and that the amount of penalties remains too low to represent an effective deterrent against non-compliance with the rules of the common fisheries policy.
Regarding whether criminal procedures or administrative procedures are the best option, Article 25 of Regulation (EC) No 2371/2002 foresees that Member States are to take appropriate measures against responsible persons when the common fisheries rules have not been respected.
Member States can prosecute infringements through criminal or administrative procedures, provided that these measures are effective and proportionate to the seriousness of the infringements. The Commission cannot otherwise interfere in the choice of the instrument by individual Member States. This could touch upon the sensitive issue of state sovereignty.
Having said that, I repeat that it is the Commission’s view that administrative procedures – and thus administrative sanctions – are preferable. They are preferable because they can be imposed swiftly by an administrative authority, as this does not require the lengthy process involved in establishing liability before sanctions can be imposed in criminal proceedings. They are less expensive than judicial proceedings. Non-criminal sanctions can be swiftly imposed and have been seen to be more effective than more severe penal sanctions. For instance, an administrative sanction, such as suspension of a fishing permit, may be an effective way to encourage compliance, as it can be applied quickly. I regret that the majority of Member States do not use this tool more often.
The sanction – be it criminal or administrative – must be tailored to the seriousness of the infringement. Mitigating or aggravating factors include: a negative impact of the violation on fisheries resources or type of fish; previous conduct of the violators; repetition of the same infringement; and the estimated economic benefits deriving from the infringement."@sl19
".
Herr talman! Jag vill börja med att säga – med hänvisning till den föregående poängen från Paulo Casaca – att vid förberedelsen av tilldelningen av bidrag undersöker kommissionen de förfrågningar som har framställts av medlemsstaterna, och tar hänsyn till varje medlemsstats behov och effektivitet, eftersom de främst är följder av det nationella programmet och av den tidigare rapporten om kontrollverksamhet, som varje medlemsstat måste överlämna till kommissionen. Prioritet ges åt de investeringar som anses mest kostnadseffektiva, och vi kommer ihåg det allmänna intresset för att uppnå en hög kontrollnivå i hela gemenskapen. Därför kan prioriteringen förändras över åren och vara olika för olika medlemsstater.
Kommissionen har inlett ett samrådsförfarande för att förbättra kvaliteten på de uppgifter som samlas in och rapporteras och analysen av dessa uppgifter, för att jämföra situationen mellan medlemsstaterna. Kommissionen har vidare för avsikt att föreslå en katalog av påföljder som ska utdömas i fall av allvarliga överträdelser, som ska antas av rådet, i enlighet med artikel 25.4 i rådets förordning (EG) nr 2371/2002. Katalogen bör bidra till att höja sanktionernas nivå och bidra till att skapa mer likvärdiga villkor. Enligt planen ska denna katalog läggas fram av kommissionen under andra halvåret 2007.
Som jag redan har sagt är skillnaderna därför stora, och vi föredrar administrativa påföljder, eftersom de är effektivare och kan genomföras snabbt.
Som svar på en specifik punkt som togs upp vill jag säga att vårt förslag för harmonisering av påföljderna för allvarliga överträdelser kommer att publiceras 2007. Vi hoppas att det kommer att skapa mer likvärdiga villkor och samtidigt hantera frågan om proportionalitet.
När det gäller den sista punkt som togs upp av Paulo Casaca, om ändringsförslagen 2 och 6, ber jag om ursäkt. Den information som jag har är att dessa ändringsförslag saknade stöd i utskottet. Jag ska emellertid se över detta och kontakta honom i morgon före omröstningen.
Jag håller helt med Heinz Kindermann och att kontroll och verkställande är en hörnsten i den gemensamma fiskeripolitikens effektivitet. Jag är hängiven uppgiften att fortsätta att stärka aktiviteterna för kontroll och verkställande. Inrättandet av kontrollmyndigheten i år kommer utan tvekan att ge ett stort bidrag inom detta område.
När det gäller de punkter som har tagits upp av Elspeth Attwooll, Brian Crowley och andra talare med hänsyn till hela påföljdsfrågan vill jag säga att huvudtrenden, som publiceras i meddelandet, visar att det totala antalet allvarliga överträdelser har varierat avsevärt från ett år till nästa – från 4 180 under 2000 till 9 502 under 2003. Det är svårt att veta om denna ökning av antalet upptäckta överträdelser innebär att andelen upptäckta allvarliga överträdelser förbättras eller om antalet överträdelser som begås har ökat.
En anmärkningsvärd del av framstegen när det gäller avskräckande är att det genomsnittliga bötesbelopp som utdöms har ökat från 1 757 euro 2002 till 4 664 euro 2003 – det är en ökning med 165 procent på ett år. Det faktum att de utdömda böterna för 2003 endast uppgår till 0,004 procent av värdet på den landade fångsten för 2002 får oss emellertid att tro att böterna fortfarande är för blygsamma för att utgöra en verkligt avskräckande faktor för dem som bryter mot reglerna. Samtidigt är det här ett allmänt uttalande, och man måste se över de olika undersektorer och förseelser för vilka dessa böter har utdömts.
Vissa slutsatser från de tidigare meddelandena är, för det första, att det finns betydande skillnader mellan de genomsnittliga påföljder som tillämpas – som ett antal ledamöter har gjort klart i kväll – och att påföljdernas belopp fortfarande är för lågt för att utgöra en verkligt avskräckande faktor för att inte uppfylla reglerna i den gemensamma fiskeripolitiken.
När det gäller frågan huruvida straffrättsliga eller administrativa förfaranden är det bästa alternativet föreskrivs i artikel 25 i förordning (EG) nr 2371/2002 att medlemsstaterna ska vidta lämpliga åtgärder mot de ansvariga personerna när de gemensamma fiskeribestämmelserna inte har följts.
Medlemsstaterna beivrar överträdelser genom straffrättsliga eller administrativa förfaranden, under förutsättning att dessa åtgärder är effektiva och står i proportion till överträdelsens allvar. Kommissionen får annars inte blanda sig i enskilda medlemsstaters val av instrument. Det kan snudda vid den känsliga frågan om staters suveränitet.
Samtidigt upprepar jag att kommissionen anser att administrativa förfaranden – och därmed administrativa påföljder – är att föredra. De är att föredra eftersom de kan utdömas snabbt av en administrativ myndighet, eftersom de inte kräver den utdragna process som ingår vid bevisning i ansvarsfrågan innan påföljder kan utdömas i straffrättsliga förfaranden. De är billigare än domstolsförfaranden. Icke straffrättsliga påföljder kan utdömas snabbt och har visat sig effektivare än strängare straffrättsliga påföljder. En administrativ påföljd som ett indraget fisketillstånd kan exempelvis vara ett effektivt sätt att uppmuntra till uppfyllande, eftersom den kan utdömas snabbt. Jag beklagar att de flesta medlemsstater inte använder detta redskap oftare.
Påföljden måste – oavsett om den är straffrättslig eller administrativ – vara anpassad till överträdelsens allvar. Bland de förmildrande eller försvårande faktorerna finns en negativ effekt av överträdelsen på fiskeresurserna eller typen av fisk, gärningsmännens tidigare beteende, upprepning av samma överträdelse och de beräknade ekonomiska fördelarna till följd av överträdelsen."@sv21
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