Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-11-30-Speech-3-027"
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".
Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@en4
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| lpv:translated text |
"Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@cs1
"Hr. formand, dette er en vigtig forhandling. Meget afhænger af Doha-runden, både for os i Europa, for udviklingslandene og for hele den globale økonomi. Om godt en uge begynder WTO-ministermødet i Hongkong. Jeg ved, at nogle af Dem vil være til stede, så det er afgørende, at jeg informerer Dem formelt om, hvor vi står, og at vi drøfter situationen i forbindelse med denne runde.
Lad os gøre værdien af vores tilbud om landbrug klar. Det går meget længere, end vi gik i Uruguay-runden. Det skal ses som en helhed, ikke bare hvad angår de toldnedsættelser, som vi foreslår, men også hvad angår vores store bidrag til at nedsætte den interne støtte gennem reformen af den fælles landbrugspolitik og vores tilbud om helt at afskaffe eksportsubsidier.
Vi vil nedsætte de handelsforvridende subsidier med 70 %. Allerede som følge af reformen af den fælles landbrugspolitik i 2003 vil 90 % af de direkte betalinger til landbrugere ikke længere forvride handelen. Med vores forslag vil vores gennemsnitlige landbrugstold falde fra 23 % til 12 %, hvilket i øvrigt svarer til USA's aktuelle niveau. Som helhed er dette det mest vidtrækkende tilbud, EU nogensinde har givet i en handelsrunde. Hvert af dets elementer - ikke bare toldnedsættelserne - vil give væsentligt forbedret markedsadgang, som det kræves i rammeaftalen fra 2004. Det vil give landbrugseksportørerne betydelige muligheder uden at udslette den præferentielle adgang for fattige udviklingslande eller volde vores egen landbrugssektor i Europa alvorlig skade.
Vi må skabe en balance. Dette er efter min mening den rette balance. Vi har et ansvar for at tage hensyn til reformers indvirkning på de europæiske landbrugssamfund. Hvad mere er, er dette en runde for
udviklingslande, navnlig de fattige og nødlidende, og ikke bare for konkurrencedygtige landbrugsproducenter, der efter min opfattelse ikke bør forsøge at maksimere deres egne konkurrencefordele på verdensmarkederne på bekostning af andre udviklingslande i WTO.
I sidste uge så vi inden for sukker, hvor følsomt problemet med præferenceudhulning er for nødlidende AVS-lande. Det påhviler os alle, ikke bare i Europa, men alle WTO's medlemmer, at tage dette fuldt ud i betragtning. Vi ignorerer dette med fare for alle, både dem, hvis livsgrundlag trues af det, og dem, der bærer ansvaret, hvis de ikke reagerer på præferenceudhulning.
Derfor er vores tilbud vidtrækkende, velovervejet og troværdigt. Det har bragt realisme ind i landbrugsforhandlingerne. Mens USA's krav om toldnedsættelser og - i mindre grad - G20's forslag utvivlsomt ville være til fordel for disse lande, ville de også have katastrofal beskæftigelsesmæssig indvirkning på vores egne landbrugere og på fattige lande i Afrika, Vestindien og Stillehavet, fordi størstedelen af deres landbrugshandel ganske enkelt ville blive udslettet, hvis vi accepterede disse krav.
Derfor skal det stå helt klart, at jeg ikke har nogen planer om at tilbyde mere på landbrugsområdet. Det er ikke rimeligt og ville bringe forhandlingerne endnu mere ud af balance. Det er på tide, at andre lever op til vores indsats. Regeringerne og borgerne i Europa må have tiltro til, at strukturelle ændringer og evt. tab af arbejdspladser i landbrugssektoren vil blive opvejet af nye arbejdspladser og nye muligheder i andre sektorer. Det er derfor, at vores forhandlingsmål for markedsadgang for ikke-landbrugsvarer, for industrivarer og tjenesteydelser, er så vigtige. De er afgørende for vækst og beskæftigelse i Europa og er et vigtigt led i Lissabon-dagsordenen.
Jeg vil forsvare disse interesser energisk, og på landbrugsområdet vil jeg også insistere på en aftale om og en udvidelse af et register over geografiske betegnelser. Det er sådan, multilaterale forhandlinger fungerer. Der skal være gevinster hele vejen rundt. Det betyder, at andre nu må gøre en alvorlig indsats for at skabe ny markedsadgang for varer og tjenesteydelser, som ikke bare er vigtig for Europa, men også for verdensøkonomien og især for udviklingen. Det betyder nedsættelse af de toldsatser på industrivarer, der faktisk anvendes, ikke kun nedsættelse af det bundne niveau, der blev aftalt for 12 år siden under Uruguay-runden. Dette vil, når alt kommer til alt, være virkningen af vores forslag på landbrugsområdet, for til forskel fra mange udviklingslande er vores bundne og anvendte toldsatser normalt de samme.
Det betyder ikke, at vi løber fra vores tilsagn om, at udviklede lande skal gøre mere end udviklingslande. Det gør vi naturligvis ikke. Vi forventer ikke tilbud fra de mindst udviklede lande og andre svage og sårbare lande. Vi forventer heller ikke, at udviklingslandene skal leve op til de udviklede landes markedsåbningsniveau. Men noget må de gøre. Det er princippet for denne runde.
Vi må også gøre fremskridt inden for handel med tjenesteydelser. Den aktuelle forhandlingsstrategi baseret på anmodninger og tilbud har ikke givet tilfredsstillende resultater. Vi må skabe en platform for ægte multilateral forhandling, som ikke eksisterer for øjeblikket. Dette er en følge af betydningen af tjenesteydelser i den moderne verdensøkonomi. Det er vigtigt for ikke bare os, men også udviklingslandene. Disse lande skal naturligvis fortsat have mulighed for inden for tjenesteydelser at arbejde for nationale politiske mål og fuldt ud beskytte deres nationale ret til at regulere.
Det, vi ønsker, er ligebehandling af udenlandske leverandører af tjenesteydelser i nogle sektorer, ikke et tilsagn om at deregulere markeder eller privatisere eksisterende operatører. Også her udelukker vi i vores forslag svage og sårbare lande og giver andre udviklingslande fleksibilitet.
Vi er langt fra der, hvor vi håbede at være. Ligesom Pascal Lamy havde jeg håbet, at vi i Hongkong kunne fuldføre to tredjedele af rundens arbejde, navnlig ved at blive enige om de fulde modaliteter på de vigtigste forhandlingsområder. Årsagen til, at vi ikke har opnået dette, er ganske enkelt, at forhandlingerne gik i stå, efter at vi blev enige om rammeaftalen i juli 2004. Nogle forhandlere gennemgik en periode med overvejelser, som vi først var i stand til at bryde i juli i år. Selv om USA omsider gav et landbrugstilbud i oktober, var det mange måneder senere, end vi havde håbet. EU reagerede den samme måned med vores eget tilbud om landbrugsmarkedsadgang. Men der var andre, som fortsat blokerede forhandlingerne. I alt for lang tid har vi hængt fast i et emne og en gruppes interesser - de store landbrugseksportørers - i stedet for at fremme hele Doha-dagsordenen.
Til sidst vil jeg sige, at jeg vil gøre mit yderste for, at Hongkong-konferencen bliver vellykket, for at holde fast i de fremskridt, vi har gjort, og for at skabe en platform, der giver os mulighed for at fuldføre arbejdet i 2006. Det allervigtigste er, at mødet ikke ender i bitterhed. Jeg vil forsvare og forklare Europas forslag. Jeg vil varetage Europas interesser, og jeg vil opretholde ambitionerne med runden som helhed ved at nå til enighed med vores forhandlingspartnere, når og hvor det er muligt.
Jeg håber, at de vil gøre ligeså. De må holde op med at gemme sig bag ubegrundet kritik af EU, holde op med at gemme sig bag åbenlyst urealistiske og taktiske krav og indgå i en reel forhandling om alle emnerne. Hvis de bliver ved med bare at forlange mere af Europa uden at bidrage med noget selv, er det dem og ikke os, der risikerer at ødelægge denne runde. Hvis det sker, ender de med ikke at opnå noget som helst.
Lad os hellere arbejde sammen om et resultat, der sætter skub i verdens økonomi, skaber politisk tillid og hjælper verdens fattige. Det var sådan, vi gik ind i denne runde, og det er sådan, vi ønsker at komme ud af den. Muligheden er der stadig, og behovet er lige så påtrængende nu, som det var, da vi indledte runden. Nu må alle trække på samme hammel for at få det til at ske og nå de mål, som vi satte os til at begynde med, da vi blev enige om Doha-dagsordenen for snart mange år siden.
Så selv om det er in at beskylde EU for at forsinke denne runde ved at være forbeholden på landbrugsområdet, er det faktisk lige omvendt. Vi har fremmet runden inden for landbrug, ikke bare en, men tre gange i løbet af de sidste 18 måneder. Sandheden er, at andre har stillet sig afventende, ikke fordi vi har gjort eller tilbudt for lidt, men fordi de har forlangt for meget. Dette er en udviklingsrunde, ikke en landbrugseksportørrunde, og de to ting må ikke forveksles.
I betragtning af denne forsinkelse fulgte WTO-medlemmerne Pascal Lamys råd og besluttede, at de i stedet for at tage til Hongkong med store forventninger og lige så stor risiko for fiasko ville sænke ambitionerne for mødet. Jeg var den sidste, der modvilligt accepterede det, men da jeg gjorde det, gjorde jeg det klart, at det ikke må være ensbetydende med, at ambitionerne for runden som helhed sænkes. Vi skal stadig gå efter et vellykket resultat over hele forhandlingsdagsordenen med betydelige udviklingsgevinster inden udgangen af næste år.
Det skal stå klart, at Doha-runden er for omfattende til at mislykkes. Det drejer sig ikke bare om handel, det drejer sig om at fastholde det multilaterale samarbejdes troværdighed, om at vise, at multilaterale institutioner kan finde globale svar på globale spørgsmål, og bevise, at handel virkelig kan skabe udvikling.
Den bedste måde at fremme udvikling på er at åbne nye handelsmuligheder for udviklingslandene og dernæst yde bistand, så de kan udnytte disse muligheder. Det gælder i endnu højere grad for industrivarer og tjenesteydelser end for handel med landbrugsvarer, og det gælder især for handel mellem udviklingslande. De største handelsmuligheder for udviklingslandene består i, at de handler indbyrdes. De største hindringer for denne handel er de toldsatser på industrivarer, der eksisterer mellem udviklingslandene. Jeg beklager, at vi ikke vil kunne gøre nogen særlige fremskridt på dette område i Hongkong. Det er derfor, at vi har brug for en udviklingspakke, der er tilpasset til de fattigste lande, ikke som en erstatning for det, vi kunne opnå senere, men som et forskud på det.
Hovedelementerne i mit udviklingsforslag, som jeg forelagde for første gang på miniministermødet i Zürich i oktober, og som jeg har argumenteret for lige siden, er for det første, at alle industrialiserede WTO-medlemmer skal forpligte sig til at give told- og kvotefri adgang for alle varer fra de mindst udviklede lande, for det andet, at vi skal vedtage en pakke med forslag til særlig og differentieret behandling for at bekræfte den fleksibilitet for de mindst udviklede lande, der eksisterer i WTO, for det tredje må vi i WTO's aftaler om intellektuelle ejendomsrettigheder skabe betingelser for bedre adgang til billig medicin mod pandemier, og for det fjerde må vi vedtage en stærk handelsstøttepakke i overensstemmelse med det, der blev aftalt på G8-topmødet i Gleneagles. Kommissionen har foregået med et godt eksempel med kommissionsformand Barrosos tilsagn om 1 milliard euro årligt på G8-topmødet. Jeg håber, at WTO-partnerne kan tilslutte sig disse idéer i Hongkong.
Nu vil jeg tale om andre aspekter af forhandlingerne. Den 28. oktober forelagde EU et omfattende forhandlingstilbud, der også omfatter landbrugsmarkedsadgang. Det skabte en hårdt tiltrængt mulighed for at sætte skub i hele runden. Det var en nødvendig og rigtig ting at gøre, fordi det gav os mulighed for at indlede de første rigtige politiske forhandlinger om industrivarer og tjenesteydelser, antidumpingbestemmelser og udvikling. Det begyndte at bringe runden tilbage på sporet.
Jeg beklager dybt, at vores forhandlingspartnere i stedet for at gribe denne chance og bygge på den besluttede at tage den letteste udvej ved at forkaste vores tilbud om landbrug og kritisere det - ofte overdrevent - i stedet for at tage det alvorligt og give os mulighed for at gøre fremskridt."@da2
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Herr Präsident! Dies ist eine wichtige Aussprache. Vieles hängt von der Doha-Runde ab, für uns in Europa, für die Entwicklungsländer und im Grunde für die gesamte Weltwirtschaft. In gut einer Woche wird in Hongkong die WTO-Ministerkonferenz beginnen. Ich weiß, einige von Ihnen werden dort sein, deshalb ist es wichtig, dass ich Ihnen formell berichte, wo wir stehen, und dass wir die Umstände dieser Runde diskutieren.
Zum Wert unseres Angebots zur Landwirtschaft muss man doch ganz klar sagen, dass es viel weiter geht als in der Uruguay-Runde. Man muss es im Ganzen betrachten, nicht nur unter dem Aspekt der Zollsenkungen, die wir vorgeschlagen haben, sondern man muss auch unsere erheblichen Beiträge in Bezug auf den Abbau der Stützungen durch die GAP-Reform und unser Angebot, die Exportunterstützungen ganz und gar aufzuheben, sehen.
Wir werden handelsverzerrende Subventionen um 70 % reduzieren. Schon im Rahmen der GAP-Reform von 2003 werden 90 % der Direktzahlungen an Landwirte nicht mehr handelsverzerrend wirken. Gemäß unserem Vorschlag wird der durchschnittliche Agrarzoll von 23 % auf 12 % sinken, was übrigens genau so hoch ist wie der derzeitige Stand in den USA. Unter dem Strich ist dies das substanziellste Angebot, das die Europäische Union in einer Handelsrunde je auf den Tisch gelegt hat. Jeder Teil davon, nicht nur die Zollkürzungen, wird den Marktzugang erheblich verbessern, wie im Rahmenabkommen von 2004 gefordert. Damit werden sich erhebliche Chancen für Agrarexporteure eröffnen, ohne den Präferenzzugang für arme Entwicklungsländer abzuschaffen oder unserem eigenen Agrarsektor in Europa übermäßigen Schaden zuzufügen.
Wir müssen ein Gleichgewicht herstellen. Meiner Meinung nach ist dies das richtige Gleichgewicht. Wir haben die Verantwortung, die Auswirkungen von Reformen auf europäische Landwirte zu bedenken. Zudem ist dies eine Runde für
Entwicklungsländer, vor allem die armen und bedürftigen, und nicht nur für die wettbewerbsfähigen Agrarproduzenten, die meines Erachtens nicht danach streben sollten, ihren Wettbewerbsvorteil auf den Weltmärkten auf Kosten anderer Entwicklungsländer in der WTO so hoch wie möglich zu schrauben.
Wir haben ja letzte Woche beim Zucker erlebt, wie sensibel das Problem der Präferenzerosion für bedürftige AKP-Länder ist. Wir alle, nicht nur die Europäer, sondern die WTO-Mitglieder insgesamt, müssen dies in jeder Beziehung in Betracht ziehen. Wir ignorieren es zum Schaden aller: derjenigen, deren Lebensunterhalt davon bedroht ist, und derjenigen, die verantwortlich sind, wenn sie nicht auf das Problem der Präferenzerosion reagieren.
Deshalb ist unser Angebot substanziell, ausgelotet und glaubwürdig. Es lässt die Agrarverhandlungen realistisch werden. Sicherlich würden die amerikanischen Forderungen für Zollsenkungen und – in geringerem Maße – die G20-Vorschläge diesen Ländern nützen, aber sie hätten auch verheerende Arbeitsmarktauswirkungen für unsere eigenen Landwirte und die armen Länder in Afrika, der Karibik und im pazifischen Raum, deren Agrarhandel zum großen Teil einfach ausgelöscht würde, wenn wir diesen Forderungen nachgeben würden.
Deshalb müssen wir eines ganz klar sagen: Ich habe nicht vor, ein weiteres Angebot zur Landwirtschaft zu unterbreiten. Das wäre nicht gerechtfertigt und würde die Verhandlungen weiter aus dem Gleichgewicht bringen. Jetzt sind andere am Zug, unseren Bemühungen etwas Gleichwertiges entgegenzusetzen. Regierungen und Bürger in Europa müssen daran glauben, dass Strukturveränderungen und eventuelle Arbeitsplatzverluste in der Landwirtschaft durch die Schaffung neuer Arbeitsplätze und neuer Möglichkeiten in anderen Sektoren ausgeglichen werden. Deshalb sind unsere Verhandlungsziele beim Zugang zu anderen Märkten als der Landwirtschaft, bei Industriegütern und Dienstleistungen, auch so wichtig. Sie entscheiden über Wachstum und Arbeitsplätze in Europa und sind ein unverzichtbarer Teil der Lissabon-Agenda.
Ich werde diese Interessen mit aller Kraft vertreten und werde bei der Landwirtschaft auch auf der Einführung und Erweiterung eines Verzeichnisses der geografischen Bezeichnungen bestehen. So funktionieren multilaterale Verhandlungen. Es muss für alle etwas dabei herauskommen. Also müssen andere nun ernsthaft daran gehen, einen neuen Marktzugang für Güter und Dienstleistungen zu schaffen, die nicht nur für Europa eine Rolle spielen, sondern auch für die Weltwirtschaft und ganz entscheidend für die Entwicklung. Das bedeutet eine Kürzung von Industriezöllen, wie sie tatsächlich angewandt werden, nicht nur durch eine Absenkung der verbindlichen Tarife, die vor zwölf Jahren in der Uruguay-Runde vereinbart wurden. Immerhin wird das ja die Folge unserer Vorschläge zur Landwirtschaft sein, denn im Gegensatz zu vielen Entwicklungsländern sind unsere verbindlichen und angewandten Zölle in der Regel gleich.
Das bedeutet nicht, dass wir unsere Verpflichtung aufgeben, als entwickelte Länder mehr zu leisten als die Entwicklungsländer. Natürlich werden wir uns daran halten. Wir erwarten keine Angebote von den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern und anderen schwachen und labilen Ländern. Ebenso wenig erwarten wir von anderen Entwicklungsländern, dass sie ihre Märkte im gleichen Umfang öffnen wie die entwickelten Länder. Aber etwas müssen sie tun. Das ist der Grundsatz dieser Runde.
Wir brauchen auch Fortschritte beim Handel mit Dienstleistungen. Das aktuelle Verhandlungskonzept, das auf Anträgen und Angeboten basiert, hat keine befriedigenden Resultate erbracht. Wir müssen eine Plattform für echte mehrseitige Verhandlungen schaffen, die es bisher nicht gibt. Darin zeigt sich, wie wichtig Dienstleistungen in der modernen Weltwirtschaft sind. Wichtig nicht nur für uns, sondern auch für die Entwicklungsländer. Diese Länder müssen eindeutig kostenlose Dienstleistungen beibehalten, um landespolitische Ziele zu verfolgen und ihr nationales Regulierungsrecht in vollem Umfang zu sichern.
Worum wir uns bemühen müssen ist die Gleichbehandlung von ausländischen Diensteanbietern in einigen Sektoren, keine Verpflichtung, Märkte zu deregulieren oder vorhandene Betreiber zu privatisieren. Auch hier sind bei unseren Vorschlägen schwache und labile Länder ausgenommen und wird anderen Entwicklungsländern Flexibilität eingeräumt.
Wir sind weit von dem entfernt, was wir erhofft hatten. Wie Pascal Lamy hatte auch ich erwartet, dass wir in Hongkong zwei Drittel der Arbeit dieser Runde abschließen könnten, vor allem durch die Vereinbarung aller Modalitäten in den wichtigsten Verhandlungsfeldern. Der Grund, warum wir das nicht erreicht haben, ist einfach der, dass nach der Einigung auf das Rahmenabkommen im Juli 2004 die Gespräche schlicht stagnierten. Die Periode der Hinhaltetaktik einiger Verhandlungsteilnehmer konnte erst im Juli dieses Jahres beendet werden. Im Oktober legten die USA endlich ein Angebot zur Landwirtschaft vor, aber das kam viele Monate später als wir erhofft hatten. Die EU hat im selben Monat mit einem eigenen Angebot für den Zugang zum Agrarmarkt reagiert. Andere haben die Verhandlung weiter behindert. Wir stecken schon viel zu lange bei einem Thema und einem Interessensbereich fest – dem der Agrar-Großexporteure –, statt mit der gesamten Doha-Agenda voranzukommen.
Abschließend möchte ich sagen, dass ich mein Bestes tun werde, um Hongkong zu einem Erfolg zu machen, die Fortschritte, die wir bisher erreicht haben, zu festigen und eine Basis zu schaffen, von der aus wir die Arbeit 2006 zu Ende bringen können. Vor allem kommt es darauf an, dass die Konferenz nicht in Missstimmung endet. Ich werde die europäischen Vorschläge verteidigen und erläutern. Ich werde die europäischen Interessen vertreten, und ich werde den Anspruch der Runde als Ganzes hochhalten, indem ich - wann immer und wo immer möglich - Konsens mit unseren Verhandlungspartnern schaffe.
Ich hoffe, sie werden das auch tun. Sie müssen aufhören, sich hinter unbegründeter Kritik der Europäischen Union zu verstecken, aufhören, sich hinter offenkundig unrealistischen und taktischen Forderungen zu verstecken, sondern sich an echten Verhandlungen zu allen Punkten beteiligen. Wenn sie nur fortfahren, mehr von Europa zu verlangen, als sie selbst beizusteuern bereit sind, dann riskieren sie – nicht wir – das Scheitern dieser Runde. Wenn das eintritt, werden sie am Ende mit völlig leeren Händen dastehen.
Wir sollten lieber gemeinsam auf ein Ergebnis hinarbeiten, das die Weltwirtschaft ankurbelt, politisches Vertrauen erzeugt und den Armen der Welt hilft. So sind wir in diese Runde hineingegangen, so wollen wir aus ihr herausgehen. Die Möglichkeit ist nach wie vor gegeben, die Notwendigkeit jetzt so drängend wie zu Beginn der Runde. Jeder muss nun am gleichen Strang ziehen, damit wir das schaffen und die Ziele erreichen, die wir uns eingangs gesteckt haben, als wir vor so vielen Jahren die Charta von Doha vereinbarten.
So ist es nun zwar Mode, der Europäischen Union vorzuwerfen, sie halte diese Runde auf, weil sie bei der Landwirtschaft unnachgiebig sei, aber in Wahrheit ist doch das Gegenteil der Fall. Wir haben die Runde bei der Landwirtschaft vorangebracht, und das nicht nur einmal, sondern dreimal in den letzten 18 Monaten. In Wahrheit haben sich andere zurückgehalten, nicht, weil wir zu wenig getan oder angeboten hätten, sondern weil sie zu viel gefordert haben. Dies ist eine Entwicklungsrunde, keine Agrarexporteurrunde, und man darf die beiden nicht miteinander verwechseln.
Angesichts dieser Verzögerung reisen die WTO-Mitglieder nicht mit großen Erwartungen und einem entsprechenden Risiko des Scheiterns nach Hongkong, sondern haben auf Anraten von Pascal Lamy die Ansprüche an diese Konferenz heruntergeschraubt. Ich war der Letzte, der das unter Zögern akzeptiert hat, aber auf diese Weise habe ich klargemacht, dass damit nun nicht die Ansprüche für die gesamte Runde niedriger sind. Wir müssen uns weiterhin um einen erfolgreichen Ausgang für die gesamte Verhandlungsagenda bemühen, so dass bis Ende nächsten Jahres deutliche Entwicklungsgewinne vorliegen.
Man muss doch ganz klar sagen, dass die Doha-Runde zu bedeutsam ist, um zu scheitern. Es geht ja nicht nur um Handel, es geht darum, die Glaubwürdigkeit der multilateralen Zusammenarbeit zu wahren, zu zeigen, dass multilaterale Institutionen globale Antworten auf globale Fragen finden können, zu beweisen, dass Handel tatsächlich in den Dienst von Entwicklung gestellt werden kann.
Der beste Weg, Entwicklung zu fördern, besteht darin, für Entwicklungsländer neue Handelschancen zu eröffnen und ihnen dann mit Entwicklungshilfe zu helfen, diese Chancen zu nutzen. Das gilt noch mehr für Industriegüter und Dienstleistungen als für den Agrarhandel, und es gilt ganz besonders für den Handel zwischen Entwicklungsländern. Die größten Handelschancen für Entwicklungsländer bestehen im Handel mit anderen Entwicklungsländern. Die größten Hindernisse für diesen Handel sind die Zölle auf Industriegüter zwischen Entwicklungsländern. Ich bedauere, dass wir das in Hongkong nicht wesentlich werden voranbringen können. Eben deshalb brauchen wir ein maßgeschneidertes Entwicklungspaket für die ärmsten Länder, nicht als Ersatz dafür, was wir später erreichen könnten, sondern als „Anzahlung“ darauf.
Die Hauptbestandteile meines Entwicklungsvorschlags, den ich zuerst auf der Mini-Ministerkonferenz im Oktober in Zürich vorgetragen habe und für den ich mich seither mit Nachdruck einsetze, sehen wie folgt aus: Erstens sollten sich alle der WTO angehörenden Industriestaaten verpflichten, einen zoll- und quotenfreien Marktzugang für alle Produkte aus den am wenigsten entwickelten Ländern zu gewähren; zweitens sollten wir ein Paket von besonderen und differenzierten Vorschlägen vereinbaren, um die Flexibilität für diejenigen LDC zu bestätigen, die WTO-Mitglieder sind; drittens müssen wir die Bedingungen der WTO-Vereinbarungen zum geistigen Eigentum für einen besseren Zugang zu preiswerten Arzneimitteln zur Behandlung bei Pandemien verankern; und viertens sollten wir ein umfassendes Paket zur handelsbezogenen Entwicklungshilfe, „aid for trade“, im Sinne dessen beschließen, was auf dem G8-Gipfel von Gleneagles vereinbart wurde. Die Kommission gibt hier ein Beispiel mit der Zusage von Präsident Barroso auf dem G8-Gipfel über eine Milliarde Euro jährlich. Ich hoffe, die WTO-Partner können sich diesen Konzepten in Hongkong anschließen.
Lassen Sie mich nun etwas zu anderen Aspekten der Verhandlungen sagen. Am 28. Oktober legte die EU ein umfangreiches Verhandlungsangebot auf den Tisch, darunter auch zum Zugang zum Agrarmarkt. Damit wurde eine dringend benötigte Gelegenheit eröffnet, die gesamte Runde voranzubringen. Das war notwendig und richtig, denn so konnten die ersten wirklichen Verhandlungen auf politischer Ebene über Industriegüter und Dienstleistungen, Antidumpingbestimmungen und Entwicklung geführt werden. Das war der Auftakt für eine Neuausbalancierung der Runde.
Ich bedauere zutiefst, dass unsere Verhandlungspartner diese Chance nicht beim Schopf ergriffen und darauf aufgebaut haben, sondern es vorzogen, sich die Sache einfach zu machen, indem sie unser Angebot zur Landwirtschaft ablehnten und kritisierten – oft in unangemessener Weise –, statt darauf einzugehen und uns zu ermöglichen, voranzukommen."@de9
"Κύριε Πρόεδρε, πρόκειται για μια σημαντική συζήτηση. Πολλά εξαρτώνται από τον Γύρο της Ντόχα: για εμάς στην Ευρώπη, για τις αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες και για όλη την παγκόσμια οικονομία. Σε λίγο περισσότερο από μία εβδομάδα, θα ξεκινήσει στο Χονγκ Κονγκ η Υπουργική Διάσκεψη του ΠΟΕ. Γνωρίζω ότι κάποιοι από εσάς θα είστε παρόντες, συνεπώς είναι σημαντικό να σας ενημερώσω επίσημα σχετικά με τη θέση μας και να συζητήσουμε την κατάσταση σε αυτό τον γύρο.
Ας είμαστε σαφείς για την αξία της προσφοράς μας σχετικά με τη γεωργία. Προχωρά πολύ πιο μακριά από εκεί που φτάσαμε στον Γύρο της Ουρουγουάης. Πρέπει να εξεταστεί ως σύνολο και όχι απλώς ως προς τις μειώσεις δασμών που προτείνουμε, αλλά λαμβάνοντας υπόψη και τις σημαντικές συνδρομές μας για τη μείωση των εσωτερικών ενισχύσεων μέσω της μεταρρύθμισης της ΚΓΠ και την προσφορά μας για την πλήρη κατάργηση των εξαγωγικών επιδοτήσεων.
Θα μειώσουμε τις επιδοτήσεις που στρεβλώνουν το εμπόριο κατά 70%. Ήδη, στο πλαίσιο της μεταρρύθμισης της ΚΓΠ του 2003, το 90% των άμεσων πληρωμών στους αγρότες δεν θα στρεβλώνει πλέον την αγορά. Σύμφωνα με την πρότασή μας, ο μέσος γεωργικός δασμός θα μειωθεί από το 23% στο 12%, ποσοστό που παρενθετικά είναι το ίδιο με το τρέχον επίπεδο των ΗΠΑ. Στο σύνολό της, πρόκειται για την πιο ουσιαστική προσφορά που κατατέθηκε ποτέ από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση σε γύρο εμπορικών διαπραγματεύσεων. Κάθε στοιχείο της –όχι μόνον οι μειώσεις των δασμών– θα παράσχει ουσιαστική βελτίωση στην πρόσβαση στην αγορά, όπως απαιτείται στο πλαίσιο της συμφωνίας πλαισίου του 2004. Θα δημιουργήσει σημαντικές ευκαιρίες για τους γεωργικούς εξαγωγείς, χωρίς να καταργήσει την προτιμησιακή πρόσβαση για τις φτωχές αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες ή να βλάψει υπερβολικά τον δικό μας γεωργικό τομέα στην Ευρώπη.
Πρέπει να επιτύχουμε μια ισορροπία. Κατά την άποψή μου, αυτή είναι η κατάλληλη ισορροπία. Έχουμε ευθύνη να λάβουμε υπόψη τις επιπτώσεις της μεταρρύθμισης στις ευρωπαϊκές αγροτικές κοινωνίες. Επιπλέον, αυτός είναι ένας γύρος για
τις αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες, κυρίως τις φτωχές και τις χώρες που αντιμετωπίζουν ανάγκες, και όχι μόνο για ανταγωνιστικούς γεωργικούς παραγωγούς, οι οποίοι δεν πρέπει να επιδιώκουν, κατά τη γνώμη μου, τη μεγιστοποίηση του ανταγωνιστικού πλεονεκτήματός τους στις παγκόσμιες αγορές εις βάρος άλλων αναπτυσσόμενων χωρών στον ΠΟΕ.
Είδαμε την περασμένη εβδομάδα με τη ζάχαρη πόσο ευαίσθητο είναι το πρόβλημα της διάβρωσης των προτιμησιακών καθεστώτων για τις φτωχές χώρες ΑΚΕ. Πρέπει όλοι μας, όχι μόνο στην Ευρώπη, αλλά γενικά στον ΠΟΕ, να το λάβουμε αυτό πλήρως υπόψη. Το αγνοούμε θέτοντας όλους σε κίνδυνο: εκείνους που η επιβίωσή τους απειλείται από αυτό και εκείνους που θα φέρουν ευθύνη αν δεν ανταποκριθούν στο πρόβλημα της διάβρωσης των προτιμησιακών καθεστώτων.
Ως εκ τούτου, η προσφορά μας είναι ουσιαστική, μετρημένη και αξιόπιστη. Έχει προσδώσει ρεαλισμό στις γεωργικές διαπραγματεύσεις. Ενώ οι απαιτήσεις των ΗΠΑ για τις μειώσεις των δασμών και –σε μικρότερο βαθμό– οι προτάσεις της ομάδας G20 θα ωφελούσαν αναμφίβολα αυτές τις χώρες, θα είχαν επίσης και καταστρεπτικές συνέπειες για τους δικούς μας αγρότες και για τις φτωχές χώρες στην Αφρική, την Καραϊβική και τον Ειρηνικό, μεγάλο μέρος του γεωργικού εμπορίου των οποίων θα εξαφανιζόταν, αν αποδεχόμασταν αυτές τις απαιτήσεις.
Ας είμαστε λοιπόν απολύτως σαφείς. Δεν σκοπεύω να καταθέσω άλλη προσφορά για τη γεωργία. Αυτό δεν είναι βάσιμο και θα προκαλούσε περαιτέρω ανισορροπία στις διαπραγματεύσεις. Ήρθε η ώρα και για τους άλλους να επιδείξουν προσπάθεια εφάμιλλη με τη δική μας. Οι κυβερνήσεις και οι πολίτες στην Ευρώπη πρέπει να πιστέψουν ότι η διαρθρωτική αλλαγή και οι πιθανές απώλειες θέσεων απασχόλησης στη γεωργία θα εξισορροπηθούν από τη δημιουργία νέων θέσεων απασχόλησης και νέων ευκαιριών σε άλλους τομείς. Για αυτό είναι τόσο σημαντικοί οι διαπραγματευτικοί μας στόχοι για την πρόσβαση σε μη γεωργικές αγορές, για τα βιομηχανικά αγαθά και τις υπηρεσίες. Είναι καίριοι για την ανάπτυξη και για τις θέσεις απασχόλησης στην Ευρώπη και αποτελούν ζωτικό τμήμα της ατζέντας της Λισαβόνας.
Θα επιδιώξω σθεναρά αυτά τα συμφέροντα και, όσον αφορά τη γεωργία, θα επιμείνω επίσης για μια συμφωνία και μια επέκταση ενός μητρώου γεωγραφικών δεικτών. Έτσι λειτουργούν οι πολυμερείς διαπραγματεύσεις. Πρέπει να υπάρχουν κέρδη για όλους. Αυτό σημαίνει ότι άλλοι πρέπει τώρα να ασχοληθούν σοβαρά με τη δημιουργία νέας πρόσβασης στην αγορά για τα αγαθά και τις υπηρεσίες, τα οποία είναι σημαντικά όχι μόνο για την Ευρώπη αλλά και για την παγκόσμια οικονομία και για την ανάπτυξη. Αυτό σημαίνει μείωση των βιομηχανικών δασμών, όπως εφαρμόζονται στην πραγματικότητα, και όχι μόνο μείωση των παγιοποιημένων επιπέδων που συμφωνήθηκαν πριν από 12 χρόνια στον Γύρο της Ουρουγουάης. Αυτή, εξάλλου, θα είναι η επίδραση των προτάσεών μας στη γεωργία, διότι, σε αντίθεση με πολλές αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες, οι παγιοποιημένοι και εφαρμοζόμενοι δασμοί μας είναι συνήθως οι ίδιοι.
Αυτό δεν σημαίνει αθέτηση της δέσμευσής μας ότι οι αναπτυγμένες χώρες θα κάνουν περισσότερα από τις αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες. Ασφαλώς και θα κάνουν περισσότερα. Δεν περιμένουμε προσφορές από τις λιγότερο αναπτυγμένες και άλλες αδύναμες και ευάλωτες χώρες. Ούτε περιμένουμε από άλλες αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες να προχωρήσουν σε εφάμιλλο άνοιγμα της αγοράς με αυτό τον αναπτυγμένων χωρών. Πρέπει όμως να κάνουν κάτι. Αυτή είναι η αρχή που διέπει αυτόν τον γύρο διαπραγματεύσεων.
Χρειαζόμαστε επίσης πρόοδο στο εμπόριο των υπηρεσιών. Η τρέχουσα διαπραγματευτική προσέγγιση που βασίζεται στα αιτήματα και στις προσφορές δεν έχει φέρει ακόμα ικανοποιητικά αποτελέσματα. Πρέπει να δημιουργήσουμε μια πλατφόρμα για αληθινή πολυμερή διαπραγμάτευση, η οποία, επί του παρόντος, δεν υπάρχει. Αυτό αντανακλά τη σημασία των υπηρεσιών στη σύγχρονη παγκόσμια οικονομία. Είναι σημαντικό όχι μόνο για εμάς αλλά και για τις αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες. Αυτές οι χώρες πρέπει να παραμείνουν ασφαλώς ελεύθερες στις υπηρεσίες για να επιδιώξουν την επίτευξη των εθνικών στόχων πολιτικής και να διασφαλίσουν το εθνικό τους δικαίωμα στη ρύθμιση.
Αυτό που επιδιώκουμε είναι ίση μεταχείριση για τους ξένους παρόχους υπηρεσιών σε ορισμένους κλάδους, όχι μια δέσμευση για κατάργηση των ρυθμίσεων στις αγορές ή ιδιωτικοποίηση υπαρχόντων φορέων. Και εδώ, η πρότασή μας αποκλείει τις αδύναμες και ευάλωτες χώρες και παρέχει ευελιξία σε άλλες αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες.
Απέχουμε κατά πολύ από την κατάσταση στην οποία ελπίζαμε ότι θα βρισκόμασταν. Όπως ο Pascal Lamy, ήλπιζα ότι στο Χονγκ Κονγκ θα καταφέρναμε να ολοκληρώσουμε τα δύο τρίτα των εργασιών του γύρου, κυρίως επιτυγχάνοντας συμφωνία για τις πλήρεις διαδικασίες στους βασικούς τομείς της διαπραγμάτευσης. Ο λόγος που δεν το επιτύχαμε αυτό είναι απλά ότι μετά τη συμφωνία μας για τη συμφωνία πλαίσιο τον Ιούλιο του 2004, οι συνομιλίες απλώς έμειναν στάσιμες. Ορισμένοι διαπραγματευτές διήνυσαν μια περίοδο ακινητοποίησης, την οποία καταφέραμε ταράξουμε μόλις τον Ιούλιο του τρέχοντος έτους. Αν και οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες κατέθεσαν τελικά μια προσφορά για τη γεωργία τον Οκτώβριο, αυτό έγινε πολλούς μήνες αργότερα από ό,τι ελπίζαμε. Η ΕΕ απάντησε εντός του ίδιου μήνα με τη δική μας προσφορά για την πρόσβαση σε γεωργικές αγορές. Ακόμα και τότε, άλλοι συνέχιζαν να αποθαρρύνουν τη διαπραγμάτευση. Για πολύ μεγάλο διάστημα κολλήσαμε σε ένα θέμα και σε μία ομάδα συμφερόντων –των γεωργικών εξαγωγέων μεγάλης κλίμακας– αντί να πιέζουμε για την προώθηση όλου του προγράμματος της Ντόχα.
Ολοκληρώνοντας, θα καταβάλω κάθε προσπάθεια για την επιτυχία του Χονγκ Κονγκ, για την εξασφάλιση της προόδου που σημειώσαμε και για την καθιέρωση μιας πλατφόρμας για να ολοκληρώσουμε το έργο το 2006. Πάνω από όλα, είναι σημαντικό να μην τελειώσει η διάσκεψη με πικρία. Θα υπερασπιστώ και θα εξηγήσω τις προτάσεις της Ευρώπης. Θα προωθήσω τα συμφέροντα της Ευρώπης και θα διατηρήσω τη φιλοδοξία του γύρου γενικά, επιτυγχάνοντας συναίνεση όταν και όπου αυτό είναι δυνατό να γίνει με τους διαπραγματευτικούς μας εταίρους.
Ελπίζω να κάνουν κι εκείνοι το ίδιο. Πρέπει να σταματήσουν να κρύβονται πίσω από αβάσιμες επικρίσεις εις βάρος της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, να σταματήσουν να κρύβονται πίσω από εντέχνως μη ρεαλιστικά και στρατηγικά αιτήματα και να συμμετάσχουν σε μια πραγματική διαπραγμάτευση εφ’ όλων των θεμάτων. Αν συνεχίσουν να ζητούν από την Ευρώπη περισσότερα χωρίς να συμβάλλουν, εκείνοι –όχι εμείς– κινδυνεύουν να καταστρέψουν αυτό τον γύρο. Αν συμβεί αυτό, δεν θα επιτύχουν τίποτα απολύτως.
Αντ’ αυτού λοιπόν, ας συνεργαστούμε για ένα αποτέλεσμα που θα ενισχύσει την παγκόσμια οικονομία, θα δημιουργήσει πολιτική εμπιστοσύνη και θα βοηθήσει τους φτωχούς του κόσμου. Έτσι μπήκαμε σε αυτό τον γύρο και έτσι θέλουμε να βγούμε από αυτόν. Υπάρχει ακόμα η πιθανότητα· η ανάγκη είναι τόσο επιτακτική τώρα όπως ήταν και κατά την έναρξη του γύρου. Όλοι τώρα πρέπει να συνεργαστούν για να συμβεί αυτό και για να επιτευχθούν οι στόχοι που θέσαμε στην αρχή, όταν συμφωνήσαμε το Χάρτη της Ντόχα πριν από τόσα χρόνια.
Έτσι, αν και είναι της μόδας να κατηγορούμε την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση ότι καθυστέρησε αυτόν το γύρο παραμένοντας σιωπηλή σχετικά με τη γεωργία, στην πραγματικότητα έγινε το αντίθετο. Προχωρήσαμε τον γύρο στο θέμα της γεωργίας, όχι μία, αλλά τρεις φορές τους τελευταίους δεκαοκτώ μήνες. Η αλήθεια είναι ότι οι άλλοι καθυστερούν, όχι διότι εμείς κάναμε ή προσφέραμε πολύ λίγα, αλλά διότι εκείνοι υπήρξαν υπερβολικά απαιτητικοί. Πρόκειται για έναν γύρο ανάπτυξης, όχι για έναν γύρο γεωργικών εξαγωγέων, και αυτά τα δύο δεν πρέπει να συγχέονται.
Στο πλαίσιο αυτής της καθυστέρησης, αντί να μεταβούν στο Χονγκ Κονγκ με μεγάλες προσδοκίες και με εξίσου μεγάλο κίνδυνο αποτυχίας, τα μέλη του ΠΟΕ, κατόπιν συμβουλής του Pascal Lamy, αποφάσισαν να μειώσουν τη φιλοδοξία για αυτή τη διάσκεψη. Ήμουν ο τελευταίος που το δέχθηκα απρόθυμα αυτό, αλλά κατέστησα σαφές ότι αυτό δεν σημαίνει τη μείωση της φιλοδοξίας για τον γύρο στο σύνολό του. Πρέπει να εξακολουθήσουμε να στοχεύουμε σε ένα επιτυχές αποτέλεσμα επί του συνόλου της ατζέντας διαπραγμάτευσης, διασφαλίζοντας σημαντικά αναπτυξιακά οφέλη μέχρι το τέλος του προσεχούς έτους.
Ας είμαστε σαφείς: ο Γύρος της Ντόχα είναι πολύ σημαντικός για να αποτύχει. Δεν αφορά μόνο το εμπόριο, αφορά τη διατήρηση της αξιοπιστίας της πολυμερούς συνεργασίας, την απόδειξη ότι οι πολυμερείς οργανισμοί μπορούν να βρουν παγκόσμιες απαντήσεις σε παγκόσμια θέματα, με τον όρο ότι το εμπόριο θα τεθεί πραγματικά στην υπηρεσία της ανάπτυξης.
Ο καλύτερος τρόπος για την προώθηση της ανάπτυξης είναι το άνοιγμα νέων εμπορικών ευκαιριών στις αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες και κατόπιν η παροχή βοήθειας προς αυτές με τη μορφή ενίσχυσης για την αξιοποίηση αυτών των ευκαιριών. Αυτό ισχύει ακόμα περισσότερο για τα βιομηχανικά αγαθά και υπηρεσίες από ό,τι για το γεωργικό εμπόριο και ισχύει ειδικά για το εμπόριο μεταξύ των αναπτυσσόμενων χωρών. Οι μεγαλύτερες ευκαιρίες εμπορικών συναλλαγών για τις αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες είναι με άλλες αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες. Τα μεγαλύτερα εμπόδια σε αυτές τις εμπορικές συναλλαγές είναι οι δασμοί επί των βιομηχανικών αγαθών, οι οποίοι επιβάλλονται ανάμεσα στις αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες. Λυπάμαι που δεν θα καταφέρουμε να προωθήσουμε αυτό το θέμα ουσιαστικά στο Χονγκ Κονγκ. Για τον λόγο αυτό, χρειαζόμαστε ένα πακέτο ανάπτυξης προσαρμοσμένο στις ανάγκες των φτωχότερων χωρών, όχι ως υποκατάστατο για αυτά που μπορούμε να επιτύχουμε αργότερα, αλλά ως προκαταβολή για αυτά.
Τα βασικά στοιχεία της πρότασής μου για την ανάπτυξη, την οποία υπέβαλα για πρώτη φορά τον Οκτώβριο στη μικρή υπουργική διάσκεψη στη Ζυρίχη και για την οποία ασκώ πιέσεις από τότε είναι τα εξής: πρώτον, όλα τα βιομηχανοποιημένα μέλη του ΠΟΕ πρέπει να δεσμευτούν για την παροχή πρόσβασης χωρίς φόρους και ποσοστώσεις σε όλα τα προϊόντα από τις λιγότερο αναπτυγμένες χώρες· δεύτερον, πρέπει να εγκρίνουμε μια δέσμη προτάσεων ειδικής και διαφοροποιημένης μεταχείρισης για να βεβαιώσουμε τα μέσα ευελιξίας για εκείνες τις λιγότερο αναπτυγμένες χώρες που ανήκουν στον ΠΟΕ· τρίτον, πρέπει να εισαγάγουμε στις συμφωνίες για τα δικαιώματα πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας του ΠΟΕ όρους για καλύτερη πρόσβαση σε φθηνά φάρμακα κατά πανδημιών· και τέταρτον, πρέπει να εγκρίνουμε μια ισχυρή ενίσχυση για την εμπορική δέσμη στο πλαίσιο των όσων συμφωνήθηκαν στη σύνοδο κορυφής της G8 στο Gleneagles. Η Επιτροπή έδωσε το παράδειγμα με τη δέσμευση του 1 δισεκατομμυρίου ευρώ ετησίως που ανέλαβε ο Πρόεδρος Barroso στη σύνοδο της G8. Ελπίζω ότι οι εταίροι του ΠΟΕ θα συμφωνήσουν με αυτές τις ιδέες στο Χονγκ Κονγκ.
Επιτρέψτε μου τώρα να στραφώ σε άλλες πτυχές των διαπραγματεύσεων. Στις 28 Οκτωβρίου, η ΕΕ κατέθεσε μια συνολική προσφορά διαπραγμάτευσης, περιλαμβανομένης της πρόσβασης στις γεωργικές αγορές. Αυτό δημιούργησε μια αναγκαία ευκαιρία να προωθηθεί ολόκληρος ο γύρος διαπραγματεύσεων προς τα εμπρός. Ήταν απαραίτητο και ορθό να γίνει, καθώς μας επέτρεψε να διεξαγάγουμε τις πρώτες πραγματικές διαπραγματεύσεις σε πολιτικό επίπεδο σχετικά με τα βιομηχανικά αγαθά και τις υπηρεσίες, τους κανόνες αντιντάμπινγκ και την ανάπτυξη. Άρχισε να εξισορροπεί τον γύρο.
Λυπάμαι βαθύτατα για το γεγονός ότι, αντί να εκμεταλλευτούν αυτή την ευκαιρία και να την αναπτύξουν, οι εταίροι μας στις διαπραγματεύσεις αποφάσισαν να διαλέξουν την εύκολη οδό διαφυγής, απορρίπτοντας την προσφορά μας για τη γεωργία και επικρίνοντάς τη –συχνά με οξύτατους όρους– αντί να την εξετάσουν και να μας επιτρέψουν να προχωρήσουμε."@el10
"Señor Presidente, este debate es importante. Son muchas cosas las que dependen de la Ronda de Doha: para nosotros en Europa, para los países en desarrollo y, de hecho, para la totalidad de la economía mundial. Dentro de poco más de una semana va a comenzar la Conferencia Ministerial de la OMC en Hong Kong. Sé que algunos de ustedes estarán allí, así que es fundamental que les informe formalmente de la situación actual y que analicemos las circunstancias a que se enfrenta esta ronda.
Dejemos claro el valor de nuestra oferta sobre la agricultura. Va mucho más lejos de lo que llegamos en la Ronda de Uruguay. Debe contemplarse como un todo, no solo desde el punto de vista de las reducciones arancelarias que presentamos, sino incorporando nuestras principales contribuciones sobre la reducción del apoyo interno a través de la reforma de la PAC y nuestra oferta de eliminar totalmente las subvenciones a las exportaciones.
Vamos a reducir un 70 % las subvenciones que distorsionan el comercio. Ya con la reforma de la PAC de 2003, el 90 % de los pagos directos a los agricultores dejará de suponer una distorsión del comercio. De acuerdo con nuestra propuesta, nuestro arancel agrícola medio se reducirá del 23 % al 12 %, que por cierto es el mismo que el estadounidense actual. Vista en conjunto, se trata de la oferta más importante jamás realizada por la Unión Europea en una ronda comercial. Cada elemento de la misma –no solo los recortes arancelarios– va a proporcionar una mejora notable del acceso al mercado, tal como exige el Acuerdo Marco de 2004. Creará oportunidades notables para los exportadores agrícolas sin suprimir el acceso preferencial para los países en desarrollo pobres o sin causar un daño excesivo a nuestro sector agrícola en Europa.
Hemos de encontrar un equilibrio. A mi juicio, éste es el equilibrio correcto. Tenemos la responsabilidad de contemplar el impacto de la reforma sobre las comunidades agrícolas europeas. Más aún, esta es una ronda para
los países en desarrollo, sobre todo los pobres y necesitados, y no solo para los productores agrícolas competitivos que no deberían pretender, a mi juicio, maximizar su ventaja competitiva en los mercados mundiales a costa de otros países en desarrollo en la OMC.
La semana pasada hemos constatado en el caso del azúcar lo delicado que es el problema de la erosión de las preferencias para los países ACP pobres. Nos incumbe a todos, no solo en Europa, sino también a los miembros de la OMC en su conjunto, tenerlo plenamente en cuenta. Ignorarlo iría en detrimento de todo el mundo: de aquellos cuyo sustento está amenazado y de quienes deban asumir la responsabilidad en caso de que no respondan a la cuestión de la erosión de las preferencias.
Por consiguiente, nuestra oferta es sustancial, ponderada y creíble. Ha supuesto una inyección de realismo en las negociaciones agrícolas. Aun cuando las peticiones de los Estados Unidos sobre reducciones arancelarias y –en menor medida– las propuestas del G20 beneficiarían sin lugar a dudas a estos países, también tendrían un efecto devastador en el empleo entre nuestros propios agricultores y en los países pobres de África, el Caribe y el Pacífico, gran parte de cuyo comercio agrícola quedaría simplemente arrasada si aceptáramos tales demandas.
Por tanto, dejemos las cosas muy claras. No tengo intención de realizar una nueva oferta en el tema de la agricultura. No estaría justificada y desequilibraría aún más las negociaciones. Ha llegado el momento de que otros hagan un esfuerzo como el nuestro. Los Gobiernos y los ciudadanos de Europa necesitan creer que el cambio estructural y las posibles pérdidas de puestos de trabajo en la agricultura se verán compensados por la creación de nuevos puestos de trabajo y nuevas oportunidades en otros sectores. Esa es la razón por la que son tan importantes nuestros objetivos de la negociación en torno al acceso al mercado no agrícola, a los productos industriales y los servicios. Son cruciales para el crecimiento y el empleo en Europa y son un componente vital de la Agenda de Lisboa.
Voy a defender con ahínco esos intereses y, en la agricultura, también voy a insistir en un acuerdo acerca de un registro de indicaciones geográficas y de su ampliación. Así es como funciona una negociación multilateral. Tiene que haber beneficios para todo el mundo. Eso significa que otros tienen ahora que emplearse a fondo para crear un nuevo acceso al mercado de productos y servicios, que no solo importa a Europa, sino también a la economía mundial y sobre todo al desarrollo. Esto implica una reducción de los aranceles industriales tal como se aplican realmente, no solo la bajada de los niveles límite acordados hace 12 años en la Ronda de Uruguay. Este va a ser, a la postre, el efecto de nuestras propuestas en el ámbito de la agricultura, ya que a diferencia de muchos países en desarrollo, nuestros aranceles límite y los aplicados son normalmente los mismos.
Eso no significa que faltemos a nuestro compromiso de que los países desarrollados pongan más de su parte que los países en desarrollo. Por supuesto que lo vamos a hacer. No esperamos ofertas por parte de los países menos desarrollados y otros países débiles y vulnerables. Como tampoco esperamos que otros países en desarrollo igualen el nivel de apertura del mercado realizado por los países desarrollados. Pero tienen que hacer algo. Ese es el principio rector de esta ronda.
Necesitamos asimismo progresos en el comercio de servicios. El enfoque actual de la negociación, basado en demandas y ofertas, no ha producido resultados satisfactorios. Tenemos que crear una plataforma para una verdadera negociación multilateral que, hoy por hoy, no existe. Esto pone de manifiesto la importancia de los servicios en la moderna economía mundial. No solo es importante para nosotros, sino también para los países en desarrollo. Dichos países tienen sin duda que seguir siendo libres en cuestión de servicios para perseguir objetivos de política nacional y salvaguardar plenamente su derecho nacional a fijar reglas.
Lo que buscamos es un trato igual para los proveedores extranjeros de servicios en ciertos sectores, no un compromiso para desregular los mercados o privatizar los operadores existentes. También en esto, nuestra propuesta excluye a los países débiles y vulnerables y concede flexibilidad a otros países en desarrollo.
Estamos muy lejos de donde esperábamos hallarnos. Lo mismo que Pascal Lamy, yo albergaba la esperanza de que en Hong Kong pudiéramos completar dos tercios de la labor de la ronda, sobre todo acordando modalidades completas en los principales ámbitos de negociación. La razón por la que no lo hemos conseguido es sencillamente que después de haber convenido el acuerdo marco en julio de 2004, las conversaciones encallaron. Algunos negociadores hacían ver que negociaban durante un tiempo, y esto solo logramos superarlo en julio de este año. Aunque los Estados Unidos presentaron finalmente una oferta agrícola en octubre, llegó muchos meses más tarde de lo que esperábamos. La UE respondió ese mismo mes con nuestra propia oferta de acceso al mercado agrícola. Otros continuaron bombardeando la negociación. Hemos estado demasiado tiempo atascados en un tema y en un conjunto de intereses –los de los grandes exportadores agrícolas–, en lugar de avanzar en el conjunto del programa de Doha.
Para terminar, haré cuanto esté en mi mano para que Hong Kong sea un éxito, para afianzar los progresos que hemos realizado y para establecer una plataforma que nos permita concluir el trabajo en 2006. Sobre todo, es esencial que la reunión no acabe en un ambiente de acritud. Voy a defender y a explicar las propuestas de Europa. Voy a velar por los intereses de Europa y voy a mantener la ambición de la ronda en su conjunto, creando consenso cuando y donde sea posible hacerlo con nuestros interlocutores.
Espero que ellos hagan lo mismo. Tienen que dejar de ampararse tras una actitud crítica infundada contra la Unión Europea; dejar de parapetarse tras unas demandas claramente carentes de realismo y tácticas, y adherirse a la negociación real en todos los temas. Si continúan limitándose a pedir más por parte de Europa sin contribuir en nada al fondo común, serán ellos –no nosotros– los que pongan en peligro la ronda. Si eso ocurre, saldrán de allí sin nada.
Trabajemos juntos en favor de un resultado que relance la economía mundial, que genere confianza política y ayude a los pobres del mundo. Así es como hemos entrado en esta ronda; así es como queremos salir de ella. La posibilidad continúa existiendo, la necesidad ahora es tan apremiante como cuando comenzamos la ronda. En estos momentos, todo el mundo debe arrimar el hombro para que así sea y alcanzar los objetivos que fijamos en primer lugar para nosotros cuando acordamos la Carta de Doha hace tantos años.
Así pues, aunque esté de moda culpar a la Unión Europea de frenar esta ronda por el hecho de mostrarse reticente en materia agrícola, lo cierto es justo lo contrario. Hemos hecho avanzar la ronda en el tema agrícola no una sola vez, sino tres veces en los últimos dieciocho meses. La verdad es que son otros los que se han mostrado reticentes, no porque hayamos hecho u ofrecido demasiado poco, sino porque ellos han estando exigiendo demasiadas cosas. Se trata de una ronda sobre el desarrollo, no de una ronda de exportadores agrícolas, y no conviene confundir las dos cosas.
A la vista de este retraso, en lugar de acudir a Hong Kong con grandes expectativas y un riesgo igualmente elevado de fracaso, los miembros de la OMC, por consejo de Pascal Lamy, han decidido rebajar el nivel de aspiraciones para esta reunión. He sido el último en aceptar esto a regañadientes, pero al hacerlo he dejado claro que no puede significar que se rebajen las aspiraciones de la ronda en su conjunto. Tenemos que seguir aspirando a un buen resultado de todo el programa de negociaciones, que comporte unos beneficios notables para el desarrollo a finales del año que viene.
Que quede claro: la Ronda de Doha es demasiado importante para fracasar. No solo se trata del comercio, sino de mantener la credibilidad de la cooperación multilateral; de mostrar que las instituciones multilaterales pueden encontrar respuestas mundiales a cuestiones mundiales; de demostrar que el comercio se puede poner verdaderamente al servicio del desarrollo.
La mejor forma de promover el desarrollo consiste en brindar nuevas oportunidades comerciales a los países en desarrollo y ayudarles luego con subvenciones para que aprovechen tales oportunidades. Lo dicho es más cierto para los bienes y servicios industriales que para el comercio agrícola, y lo es especialmente para el comercio entre los países en desarrollo. Las mayores oportunidades comerciales para los países en desarrollo residen en las relaciones con otros países en desarrollo. Los obstáculos más importantes a este comercio radican en los aranceles sobre bienes industriales que existen entre los países en desarrollo. Lamento que no vayamos a poder avanzar significativamente en este tema en Hong Kong. Por eso necesitamos un paquete de desarrollo confeccionado a medida para los países más pobres, no como sucedáneo de lo que podríamos lograr más adelante, sino como un anticipo de ello.
Los elementos principales de mi propuesta para el desarrollo, que formulé por primera vez en la Cumbre Ministerial reducida celebrada en Zúrich en octubre y que llevo promoviendo desde entonces, son: primero, todos los miembros industrializados de la OMC deben comprometerse a proporcionar un acceso libre de impuestos y de cuotas para todos los productos procedentes de los países menos desarrollados; segundo, deberíamos aprobar un paquete de propuestas de trato especial y diferencial para confirmar las flexibilidades para dichos países menos desarrollados que existen en la OMC; tercero, tenemos que consagrar, dentro de los acuerdos de propiedad intelectual de la OMC, unas condiciones para un mejor acceso a medicamentos de bajo coste contra las pandemias; y cuarto, deberíamos aprobar una ayuda significativa para el paquete comercial en línea con lo aprobado en la Cumbre del G8 de Gleneagles. La Comisión ha dado ejemplo con la promesa de los 1 000 millones de euros al año realizada por el Presidente Barroso durante la Cumbre del G8. Espero que los socios de la OMC acepten estas ideas en Hong Kong.
Permítanme referirme ahora a otros aspectos de las negociaciones. El 28 de octubre, la UE presentó una oferta negociadora exhaustiva, incluso sobre el tema del acceso al mercado agrícola. Eso ha creado una oportunidad muy necesaria de hacer avanzar toda la ronda. Eso era necesario y apropiado, ya que nos ha permitido celebrar las primeras negociaciones reales en el plano político sobre productos industriales y servicios, leyes antidúmping y desarrollo. Comenzó a restaurar el equilibrio en la ronda.
Lamento profundamente que en lugar de aprovechar esta ocasión y desarrollarla, nuestros interlocutores en la negociación decidieran emprender el camino de salida fácil, rechazando nuestra oferta sobre agricultura y criticándola –a menudo en términos poco comedidos– en vez de hacerla suya y permitir que avanzáramos."@es20
"Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@et5
"Arvoisa puhemies, tämä on tärkeä keskustelu. Dohan neuvottelukierroksen panokset ovat suuret niin EU:n, kehitysmaiden kuin koko maailmantalouden kannalta. Hieman yli viikon päästä alkaa Hongkongissa WTO:n ministerikokous. Tiedän, että jotkut teistä osallistuvat siihen, joten on tärkeää, että ilmoitan teille virallisesti, mikä tilanne nyt on, ja että keskustelemme tämän neuvottelukierroksen tilanteesta.
Haluan selventää maataloutta koskevan tarjouksemme arvoa. Siinä mennään huomattavasti pidemmälle kuin Uruguayn neuvottelukierroksen tarjouksessa. Sitä on tarkasteltava kokonaisuutena eikä ainoastaan esitettyinä tullialennuksina. Se sisältää merkittäviä sitoumuksia kotimaisen tuen vähentämisestä YMP:tä koskevan uudistuksen avulla ja tarjouksen kaikkien vientitukien lakkauttamisesta.
Aiomme vähentää kauppaa vääristäviä tukia 70 prosenttia. Jo vuoden 2003 YMP:n uudistuksen ansiosta 90 prosenttia viljelijöille maksettavista suorista tuista ei enää vääristä kauppaa. Ehdotuksemme mukaisesti maataloustuotteiden keskimääräinen tulli alenee 23 prosentista 12 prosenttiin, mikä muuten vastaa Yhdysvaltojen tullitasoa. Kaiken kaikkiaan tarjous on merkittävin EU:n koskaan kauppaneuvotteluissa tekemä tarjous. Kaikilla sen osilla, ei ainoastaan tullialennuksilla, parannetaan huomattavasti pääsyä markkinoille, kuten vuoden 2004 puitesopimuksessa edellytetään. Sillä luodaan maataloustuotteiden viejille merkittäviä mahdollisuuksia niin, ettei köyhiltä kehitysmailta viedä etuuskohtelua eikä Euroopan maatalousalaa vahingoiteta liikaa.
Tasapaino on löydettävä, ja mielestäni tämä on oikea tasapaino. Velvollisuutenamme on ottaa huomioon uudistuksen vaikutukset Euroopan maatalousyhteisöihin. Neuvottelukierroksella pyritään lisäksi edistämään
kehitysmaiden ja etenkin köyhien ja puutteenalaisten maiden etuja, eikä siinä ole kyse ainoastaan kilpailukykyisten maataloustuotteiden viejistä, joiden ei mielestäni pitäisi pyrkiä maksimoimaan kilpailuetuaan maailmanmarkkinoilla muiden WTO:n kehitysmaiden kustannuksella.
Viime viikkona käsitellyn sokerialan yhteydessä havaitsimme, kuinka vaikea ongelma etuuskohtelun heikkeneminen on puutteessa eläville AKT-valtioille. Tämä on otettava täysimääräisesti huomioon niin EU:ssa kuin WTO:ssa. Jollemme näin tee, siitä kärsivät kaikki, sekä ne, joiden elinkeino on uhattuna, että ne, jotka joutuvat vastuuseen, elleivät vastaa etuuskohtelun heikentymiseen.
Tarjouksemme on näin ollen merkittävä, oikeasuhtainen ja uskottava. Sillä tehtiin maatalousalan neuvotteluista realistisemmat. Yhdysvaltojen vaatimukset tullien alentamisesta ja jossain määrin myös G20-maiden ehdotukset epäilemättä hyödyttäisivät kyseisiä maita, mutta niillä olisi myös musertava vaikutus omiin viljelijöihimme sekä Afrikan, Karibian ja Tyynenmeren köyhiin valtioihin, joiden maataloustuotteiden kaupasta suurin osa yksinkertaisesti häviäisi, jos hyväksyisimme nämä vaatimukset.
Haluan siis tehdä täysin selväksi, ettei suunnitelmissani ole esittää uutta maataloustarjousta. Sille ei ole perusteita, vaan se haittaisi edelleen neuvottelujen tasapainoa. Muiden on nyt aika ryhtyä meidän laillamme töihin. Euroopan hallitusten ja kansalaisten on uskottava siihen, että maatalouden rakennemuutos ja mahdolliset työpaikkojen menetykset kompensoituvat uusien työpaikkojen syntymisellä ja uusilla mahdollisuuksilla muilla aloilla. Tästä syystä neuvottelutavoitteemme muiden kuin maataloustuotteiden markkinoille pääsyn alalla sekä teollisten tuotteiden ja palvelujen alalla ovat erittäin tärkeitä. Ne ovat keskeisiä Euroopan kasvun ja työpaikkojen kannalta ja merkittävä osa Lissabonin strategiaa.
Ajan väsymättä näitä intressejä ja pyrin maatalouden alalla sopimukseen myös maantieteellisiä merkintöjä koskevasta rekisteristä ja sen laajentamisesta. Näin monenvälinen neuvottelu toimii, kaikkien on hyödyttävä. Tämä tarkoittaa, että muiden on nyt todellakin sitouduttava laatimaan uudet tavaroiden ja palvelujen markkinoille pääsyä koskevat ehdot, jotka pätevät EU:n lisäksi koko maailmantalouteen ja joilla edistetään kehitystä. Tämä tarkoittaa teollisten tuotteiden tullien alentamista sellaisena kuin niitä todellisuudessa sovelletaan, ei ainoastaan 12 vuotta sitten Uruguayn neuvottelukierroksella sovittujen sitovien tullien alentamista. Näinhän maataloutta koskevat ehdotuksemme joka tapauksessa vaikuttavat, sillä useista kehitysmaista poiketen EU:n sitovat ja sovelletut tullit ovat yleensä samat.
Tämä ei tarkoita sitä, että peräytyisimme sitoumuksestamme, jonka mukaan teollisuusmaiden on tehtävä kehitysmaita enemmän myönnytyksiä. Tietenkin noudatamme tätä sitoumusta. Emme odota tarjouksia vähiten kehittyneiltä ja muilta heikoilta ja haavoittuvilta mailta. Emme myöskään odota, että muut kehitysmaat avaisivat markkinansa yhtä kattavasti kuin teollisuusmaat. Niiden on kuitenkin tehtävä jotakin. Tämä on neuvottelukierroksen periaate.
Palvelujen kaupassa on myös edettävä. Nykyinen pyyntöihin ja tarjouksiin perustuva neuvotteluja koskeva lähestymistapa ei vielä ole tuottanut tyydyttäviä tuloksia. On luotava todellisen monenvälisen neuvottelun foorumi, jollaista ei vielä ole. Tässä nähdään palvelujen merkitys nykyaikaisessa maailmantaloudessa. Se on tärkeää meidän lisäksemme myös kehitysmaille. Niiden on selvästikin voitava vapaasti säännellä palvelualojaan kansallisten poliittisten tavoitteidensa saavuttamiseksi ja suojatakseen kansallista sääntelyoikeuttaan.
Pyrimme joillakin aloilla ulkomaisten palveluntarjoajien yhtäläiseen kohteluun, emme sitoumukseen markkinoiden sääntelyn vähentämisestä tai nykyisten toimijoiden yksityistämisestä. Ehdotuksemme ei tältäkään osin koske heikkoja ja haavoittuvia maita, ja siinä annetaan riittävästi joustoa muille kehitysmaille.
Olemme huomattavan kaukana tavoitteistamme. Pascal Lamyn tavoin toivoin, että saisimme Hongkongissa saatettua päätökseen kaksi kolmasosaa työstä ja sovittua erityisesti kaikista muodollisuuksista tärkeimmillä neuvottelualoilla. Syy siihen, ettemme ole onnistuneet tässä, on kaikessa yksinkertaisuudessaan se, että tehtyämme puitesopimuksen heinäkuussa 2004 keskustelut laimenivat. Jotkut neuvottelijoista miettivät kantojaan, ja pääsimme jatkamaan neuvotteluja vasta tämän vuoden heinäkuussa. Vaikka Yhdysvallat esitti vihdoin lokakuussa maataloutta koskevan tarjouksen, se tapahtui useita kuukausia toivomaamme myöhemmin. EU vastasi saman kuukauden aikana omalla maatalousmarkkinoita koskevalla tarjouksellaan. Jotkin osapuolet vaikeuttivat neuvotteluja kuitenkin edelleen. Olemme jumittuneet aivan liian pitkäksi aikaa yhden aiheen käsittelyyn ja yhden osapuolen eli maataloustuotteiden suurviejien intresseihin sen sijaan, että olisimme edistäneet koko Dohan kehitysohjelmaa.
Lopuksi totean, että teen kaikkeni, jotta Hongkongin kokouksesta tulee menestys, jotta saavuttamamme edistys vakiinnutetaan ja jotta sovitaan foorumista, jossa saatamme työmme päätökseen vuonna 2006. Ennen kaikkea on olennaista, ettei kokous pääty katkeruuteen. Aion puolustaa EU:n ehdotuksia ja selitän niitä. Ajan EU:n intressejä ja säilytän koko neuvottelukierroksen tavoitteellisuuden niin, että rakennamme neuvottelukumppaniemme kanssa yksimielisyyden varaan aina mahdollisuuksien mukaan.
Toivon, että neuvottelukumppanimme toimivat samalla tavoin. Niiden on lopetettava EU:n perusteeton kritisointi ja sen taakse piiloutuminen, ilmeisen epärealististen ja taktisten vaatimusten taakse piiloutuminen ja ryhdyttävä sen sijaan neuvottelemaan vakavasti kaikista asioista. Jos ne ainoastaan vaativat edelleen EU:lta yhä enemmän eivätkä itse millään lailla osallistu, ne ovat vaarassa ajaa karille koko neuvottelukierroksen, emme me. Jos näin käy, ne eivät saa mitään.
Työskennelkäämme sen sijaan yhdessä sellaisen tuloksen saavuttamiseksi, joka piristää maailmantaloutta, luo poliittista luottamusta ja auttaa maailman köyhiä. Nämä tavoitteet meillä oli aloittaessamme neuvottelukierroksen, ja ne haluamme saavuttaa. Tämä on vielä mahdollista, ja asia on yhtä kiireellinen nyt kuin neuvottelukierroksen alkaessa. Kaikkien on nyt puhallettava yhteen hiileen, jotta saavutamme ne tavoitteet, jotka asetimme itsellemme jo silloin kauan sitten, kun Dohan kehitysohjelmasta sovittiin.
Vaikka onkin muodissa syyttää EU:ta siitä, että se on hidastanut neuvotteluja maataloutta koskevalla joustamattomuudellaan, asia on todellisuudessa juuri päinvastoin. EU on sysännyt maatalousneuvotteluja eteenpäin ei pelkästään kerran vaan kolmesti puolentoista viime vuoden aikana. Totuus on, että muut ovat jarrutelleet, eivät siksi, että olisimme tehneet tai tarjonneet liian vähän, vaan siksi, että muut ovat pyytäneet liikoja. Tämä on kehitysohjelmaa koskeva neuvottelukierros, ei maatalouden viejämaiden neuvottelukierros, eikä näitä kahta pitäisi sekoittaa.
Viivästymisen vuoksi WTO:n jäsenet päättivät Pascal Lamyn neuvosta alentaa Hongkongin kokouksen tavoitteita sen sijaan, että ne olisivat tavoitelleet liikoja ja vaarantaneet neuvottelujen onnistumisen. Minä suostuin tähän viimeisten joukossa, mutta tein samalla selväksi, ettei tämä voinut tarkoittaa koko neuvottelukierroksen tavoitteiden alentamista. Meidän on edelleen pyrittävä onnistuneeseen tulokseen kaikissa neuvottelukysymyksissä ja edistettävä kehitystä merkittävästi ensi vuoden loppuun mennessä.
Tehtäköön selväksi, että Dohan neuvottelukierros on liian merkittävä, jotta siinä voitaisiin epäonnistua. Kyse ei ole ainoastaan kaupasta vaan monenvälisen yhteistyön uskottavuuden säilyttämisestä. On osoitettava, että monenväliset elimet voivat löytää maailmanlaajuisia vastauksia maailmanlaajuisiin ongelmiin ja että kaupalla todellakin voidaan edistää kehitystä.
Paras tapa edistää kehitystä on avata uusia kauppamahdollisuuksia kehitysmaille ja tukea niitä tämän jälkeen mahdollisuuksien hyödyntämisessä. Tämä pätee maataloustuotteiden kauppaa enemmän teollisiin tuotteisiin ja palveluihin ja etenkin kehitysmaiden välillä käytävään kauppaan. Kehitysmaiden suurimmat kauppamahdollisuudet liittyvät kauppaan muiden kehitysmaiden kanssa. Suurimpana esteenä tälle kaupalle ovat teollisten tuotteiden tullit eri kehitysmaiden välillä. Valitettavasti emme pysty etenemään tässä asiassa merkittävästi Hongkongissa. Siksi köyhimmille maille on tarjottava räätälöityä kehityspakettia etumaksuna siitä, mitä voimme saavuttaa myöhemmin, eikä niinkään korvauksena siitä.
Esitin kehitysehdotukseni ensimmäistä kertaa Zürichin ministerikokouksessa lokakuussa ja olen ajanut sitä siitä lähtien. Kehitysehdotukseni tärkeimmät osa-alueet ovat seuraavat. Kaikkien WTO:n teollisuusmaiden on ensinnäkin sitouduttava tarjoamaan kaikille vähiten kehittyneiden maiden tuotteille tulli- ja kiintiövapaa pääsy markkinoilleen. Toiseksi meidän on hyväksyttävä erityis- ja etuuskohtelua koskeva ehdotuspaketti osoittaaksemme näille vähiten kehittyneille maille, että WTO:n toiminta on joustavaa. Kolmanneksi teollis- ja tekijänoikeuksia koskeviin WTO:n sopimusehtoihin on kirjattava halpojen pandemialääkkeiden parempi saatavuus. Neljänneksi meidän on hyväksyttävä vakavasti otettava vastavuoroinen tukea ja kauppaa koskeva paketti, jollaisesta sovittiin G8-maiden huippukokouksessa Gleneaglesissa. Komissio näytti G8-maiden kokouksessa esimerkkiä, kun puheenjohtaja Barroso lupasi miljardin euron vuosittaisen tukipaketin. Toivon, että WTO:n jäsenet pääsevät sopimukseen näistä asioista Hongkongissa.
Käsittelen seuraavaksi muita neuvottelujen näkökohtia. EU esitti 28. lokakuuta kattavan neuvottelutarjouksen, joka sisälsi pääsyn maatalousmarkkinoille. Näin saatiin kaivattu mahdollisuus edistää koko neuvottelukierrosta. Tämä oli välttämätöntä ja ainoa oikea tapa edetä, sillä näin saimme aikaan ensimmäiset todelliset poliittisen tason neuvottelut teollisista tuotteista ja palveluista, polkumyyntisäännöistä ja kehityksestä, mikä tasapainotti neuvottelukierrosta.
Olen erittäin pettynyt siihen, etteivät neuvottelukumppanimme tarttuneet tilaisuuteen ja halunneet jatkaa tällä linjalla vaan päättivät mennä sieltä, missä aita on matalin, ja torjuivat maataloutta koskevan tarjouksemme ja kritisoivat sitä usein kohtuuttomastikin. Ne eivät tarttuneet tarjoukseen, jolloin olisimme voineet päästä asiassa eteenpäin."@fi7
".
Monsieur le Président, il s’agit d’un important débat. Les enjeux du cycle de Doha sont importants: pour nous Européens, pour les pays en développement et bien évidemment pour l’économie mondiale tout entière. La rencontre ministérielle de Hong Kong débutera dans un peu plus d’une semaine seulement. Je sais que certains d’entre vous y participeront. Il est donc essentiel que je vous expose la situation de manière officielle et que nous abordions le problème qui attend ce cycle.
Soyons clairs quant à la valeur de notre offre sur l’agriculture. Elle va nettement plus loin que notre position du cycle d’Uruguay. Il convient de l’envisager de manière globale, pas uniquement au niveau de la réduction des droits de douane que nous proposons, mais avec nos contributions majeures à la réduction du soutien interne par l’intermédiaire de la réforme de la PAC et de notre offre de suppression intégrale des subventions à l’exportation.
Nous réduirons de 70 % les subventions entraînant une distorsion des échanges. Dans le cadre de la réforme de la PAC de 2003 déjà, 90 % des paiements directs aux agriculteurs n’engendreront plus de distorsion des échanges. Selon notre proposition, nos tarifs douaniers agricoles moyens passeront de 23 % à 12 %, soit, incidemment, une valeur identique au niveau américain actuel. Il s’agit globalement de l’offre la plus complète jamais présentée par l’Union européenne dans un cycle de négociations. Chacun de ses éléments - pas uniquement la réduction des tarifs douaniers - améliorera de manière substantielle l’accès au marché, comme l’exige l’accord-cadre de 2004. Il créera d’importantes opportunités pour les exportateurs agricoles, sans supprimer l’accès préférentiel des pays pauvres en développement ni porter un préjudice excessif à notre secteur agricole européen.
Nous devons trouver un équilibre. Telle est, à mes yeux, l’équilibre adéquat à trouver. Nous avons pour responsabilité de prendre en considération l’impact de la réforme sur les communautés agricoles d’Europe. Il s’agit, qui plus est, d’un cycle concernant
les pays en développement, les pauvres et les nécessiteux notamment, pas seulement les producteurs agricoles compétitifs qui ne doivent pas, à mes yeux, chercher à optimiser leur avantage concurrentiel sur les marchés mondiaux au détriment d’autres pays en développement de l’OMC.
Le sucre nous a permis de constater la semaine dernière à quel point le problème de l’érosion des préférences était épineux pour les pays ACP dans le besoin. Il nous incombe à tous, pas seulement en Europe, mais à l’ensemble des membres de l’OMC, d’en tenir pleinement compte. Nous l’ignorons au risque de tous: de ceux dont les moyens de subsistance s’en trouvent menacés et de ceux qui porteront la responsabilité s’ils ne réagissent pas au problème de l’érosion des préférences.
Notre proposition est par conséquent substantielle, mesurée et crédible. Elle a injecté du réalisme dans les négociations agricoles. Si les exigences américaines en matière de réductions de droits de douanes et - dans une moindre mesure - les propositions du G20 seraient indubitablement bénéfiques pour ces pays, elles auraient également un effet dévastateur sur l’emploi de nos agriculteurs et sur les pays pauvres en Afrique, dans les Caraïbes et dans le Pacifique. Une grande partie de leurs échanges agricoles seraient tout simplement rayés de la carte si nous accédions à ces exigences.
Soyons dès lors très clairs. Je n’ai pas l’intention de présenter une nouvelle offre sur l’agriculture. Cela ne se justifie pas et déséquilibrerait encore les négociations. Il est temps que les autres consentent des efforts comparables à ceux que nous avons réalisés. Les gouvernements et les citoyens européens doivent croire que le changement structurel et les éventuelles pertes d’emplois dans l’agriculture seront contrebalancés par la création de nouveaux emplois et de nouvelles opportunités dans d’autres secteurs. D’où l’importance essentielle de nos objectifs de négociation sur l’accès au marché non agricole, les biens industriels et les services. Ils sont cruciaux pour la croissance et l’emploi en Europe et constituent un élément incontournable de l’agenda de Lisbonne.
Je défendrai énergiquement ces intérêts et, en agriculture, j’insisterai également sur un accord concernant un registre d’indications géographiques et sur l’extension de celui-ci. C’est ainsi que fonctionnent les négociations multilatérales. Elles doivent constituer un gain général. En d’autres termes, d’autres doivent maintenant s’engager sérieusement dans la création d’un nouvel accès au marché pour les biens et les services, un point important non seulement pour l’Europe, mais aussi pour l’économie mondiale et, surtout, pour le développement. Il convient dès lors de diminuer les droits de douane actuellement appliqués, pas seulement de réduire les niveaux consolidés adoptés il y a 12 ans lors du cycle d’Uruguay. Tel sera, en fin de compte, l’effet de nos propositions dans le domaine agricole puisque, contrairement à de nombreux pays en développement, nos niveaux tarifaires et nos niveaux consolidés sont généralement identiques.
Cette démarche n’implique pas que nous revenions sur notre engagement de voir les pays développés faire davantage que les pays en développement. Bien sûr, nous le ferons. Nous n’attendons pas d’offres des pays les moins développés et d’autres États faibles et vulnérables. Pas plus que nous n’escomptons d’autres pays en développement d’égaler le niveau d’ouverture du marché des pays développés. Ils doivent cependant agir. C’est le principe de ce cycle.
Nous devons également progresser dans le domaine du commerce des services. L’approche de négociation actuelle reposant sur les exigences et les propositions n’a pas donné de résultats satisfaisants. Nous devons développer une plate-forme de véritables négociations multilatérales, laquelle n’existe pas actuellement. Ceci reflète l’importance des services dans l’économie mondiale actuelle. Ce n’est pas seulement important pour nous, mais pour les pays en développement également. Ceux-ci doivent clairement rester libres dans le domaine des services afin de poursuivre des objectifs de politique nationale et de préserver entièrement leur droit national de réglementer.
Notre objectif, c’est l’égalité de traitement pour les fournisseurs de services étrangers dans certains secteurs, pas l’engagement de déréguler les marchés ou de privatiser les opérateurs existants. Dans ce cas également, notre proposition exclut les pays faibles et vulnérables et donne de la flexibilité à d’autres pays en développement.
Nous sommes loin du point que nous aurions souhaité atteindre. J’aurais voulu, à l’instar de Pascal Lamy, être en mesure de terminer à Hong Kong deux tiers des travaux du cycle, notamment en approuvant la totalité des modalités applicables dans les principaux domaines de négociation. Nous n’y sommes pas parvenus pour une raison: après avoir approuvé l’accord-cadre en juillet 2004, les pourparlers se sont simplement enlisés. Certains négociateurs ont traversé une période de roublardise à laquelle nous n’avons réussi à mettre un terme qu’en juillet de cette année. Même si les États-Unis ont finalement présenté une proposition agricole en octobre, c’est avec de nombreux mois de retard par rapport au calendrier espéré. L’Union a répondu dans le mois avec notre proposition d’accès au marché agricole. Toutefois, d’autres ont continué à gêner les négociations. Pendant bien trop longtemps, nous avons été bloqués sur une question et un groupe d’intérêts - ceux des grands exportateurs agricoles -, au lieu de faire progresser l’ensemble de l’agenda de Doha.
En guise de conclusion, je ferai tout ce qui est en mon pouvoir pour que Hong Kong soit une réussite, pour verrouiller les progrès que nous avons réalisés et pour instaurer une plate-forme nous permettant de clôturer les travaux en 2006. Il est avant tout essentiel que la réunion ne se termine pas dans la mauvaise humeur. Je défendrai et j’expliquerai les propositions européennes. Je défendrai les intérêts européens et je préserverai l’ambition du cycle d’une manière globale, en instaurant un consensus chaque fois qu’il est possible de le faire avec nos interlocuteurs.
J’espère qu’ils feront de même. Ils doivent cesser de s’abriter derrière des critiques infondées de l’Union européenne, derrière des exigences manifestement irréalistes et tactiques, et doivent se joindre à nous dans de véritables négociations sur toutes ces questions. S’ils continuent à exiger davantage de l’Europe sans apporter leur contribution, c’est eux, pas nous, qui risquent de détruire ce cycle. Ils repartiront dans ce cas les mains entièrement vides.
Collaborons plutôt afin d’obtenir un résultat qui encourage l’économie mondiale, crée une confiance politique et aide les démunis de ce monde. C’est ainsi que nous avons entamé ce cycle et c’est ainsi que nous souhaitons le clôturer. Cela reste possible, le besoin est aussi urgent actuellement que lorsque nous avons débuté ce cycle. Chacun doit maintenant se ressaisir afin de réussir et d’atteindre les objectifs que nous nous étions initialement fixés en approuvant cette charte de Doha, il y a de nombreuses années de cela.
Aussi, bien qu’il soit dans l’air du temps de reprocher à l’Union européenne le blocage de ce cycle en raison de sa réticence dans le domaine agricole, c’est en réalité l’inverse qui est vrai. Nous avons fait progresser le cycle au niveau de l’agriculture, pas seulement une fois, mais trois fois au cours des derniers mois. La vérité, c’est que les autres parties ont fait preuve de réticence, pas parce que nos actes ou nos propositions étaient insuffisants, mais parce que leurs exigences étaient excessives. Il s’agit d’un cycle pour le développement, pas d’un cycle réservé aux exportateurs agricoles, ne confondons pas.
Face à ce retard, les membres de l’OMC ont, sur le conseil de Pascal Lamy, décidé de ne pas se rendre à Hong Kong avec des attentes considérables et un risque d’échec non moindre, mais bien de revoir leurs ambitions à la baisse pour cette réunion. J’ai été le dernier à accepter, à contrecœur. Ce faisant toutefois, j’ai clairement fait comprendre qu’il ne pouvait être question de revoir les ambitions à la baisse pour l’ensemble du cycle. Nous continuerons à ambitionner la réussite de l’ensemble de l’agenda de négociation en obtenant des avantages substantiels en matière de développement d’ici la fin de l’année prochaine.
Soyons clairs: le cycle de Doha est trop important pour que l’échec soit permis. Il n’est pas seulement question d’échanges, c’est le maintien de la crédibilité de la coopération multilatérale qui est en jeu. Il s’agit de prouver que les institutions multilatérales sont en mesure de trouver des réponses mondiales aux problèmes mondiaux, que le commerce peut réellement être mis au service du développement.
Le meilleur moyen de promouvoir le développement consiste à créer de nouvelles opportunités commerciales dans les pays en développement et de les aider à les exploiter. C’est plus vrai encore pour les biens industriels et les services que pour les échanges agricoles, entre pays en développement surtout. C’est avec leurs semblables que les pays en développement ont le plus d’opportunités en matière commerciale. Les principaux obstacles à ces échanges résident dans les droits de douane sur les biens industriels en vigueur entre les pays concernés. Je regrette que nous ne soyons pas en mesure de progresser de manière substantielle sur ce sujet à Hong Kong. Raison pour laquelle nous avons besoin d’un paquet «développement» sur mesure pour les pays les plus pauvres - pas en tant que substitut de nos réalisations futures potentielles, mais bien en tant qu’avant-goût de celles-ci.
Les principaux éléments de ma proposition sur le développement, que j’ai présentée pour la première fois lors de la mini-rencontre ministérielle d’octobre et que je défends depuis lors, sont les suivants: premièrement, tous les membres industrialisés de l’OMC doivent s’engager à fournir un accès hors taxe et hors quota à l’ensemble des produits en provenance des pays les moins développés. Deuxièmement, nous devons adopter un paquet de propositions de traitement spéciales et différenciées afin de confirmer les aménagements dont bénéficient ces pays les moins développés dans le cadre de l’OMC. Troisièmement, nous devons intégrer dans les accords de l’OMC relatifs à la propriété intellectuelle des conditions d’accès améliorées à des médicaments bon marché contre les pandémies. Enfin, quatrièmement, nous devons approuver une assistance solide pour le paquet commercial, conformément aux principes convenus lors du sommet du G8 de Gleneagles. La Commission a donné un exemple avec l’engagement d’un milliard d’euros par an pris par le président Barroso lors du G8. J’espère que nos partenaires de l’OMC pourront approuver ces idées à Hong Kong.
Permettez-moi maintenant d’aborder d’autres aspects des négociations. Le 28 octobre, l’Union a présenté une proposition de négociation exhaustive, notamment sur l’accès au marché. Celle-ci a créé une opportunité bienvenue de faire progresser l’ensemble du cycle. Elle était nécessaire et opportune, puisqu’elle nous a permis d’avoir les premières négociations véritables au niveau politique sur les biens industriels et les services, les règles anti-dumping et le développement. Cette proposition a commencé à rééquilibrer le cycle.
Je regrette profondément que nos partenaires de négociation, au lieu de saisir cette opportunité et de la prendre pour point de départ, aient décidé de choisir la facilité en rejetant notre offre sur l’agriculture et en la critiquant - dans des termes excessifs, bien souvent -, au lieu de s’engager avec elle et de nous permettre d’avancer."@fr8
"Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@hu11
".
Signor Presidente, questa è una discussione importante. Molto dipende dal ciclo di Doha: per noi in Europa, per i paesi in via di sviluppo e di fatto per l’intera economia globale. Tra poco più di una settimana comincerà la Conferenza ministeriale dell’OMC a Hong Kong. So che alcuni di voi vi assisteranno ed è quindi essenziale che vi riferisca formalmente qual è la nostra posizione e che si discuta la situazione che affronteremo in questo ciclo di negoziati.
Cerchiamo di essere chiari sul valore della nostra offerta sull’agricoltura. Essa va ben oltre il livello raggiunto nell’
. Deve essere considerata nel suo insieme, non solo in base alle riduzioni tariffarie che proponiamo, ma tenendo conto anche dei nostri importanti contributi alla riduzione del sostegno interno attraverso la riforma della PAC e della nostra offerta di abolire del tutto le sovvenzioni all’esportazione.
Ridurremo le sovvenzioni che distorcono il commercio del 70 per cento. Già in base alla riforma della PAC del 2003, il 90 per cento dei pagamenti diretti a favore degli agricoltori non distorcerà più il commercio. Nel quadro della nostra proposta, la tariffa agricola media nell’Unione scenderà dal 23 al 12 per cento, che incidentalmente è pari all’attuale livello statunitense. Considerata nel suo insieme, si tratta dell’offerta più cospicua che l’Unione europea abbia mai fatto in un ciclo di negoziati commerciali. Ogni suo elemento – non solo le riduzioni tariffarie – migliorerà in modo sostanziale l’accesso al mercato, come previsto dall’accordo quadro del 2004. Essa creerà opportunità significative per gli esportatori agricoli, senza negare l’accesso preferenziale ai paesi poveri in via di sviluppo o comportare danni eccessivi per il settore agricolo europeo.
Dobbiamo trovare un equilibrio. A mio parere, questo è l’equilibrio cui aspirare. Abbiamo la responsabilità di tenere conto dell’impatto della riforma sulle comunità agricole europee. Inoltre, questo è un ciclo per
i paesi in via di sviluppo, soprattutto quelli poveri e bisognosi, non solo per i produttori agricoli competitivi che, a mio parere, non dovrebbero tentare di massimizzare il loro vantaggio concorrenziale sui mercati mondiali a spese di altri paesi in via di sviluppo membri dell’OMC.
Abbiamo visto la settimana scorsa con lo zucchero quanto sia delicato il problema dell’erosione delle preferenze per i paesi poveri ACP. E’ dovere di tutti noi, non solo dell’Europa ma di tutti i paesi membri dell’OMC, tenere pienamente conto di questo aspetto. Ignorarlo è rischioso per tutti: per coloro che vedono i propri mezzi di sussistenza minacciati dall’erosione delle preferenze e per coloro che dovranno assumersene la responsabilità se non risponderanno al problema.
La nostra offerta è quindi cospicua, misurata e credibile. Ha introdotto un elemento di realismo nei negoziati sull’agricoltura. Le richieste degli Stati Uniti in materia di riduzione tariffarie e – in minor misura – le proposte del G20 senza dubbio gioverebbero a questi paesi, ma avrebbero anche effetti devastanti sull’occupazione per i nostri agricoltori e per i paesi poveri dell’Africa, dei Caraibi e del Pacifico, il cui commercio agricolo, se dovessimo accogliere tali richieste, sarebbe in gran parte destinato a scomparire.
Permettetemi quindi di essere molto chiaro. Non ho alcuna intenzione di fare una nuova offerta in materia di agricoltura. Non è giustificata e creerebbe ulteriori squilibri nei negoziati. E’ ora che altri compiano sforzi pari ai nostri. I governi e i cittadini d’Europa devono essere convinti che i cambiamenti strutturali e la possibile perdita di posti di lavoro in agricoltura saranno bilanciati dalla creazione di nuovi posti di lavoro e nuove opportunità in altri settori. Questo è il motivo per cui i nostri obiettivi negoziali riguardanti l’accesso ai mercati dei prodotti non agricoli, i prodotti e i servizi industriali sono così importanti. Sono essenziali per la crescita e l’occupazione in Europa e sono un elemento vitale dell’agenda di Lisbona.
Perseguirò con vigore questi obiettivi e, riguardo all’agricoltura, insisterò anche su un accordo relativo a un registro delle indicazioni geografiche e sulla sua estensione. Questo è il modo in cui funzionano i negoziati multilaterali. Devono offrire vantaggi per tutti. Ciò significa che altri devono ora impegnarsi seriamente a creare accesso ai mercati dei prodotti e dei servizi, che è importante non solo per l’Europa, ma per l’intera economia mondiale, ed è decisivo per lo sviluppo. Ciò significa ridurre le tariffe industriali effettivamente applicate, non solo abbassare i livelli consolidati decisi 12 anni fa nell’
. Dopo tutto, questo sarà l’effetto delle nostre proposte relative all’agricoltura, perché, diversamente da molti paesi in via di sviluppo, le nostre tariffe consolidate e applicate di solito sono identiche.
Ciò non significa venir meno al nostro impegno di garantire che i paesi industrializzati offrano di più rispetto ai paesi in via di sviluppo. Naturalmente lo manterremo. Non ci aspettiamo offerte dai paesi meno sviluppati o dai paesi deboli e vulnerabili, né ci aspettiamo che altri paesi in via di sviluppo garantiscano un livello di apertura dei mercati equivalente a quello dei paesi industrializzati. Ma devono fare qualcosa. Questo è il principio alla base dei negoziati.
Dobbiamo anche compiere progressi negli scambi di servizi. L’attuale strategia negoziale basata su richieste e offerte non ha dato risultati soddisfacenti. Dobbiamo creare una piattaforma per condurre autentici negoziati a livello multilaterale, che per ora non esiste. Ciò rispecchia l’importanza dei servizi nell’economia mondiale moderna ed è fondamentale non solo per noi, ma anche per i paesi in via di sviluppo. Questi paesi devono chiaramente rimanere liberi di perseguire gli obiettivi strategici nazionali e salvaguardare il loro diritto nazionale di regolamentare i servizi.
Ciò che chiediamo è la parità di trattamento per i fornitori di servizi esteri in alcuni settori, non un impegno a liberalizzare i mercati o privatizzare gli operatori esistenti. Anche in questo caso, la nostra proposta esclude i paesi deboli e vulnerabili e garantisce flessibilità per altri paesi in via di sviluppo.
Siamo lontani dal punto in cui ci auguravamo di essere. Come Pascal Lamy, speravo che a Hong Kong saremmo stati in grado di completare due terzi del lavoro, in particolare stabilendo modalità complete per i negoziati in settori chiave. Non siamo pervenuti a questo risultato perché, in seguito all’adozione dell’accordo quadro nel luglio 2004, i negoziati sono semplicemente rimasti in panna. Alcuni negoziatori hanno ostentato per un certo periodo una presa di posizione che siamo riusciti a superare solo nel luglio di quest’anno. Anche se in ottobre gli Stati Uniti hanno infine presentato un’offerta sull’agricoltura, ciò è avvenuto molti mesi dopo la data sperata. L’Unione europea ha risposto entro lo stesso mese con la nostra offerta di accesso al mercato agricolo. Tuttavia, altri hanno continuato a ostacolare i negoziati. Troppo a lungo siamo rimasti bloccati su una questione e su una serie di interessi – quelli dei grandi esportatori agricoli – anziché procedere con l’intera agenda di Doha.
Per concludere, farò del mio meglio per garantire il successo di Hong Kong, consolidare i progressi compiuti e definire una piattaforma per il completamento dei lavori nel 2006. Soprattutto, è essenziale che la Conferenza non si svolga in un clima astioso. Difenderò e illustrerò le proposte dell’Europa. Promuoverò gli interessi dell’Europa e manterrò alta l’ambizione dei negoziati nel loro insieme, creando consenso quando e dove possibile con i nostri
negoziali.
Mi auguro che loro adottino lo stesso atteggiamento. Devono smettere di nascondersi dietro critiche infondate dell’Unione europea, smettere di nascondersi dietro richieste tattiche e palesemente irrealistiche e impegnarsi in negoziati reali su tutte le questioni. Se continuano a limitarsi a chiedere di più all’Europa senza offrire il loro contributo, essi – non noi – rischiano di far crollare l’intero ciclo di negoziati. Se così fosse, tornerebbero a casa a mani vuote.
Dobbiamo lavorare insieme per ottenere un risultato che dia impulso all’economia mondiale, generi fiducia politica e aiuti i poveri del mondo. Questo è l’atteggiamento con cui siamo entrati nel ciclo di Doha ed è l’atteggiamento con cui intendiamo uscirne. La possibilità esiste ancora, la necessità è tanto pressante oggi quanto lo era all’avvio del ciclo. Tutti devono ora unire gli sforzi per completarlo e conseguire gli obiettivi che ci siamo prefissi quando abbiamo adottato la Carta di Doha molti anni fa.
Così, anche se è di moda criticare l’Unione europea perché rallenta questo ciclo di negoziati con la sua riluttanza a fare concessioni sull’agricoltura, in realtà è vero il contrario. Abbiamo dato impulso ai negoziati sull’agricoltura non solo una, ma ben tre volte negli ultimo diciotto mesi. La verità è che sono stati altri a rallentarli, non perché noi abbiamo fatto o offerto troppo poco, ma perché loro chiedevano troppo. Questo è un ciclo di negoziati per lo sviluppo, non degli esportatori agricoli, e le due cose non vanno confuse.
Alla luce di questo ritardo, anziché andare a Hong Kong con grandi aspettative e un rischio altrettanto grande di insuccesso, i membri dell’OMC, su consiglio di Pascal Lamy, hanno deciso di ridimensionare le ambizioni per la Conferenza. Sono stato l’ultimo ad accettare con riluttanza la proposta, ma ho così chiarito che ciò non può tradursi nel ridimensionamento delle ambizioni per l’intero ciclo. Dobbiamo continuare a mirare a un esito fruttuoso per tutta l’agenda negoziale e conseguire vantaggi significativi in termini di sviluppo entro la fine del prossimo anno.
Cerchiamo di essere chiari: il
è troppo importante per fallire. Non si tratta solo di commercio: si tratta di preservare la credibilità della cooperazione multilaterale, di dimostrare che le istituzioni multilaterali possono trovare risposte globali a questioni globali, di provare che il commercio può essere realmente messo al servizio dello sviluppo.
Il miglior modo di promuovere lo sviluppo è offrire nuove opportunità commerciali ai paesi in via di sviluppo e quindi fornire loro assistenza per aiutarli a sfruttarle. Ciò vale ancor più per i prodotti e i servizi industriali rispetto agli scambi di prodotti agricoli e vale soprattutto per gli scambi tra paesi in via di sviluppo. Le maggiori opportunità commerciali per i paesi in via di sviluppo sono rappresentate da altri paesi in via di sviluppo. I principali ostacoli a questi scambi sono le tariffe applicate per i prodotti industriali tra paesi in via di sviluppo. Mi rammarico che a Hong Kong non riusciremo a compiere progressi sostanziali in proposito. Questo è il motivo per cui è necessario un pacchetto per lo sviluppo studiato specificamente per i paesi più poveri, non in sostituzione, ma come anticipo di ciò che si potrà conseguire in futuro.
I principali elementi della mia proposta per lo sviluppo, che ho presentato per la prima volta alla miniconferenza ministeriale di ottobre a Zurigo e sulla quale insisto sin d’allora, sono: in primo luogo, l’impegno da parte di tutti i membri industrializzati dell’OMC ad accordare libero accesso, esente da dazi e contingenti, a tutti i prodotti provenienti dai paesi meno sviluppati; in secondo luogo, l’adozione di un pacchetto di proposte di trattamento speciale e differenziato che confermi le flessibilità esistenti in seno all’OMC per i paesi meno sviluppati; in terzo luogo, l’incorporazione negli accordi dell’OMC in materia di proprietà intellettuale di condizioni che garantiscano un migliore accesso a medicinali poco costosi contro le pandemie; in quarto luogo, l’adozione di un consistente pacchetto di aiuti al commercio, in linea con quanto deciso al Vertice G8 di Gleneagles. La Commissione ha dato l’esempio con l’offerta di 1 miliardo di euro all’anno fatta dal Presidente Barroso al G8. Mi auguro che i membri dell’OMC possano accogliere queste proposte a Hong Kong.
Consentitemi di passare ora ad altri aspetti dei negoziati. Il 28 ottobre l’Unione europea ha presentato un’offerta negoziale completa, comprendente l’accesso al mercato agricolo. Ciò ha creato l’opportunità oltremodo necessaria di portare avanti l’intero ciclo di negoziati. Era il passo necessario e giusto da compiere, in quanto ci ha permesso di svolgere i primi veri negoziati a livello politico sui prodotti e servizi industriali, sulle norme
e sullo sviluppo. Si è così cominciato a riequilibrare il ciclo di negoziati.
Deploro profondamente che, invece di cogliere e sfruttare questa opportunità, i nostri
negoziali abbiano deciso di adottare la soluzione più comoda, respingendo la nostra offerta sull’agricoltura e criticandola – spesso in termini eccessivi – anziché prenderla in seria considerazione e permetterci di compiere progressi."@it12
"Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@lt14
"Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@lv13
"Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@mt15
"Mijnheer de Voorzitter, dit is een belangrijk debat. Er hangt veel van de Doha-ronde af, niet alleen voor ons in Europa en voor de ontwikkelingslanden, maar ook voor de mondiale economie in haar geheel. Over iets meer dan een week begint in Hongkong de ministersconferentie van de WTO. Ik weet dat een aantal afgevaardigden de conferentie bij zal wonen en daarom is het essentieel dat ik u formeel verslag doe van de stand van zaken, waarna wij kunnen discussiëren over de vooruitzichten voor deze onderhandelingsronde.
Staat u mij toe om voor alle duidelijkheid ons landbouwaanbod even nader toe te lichten. Dat aanbod gaat veel verder dan dat van de Uruguay-ronde, maar moet wel als één geheel worden gezien. Er moet niet alleen worden gekeken naar de voorgestelde verlagingen van invoerheffingen, maar ook naar de grote inspanningen die wij leveren bij het verminderen van de binnenlandse steun door de hervorming van het gemeenschappelijk landbouwbeleid (GLB), en naar ons aanbod om alle uitvoersubsidies af te schaffen.
Wij zullen subsidies die de handel verstoren, met 70 procent verminderen. Dankzij de hervorming van het GLB van 2003 geldt reeds voor 90 procent van de directe betalingen aan landbouwers dat er geen verstorend effect meer van uit zal gaan op de handel. Op basis van ons voorstel zal onze gemiddelde landbouwheffing van 23 tot 12 procent worden teruggebracht. Dat is overigens precies hetzelfde percentage als het tarief dat op dit moment in de Verenigde Staten wordt gehanteerd. In zijn geheel bezien, is dit het meest substantiële aanbod dat de Europese Unie ooit tijdens een onderhandelingsronde heeft gedaan. Elk element van dat aanbod - en dus niet alleen de verlaging van de heffingen - zal tot een aanzienlijke verbetering van de markttoegang leiden, zoals ook is vastgelegd in de kaderovereenkomst uit 2004. Hierdoor worden significante mogelijkheden voor agrarische exporteurs gecreëerd zonder dat dit ten koste gaat van de preferentiële toegang voor arme ontwikkelingslanden en zonder dat dit buitensporige negatieve gevolgen voor onze eigen Europese landbouwsector heeft.
Wij moeten een goed evenwicht zien te vinden en naar mijn idee kan dat evenwicht op basis van ons aanbod tot stand worden gebracht. Daarbij is het onze verantwoordelijkheid om ook rekening te houden met de gevolgen van de hervorming voor de Europese landbouwgemeenschappen. Wel moet bedacht worden dat dit een onderhandelingsronde voor
ontwikkelingslanden is, met name voor de arme en behoeftige landen, en dat deze ronde dus niet alleen bedoeld is voor competitieve landbouwproducenten. Naar mijn idee zouden deze producenten er ook niet op uit mogen zijn om hun eigen concurrentievoordeel op de wereldmarkten te maximaliseren ten koste van andere ontwikkelingslanden in de WTO.
Wij hebben de afgelopen week met betrekking tot suiker kunnen constateren hoe gevoelig het probleem van de uitholling van het preferentiestelsel voor behoeftige ACS-landen ligt. Het zou een goede zaak zijn als iedereen, niet alleen in Europa, maar ook in alle andere WTO-lidstaten, zich hier volledig rekenschap van zou geven. Als wij dit feit negeren, loopt iedereen gevaar: zowel degenen wier bron van inkomsten wordt bedreigd als degenen die er uiteindelijk verantwoordelijk voor zijn dat de gevolgen van een uitholling van het preferentiestelsel genegeerd worden.
Ons aanbod is dan ook substantieel, meetbaar en geloofwaardig. Dit aanbod heeft ook een realistische impuls aan de landbouwonderhandelingen gegeven. Indien aan de eisen van de VS betreffende verlagingen van de invoerheffingen uitvoering gegeven zou worden - en dat geldt ook, zij het in mindere mate, voor de voorstellen van de G20 -, zou dat ongetwijfeld positieve gevolgen voor deze landen hebben, maar tegelijkertijd ook een vernietigend effect hebben op onze eigen landbouwers en op de arme landen van Afrika, het Caribisch gebied en de Stille Oceaan. Als wij op deze eisen in zouden gaan, zouden veel agrarische handelsactiviteiten in laatstgenoemde landen eenvoudigweg verdwijnen.
Daarom moeten wij een duidelijk signaal afgeven. Ik ben niet van plan om nog een nieuw aanbod op landbouwgebied te doen. Daar is geen enkele goede reden voor en daardoor zouden de onderhandelingen nog meer in onbalans raken. Het is nu tijd voor anderen om een gelijkwaardig aanbod te doen. Regeringen en burgers in Europa moeten ervan overtuigd zijn dat structurele veranderingen en mogelijk banenverlies in de landbouw gecompenseerd zullen worden door nieuwe banen en nieuwe mogelijkheden in andere sectoren. Daarom zijn onze onderhandelingsdoelstellingen inzake markttoegang voor niet-landbouwproducten en inzake industriële goederen en diensten zo belangrijk. Zij zijn cruciaal voor economische groei en werkgelegenheid in Europa en vormen een essentieel onderdeel van de agenda van Lissabon.
Ik zal alles in het werk stellen om deze doelstellingen te verwezenlijken. Wat de landbouw betreft, zal ik daarnaast blijven aandringen op een consensus over en uitbreiding van een register van geografische aanduidingen. Dat is de wijze waarop multilaterale onderhandelingen functioneren. Iedereen moet voordeel trekken uit het onderhandelingsproces. Dat betekent dat anderen zich nu serieus moeten gaan richten op het creëren van nieuwe markttoegang voor goederen en diensten. Een dergelijke markttoegang is belangrijk voor Europa en voor de wereldeconomie, en, vooral, cruciaal voor ontwikkeling. Dat betekent dat de industriële heffingen die op dit moment feitelijk worden gehanteerd, verlaagd moeten worden. Het is niet voldoende om de plafonds te verlagen die twaalf jaar geleden tijdens de Uruguay-ronde zijn afgesproken. Dat is uiteindelijk het effect dat onze voorstellen op landbouwgebied zullen hebben, omdat, anders dan in veel ontwikkelingslanden, onze maximale en feitelijk toegepaste heffingen doorgaans gelijk zijn.
Dat betekent niet dat wij afstappen van onze toezegging dat ontwikkelde landen een grotere bijdrage dienen te leveren dan ontwikkelingslanden. Daar houden wij uiteraard aan vast. Wij verwachten geen offers van de minst ontwikkelde en andere zwakke en kwetsbare landen. Wij verwachten ook niet dat andere ontwikkelingslanden hun markten tot op hetzelfde niveau zullen openstellen als de ontwikkelde landen. Zij moeten echter wel een eigen bijdrage leveren. Dat is het uitgangspunt van deze onderhandelingsronde.
Wij moeten ook vooruitgang boeken bij de handel in diensten. De huidige aanpak van de onderhandelingen op basis van "loven en bieden" heeft geen bevredigend resultaat opgeleverd. Wij moeten een platform creëren voor daadwerkelijke multilaterale onderhandelingen, een platform dat er tot op heden nog niet is. Wij moeten op dit vlak resultaten boeken, omdat het belang van de diensten in de moderne wereldeconomie steeds groter wordt. Deze kwestie is zowel voor ons als voor de ontwikkelingslanden van belang. Het is duidelijk dat deze landen op dienstengebied de vrijheid moeten hebben om de nationale beleidsdoelstellingen te verwezenlijken, waarbij hun recht om nationale wet- en regelgeving uit te vaardigen volledig gewaarborgd dient te blijven.
Wij hebben behoefte aan een gelijke behandeling van buitenlandse dienstverleners in sommige sectoren, niet aan deregulering van markten of aan privatisering van bestaande exploitanten. Ook op dit punt worden zwakke en kwetsbare landen in ons voorstel ontzien en wordt voor andere ontwikkelingslanden een flexibele aanpak voorgesteld.
Wij zijn nog lang niet waar wij hadden willen zijn. Net als Pascal Lamy had ik gehoopt dat wij in Hongkong tweederde deel van de werkzaamheden van deze ronde zouden kunnen voltooien, met name door op de belangrijkste onderhandelingsgebieden afspraken te maken over alle modaliteiten. De reden dat wij daar niet in zijn geslaagd is simpel. Nadat er in juli 2004 overeenstemming was bereikt over de kaderovereenkomst, zijn de besprekingen gewoon op een laag pitje gezet. Een aantal onderhandelaars heeft een tijd lang zelfgenoegzaam achterover geleund en die houding hebben wij pas in juli van dit jaar kunnen ombuigen. De Verenigde Staten hebben uiteindelijk in oktober alsnog een aanbod op landbouwgebied gedaan, maar dat was vele maanden later dan wij hadden gehoopt. De EU heeft nog in diezelfde maand gereageerd met een eigen voorstel voor toegang tot de landbouwmarkt. Andere partijen blijven de onderhandelingen echter nog steeds torpederen. Wij blijven nu al weer veel te lang bij één onderwerp en één belangenafweging - die van de grootschalige landbouwexporteurs - hangen, terwijl wij eigenlijk zouden moeten streven naar vooruitgang met betrekking tot de gehele Doha-agenda.
Samenvattend kan ik u meedelen dat ik mijn uiterste best zal doen om Hongkong tot een succes te maken, om de vooruitgang die wij geboekt hebben, veilig te stellen en om een zodanig platform te creëren dat deze taak in 2006 afgerond kan worden. Het is namelijk van het allergrootste belang dat wij aan de bijeenkomst geen bittere nasmaak overhouden. Ik zal de voorstellen van Europa toelichten en verdedigen. Ik zal de Europese belangen behartigen en blijven streven naar verwezenlijking van de volledige Doha-ronde door waar en wanneer mogelijk een consensus met onze onderhandelingspartners te bewerkstelligen.
Ik hoop dat dit ook de insteek van onze onderhandelingspartners is. Zij moeten zich niet langer achter ongefundeerde kritiek op de Europese Unie verschuilen, en evenmin achter eisen die overduidelijk onrealistisch en op tactische overwegingen gebaseerd zijn. Het is nu tijd dat zij samen met ons over alle onderwerpen serieuze onderhandelingen gaan voeren. Als zij alleen maar blijven doorgaan met steeds meer van Europa te vragen zonder zelf een bijdrage te leveren, zijn zij - en niet wij - verantwoordelijk als deze onderhandelingsronde op niets uitloopt. Als dat gebeurt, staan zij met volledig lege handen.
Daarom moeten wij samenwerken om een resultaat te bewerkstelligen dat een enorme impuls aan de wereldeconomie zal geven, dat politiek vertrouwen zal genereren en dat hulp biedt aan de arme mensen in de wereld. Met die gedachte zijn wij aan deze ronde begonnen en met die gedachte willen wij deze ronde ook afsluiten. Dat kan nog steeds en de noodzaak daarvoor is ook nog net zo urgent als bij het begin van de onderhandelingsronde. Wij moeten nu de rijen sluiten en de doelstellingen verwezenlijken die wij voor onszelf zoveel jaren geleden, met de ondertekening van de Verklaring van Doha, vastgesteld hebben.
Het lijkt in de mode te zijn om de Europese Unie de schuld te geven van de vertraging die zich in deze onderhandelingsronde voordoet door te zeggen dat wij ons op landbouwgebied terughoudend opstellen, maar in werkelijkheid is het tegenovergestelde het geval. Wij hebben de ontwikkelingen op landbouwgebied in deze ronde juist gestimuleerd, niet één keer, maar drie keer in de afgelopen achttien maanden. De waarheid is dat andere partijen zich terughoudend opstellen, niet omdat wij te weinig gedaan hebben of te weinig bieden, maar omdat zij te veel vragen. Wij zitten in een ontwikkelingsronde en niet in een ronde voor landbouwexporteurs. Die twee dingen mogen niet door elkaar worden gehaald.
Tegen de achtergrond van deze vertraging hebben de WTO-leden op advies van Pascal Lamy besloten om niet met al te hoge verwachtingen - en dus ook niet met een al te groot risico op mislukkingen - naar Hongkong af te reizen, maar om de ambities voor de bijeenkomst naar beneden bij te stellen. Na lang aarzelen was ik de laatste die hiermee akkoord ging, maar daarbij heb ik wel duidelijk gemaakt dat dit niet betekent dat wij ook onze ambities voor de Doha-ronde als geheel naar beneden bijstellen. Wij moeten blijven streven naar een positieve invulling van de totale onderhandelingsagenda, waarbij wij volgend jaar op concrete resultaten op ontwikkelingsgebied moeten kunnen wijzen.
Eén ding moet duidelijk zijn: de Doha-ronde is te belangrijk om te mislukken. Die ronde gaat niet alleen over handel, maar ook over het in stand houden van de geloofwaardigheid van de multilaterale samenwerking. Wij moeten niet alleen laten zien dat multilaterale instellingen in staat zijn om voor mondiale oplossingen voor mondiale problemen te zorgen, maar wij moeten ook aantonen dat de handel gebruikt kan worden om de ontwikkeling te bevorderen.
De beste manier om ontwikkeling te bevorderen, is het creëren van nieuwe handelsmogelijkheden voor ontwikkelingslanden, waarbij zij de hulp en steun krijgen die zij nodig hebben om deze kansen ook te grijpen. Dit is zelfs nog meer van toepassing op industriële goederen en diensten dan op de handel in agrarische producten, en dit geldt met name voor de onderlinge handel tussen ontwikkelingslanden. Het beste handelsperspectief voor een ontwikkelingsland bieden de andere ontwikkelingslanden. De grootste obstakels voor deze handel zijn de invoerheffingen op industriële goederen die door ontwikkelingslanden onderling worden gehanteerd. Ik betreur het dat wij op dit punt in Hongkong geen wezenlijke vooruitgang zullen boeken. Daarom hebben wij een op maat gemaakt ontwikkelingspakket voor de armste landen nodig, niet als substituut voor wat wij later eventueel zouden kunnen verwezenlijken, maar als voorschot daarop.
Staat u mij toe om nader in te gaan op de belangrijkste elementen van het voorstel voor ontwikkeling dat ik voor het eerst in Zürich tijdens de "mini-ministeriële bijeenkomst" naar voren heb gebracht en waarop ik sinds die tijd ben blijven hameren. Ten eerste dienen alle WTO-leden zich vast te leggen op een accijns- en quotumvrije toegang voor alle producten uit de minst ontwikkelde landen (MOL’s); ten tweede dienen wij een pakket met speciale, op differentiële behandeling gerichte maatregelen op te stellen ter versterking van de flexibele aanpak voor de MOL’s die deel uitmaken van de WTO; ten derde dienen wij in de WTO-overeenkomsten betreffende de intellectuele eigendom voorwaarden te verankeren voor een betere toegang tot goedkope geneesmiddelen tegen pandemieën; en ten vierde moeten wij een uitgebreid "steun-voor-handel"-pakket ontwikkelen aan de hand van de afspraken die zijn gemaakt tijdens de G8-Top in Gleneagles. De Commissie heeft het goede voorbeeld gegeven door de toezegging van 1 miljard euro per jaar die voorzitter Barroso tijdens de G8 heeft gedaan. Ik hoop dat de WTO-partners deze ideeën in Hongkong zullen steunen.
Dan zou ik nu graag nader in willen gaan op andere aspecten van de onderhandelingen. Op 28 oktober heeft de EU een veelomvattend aanbod gedaan, inclusief voorstellen met betrekking tot markttoegang. Hierdoor wordt de opening gecreëerd die hard nodig is om de hele onderhandelingsronde weer op de rails te krijgen. Dit was een noodzakelijke en juiste stap, aangezien hierdoor de eerste echte onderhandelingen op politiek niveau over industriële goederen en diensten, antidumpingregels en ontwikkeling mogelijk werden. De onderhandelingsronde dient namelijk een hernieuwd evenwicht vinden.
Ik betreur het in hoge mate dat onze onderhandelingspartners deze mogelijkheid niet aangegrepen hebben om vooruitgang te boeken. Zij hebben voor de gemakkelijkste uitweg gekozen door ons aanbod af te wijzen en te bekritiseren - vaak in buitensporige bewoordingen - in plaats van in onderling overleg en gezamenlijk naar een oplossing toe te werken."@nl3
"Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@pl16
"Senhor Presidente, este é um debate importante. Há muita coisa que está dependente da Ronda de Doha: para nós, na Europa, para os países em desenvolvimento e também para a economia global na sua totalidade. A conferência ministerial da OMC em Hong Kong terá início dentro de pouco mais de uma semana. Sei que alguns dos presentes lá estarão, portanto é essencial que vos dê conta, formalmente, do pé em que estamos e que discutamos a situação com que esta ronda de negociações se confronta.
Vamos ser claros acerca do valor da nossa proposta relativa à agricultura. É uma proposta que vai muito mais longe do que fomos no Ronda do Uruguai. Tem de ser vista como um todo, não apenas em termos das reduções pautais que apresentamos, mas incluindo também as nossas importantes contribuições relativas à redução do apoio interno através da reforma da PAC e da nossa oferta de eliminar completamente os subsídios à exportação.
Vamos reduzir em 70% os subsídios que provocam uma distorção do comércio. Já nos termos da reforma da PAC de 2003, 90% dos pagamentos directos aos agricultores deixarão de provocar distorções do comércio. Nos termos da nossa proposta, a nossa pauta aduaneira agrícola média sofrerá uma redução de 23% para 12%, nível que, a propósito, é igual ao nível actualmente existente nos EUA. Na sua globalidade, esta é a proposta mais considerável alguma vez apresentada pela União Europeia em qualquer ronda de negociações no domínio comercial. Cada um dos seus elementos – e não apenas as reduções pautais – melhorará de forma considerável o acesso aos mercados, tal como o exige o Acordo-Quadro de 2004. Irá gerar importantes oportunidades para os exportadores agrícolas sem eliminar o acesso preferencial para os países em desenvolvimento pobres nem prejudicar excessivamente o nosso sector agrícola na Europa.
Temos de estabelecer um equilíbrio. A meu ver, este é o equilíbrio correcto a estabelecer. Temos a responsabilidade de levar em consideração o impacto exercido pela reforma sobre as comunidades agrícolas europeias. Acresce que esta é uma ronda de negociações para
os países em desenvolvimento, principalmente os que são pobres e carenciados, e não apenas para produtores agrícolas competitivos que, a meu ver, não devem procurar maximizar a sua vantagem competitiva nos mercados mundiais à custa de outros países em desenvolvimento que fazem parte da OMC.
Vimos na semana passada, com a questão do açúcar, como é sensível o problema da erosão das preferências para os países ACP carenciados. Compete-nos a todos nós, não apenas na Europa, mas a todos os membros da OMC, ter plenamente em conta este aspecto. Se o ignorarmos, estamos a pôr toda a gente em perigo: os que, por esse motivo, ficam com a sua subsistência ameaçada e os que arcarão com as responsabilidades se não responderem à questão da erosão de preferências.
Por conseguinte, a nossa proposta é considerável, ponderada e credível. Introduziu realismo nas negociações em matéria agrícola. Muito embora as exigências dos EUA em matéria de reduções pautais e – em menor grau – as propostas dos membros do G20 beneficiassem sem dúvida estes países, elas teriam igualmente um efeito devastador em termos de emprego para os nossos próprios agricultores e para países pobres de África, das Caraíbas e do Pacífico, cujo comércio de produtos agrícolas, se acaso aceitássemos tais exigências, seria em grande parte pura e simplesmente eliminado.
Vamos, pois, ser muito claros. Não projecto fazer mais nenhuma proposta no domínio da agricultura. Não se justifica que o faça e iria desequilibrar ainda mais as negociações. É chegada a altura de outros fazerem esforços equivalentes ao que nós fizemos. É necessário que os governos e os cidadãos da Europa acreditem que as alterações estruturais e a possível perda de postos de trabalho na agricultura serão contrabalançadas pela criação de novos postos de trabalho e novas oportunidades noutros sectores. É por isso que são tão importantes os nossos objectivos negociais em matéria de acesso aos mercados para os produtos não agrícolas, em matéria de bens industriais e serviços. São cruciais para o crescimento e o emprego na Europa e são uma parte vital da Agenda de Lisboa.
Continuarei a defender vigorosamente esses interesses e, no domínio da agricultura, insistirei também num acordo relativo a um registo das indicações geográficas e no alargamento desse mesmo registo. É assim que funciona a negociação multilateral. Tem de haver benefícios para todos. Significa isso que outros têm agora de se empenhar seriamente na criação de um novo acesso aos mercados para bens e serviços, que são importantes não apenas para a Europa, mas também para a economia mundial e, de forma crucial, para o desenvolvimento. Quer isto dizer, reduzir as pautas aduaneiras industriais nos termos em que realmente se aplicavam, não diminuindo apenas níveis consolidados acordados há 12 anos no Ronda do Uruguai. Este será, no fim de contas, o efeito das nossas propostas no sector agrícola, porque, ao contrário de muitos países em desenvolvimento, as nossas pautas aduaneiras consolidadas e aplicadas são habitualmente as mesmas.
Isto não significa voltar atrás relativamente ao nosso compromisso de que o esforço dos países desenvolvidos será superior ao dos países em desenvolvimento. É claro que será. Não estamos à espera que os países menos desenvolvidos e outros países frágeis e vulneráveis ofereçam nada, tal como não estamos à espera de que outros países em desenvolvimento procedam a uma abertura dos mercados de nível equivalente à dos países desenvolvidos. Têm, porém, de fazer alguma coisa. Esse é o princípio desta ronda de negociações.
Também precisamos que se façam progressos no domínio do comércio de serviços. A actual abordagem negocial baseada em pedidos e ofertas não produziu resultados satisfatórios. É necessário que criemos uma plataforma para uma verdadeira negociação multilateral que, até ao momento, não existe. Isto reflecte a importância dos serviços na moderna economia mundial. Importância não apenas para nós, mas também para os países em desenvolvimento. Esses países têm, claramente, de continuar a ser livres em matéria de serviços para tentarem atingir objectivos de política nacional e para salvaguardarem integralmente o seu direito nacional de regulamentação.
O que procuramos alcançar é a igualdade de tratamento para os prestadores estrangeiros de serviços em alguns sectores, não um compromisso de desregular mercados ou privatizar operadores já existentes. Também neste caso a nossa proposta exclui países frágeis e vulneráveis e confere flexibilidade a outros países em desenvolvimento.
Estamos longe da situação em que esperávamos encontrar-nos. Tal como Pascal Lamy, eu tinha a esperança de que, em Hong Kong, pudéssemos concluir dois terços do trabalho da ronda de negociações, principalmente chegando a acordo sobre modalidades completas nas principais áreas de negociação. O motivo por que o não conseguimos foi simplesmente o facto de, depois de chegarmos a consenso acerca do acordo-quadro, em Julho de 2004, as conversações terem pura e simplesmente ficado paradas. Alguns dos negociadores passaram a assumir determinadas posturas em busca de protagonismo, atitude que só conseguimos quebrar em Julho do corrente ano. Embora os Estados Unidos apresentassem finalmente uma proposta no domínio da agricultura em Outubro, isso aconteceu muitos meses mais tarde do que tínhamos esperado que acontecesse. A UE respondeu no mesmo mês com a nossa proposta de acesso ao mercado no domínio agrícola. Todavia, outros continuaram a frustrar as negociações. Estivemos encalhados durante demasiado tempo numa única questão e num único conjunto de interesses – o dos grandes exportadores de produtos agrícolas – em vez de avançarmos com toda a Agenda de Doha.
Direi, para concluir, que farei tudo o que estiver ao meu alcance para que Hong Kong se salde por um êxito, para retirar benefícios duradouros dos progressos que fizemos e para criar uma plataforma que nos permita concluir estes trabalhos em 2006. Acima de tudo, é essencial que a reunião não termine num clima de azedume. Vou defender e explicar as propostas da Europa. Vou defender os interesses da Europa e manter as ambições da ronda de negociações no seu todo, construindo consensos sempre que for possível e onde for possível construí-los com os nossos parceiros nas negociações.
Espero que eles façam o mesmo. Têm de deixar de se esconder por trás de críticas não fundamentadas à União Europeia; têm de deixar de se esconder por trás de exigências manifestamente irrealistas e tácticas e participar numa verdadeira negociação sobre todas as questões. Se continuarem unicamente a pedir mais e mais à Europa sem contribuírem com nada, arriscam-se – eles, não nós – a destruir esta ronda de negociações. Se isso acontecer, sairão dela de mãos vazias.
Vamos é trabalhar conjuntamente para chegarmos a um resultado que reforce a economia mundial, gere confiança política e ajude os pobres do mundo. Foi nesse espírito que entrámos nesta ronda de negociações; é nesse espírito que dela queremos sair. Ainda existe essa possibilidade, a necessidade é tão urgente agora como era quando demos início à ronda. Todos temos agora de puxar para o mesmo lado para concretizarmos as nossas ambições e atingirmos os objectivos que nos propusemos atingir quando, há já tantos anos, chegámos a acordo sobre a Carta de Doha.
Portanto, embora esteja na moda culpar a União Europeia por não deixar avançar esta ronda de negociações devido à sua reticência no domínio da agricultura, de facto o que é verdade é exactamente o oposto. Nós fizemos avançar a ronda de negociações no domínio agrícola, não apenas uma vez, mas três, nos últimos dezoito meses. A verdade é que foram outros que impediram que se avançasse, não porque nós tenhamos feito muito pouca coisa ou tenhamos oferecido muito pouco, mas porque eles fizeram demasiadas exigências. Esta é uma ronda para o desenvolvimento, não é uma ronda de negociações de exportadores de produtos agrícolas e não se devem confundir as duas coisas.
Perante este atraso, em vez de irem para Hong Kong com grandes expectativas e correrem um risco igualmente grande de fracasso, os membros da OMC, seguindo os conselhos de Pascal Lamy, decidiram baixar a fasquia das ambições para esta reunião. Eu fui o último a aceitar, com relutância, esta situação, mas ao aceitá-la deixei claro que isso não pode significar baixar a fasquia das ambições para o todo da ronda de negociações. Temos de continuar a ter ainda como objectivo a obtenção de um resultado positivo no todo da agenda de negociações, apresentando, até finais do próximo ano, importantes frutos do desenvolvimento.
Sejamos claros: a Ronda de Doha é demasiado importante e por isso não pode saldar-se por um fracasso. Não tem apenas a ver com o comércio, tem a ver com a manutenção da credibilidade da cooperação multilateral; com a demonstração de que as instituições multilaterais podem encontrar respostas globais para questões globais; com o facto de provar que é possível pôr realmente o comércio ao serviço do desenvolvimento.
A melhor maneira de promover o desenvolvimento é abrir novas oportunidades aos países em desenvolvimento no domínio do comércio e seguidamente fornecer-lhes ajuda, contribuindo assim para que eles possam explorar essas oportunidades. Isto ainda se aplica mais aos sectores dos bens industriais e dos serviços do que ao comércio de produtos agrícolas, e aplica-se em especial ao comércio entre países em desenvolvimento. As maiores oportunidades de comércio que se oferecem aos países em desenvolvimento são oportunidades de comércio com outros países em desenvolvimento. Os maiores obstáculos a este comércio são as pautas aduaneiras sobre bens industriais que existem entre países em desenvolvimento. Lamento que não possamos avançar substancialmente nesta matéria em Hong Kong. É por isso que precisamos de um pacote de medidas relativo às questões do desenvolvimento especialmente talhado para os países mais pobres, não como substituto para o que poderemos alcançar mais tarde, mas como uma forma de adiantamento.
Os principais elementos da minha proposta relativa ao desenvolvimento, que comecei por apresentar na mini-reunião ministerial de Zurique, em Outubro, e nos quais tenho vindo a insistir desde então são os seguintes: em primeiro lugar, todos os países industrializados que são membros da OMC deveriam comprometer-se a fornecer acesso a todos os produtos provenientes dos países menos desenvolvidos com isenção de direitos aduaneiros e de contingentes; em segundo lugar, deveríamos adoptar um pacote de propostas de tratamento especial e diferencial para confirmar as flexibilidades que existem na OMC para esses países menos desenvolvidos; em terceiro lugar, temos de consagrar nos acordos relativos a aspectos dos direitos de propriedade intelectual, celebrados no âmbito da OMC, condições para um melhor acesso a medicamentos baratos contra pandemias; e, em quarto lugar, deveríamos adoptar um importante pacote de medidas de ajuda ao comércio em sintonia com o que foi acordado na Cimeira do G8 em Gleneagles. A Comissão deu um exemplo com o compromisso assumido pelo Senhor Presidente Barroso na reunião do G8, no valor de mil milhões de euros por ano. Faço votos de que os parceiros da OMC possam dar o seu acordo a estas ideias em Hong Kong.
Passarei agora a outros aspectos das negociações. Em 28 de Outubro, a UE pôs em cima da mesa uma proposta de negociação abrangente que incluía, entre outras coisas, o acesso aos mercados para os produtos agrícolas. Isto criou uma oportunidade muito necessária para fazer avançar toda a ronda de negociações. Foi uma coisa necessária e conveniente, porque nos permitiu efectuar as primeiras negociações a sério a nível político sobre bens industriais e serviços, regras anti-dumping e desenvolvimento. Começou-se a reequilibrar a ronda de negociações.
Lamento profundamente que, em vez de aproveitar esta oportunidade e de a desenvolver, os nossos parceiros nas negociações decidissem sair pelo caminho mais fácil, rejeitando a nossa proposta relativa à agricultura e criticando-a – as mais das vezes em termos nada moderados – em vez de agirem relativamente a essa proposta e de nos permitirem avançar."@pt17
"Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@sk18
"Mr President, this is an important debate. Much rides on the Doha Round: for us in Europe, for developing countries and indeed for the whole of the global economy. In just over one week, the Hong Kong WTO ministerial will begin. I know some of you will be there, so it is essential that I report to you formally on where we stand and that we discuss the situation that this round faces.
Let us be clear about the value of our offer on agriculture. It goes much further than we went in the Uruguay Round. It has to be seen as a whole, not just in terms of the tariff reductions that we are tabling, but including our major contributions on reducing domestic support through CAP reform and our offer to eliminate export subsidies altogether.
We will reduce trade distorting subsidies by 70%. Already under the 2003 CAP reform, 90% of direct payments to farmers will no longer distort trade. Under our proposal, our average agricultural tariff will fall from 23% to 12%, which incidentally is the same as the current US level. Taken as a whole, this is the most substantial offer ever made by the European Union in any trade round. Each element of it – not just the tariff cuts – will provide substantial improvement in market access, as required under the 2004 Framework Agreement. It will create significant opportunities for agricultural exporters without wiping out preferential access for poor developing countries or doing excessive damage to our own agricultural sector in Europe.
We have to strike a balance. In my view this is the right balance to strike. We have a responsibility to take into account the impact of reform on European farming communities. What is more, this is a round for
developing countries, notably the poor and needy ones, and not just for competitive agricultural producers who should not seek, in my view, to maximise their own competitive advantage in world markets at the expense of other developing countries in the WTO.
We saw last week with sugar how sensitive the problem of preference erosion for needy ACP countries is. It behoves us all, not just in Europe but in the WTO membership as a whole, to take this fully into account. We ignore this at everyone’s peril: those whose livelihoods are threatened by it and those who will bear responsibility if they do not respond to the issue of preference erosion.
Our offer is therefore substantial, measured and credible. It has injected realism into the agricultural negotiations. Whereas the US demands on tariff reductions and – to a lesser extent – the G20 proposals would without doubt benefit these countries, they would also have a devastating employment effect on our own farmers and on poor countries in Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific, much of whose agricultural trade, if we were to accept these demands, would simply be wiped out.
Let us therefore be very clear. I have no plan to make a further offer in agriculture. This is not justified and would further unbalance the negotiations. The time has come for others to match the effort we have made. Governments and citizens in Europe need to believe that structural change and possible job losses in agriculture will be balanced by the creation of new jobs and new opportunities in other sectors. That is why our negotiating objectives on non-agricultural market access, on industrial goods and services are so important. They are crucial to growth and jobs in Europe and are a vital part of the Lisbon Agenda.
I will vigorously pursue these interests and, in agriculture, I will also insist on an agreement on, and an extension of, a register of geographical indications. That is how multilateral negotiation works. There have to be gains all round. That means that others now have to engage seriously in creating new market access for goods and services, which matter not only to Europe but also to the world economy and, crucially, to development. This means cutting industrial tariffs as they actually applied, not only lowering bound levels agreed 12 years ago in the Uruguay Round. This, after all, will be the effect of our proposals in agriculture because, unlike many developing countries, our bound and applied tariffs are usually the same.
This does not mean going back on our commitment that developed countries will do more than developing countries. Of course we will. We do not expect offers from the least-developed and other weak and vulnerable countries. Nor do we expect other developing countries to match the level of market opening by developed countries. But they must do something. That is the principle of this round.
We also need progress in trade in services. The current negotiating approach based on requests and offers has not yielded satisfactory results. We need to create a platform for genuine multilateral negotiation which, so far, does not exist. This reflects the importance of services in the modern world economy. It is important not just to us but to developing countries as well. These countries must clearly remain free in services to pursue national policy objectives and fully to safeguard their national right to regulate.
What we seek is equal treatment for foreign service suppliers in some sectors, not a commitment to deregulate markets or privatise existing operators. Here again, our proposal excludes weak and vulnerable countries and gives flexibility to other developing countries.
We are far from where we hoped to be. Like Pascal Lamy, I had hoped that in Hong Kong we would be able to complete two thirds of the work of the round, notably by agreeing full modalities in the main areas of negotiation. The reason we have not achieved this is simply that after we agreed on the framework agreement in July 2004, the talks were simply becalmed. Some negotiators went through a period of posturing which we were able to break only in July of this year. Although the United States finally put forward an agriculture offer in October, this was many months later than we had hoped. The EU responded within the same month with our own agriculture market access offer. Still others continued to frustrate the negotiation. For far too long we have been stuck on one issue and one set of interests – that of large-scale agriculture exporters – rather than pushing ahead on the whole Doha agenda.
To conclude, I will do my utmost to make a success of Hong Kong, to lock in the progress we have made and to establish a platform for us to finish the job in 2006. Above all, it is essential that the meeting does not end in acrimony. I will defend and explain Europe’s proposals. I will pursue Europe’s interests and I will maintain the ambition of the round as a whole, building consensus whenever and wherever it is possible to do so with our negotiating partners.
I hope that they will do likewise. They must stop hiding behind unfounded criticism of the European Union; stop hiding behind patently unrealistic and tactical demands, and join in a real negotiation on all the issues. If they continue merely to ask for more from Europe without paying into the pot themselves, they – not we – risk destroying this round. They will come away, if that happens, with nothing at all.
Let us rather work together for an outcome that boosts the world’s economy, generates political confidence and helps the world’s poor. That is how we went into this round; that is how we want to come out of it. The possibility still exists, the need is as urgent now as it was when we began the round. Everyone must now pull together to make it happen and achieve the objectives that we first set out for ourselves when we agreed the Doha Charter all those years ago.
So, although it is fashionable to blame the European Union for holding up this round by being reticent on agriculture, in fact the opposite is the truth. We have moved the round forward in agriculture, not just once, but three times in the last eighteen months. The truth is that others have been holding back, not because we have done or offered too little, but because they have been demanding too much. This is a development round, not an agricultural exporters’ round, and the two should not be confused.
In view of this delay, rather than go to Hong Kong with great expectations and an equally great risk of failure, WTO members, on the advice of Pascal Lamy, decided to lower the ambition for this meeting. I was the last one reluctantly to accept this, but in doing so, I made clear that it cannot mean lowering ambition for the round as a whole. We must still aim for a successful outcome across the whole negotiating agenda, delivering significant development gains by the end of next year.
Let us be clear, the Doha Round is too big to fail. It is not just about trade, it is about maintaining the credibility of multilateral cooperation; showing that multilateral institutions can find global answers to global issues; proving that trade genuinely can be put at the service of development.
The best way to promote development is to open new trading opportunities to developing countries and then help them with aid to exploit those opportunities. This is even more true for industrial goods and services than it is for agriculture trade, and it is true especially for trade between developing countries. The biggest trade opportunities for developing countries are with other developing countries. The biggest obstacles to this trade are the tariffs on industrial goods that exist between developing countries. I regret that we will not be able to advance this substantially in Hong Kong. That is why we need a tailored development package for the poorest countries, not as a substitute for what we could achieve later, but as a down payment on it.
The main elements of my development proposal which I first made at the Zurich mini-ministerial in October and for which I have been pressing since are: first, all industrialised WTO members should commit to providing duty- and quota-free access to all products from the least developed countries; second, we should adopt a package of special and differential treatment proposals to confirm the flexibilities for those LDCs that exist in the WTO; third, we must enshrine in the WTO’s intellectual property agreements conditions for better access to cheap drugs against pandemics; and fourth, we should adopt a strong aid for trade package along the lines of what was agreed at the Gleneagles G8 Summit. The Commission has set an example with the EUR 1 billion per year pledge made by President Barroso at the G8. I hope the WTO partners can agree to these ideas in Hong Kong.
Let me turn now to other aspects of the negotiations. On 28 October, the EU put a comprehensive negotiating offer on the table, including on agricultural market access. This created a much-needed opportunity to move the whole round forward. It was a necessary and right thing to do, as it allowed us to have the first real negotiations at the political level on industrial goods and services, anti-dumping rules and development. It began to rebalance the round.
I deeply regret that, rather than seizing this opportunity and building on it, our negotiating partners decided to take the easy way out, rejecting our offer on agriculture and criticising it – often in immoderate terms – rather than engaging with it and enabling us to move forward."@sl19
".
Herr talman! Detta är en viktig debatt. Det är mycket som hänger på Doharundan: för oss i EU, för utvecklingsländerna och faktiskt för hela den globala ekonomin. Om bara drygt en vecka inleds WTO:s ministerkonferens i Hongkong. Jag vet att vissa av er kommer att vara där, så det är mycket viktigt att jag formellt redogör för var vi står och att vi diskuterar den situation som vi kommer att ställas inför.
Låt oss klargöra värdet av vårt jordbruksförslag. Här går vi mycket längre än i Uruguayrundan. Det måste betraktas i sin helhet, inte bara i form av det förslag till tullsänkningar som vi lagt fram, utan också innefattande våra betydande inlägg om reducering av inhemskt stöd genom reformen av den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken och vårt förslag att avskaffa exportstöd helt och hållet.
Vi kommer att reducera snedvridande stöd med 70 procent. Redan enligt 2003 års reform av den gemensamma jordbrukspolitiken är 90 procent av direktbetalningarna till jordbrukare sådana att de inte kommer att snedvrida handeln. Enligt vårt förslag kommer våra genomsnittliga tullavgifter för jordbruksprodukter att sjunka från 23 procent till 12 procent, vilket för övrigt är likvärdigt med Förenta staternas nivå för närvarande. Detta är i sin helhet det mest omfattande förslag som Europeiska unionen någonsin har lagt fram under en förhandlingsrunda om handel. Varje del i det – inte bara sänkningarna av tullavgifter – kommer att innebära avsevärda förbättringar i fråga om marknadstillträde, vilket krävs enligt ramavtalet från 2004. Det kommer att skapa betydelsefulla möjligheter för jordbruksexportörer utan att utplåna förmånstillträde för fattiga utvecklingsländer eller orsaka stor skada på vår egen jordbrukssektor i Europa.
Vi måste skapa en balans. Enligt min uppfattning är detta den rätta balansen. Vi har ansvaret att ta med inverkan av reformen på Europas jordbrukssamhällen i beräkningen. Detta är dessutom en förhandlingsrunda för
utvecklingsländer, i synnerhet de fattiga och behövande, och inte bara för konkurrenskraftiga jordbruksproducenter som enligt min uppfattning inte bör försöka maximera sina egna konkurrensfördelar på världsmarknaderna på bekostnad av andra utvecklingsländer inom WTO.
Förra veckan fick vi verkligen uppleva hur känsligt problemet med urholkade preferenser för behövande AVS-länder är. Det anstår oss alla, inte bara inom EU utan inom WTO:s sammansättning som helhet, att ta full hänsyn till detta. Vi ignorerar detta, vilket innebär en risk för alla parter: de vars livsuppehällen hotas av detta och de som kommer att bära ansvaret om de inte svarar på frågan om urholkade preferenser.
Vårt förslag är därför väsentligt, genomtänkt och trovärdigt. Vi har med detta förslag tillfört realism till jordbruksförhandlingarna. Samtidigt som Förenta staternas krav på tullsänkningar och – i mindre grad – G20:s förslag utan tvekan skulle gynna dessa länder skulle de få en förödande sysselsättningseffekt för våra egna jordbrukare och för fattiga länder i Afrika, Västindien och Stillahavsområdet, hos vilka en stor del av jordbrukshandeln helt enkelt skulle utplånas om vi skulle acceptera dessa krav.
Låt oss därför vara mycket tydliga. Jag har inga planer på att lägga fram något ytterligare förslag i jordbruksfrågan. Det är inte motiverat, och det skulle rubba balansen i förhandlingarna ytterligare. Det är dags för andra att anstränga sig som vi har gjort. Regeringar och medborgare i Europa måste tro på att strukturella förändringar och eventuella förlorade arbetstillfällen inom jordbruket kommer att vägas upp av skapandet av nya arbetstillfällen och nya möjligheter inom andra sektorer. Det är anledningen till att våra förhandlingsmål i fråga om marknadstillträde för icke-jordbruksprodukter och om industrivaror och tjänster är så viktiga. De är av avgörande betydelse för tillväxt och arbetstillfällen i Europa och utgör en ytterst betydelsefull del av Lissabonmålen.
Jag kommer att arbeta för dessa intressen med kraft, och på jordbruksområdet kommer jag också att insistera på en överenskommelse om, och en utvidgning av, en förteckning över geografiska beteckningar. Det är så multilaterala förhandlingar fungerar. Alla måste vinna något på dem. Det innebär att andra nu verkligen måste anstränga sig för att skapa ett nytt marknadstillträde för varor och tjänster, vilket inte bara har betydelse för Europa utan för världsekonomin och, på ett avgörande sätt, för utvecklingen. Detta innebär en nedskärning av industritullar i sin tillämpade form, inte bara en sänkning av gränsnivåer som man enades om för tolv år sedan i Uruguayrundan. Detta kommer när allt kommer omkring att bli effekten av våra jordbruksförslag, för till skillnad från många utvecklingsländer är vår bundna tullar och tillämpade tullar vanligtvis desamma.
Detta innebär inte att vi kommer att bryta vår utfästelse att utvecklade länder ska göra mer än utvecklingsländer. Det ska vi naturligtvis göra. Vi förväntar oss inga erbjudanden från de minst utvecklade länderna eller andra svaga och sårbara länder. Vi förväntar oss inte heller att andra utvecklingsländer ska anpassa sin nivå av öppnande av marknaden till de utvecklade ländernas. Men de måste göra någonting. Det är principen för den här förhandlingsrundan.
Vi måste också göra framsteg inom handeln med tjänster. Den befintliga förhandlingstaktiken som grundas på krav och förslag har ännu inte gett några tillfredsställande resultat. Vi måste skapa en plattform för riktiga multilaterala förhandlingar, som ännu inte existerar. Detta speglar vikten av tjänster i den moderna världsekonomin. Det är inte bara viktigt för oss, utan även för utvecklingsländerna. Dessa länder måste även i fortsättningen helt klart vara oberoende inom tjänster för att söka nå nationella politiska mål och skydda sin nationella rätt till reglering till fullo.
Vad vi strävar efter är likabehandling av utländska tillhandahållare av tjänster i vissa sektorer, inte ett åtagande att avreglera marknader eller privatisera befintliga operatörer. Här utesluts i vårt förslag återigen svaga och sårbara länder, och andra utvecklingsländer ges flexibilitet.
Vi är långt ifrån var vi hoppades befinna oss. Jag hade, liksom Pascal Lamy, hoppats att vi i Hongkong skulle kunna slutföra två tredjedelar av arbetet med förhandlingarna, i synnerhet genom att enas om bestämmelserna fullt ut på de huvudsakliga områdena i förhandlingarna. Orsaken till att vi inte har lyckats med detta är helt enkelt att samtalen stannade av efter att vi enats om ramavtalet i juli 2004. Vissa förhandlare genomgick en period av spel för gallerierna, som vi inte lyckades bryta förrän i juli i år. Förenta staterna lade slutligen fram ett jordbruksförslag i oktober, men det var många månader senare än vi hade hoppats på. EU svarade inom samma månad med vårt eget förslag till tillträde till marknaderna för jordbruksprodukter. Men det fanns andra som fortsatte att försöka omintetgöra förhandlingarna. Vi har under alldeles för lång tid stått stilla vid en enda fråga och intressen från ett enda håll – från storskaliga exportörer av jordbruksprodukter – i stället för att bedriva påtryckningar i fråga om hela dagordningen från Doha.
Avslutningsvis kommer jag att göra mitt allra bästa för att förhandlingarna i Hongkong ska bli en framgång, att säkra de framsteg vi har gjort och att skapa en plattform för oss för en avslutning av arbetet under 2006. Det är framför allt mycket viktigt att detta möte inte slutar i bitterhet. Jag ska försvara och förklara EU:s förslag. Jag ska driva EU:s intressen vidare och upprätthålla ambitionen inom förhandlingsrundan som helhet och bygga upp samförstånd närhelst och varhelst det är möjligt att göra detta med våra förhandlingspartner.
Jag hoppas att de kommer att göra likadant. De måste sluta gömma sig bakom ogrundad kritik av Europeiska unionen, sluta gömma sig bakom uppenbart orealistiska och taktiska krav, och ansluta sig till en riktig förhandling om alla frågor. Om de bara fortsätter att kräva mer från EU utan att bidra med något själva riskerar de – inte vi – att tillintetgöra den här förhandlingsrundan. Om detta sker kommer de att gå därifrån tomhänta.
Låt oss hellre arbeta tillsammans för en lösning som ger världsekonomin ett uppsving, skapar politiskt förtroende och hjälper de fattiga i världen. Det var så vi gick in i förhandlingarna, och det är så vi vill avsluta dem. Möjligheten kvarstår, och behovet är lika överhängande nu som det var när vi inledde förhandlingarna. Nu måste alla hjälpas åt för att förverkliga detta och uppnå de mål som vi först satte upp för oss själva då vi accepterade utvecklingsagendan från Doha för så många år sedan.
Så även om det är trendigt att anklaga Europeiska unionen för att uppehålla denna runda genom att vara förteget om jordbruket är faktiskt verkligheten den rakt motsatta. Vi har drivit Doharundan framåt på jordbruksområdet, inte bara en utan tre gånger under de senaste arton månaderna. Sanningen är att andra har hållit den tillbaka, inte för att vi har gjort eller erbjudit för lite, utan för att de har krävt för mycket. Detta är en utvecklingsrunda, inte en runda för jordbruksexportörer, och dessa två bör inte förväxlas.
Med tanke på denna försening har medlemmar i WTO, på inrådan av Pascal Lamy, beslutat att sänka anspråken på denna konferens, hellre än att åka till Hongkong med höga förväntningar och en lika hög risk för misslyckande. Jag var den sista att acceptera detta, motvilligt, men när jag gjorde det gjorde jag klart att detta inte får innebära sänkta ambitioner för rundan som helhet. Vi måste fortfarande sikta på ett lyckat resultat över hela förhandlingsagendan och leverera betydelsefulla framsteg inom utvecklingen i slutet av nästa år.
Låt oss tala klarspråk: Doharundan är för omfattande för att misslyckas. Den handlar inte bara om handel, utan också om att upprätthålla trovärdigheten hos multilateralt samarbete, visa att multilaterala institutioner kan finna globala lösningar på globala problem och bevisa att handeln verkligen kan tjäna utvecklingen.
Det bästa sättet att främja utveckling är att öppna för nya handelsmöjligheter för utvecklingsländer och sedan bistå dem i att utnyttja dessa möjligheter. Detta stämmer till och med ännu bättre in på industrivaror och tjänster än på jordbrukshandel, och det stämmer särskilt bra in på handel mellan utvecklingsländer. De största handelsmöjligheterna för utvecklingsländerna ligger i handel med andra utvecklingsländer. De största hindren för denna handel är de avgifter på industrivaror som förekommer mellan utvecklingsländer. Jag beklagar att vi inte kommer att få möjlighet att påskynda detta väsentligt i Hongkong. Det är anledningen till att vi behöver ett anpassat utvecklingspaket för de fattigaste länderna, inte som ersättning för vad vi skulle kunna uppnå senare, utan som ett förskott på det.
Huvudelementen i mitt utvecklingsförslag, som jag först presenterade vid ”mini”-ministermötet i Zürich i oktober och som jag har strävat efter sedan dess, är följande: för det första bör alla industrialiserade WTO-medlemmar förbinda sig att tillhandahålla tull- och kvotfri tillgång till alla produkter från de minst utvecklade länderna, för det andra bör vi anta ett förslagspaket om särskild och differentierad behandling för att bekräfta flexibiliteten för de minst utvecklade länder som finns inom WTO, för det tredje måste vi skriva in förutsättningar för större tillgång till billig medicin mot pandemier i WTO:s överenskommelser som gäller immateriell äganderätt och för det fjärde bör vi godkänna ett starkt stöd för handelspaket i linje med överenskommelsen vid G8-mötet i Gleneagles. Kommissionen har föregått med gott exempel genom löftet om 1 miljard euro per år som gavs av José Manuel Barroso vid G8-mötet. Jag hoppas att våra partner i WTO går med på dessa idéer i Hongkong.
Låt mig nu övergå till andra aspekter av förhandlingarna. Den 28 oktober lade EU fram ett omfattande förhandlingsförslag, bland annat om marknadstillträde för jordbruksprodukter. Detta skapade en välbehövlig möjlighet att driva fram hela rundan. Det var en nödvändig och riktig sak att göra, eftersom det tillät oss att föra de första riktiga förhandlingarna på politisk nivå om industrivaror och tjänster, antidumpningsregler och utveckling. Det ledde till att rundan uppnådde större balans.
Jag beklagar verkligen att våra förhandlingspartner beslutade att ta den lätta vägen i stället för att ta vara på tillfället och bygga vidare på det, och förkastade och kritiserade vårt jordbruksförslag – ofta i överdrivna ordalag – i stället för att engagera sig i det och göra det möjligt för oss att gå framåt."@sv21
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