Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-11-14-Speech-1-140"
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"en.20051114.17.1-140"6
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Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@en4
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"Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@cs1
"Hr. formand, de medlemsstater, der ikke har eller kun delvis har underrettet Kommissionen om gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, vil blive genstand for overtrædelsesprocedurer for manglende underretning i medfør af EF-traktatens artikel 226. Det bør understreges, at sådanne overtrædelsesprocedurer kun vedrører underretningen om nationale foranstaltninger og ikke gennemførelsens kvalitet. Når Kommissionen har modtaget fuldstændig underretning, undersøger den de nationale gennemførelsesforanstaltninger, hvilket på et senere tidspunkt kan føre til overtrædelsesprocedurer på grund af ukorrekt gennemførelse af direktivet.
I de 25 medlemsstater er der truffet forskellige valg med hensyn til anvendelse af statslige pensionsordninger, arbejdsmarkedsordninger og individuelle ordninger og deres størrelse og finansiering. Der er ikke et samlet EU-svar på udfordringerne ved et aldrende samfund. Passende løsninger må tilpasses efter medlemsstaternes forskellige pensionssystemer. Derfor ligger det endelige ansvar hos medlemsstaterne.
Kommissionen kan hjælpe medlemsstaterne ved at sikre, at det europæiske regelsæt for finansielle tjenesteydelser fremmer sikre markedsbaserede måder at finansiere pensionsordninger på. Flaskehalse skal fjernes, så aktiver, der er øremærket til pensionsordninger, kan forvaltes så effektivt som muligt, så europæerne kan få de højeste mulige pensionsudbetalinger og livrenter. Direktivet opfylder denne målsætning. I andet halvår 2006 vil Kommissionen forelægge en hvidbog om institutter for kollektiv investering i værdipapirer (UCITS), der også spiller en rolle på pensionsområdet.
Andre initiativer, der skal forbedre de europæiske pensionssystemer, omfatter det nyligt vedtagne forslag til et direktiv om en styrkelse af retten til at overføre supplerende pensionsrettigheder og de igangværende overtrædelsesprocedurer vedrørende skattemæssig ligebehandling af pensionsbidrag.
Direktivet tillægger ikke Kommissionen komitologibeføjelser. Det er ikke et "Lamfalussy"-direktiv. Det Europæiske Tilsynsudvalg for Forsikrings- og Arbejdsmarkedspensionsordninger - CEIOPS - tildeles således intet mandat, og Kommissionen vedtager heller ikke gennemførelsesforanstaltninger. Da man endnu ikke har nogen praktisk erfaring med direktivet, er det for tidligt at tage stilling til behovet for komitologi og dermed den rolle, som CEIOPS kan spille i den henseende.
CEIOPS har dog en vigtig funktion i forbindelse med direktivets artikel 21, stk. 2, og tilsynsmyndighederne har pligt til at arbejde "tæt sammen om at lette tilsynet med arbejdsmarkedsrelaterede pensionskassers aktiviteter". I den forbindelse er CEIOPS' udvalg for arbejdsmarkedspensioner i øjeblikket ved at udarbejde en multilateral samarbejdsprotokol svarende til den, der allerede eksisterer for forsikring. Et udkast er nu sendt til den anden åbne høring blandt interessenterne. Det forventes vedtaget på CEIOPS' møde i februar 2006.
I de forløbne to år har Kommissionen holdt to møder med medlemsstaterne for at hjælpe dem med at gennemføre direktivet. Drøftelserne var koncentreret om det, som medlemsstaterne, Kommissionen og andre interessenter anså for potentielle årsager til problemerne med gennemførelse, og som kan give anledning til divergerende fortolkninger i medlemsstaterne. På grundlag af disse møder har Kommissionen konkluderet, at selv om nogle artikler tilsyneladende giver problemer, er det ikke tilfældet for alle medlemsstater. Det er derfor svært at identificere nogle særligt problematiske bestemmelser. Det er ikke overraskende, da medlemsstaternes pensionsstrukturer og -ordninger er meget forskellige. Alligevel er der grund til at antage, at gennemførelsen af artikel 20 om grænseoverskridende virksomhed skaber problemer for mange medlemsstater. Det er dog for tidligt at vurdere, om årsagen til disse problemer ligger i formuleringen af Europa-Parlamentets og Rådets forslag til retsakt eller bare i de forskellige medlemsstaters forskellige fortolkninger.
I 2006 vil der blive holdt et første møde med henblik på yderligere drøftelse af nogle af de punkter, som er blevet identificeret som problematiske og væsentlige ved undersøgelsen af de nationale gennemførelsesforanstaltninger. Den indgående analyse af de nationale foranstaltninger til gennemførelse af direktivet er endnu ikke påbegyndt. På nuværende tidspunkt er indsatsen rettet mod kvaliteten af den delvise eller fulde underretning. Først når de fleste medlemsstater har givet underretning, kan man danne sig et billede af, i hvilket omfang medlemsstaterne har vedtaget supplerende kvantitative investeringsregler og elementer, der kan hæmme direktivets funktion. Eftersom Kommissionen forventer, at en lang række medlemsstater vil underrette Kommissionen om deres lovgivning inden årets udgang, kan man først danne sig dette billede i løbet af 2006.
En række definerede ydelsesordninger udnyttede 1990'ernes hausse-marked til at reducere bidragenes størrelse eller endda standse bidragsbetalingen midlertidigt i stedet for at opbygge deres finansielle reserver. Da den uundgåelige markedsnedgang kom, var nogle af disse reserver utilstrækkelige. De pensionstegnende virksomheder og medlemsstaternes tilsynsmyndigheder anvendte forskellige løsninger på problemet: øgede bidrag, supplerende betalinger, mindre dyrtidsregulering af pensioner, ændring af pensionsordningernes regler og lukning af ordninger for nye medlemmer.
Uanset hvilke midler der blev brugt, indså alle interessenter atter en gang, at en pensionsordning indebærer en langvarig forpligtelse over for arbejdstagere og pensionister. Denne erkendelse er kun blevet styrket af udviklingen på andre områder, herunder anvendelsen af IAS 19 i forbindelse med pensionstegnende virksomheder og strengere regler for tilsynsmyndighedernes vurdering af tekniske hensættelser. De pensionstegnende virksomheder har indset behovet for forbedret omkostningsstyring og mere stabile indtægter for at kunne opfylde deres pensionsløfter.
Der kan ganske rigtigt konstateres et skift fra traditionelt definerede ydelsesordninger til pensionsordninger, hvis omkostninger lettere kan styres. Der er dog tydelige tegn på, at dette skift ikke udelukkende har været til rent individuelle definerede bidragsordninger. Der findes også hybridordninger, som kombinerer definerede ydelses- og definerede bidragselementer. Alle disse ændringer sigter mod bedre omkostningsstyring og mere stabile indtægter for den pensionstegnende virksomhed.
Der er en tendens til, at grænsen mellem de tre pensionssøjler, ikke kun mellem anden søjle med arbejdsmarkedspensionsordninger og tredje søjle med individuelle ordninger, men også mellem anden søjle og første søjle med lovpligtige ordninger, til en vis grad udviskes. Det er ikke noget problem, eftersom søjlestrukturen kun er et generelt klassifikationssystem, og ordninger, hvor aktiver tildeles enkeltpersoner, findes under alle tre søjler. Det er ikke tilfældet i alle medlemsstater, da pensionsordningerne afspejler specifikke kulturelle og historiske situationer. Selv om de grundlæggende forskelle mellem første, anden og tredje søjle består, kan de relevante løsninger således være ens."@da2
"Herr Präsident, gegen die Mitgliedstaaten, die der Kommission noch keine Umsetzungsmaßnahmen oder nur Maßnahmen zur teilweisen Umsetzung mitgeteilt haben, werden gemäß Artikel 226 EG-Vertrag Vertragsverletzungsverfahren wegen Nichtmitteilung eingeleitet. Ich möchte aber darauf hinweisen, dass derartige Vertragsverletzungsverfahren nur die Mitteilung nationaler Maßnahmen, nicht die Qualität der Umsetzung betreffen. Sobald die vollständigen Mitteilungen vorliegen, wird die Kommission die nationalen Umsetzungsmaßnahmen prüfen, was zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt zu Vertragsverletzungsverfahren wegen nichtkonformer Umsetzung der Richtlinie führen kann.
Die 25 Mitgliedstaaten haben sich bei der Einrichtung, dem Umfang und der Finanzierung von Systemen der staatlichen, der betrieblichen und der individuellen Altersversorgung für unterschiedliche Modelle entschieden. Es gibt keine EU-weit einheitliche Antwort auf die Herausforderungen, die eine alternde Gesellschaft mit sich bringt. Geeignete Lösungen müssen an die unterschiedlichen Altersversorgungssysteme der Mitgliedstaaten angepasst werden. Daher liegt die Verantwortung letztlich bei den Mitgliedstaaten selbst.
Die Kommission kann die Mitgliedstaaten unterstützen, indem sie dafür sorgt, dass der gesetzliche Rahmen für Finanzdienstleistungen in Europa die Entstehung sicherer, marktorientierter Konzepte zur Finanzierung der Altersversorgung fördert. Hindernisse müssen beseitigt werden, damit die für die Altersversorgung zurückgelegten Gelder so effizient wie möglich verwaltet werden können und die Menschen in Europa im Alter möglichst hohe Renten erhalten. Die Richtlinie erfüllt diesen Zweck. In der zweiten Hälfte des kommenden Jahres wird die Kommission ein Weißbuch über Organismen für gemeinsame Anlagen in Wertpapieren (OGAW) vorlegen, die im Bereich der Altersversorgung ebenfalls eine Rolle spielen.
Weitere Initiativen zur Verbesserung der Altersversorgung in Europa sind unter anderem der kürzlich angenommene Vorschlag für eine Richtlinie zur Verbesserung der Portabilität von Zusatzrentenansprüchen und die laufenden Vertragsverletzungsverfahren, die die steuerliche Gleichbehandlung von Beitragszahlungen zur Altersversorgung betreffen.
Die Richtlinie sieht keine Übertragung von Komitologiebefugnissen an die Kommission vor. Hier handelt es sich nicht um eine „Lamfalussy“-Richtlinie. Deshalb hat weder der Ausschuss der europäischen Aufsichtsbehörden für das Versicherungswesen und die betriebliche Altersversorgung (AEAVBA) ein Mandat, noch werden von der Kommission Umsetzungsmaßnahmen gebilligt. Da noch keine praktischen Erfahrungen mit der Richtlinie vorliegen, kann noch keine Aussage über die Notwendigkeit eines Ausschussverfahrens und somit auch nicht über die mögliche Rolle des AEAVBA in einem solchen Verfahren getroffen werden.
Allerdings sollte der AEAVBA im Rahmen von Artikel 21 Absatz 2 der Richtlinie eine wichtige Funktion übernehmen, und die Aufsichtsstellen sind verpflichtet, „eng zusammenzuarbeiten, um die Aufsicht über die Tätigkeit der Einrichtungen der betrieblichen Altersversorgung zu erleichtern“. In diesem Zusammenhang wird vom Ausschuss für betriebliche Altersversorgung des AEAVBA derzeit ein multilaterales Kooperationsprotokoll ausgearbeitet, wie es für den Versicherungsbereich bereits vorhanden ist. Soeben wurde der Entwurf für die zweite offene Konsultation mit den Beteiligten vorgelegt. Dieser Entwurf wird voraussichtlich im Februar 2006 bei der AEAVBA-Mitgliederversammlung verabschiedet.
In den vergangenen zwei Jahren wurden von der Kommission zwei Sitzungen mit den Mitgliedstaaten durchgeführt, um diese bei der Umsetzung der Richtlinie zu unterstützen. Im Mittelpunkt der Gespräche standen daher Themen, die von den Mitgliedstaaten, der Kommission und anderen Beteiligten als potenzielle Ursache für Probleme bei der Umsetzung genannt wurden und die zu einer unterschiedlichen Auslegung durch die Mitgliedstaaten führen könnten. Auf der Grundlage dieser Sitzungen ist die Kommission zu dem Ergebnis gelangt, dass nicht in allen Mitgliedstaaten Probleme auftreten, obwohl einige Artikel anscheinend problematisch sind. Daher ist es schwierig, besonders problematische Bestimmungen zu nennen. Da es erhebliche Unterschiede bei den Strukturen und Regelungen der Mitgliedstaaten für die Altersversorgung gibt, überrascht dies nicht. Trotzdem deutet einiges darauf hin, dass die Umsetzung von Artikel 20 – Grenzüberschreitende Tätigkeit – vielen Mitgliedstaaten Probleme bereitet. Es ist allerdings noch zu früh, um zu beurteilen, ob die Ursache dieser Probleme in der Formulierung des vom Europäischen Parlament und vom Rat verabschiedeten Legislativvorschlags oder lediglich in der unterschiedlichen Auslegung in den verschiedenen Mitgliedstaaten liegt.
2006 sollen auf einer ersten Sitzung einige der Punkte weiter erörtert werden, die bei der Prüfung der nationalen Umsetzungsmaßnahmen als problematische und wesentliche Punkte ermittelt worden sind. Die gründliche Analyse der nationalen Maßnahmen zur Umsetzung der Richtlinie hat noch nicht begonnen. Zum gegenwärtigen Zeitpunkt geht es in erster Linie um die Qualität der Mitteilungen von Maßnahmen zur teilweisen oder vollständigen Umsetzung. In welchem Umfang von den Mitgliedstaaten zusätzliche quantitative Anlagevorschriften und Elemente beschlossen wurden, die das reibungslose Funktionieren der Richtlinie gefährden könnten, kann erst beurteilt werden, wenn die Mitteilung der nationalen Umsetzungsmaßnahmen von den meisten Mitgliedstaaten vorliegt. Da die Kommission davon ausgeht, dass viele Mitgliedstaaten ihre Umsetzungsmaßnahmen bis Ende dieses Jahres melden werden, wird dies frühestens im Laufe des Jahres 2006 möglich sein.
Bei einigen leistungsorientierten Altersversorgungssystemen wurden während der Hausseperiode in den 90er-Jahren die Beiträge gesenkt oder sogar Beitragsbefreiungen gewährt, statt finanzielle Rücklagen zu schaffen. Als die unvermeidliche Baisse kam, stellte sich heraus, dass einige dieser Rücklagen unzureichend waren. Die Trägerunternehmen und die Aufsichtsbehörden der Mitgliedstaaten versuchten mit unterschiedlichen Maßnahmen gegenzusteuern, beispielsweise mit Beitragserhöhungen, Zusatzzahlungen, einer verminderten Dynamisierung der Rentenansprüche, mit Änderungen der Bestimmungen für Altersversorgungssysteme und mit einer Schließung dieser Systeme für Neueintritte.
Doch wie alle Beteiligten erkannten, änderten diese Gegenmaßnahmen nichts an der Tatsache, dass ein Pensionsfonds eine langfristige Verpflichtung gegenüber Beschäftigten und Rentnern darstellt. Diese Erkenntnis wurde durch andere Entwicklungen wie die Anwendung von IAS 19 für Trägerunternehmen und strengere Vorschriften für die Bewertung versicherungstechnischer Rückstellungen durch die Aufsichtsbehörden noch verstärkt. Den Trägerunternehmen ist klar geworden, dass sie eine bessere Kostenkontrolle und stabilere Einnahmen brauchen, um ihre Versorgungszusagen einhalten zu können.
Und so ist denn auch eine Verschiebung von den traditionellen leistungsorientierten Systemen, die auf dem zuletzt verdienten Gehalt basieren, zu Altersversorgungssystemen mit leichter kontrollierbarem Kostenaufwand zu beobachten. Vieles deutet allerdings darauf hin, dass diese Verschiebung nicht ausschließlich zugunsten von individuellen beitragsorientierten Systemen erfolgt. Mischsysteme mit einer Kombination aus leistungs- und beitragsorientierten Elementen sind ebenfalls vorhanden. All diese Änderungen wurden vorgenommen, um eine bessere Kostenkontrolle und stabilere Einnahmen für die Trägerunternehmen zu erreichen.
Es ist zu beobachten, dass sich die Trennlinien zwischen den drei Säulen der Altersversorgung verwischen, nicht nur zwischen der zweiten Säule der betrieblichen Altersversorgung und der dritten Säule der Eigenvorsorge, sondern auch zwischen der zweiten und der ersten Säule der gesetzlichen Altersversorgung. Das hat keine negativen Auswirkungen, da die Struktur der Säulen ohnehin nur eine allgemeine Klassifizierung ist und in allen drei Säulen Systeme zu finden sind, in denen Einzelpersonen Leistungen erhalten. Das gilt nicht für jeden Mitgliedstaat, da die Altersversorgung durch spezifische kulturelle und historische Gegebenheiten geprägt ist. Deshalb können trotz der weiterhin bestehenden grundlegenden Unterschiede zwischen der ersten, zweiten und dritten Säule identische Lösungsansätze möglich sein."@de9
"Κύριε Πρόεδρε, τα κράτη μέλη τα οποία δεν έχουν ή έχουν εν μέρει μόνο ανακοινώσει στην Επιτροπή τα εκτελεστικά μέτρα θα υπόκεινται στη διαδικασία παράβασης για μη κοινοποίηση σύμφωνα με το άρθρο 226 ΣΕΚ. Πρέπει να επισημανθεί ότι οι διαδικασίες παράβασης αυτού του είδους αφορούν μόνο την ανακοίνωση σχετικά με τα εθνικά μέτρα και δεν αναφέρονται στην ποιότητα της εκτέλεσης. Μόλις παραληφθούν οι πλήρεις κοινοποιήσεις, η Επιτροπή θα εξετάσει τα εθνικά εκτελεστικά μέτρα τα οποία, ενδεχομένως σε ένα μεταγενέστερο στάδιο, θα οδηγήσουν σε κίνηση της διαδικασίας επί παραβάσει λόγω λανθασμένης εφαρμογής της οδηγίας.
Έχουν πραγματοποιηθεί διαφορετικές επιλογές από τα 25 κράτη μέλη όσον αφορά την υπόσταση, το ύψος και τη χρηματοδότηση των κρατικών προγραμμάτων, των επαγγελματικών προγραμμάτων απασχόλησης και των μεμονωμένων ρυθμίσεων. Δεν υπάρχει μία απάντηση ευρωπαϊκής εμβέλειας στις προκλήσεις της κοινωνίας που γηράσκει. Οι κατάλληλες λύσεις πρέπει να προσαρμοστούν στα διαφορετικά συνταξιοδοτικά συστήματα των κρατών μελών. Συνεπώς, η τελική ευθύνη ανήκει στα κράτη μέλη.
Η Επιτροπή θα μπορούσε να συνδράμει τα κράτη μέλη διασφαλίζοντας ότι το ευρωπαϊκό ρυθμιστικό πλαίσιο για τις οικονομικές υπηρεσίες υποστηρίζει τη διατύπωση ασφαλών απαιτήσεων καθοδηγούμενων από την αγορά για τη χρηματοδότηση της συνταξιοδότησης. Πρέπει να αρθούν τα σημεία συμφόρησης, ώστε να είναι δυνατή η όσο το δυνατόν αποτελεσματικότερη διαχείριση των στοιχείων του ενεργητικού που προορίζονται για τη συνταξιοδότηση, επιτρέποντας έτσι στους ευρωπαίους να απολαμβάνουν τις υψηλότερες δυνατές καταβολές και ετήσιες προσόδους επί της συνταξιοδότησης. Η οδηγία εκπληρώνει τον στόχο αυτό. Στο δεύτερο ήμισυ του επόμενου έτους, η Επιτροπή θα παρουσιάσει ένα λευκό βιβλίο σχετικά με τον τομέα των ΟΣΕΚΑ, οι οποίοι επίσης διαδραματίζουν ρόλο στον συνταξιοδοτικό στίβο.
Άλλες πρωτοβουλίες, οι οποίες στοχεύουν στη βελτίωση των ευρωπαϊκών συνταξιοδοτικών διατάξεων περιλαμβάνουν την προσφάτως εγκριθείσα πρόταση οδηγίας σχετικά με τη βελτίωση της δυνατότητας μεταφοράς των δικαιωμάτων συμπληρωματικής συνταξιοδότησης, και των εν εξελίξει υποθέσεων παραβίασης στον τομέα της ίσης φορολογικής μεταχείρισης των συνταξιοδοτικών εισφορών.
Η οδηγία δεν παρέχει εξουσίες επιτροπολογίας στην Επιτροπή. Δεν πρόκειται για μια οδηγία «Lamfalussy». Επομένως, δεν παρέχονται εντολές στην Επιτροπή Ευρωπαϊκών Εποπτικών Αρχών Ασφαλίσεων και Επαγγελματικών Συντάξεων –CEIOPS– ούτε θα εφαρμοστούν από την Επιτροπή εκτελεστικά μέτρα. Καθώς δεν υπάρχει ακόμη πρακτική εμπειρία σχετικά με την οδηγία, είναι πολύ νωρίς να λάβει θέση σχετικά με την ανάγκη ύπαρξης επιτροπολογίας και, επομένως, για τον ρόλο που θα μπορούσε να αναλάβει η προαναφερθείσα επιτροπή.
Ωστόσο, η CEIOPS μπορεί να διαδραματίσει σημαντικό ρόλο στο πλαίσιο του άρθρου 21 παράγραφος 2 της οδηγίας και οι επόπτες έχουν το καθήκον να «συνεργάζονται στενά, προκειμένου να διευκολύνουν την εποπτεία των πράξεων των ιδρυμάτων επαγγελματικών συνταξιοδοτικών παροχών». Στο πλαίσιο αυτό, η Επιτροπή Επαγγελματικών Συντάξεων της CEIOPS συντάσσει επί του παρόντος ένα πρωτόκολλο πολυμερούς συνεργασίας, παρόμοιο με εκείνο που ήδη υφίσταται στον τομέα των ασφαλίσεων. Ένα προσχέδιο υποβλήθηκε τώρα προς δημόσια διαβούλευση με τους ενδιαφερομένους. Αναμένεται να εγκριθεί από τα μέλη της Επιτροπής Ευρωπαϊκών Εποπτικών Αρχών Ασφαλίσεων και Επαγγελματικών Συντάξεων στη συνεδρίασή της τον Φεβρουάριο του 2006.
Τα τελευταία δύο χρόνια, η Επιτροπή έχει οργανώσει δύο συναντήσεις με τα κράτη μέλη, προκειμένου να τα βοηθήσει στην εφαρμογή της οδηγίας. Προς τούτο, οι συζητήσεις επικεντρώθηκαν σε θέματα που ορίστηκαν από τα κράτη μέλη, την Επιτροπή και άλλους ενδιαφερομένους ως δυνητική πηγή δυσκολιών για τη μεταφορά στο εσωτερικό δίκαιο και τα οποία ενδεχομένως οδηγήσουν σε αποκλίνουσες ερμηνείες από τα κράτη μέλη. Στη βάση αυτών των συναντήσεων, η Επιτροπή συμπέρανε ότι, παρόλο που ορισμένα άρθρα φαίνεται ότι προκαλούν προβλήματα, δεν συμβαίνει το ίδιο σε όλα τα κράτη μέλη. Επομένως, είναι δύσκολο να προσδιορίσουμε τυχόν ειδικά προβληματικές διατάξεις. Το γεγονός αυτό δεν προκαλεί έκπληξη, εφόσον οι συνταξιοδοτικές δομές και ρυθμίσεις των κρατών μελών διαφέρουν σημαντικά. Ωστόσο, ευλόγως πιστεύουμε ότι η εφαρμογή του άρθρου 20 –διασυνοριακές δραστηριότητες– προκαλεί προβλήματα σε πολλά κράτη μέλη. Ωστόσο, είναι πολύ νωρίς να αξιολογήσουμε εάν η προέλευση των προβλημάτων αυτών έγκειται στη διατύπωση της νομοθετικής πρότασης όπως εγκρίθηκε από το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και το Συμβούλιο ή απλώς σε διαφορετικές ερμηνείες των διαφόρων κρατών μελών.
Το 2006, θα οργανωθεί μια πρώτη συνάντηση για να συζητήσουμε περαιτέρω ορισμένα από τα θέματα τα οποία προσδιορίστηκαν ως προβληματικά και ουσιώδη κατά την εξέταση των εθνικών εκτελεστικών μέτρων. Η εις βάθος ανάλυση των εθνικών μέτρων για τη μεταφορά της οδηγίας στο εσωτερικό δίκαιο δεν έχει ξεκινήσει ακόμη. Στο παρόν στάδιο, το έργο επικεντρώνεται στην ποιότητα της μερικής ή πλήρους κοινοποίησης. Μια ένδειξη για την έκταση στην οποία τα κράτη μέλη έχουν εγκρίνει πρόσθετους ποσοτικούς επενδυτικούς κανόνες και στοιχεία τα οποία ίσως διακυβεύσουν την ορθή λειτουργία της οδηγίας είναι δυνατόν να παρασχεθούν μόλις τα περισσότερα κράτη μέλη προβούν σε κοινοποίηση. Καθώς η Επιτροπή αναμένει μεγάλο αριθμό κρατών μελών να κοινοποιήσουν τη νομοθεσία τους στην Επιτροπή πριν από το τέλος του τρέχοντος έτους, μια τέτοια ένδειξη μπορεί να παρασχεθεί μόνο εντός του 2006.
Ορισμένα συνταξιοδοτικά προγράμματα καθορισμένων παροχών αξιοποίησαν την ανοδική αγορά του 1990 για να μειώσουν το ύψος των εισφορών ή ακόμη και να εισπράξουν εισφορές αργιών αντί να ενισχύσουν τα οικονομικά αποθέματά τους. Όταν συνέβη η αναπόφευκτη πτώση της αγοράς, ορισμένα από τα αποθέματα αυτά θεωρήθηκαν ανεπαρκή. Εν συνεχεία, οι επιχειρήσεις χορηγοί και οι εποπτικές αρχές των κρατών μελών χρησιμοποίησαν διαφορετικές λύσεις: αυξημένες εισφορές, συμπληρωματικές πληρωμές, μειωμένη τιμαριθμική αναπροσαρμογή των συνταξιοδοτικών δικαιωμάτων, μεταβολές των κανόνων των συνταξιοδοτικών συστημάτων και αποκλεισμός των νεοεισερχόμενων από τα συνταξιοδοτικά προγράμματα.
Ασχέτως των επανορθωτικών μέτρων που εφαρμόστηκαν, όλοι οι ενδιαφερόμενοι συνειδητοποίησαν εκ νέου ότι ένα συνταξιοδοτικό ταμείο συνεπάγεται μακροχρόνια δέσμευση σε υπαλλήλους και συνταξιούχους. Η αναγνώριση αυτή έχει απλώς ενισχυθεί και από άλλες ρυθμίσεις, συμπεριλαμβανομένης της εφαρμογής του διεθνούς λογιστικού προτύπου 19 για τις επιχειρήσεις χορηγούς και αυστηρότερους κανόνες για την εποπτική αξιολόγηση των τεχνικών διατάξεων. Οι επιχειρήσεις χορηγοί έχουν συνειδητοποιήσει την ανάγκη να επιτύχουν βελτιωμένο έλεγχο κόστους και σταθερότερα έσοδα, με σκοπό να τηρήσουν τις συνταξιοδοτικές τους υποσχέσεις.
Πράγματι, παρατηρείται μια στροφή από τα παραδοσιακά συνταξιοδοτικά προγράμματα καθορισμένων παροχών βάσει του τελευταίου μισθού σε συνταξιοδοτικά προγράμματα των οποίων το κόστος είναι πιο εύκολο να ελεγχθεί. Ωστόσο, υπάρχουν σαφείς αποδείξεις ότι η στροφή αυτή δεν έγινε αποκλειστικά προς αμιγώς μεμονωμένα προγράμματα καθορισμένων εισφορών. Τα υβριδικά συστήματα που συνδυάζουν στοιχεία καθορισμένων παροχών και καθορισμένων εισφορών είναι επίσης διαθέσιμα. Η συλλογιστική πίσω από όλες αυτές τις αλλαγές είναι ο καλύτερος έλεγχος του κόστους και η περισσότερη σταθερότητα για την επιχείρηση χορηγό όσον αφορά τα κέρδη.
Υπάρχει μια τάση για ασάφεια όσον αφορά τη διαχωριστική γραμμή μεταξύ των τριών συνταξιοδοτικών πυλώνων, όχι μόνο μεταξύ του δεύτερου πυλώνα της απασχόλησης και του μεμονωμένου τρίτου πυλώνα αλλά και μεταξύ του δεύτερου πυλώνα και του θεσμικού πρώτου πυλώνα. Αυτό δεν αποτελεί πρόβλημα, καθώς η δομή των πυλώνων είναι μόνο ένα σύστημα γενικής κατάταξης και τα προγράμματα όπου τα στοιχεία του ενεργητικού διανέμονται στα άτομα υπάρχουν και στους τρεις πυλώνες. Αυτό δεν ισχύει σε όλα τα κράτη μέλη, καθώς οι συντάξεις αντικατοπτρίζουν συγκεκριμένες πολιτιστικές και ιστορικές καταστάσεις. Έτσι, παρόλο που οι βασικές διαφορές μεταξύ του πρώτου, του δεύτερου και του τρίτου πυλώνα θα διατηρηθούν, οι προβλεπόμενες λύσεις μπορούν να είναι ισοδύναμες."@el10
".
Señor Presidente, los Estados miembros que no hayan comunicado las medidas de aplicación a la Comisión, o que solo lo hayan hecho parcialmente, serán objeto de expedientes de infracción por falta de notificación conforme al artículo 226 del Tratado CE. Conviene subrayar que tales expedientes solo se refieren a la comunicación de medidas nacionales y no a la calidad de la aplicación. Una vez recibidas las notificaciones completas, la Comisión examinará las medidas de aplicación nacionales, que en una fase posterior podrían dar pie a expedientes de infracción por aplicación incorrecta de la directiva.
En los veinticinco Estados miembros se ha optado por diversas soluciones en cuanto a la existencia, la magnitud y la financiación de los sistemas públicos, los regímenes laborales y los mecanismos individuales. No hay una respuesta de ámbito comunitario para los retos de la sociedad que envejece. Las soluciones deben adaptarse a los distintos sistemas de pensiones de los Estados miembros. Por eso, la responsabilidad última recae en ellos.
La Comisión podría asistir a los Estados miembros asegurando que el marco reglamentario europeo de servicios financieros favorezca la aparición de respuestas de financiación de la jubilación que sean seguras y estén impulsadas por el mercado. Deben eliminarse los cuellos de botella para que los activos destinados a la jubilación puedan gestionarse con la mayor eficiencia posible, permitiendo a los europeos gozar de las máximas prestaciones y pensiones vitalicias. La directiva cumple este objetivo. En la segunda mitad del año que viene, la Comisión presentará un libro blanco sobre los OICVM, que también cumplen una función en las pensiones.
Otras iniciativas encaminadas a mejorar la situación europea en este terreno son, por ejemplo, la recientemente aprobada propuesta de directiva sobre la mejora de la transferibilidad de los derechos de pensión complementaria y los actuales casos de infracción en el trato fiscal equitativo de las contribuciones al seguro de pensiones.
La directiva no confiere poderes de comitología a la Comisión. No se trata de una directiva «Lamfalussy». Por tanto, ni se dan mandatos al Comité Europeo de Supervisores de Seguros y Pensiones de Jubilación (CESSPJ) ni la Comisión adoptará ninguna medida de aplicación. Dado que aún no hay experiencia práctica con la directiva, es demasiado pronto para pronunciarse sobre la necesidad de la comitología y, por tanto, sobre el papel que el CESSPJ puede desempeñar en ella.
Sin embargo, el CESSPJ tiene que desempeñar una importante función en el contexto del apartado 2 del artículo 21 de la directiva, y los supervisores tienen el deber de «colaborar estrechamente para facilitar la supervisión de las actividades de los fondos de pensiones de empleo». A este respecto, el Comité de Pensiones de Jubilación del CESSPJ está desarrollando actualmente un protocolo multilateral de cooperación como el que ya existe para los seguros. Ahora hay un borrador listo para una segunda consulta abierta con los sectores interesados. Se espera que sea aprobada en la reunión de los miembros del CESSPJ en febrero de 2006.
En los últimos dos años, la Comisión ha organizado dos encuentros con Estados miembros para ayudarles en la aplicación de la directiva. A tal fin, los debates se han centrado en aspectos señalados por los Estados miembros, la Comisión y otros interesados, que pueden ser fuentes de dificultades para la transposición y que podrían dar lugar a interpretaciones discordantes entre los Estados miembros. Basándose en dichos encuentros, la Comisión ha llegado a la conclusión de que, aunque algunos artículos parezcan ser fuente de problemas, no lo son para todos los Estados miembros. De ahí la dificultad de definir cuáles son las disposiciones especialmente problemáticas. Esto no sorprende, pues las estructuras y acuerdos sobre pensiones de los Estados miembros difieren significativamente. No obstante, hay motivos para creer que la aplicación del artículo 20 –actividades transfronterizas– causa problemas a muchos Estados miembros. Pero es aún pronto para valorar si el origen de esos problemas reside en la formulación de la propuesta legislativa tal como ha sido aprobada por el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo o si radica en las diferentes interpretaciones de los Estados miembros.
En 2006 se celebrará una primera reunión para discutir más a fondo los asuntos que han sido calificados de problemáticos y esenciales durante el examen de las medidas nacionales de aplicación. El análisis profundo de las medidas de transposición de la directiva en cada país aún no ha comenzado. En este momento, el trabajo se centra en la calidad de las notificaciones totales y parciales. Solo cuando la mayor parte de los Estados miembros hayan remitido su notificación podrá darse alguna indicación de si se han aprobado normas de inversión cuantitativa adicional y elementos susceptibles de entorpecer el buen funcionamiento de la directiva. Dado que la Comisión espera que un gran número de Estados miembros comunique su legislación a la Comisión antes de que acabe este año, tal indicación solo podrá darse a lo largo de 2006.
Algunos sistemas de pensiones de prestación definida aprovecharon el mercado alcista de los años noventa para reducir el nivel de las contribuciones e incluso para otorgar vacaciones contributivas en vez de potenciar sus reservas financieras. Cuando sucedió el inevitable bajón del mercado, se vio que algunas de esas reservas eran insuficientes. En respuesta a ello, las empresas patrocinadoras y las autoridades supervisoras de los Estados miembros recurrieron a distintas soluciones: incrementar las contribuciones, poner límite a las prestaciones, reducir el índice de los derechos por pensiones, modificación de las normas que rigen los sistemas de pensiones y cierre de los sistemas a nuevos partícipes.
Al margen de los remedios aplicados, todos los interesados se dieron cuenta de nuevo de que un fondo de pensiones implica un compromiso a largo plazo con los trabajadores y los pensionistas. Este reconocimiento se ha visto reforzado por otros acontecimientos, como la aplicación de las normas IAS 19 a las empresas patrocinadoras y de normas más estrictas para la evaluación supervisora de disposiciones técnicas. Las empresas patrocinadoras se han dado cuenta de la necesidad de mejorar el control de los gastos y de estabilizar los rendimientos para cumplir sus compromisos de pensiones.
Sin duda se está observando un cambio de los sistemas tradicionales de prestación final definida a sistemas cuyo coste puede controlarse más fácilmente. Pero es evidente que este cambio no ha sido exclusivamente hacia sistemas puros de contribución individual definida. También existen sistemas híbridos que combinan elementos de prestación definida y de contribución definida. Los motivos de todos estos cambios son un mejor control del gasto y una mayor estabilidad de los beneficios para la empresa patrocinadora.
Existe una tendencia a la indefinición del límite entre los tres pilares de las pensiones, no solo entre el segundo pilar laboral y el tercer pilar individual, sino también entre el segundo y el primer pilar legal. Esto no supone un problema en la medida en que la estructura de pilares es solo un sistema genérico de clasificación, y los sistemas en que se destinan activos a las personas se pueden encontrar en los tres pilares. No es así en todos los Estados miembros, pues las pensiones reflejan situaciones culturales e históricas concretas. Así, aunque persistan las diferencias básicas entre cada uno de los tres pilares, las soluciones adoptadas pueden ser equivalentes."@es20
"Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@et5
"Arvoisa puhemies, EY:n perustamissopimuksen 226 artiklan mukaista jäsenyysvelvoitteiden noudattamatta jättämistä koskevaa menettelyä sovelletaan jäsenvaltioihin, jotka eivät ole ilmoittaneet komissiolle täytäntöönpanotoimistaan tai ovat ilmoittaneet niistä ainoastaan osittain. On korostettava, että kyseinen rikkomismenettely liittyy ainoastaan kansallisten toimien ilmoittamiseen eikä täytäntöönpanotoimien laatuun. Kun täydelliset ilmoitukset on saatu, komissio tutkii jäsenvaltioiden täytäntöönpanotoimet, mikä voi myöhemmässä vaiheessa johtaa jäsenyysvelvoitteiden noudattamatta jättämistä koskeviin menettelyihin, mikäli direktiivi on pantu täytäntöön väärällä tavalla.
Kaikissa 25 jäsenvaltiossa on tehty erilaisia ratkaisuja julkisten eläkejärjestelmien, työeläkejärjestelmien ja yksityisten järjestelmien olemassaolon, tason ja rahoituksen suhteen. Ei ole olemassa koko EU:n laajuista vastausta ikääntyvän yhteiskunnan haasteisiin. Ratkaisut on mukautettava jäsenvaltioiden erilaisiin eläkejärjestelmiin. Sen vuoksi lopullinen vastuu on jäsenvaltioilla.
Komissio voisi auttaa jäsenvaltioita varmistamalla, että rahoituspalveluita koskevilla Euroopan unionin sääntelypuitteilla tuetaan eläkerahoitusta koskevia turvallisia ja markkinavetoisia ratkaisuja. Pullonkaulat on poistettava, jotta eläkkeisiin varattuja varoja saadaan hallinnoitua mahdollisimman tehokkaasti ja jotta eurooppalaisilla on näin mahdollisuus nauttia mahdollisimman suurista etuuksista ja vuosimaksatuksista eläkeaikana. Direktiivillä täytetään tämä tavoite. Ensi vuoden toisella puoliskolla komissio esittää valkoisen kirjan yhteissijoitusyrityksistä, joilla on myös osansa eläkealalla.
Euroopan eläketarjontaa pyritään parantamaan myös muilla aloitteilla. Näihin kuuluvat esimerkiksi hiljattain annettu ehdotus direktiiviksi lisäeläkeoikeuksien siirrettävyyden parantamisesta ja meneillään olevat rikkomismenettelyt, jotka liittyvät eläkemaksujen yhdenvertaiseen verotukseen.
Direktiivillä ei anneta komissiolle komiteamenettelyvaltuuksia. Se ei ole "Lamfalussy-direktiivi". Siksi Euroopan vakuutus- ja työeläkevalvontaviranomaisten komitealle CEIOPS:lle ei anneta valtuutusta, eikä komissio anna mitään täytäntöönpanotoimia. Koska direktiivin toteuttamisesta ei ole vielä saatu käytännön kokemusta, on liian aikaista ottaa kantaa komiteamenettelyn tarpeeseen ja sen myötä myöskin CEIOPS:n mahdolliseen tehtävään.
CEIOPS:llä on kuitenkin tärkeä direktiivin 21 artiklan 2 kohtaan liittyvä tehtävä, ja valvojien "on tehtävä tiivistä yhteistyötä ammatillisia lisäeläkkeitä tarjoavien laitosten toiminnan valvonnan helpottamiseksi". CEIOPS:n ammatillisten lisäeläkkeiden komitea laatii parhaillaan asiaan liittyvää luonnosta monenväliseksi yhteistyöpöytäkirjaksi. Vastaava vakuutusalan pöytäkirja on jo olemassa. Luonnosta käsitellään parhaillaan toisessa avoimessa kuulemismenettelyssä sidosryhmien kanssa. Luonnos on tarkoitus hyväksyä CEIOPS:n jäsenten kokouksessa helmikuussa 2006.
Kahden viime vuoden aikana komissio on järjestänyt kaksi kokousta jäsenvaltioiden kanssa auttaakseen niitä panemaan direktiivin täytäntöön. Tästä syystä neuvotteluissa keskityttiin jäsenvaltioiden, komission ja muiden sidosryhmien esiin tuomiin asioihin, jotka voisivat mahdollisesti aiheuttaa vaikeuksia direktiivin saattamisessa osaksi kansallista lainsäädäntöä ja jotka voisivat johtaa direktiivin erilaisiin tulkintoihin jäsenvaltioissa. Näiden kokousten perusteella komissio päätteli, että vaikka joistakin artikloista vaikuttaisi aiheutuvan ongelmia, ongelmat eivät koske kaikkia jäsenvaltioita. Näin ollen on vaikeaa määritellä mitään erityisen ongelmallisia säännöksiä. Tämä ei ole yllätys, koska jäsenvaltioiden eläkerakenteet ja -järjestelyt ovat huomattavan erilaisia. Tästä huolimatta on syytä olettaa, että rajatylittävää toimintaa käsittelevän 20 artiklan täytäntöönpano aiheuttaa ongelmia monille jäsenvaltiolle. On kuitenkin liian aikaista arvioida, johtuvatko ongelmat Euroopan parlamentin ja neuvoston hyväksymän lainsäädäntöehdotuksen muotoilusta vai ainoastaan eri jäsenvaltioiden erilaisista tulkinnoista.
Vuonna 2006 järjestettävässä ensimmäisessä kokouksessa on tarkoitus keskustella lisää eräistä asioista, jotka on jäsenvaltioiden täytäntöönpanotoimien arvioinnin yhteydessä todettu ongelmallisiksi ja olennaisen tärkeiksi. Direktiivin täytäntöön panemiseksi toteutettujen jäsenvaltioiden toimien syvällinen analysointi ei ole vielä alkanut. Tässä vaiheessa työssä keskitytään osittaisten tai täydellisten ilmoitusten laatuun. Vasta sitten, kun suurin osa jäsenvaltioista on ilmoittanut täytäntöönpanotoimistaan, voidaan antaa arvio siitä, kuinka paljon jäsenvaltiot ovat antaneet täydentäviä määrällisiä sijoitussääntöjä ja muuta lainsäädäntöä, jotka saattavat vaarantaa direktiivin asianmukaisen toiminnan. Koska komissio odottaa lukuisien jäsenvaltioiden ilmoittavan lainsäädännöstään komissiolle ennen tämän vuoden loppua, tällainen arvio voidaan antaa vasta vuoden 2006 kuluessa.
Monet etuusperusteisista eläkejärjestelmistä hyötyivät 1990-luvun noususuhdanteesta ja alensivat maksuja tai jopa luopuivat maksujen perimisestä määräajaksi sen sijaan, että ne olisivat kasvattaneet taloudellista varantoaan. Kun väistämätön markkinoiden laskusuhdanne alkoi, jotkin varannoista osoittautuivat riittämättömiksi. Rahoittavat yritykset ja jäsenvaltioiden valvovat viranomaiset reagoivat tähän erilaisin keinoin, joita olivat maksujen korottaminen, lisämaksut, eläketason alentaminen, eläkejärjestelmien sääntömuutokset ja järjestelmien sulkeminen uusilta jäseniltä.
Toteutetuista parannustoimista huolimatta kaikki sidosryhmät ymmärsivät jälleen, että eläkerahastoon liittyy pitkäaikainen velvoite työntekijöitä ja edunsaajia kohtaan. Tätä näkemys on vahvistunut edelleen muun kehityksen myötä, johon kuuluu IAS 19-standardin soveltaminen rahoittaviin yrityksiin ja tiukemmat säännöt vakuutusteknisen vastuuvelan valvovalle arvioinnille. Rahoittavat yritykset ovat ymmärtäneet, että kulujen valvontaa on parannettava ja tulot vakautettava, jotta yritykset voivat täyttää eläkesitoumuksensa.
Voidaan huomata, että on käynnissä siirtyminen loppupalkan perusteella määritellyistä perinteisistä etuusperusteisista eläkkeistä eläkejärjestelmiin, joiden kuluja voidaan helpommin valvoa. On kuitenkin selvää näyttöä siitä, että siirtymistä ei tapahdu ainoastaan kohti yksityisiä maksuperusteisia järjestelmiä. On myös sekajärjestelmiä, joissa yhdistyvät etuusperusteisen ja maksuperusteisen eläkejärjestelmän ominaisuudet. Näiden muutosten syynä on rahoittavan yrityksen kulujen aiempaa parempi valvonta ja aiempaa vakaammat tulot.
On vallalla kehityssuunta, jossa pyritään hämärtämään näiden kolmen eläkepilarin välisiä rajoja, ei ainoastaan toisen, työeläkejärjestelmien pilarin ja kolmannen, yksityisten vakuutusjärjestelmien pilarin välisiä rajoja, mutta myös toisen pilarin ja ensimmäisen, lakisääteisten järjestelmien pilarin välistä rajaa. Tämä ei ole ongelma, koska pilarirakenne on ainoastaan yleinen luokittelujärjestelmä, ja kaikissa kolmessa pilarissa on järjestelmiä, joissa varoja maksetaan yksittäisille edunsaajille. Näin ei ole jokaisessa jäsenvaltiossa, koska eläkkeet kuvastavat erityisiä kulttuurisia ja historiallisia tilanteita. Ratkaisut voivat näin ollen olla samankaltaisia ensimmäisen, toisen ja kolmannen pilarin välisistä peruseroavaisuuksista huolimatta."@fi7
"Monsieur le Président, une procédure d’infraction pour non-notification au titre de l’article 226 CE sera engagée contre les États membres qui n’ont pas communiqué ou n’ont communiqué que partiellement les dispositions de mise en œuvre à la Commission. Il convient de souligner que de telles procédures d’infraction concernent uniquement la notification de mesures nationales et ne portent pas sur la qualité de la mise en œuvre. Une fois en possession des notifications complètes, la Commission examinera les modalités d’exécution nationales, examen susceptible de déboucher ultérieurement sur l’ouverture de procédures d’infraction pour mise en œuvre incorrecte de la directive.
Les 25 États membres ont tous privilégié des options différentes quant à l’établissement, au niveau et au financement de régimes publics, de régimes professionnels et de dispositions individuelles. Il n’y a pas de réponse unique, transposable à l’échelon européen, aux défis que représente le vieillissement de la société. Les solutions adéquates doivent être adaptées aux différents systèmes de retraite des États membres. Par conséquent, la responsabilité finale échoit aux États membres eux-mêmes.
La Commission pourrait leur rendre service en veillant à ce que le cadre réglementaire européen pour les services financiers soit favorable à l’émergence de réponses solides impulsées par les forces du marché au financement des retraites. Il convient de supprimer les goulets d’étranglement de manière à ce que les avoirs réservés à la retraite puissent être gérés le plus efficacement possible, permettant ainsi aux Européens de bénéficier de prestations et de rentes maximum une fois qu’ils partent à la retraite. Objectif auquel la directive répond. Au cours du second semestre de l’année prochaine, la Commission présentera un livre blanc dans le domaine des OPCVM, qui jouent également un rôle dans le domaine des retraites.
Parmi les autres initiatives qui tendent à améliorer les prestations de retraite au niveau européen figurent la proposition de directive relative à l’amélioration de la portabilité des droits à pension complémentaire adoptée récemment, ainsi que les cas d’infraction en instance dans le domaine de l’égalité de traitement fiscal des cotisations de retraite.
Cette dernière ne confère aucune compétence de comitologie à la Commission. Il ne s’agit pas d’une directive «Lamfalussy». C’est pour cette raison qu’aucun mandat n’est délivré au Comité européen des contrôleurs des assurances et des pensions professionnelles - CECAPP - et qu’aucune mesure d’exécution ne sera adoptée par la Commission. Étant donné que l’on ne dispose encore aucune expérience pratique concernant cette directive, il serait prématuré d’adopter une position sur l’opportunité de la procédure de comitologie et, partant, sur le rôle que le CECAPP pourrait jouer à cet égard.
Toutefois, le CECAPP a un rôle de premier plan à jouer dans le cadre de l’article 21, paragraphe 2, de la directive et les contrôleurs ont le devoir de «coopérer étroitement en vue de faciliter le contrôle des activités des institutions de retraite professionnelle». À cet égard, le comité des pensions professionnelles du CECAPP rédige en ce moment un protocole de coopération multilatérale, comme il en existe déjà pour les assurances. Un projet sera soumis aux parties prenantes dans le cadre d’une deuxième consultation ouverte. Il devrait être adopté par le CECAPP lors de sa réunion prévue en février 2006.
Ces deux dernières années, la Commission a organisé deux réunions avec les États membres dans le but de les aider à mettre la directive en application. À cet effet, les discussions se sont concentrées sur les points qui, d’après les États membres, la Commission et les autres parties concernées, pourraient poser problème au moment de la transposition de la directive et susciter une interprétation divergente selon les États membres. Sur la base de ces réunions, la Commission en est arrivée à la conclusion que, certes, certains articles semblent poser problème, mais pas pour tous les États membres. Il est par conséquent difficile de mettre le doigt sur les éventuelles dispositions particulièrement problématiques, ce qui n’est pas surprenant, étant donné que les structures et dispositions des États membres dans le domaine des retraites sont considérablement éloignées. Néanmoins, tout porte à croire que nombre d’États membres rencontrent des difficultés dans la mise en œuvre de l’article 20 - activités transfrontalières. Toutefois, il est trop tôt pour déterminer si l’origine de ces problèmes réside dans la formulation de la proposition législative adoptée par le Parlement européen et le Conseil, ou seulement dans les diverses interprétations des États membres.
Une première réunion se tiendra en 2006 afin de débattre plus en profondeur de certaines des questions reconnues comme problématiques et essentielles au cours de l’examen des mesures nationales de mise en œuvre. L’analyse détaillée des mesures nationales de transposition de la directive n’a pas encore commencé. À ce stade-ci, les travaux sont axés sur la qualité des notifications partielles ou complètes. Nous n’aurons une idée de l’ampleur des règles d’investissement quantitatives complémentaires adoptées par les États membres et des éléments qui pourraient compromettre le bon fonctionnement de la directive que lorsque la majorité d’entre eux auront rempli leur devoir de notification. Étant donné que la Commission prévoit que de nombreux États membres lui notifieront leurs dispositions législatives avant la fin de cette année, cette information ne pourra être communiquée que dans le courant de 2006.
Un certain nombre de régimes de retraite à prestations déterminées ont profité du marché haussier des années 1990 pour réduire le niveau des cotisations, voire les annuler provisoirement, au lieu de consolider leurs réserves financières. Lorsque le marché a entamé son inévitable phase descendante, comme il fallait s’y attendre, certaines de ces réserves se sont révélées insuffisantes. Pour faire face à cette situation, les entreprises d’affiliation et les autorités de contrôle des États membres ont appliqué différentes solutions: augmentation des cotisations, paiements complémentaires, baisse de l’indexation des droits à pension, modification des règles relatives aux régimes de retraite et fermeture des régimes aux nouveaux venus.
Indépendamment des remèdes appliqués, toutes les parties prenantes se sont une nouvelle fois rendu compte qu’un fonds de pension implique un engagement à long terme vis-à-vis des salariés et des retraités. Prise de conscience qui n’a été renforcée que par d’autres développements, y compris l’application de l’IAS 19 pour les entreprises d’affiliation et de règles plus sévères pour l’évaluation de contrôle des dispositions techniques. Les entreprises d’affiliation ont perçu la nécessité d’améliorer le contrôle des coûts et de stabiliser davantage les rentrées dans le but de tenir leurs promesses en matière de retraite.
On observe en effet un recul constant des régimes de paiement final, traditionnellement à prestations déterminées, au profit de régimes de retraite dont le coût peut être plus facilement contrôlé. Cependant, il apparaît très clairement que ce recul ne s’est pas fait uniquement au profit de régimes exclusivement à cotisations déterminées. L’on rencontre également des régimes hybrides combinant des éléments à prestations déterminées et à cotisations déterminées. Tous ces changements sont motivés par la volonté de mieux contrôler les coûts et d’accroître la stabilité des recettes pour les entreprises d’affiliation.
On constate un estompement progressif de la frontière entre les trois piliers de retraite, pas seulement entre les régimes de retraite professionnelle du deuxième pilier et les dispositions individuelles du troisième pilier, mais également entre le deuxième pilier et le premier pilier prévu par la loi. Cet estompement ne pose pas problème, étant donné que la structure en piliers ne constitue qu’un système de classification général et que des régimes prévoyant l’attribution d’avoirs à des personnes se retrouvent dans chacun des trois piliers. Ce n’est pas le cas dans tous les États membres, vu que les retraites sont le reflet de situations culturelles et historiques spécifiques. Aussi, même si les différences fondamentales entre les premier, deuxième et troisième piliers subsisteront, les solutions envisagées peuvent être identiques."@fr8
"Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@hu11
"Signor Presidente, gli Stati membri che non hanno comunicato alla Commissione le misure di attuazione, o lo hanno fatto solo parzialmente, saranno oggetto di procedure di infrazione per mancata notifica, in base all’articolo 226 del Trattato CE. Occorre sottolineare che tali procedure d’infrazione riguardano solo la comunicazione delle misure nazionali, e non si riferiscono alla qualità dell’applicazione. Dopo aver ricevuto le comunicazioni complete, la Commissione esaminerà le misure di attuazione nazionali, e tale esame potrebbe in seguito condurre a procedure d’infrazione per applicazione non corretta della direttiva.
Nei 25 Stati membri si sono percorse vie differenti per quanto riguarda l’esistenza, il livello e il finanziamento dei regimi statali, di quelli aziendali e professionali e degli accordi individuali. Non c’è un’unica risposta, valida per tutta l’Unione europea, alle sfide che ci pone l’invecchiamento della società. Le soluzioni opportune devono adattarsi ai diversi sistemi pensionistici degli Stati membri, ed è quindi agli Stati membri che spetta la responsabilità finale.
La Commissione può venire in aiuto agli Stati membri garantendo un quadro normativo europeo per i servizi finanziari che contribuisca alla formazione di sicure risposte di mercato ai problemi posti dal finanziamento delle pensioni. Occorre eliminare le strozzature per garantire la massima efficienza nella gestione delle attività destinate alle pensioni, affinché i cittadini europei che giungono alla pensione possano ricevere liquidazioni e vitalizi il più alti possibili. La direttiva coglie quest’obiettivo. Nella seconda metà del prossimo anno, la Commissione presenterà un Libro bianco per il settore degli organismi d’investimento collettivo in valori mobiliari (OICVM), che svolgerà a sua volta un ruolo in campo pensionistico.
Tra le altre iniziative tese a migliorare l’offerta di pensioni in Europa, segnalo la proposta, di recente adozione, di una direttiva per il miglioramento della portabilità dei diritti pensionistici supplementari, e le procedure di infrazione attualmente in corso in materia di parità di trattamento fiscale dei contributi pensionistici.
La direttiva non conferisce alla Commissione alcun potere di comitatologia: non si tratta di una direttiva “Lamfalussy”. Di conseguenza il CEIOPS (Comitato delle autorità europee di vigilanza delle assicurazioni e delle pensioni aziendali o professionali) non ha ricevuto alcun mandato, né la Commissione adotterà alcuna misura di attuazione. Dal momento che dalla direttiva non si possono ancora trarre esperienze pratiche, è prematuro prendere posizione sulla necessità di una procedura di comitatologia, e quindi sull’eventuale ruolo del CEIOPS nella questione.
Il CEIOPS svolge però un ruolo importante nel contesto dell’articolo 21, paragrafo 2, della direttiva e le autorità di controllo “collaborano strettamente per facilitare il controllo sulle operazioni degli enti pensionistici aziendali e professionali”. A tale proposito, il comitato delle pensioni aziendali o professionali del CEIOPS sta attualmente lavorando a un protocollo di cooperazione multilaterale, analogo a quello già esistente nel settore assicurativo. E’ stato preparato un testo provvisorio, che servirà per un secondo turno di consultazioni aperte con le parti interessate. Si prevede che esso venga adottato dalla riunione dei membri del CEIOPS nel febbraio 2006.
Negli ultimi due anni, la Commissione ha organizzato due riunioni con gli Stati membri per assisterli nell’applicazione della direttiva. A tal fine, le discussioni si sono concentrate su quegli aspetti che – a giudizio degli Stati membri, della Commissione e degli altri soggetti interessati – potrebbero costituire una potenziale fonte di difficoltà per il recepimento, e dare adito a interpretazioni divergenti da parte degli Stati membri. Da questi incontri la Commissione ha tratto la conclusione che alcuni articoli causano effettivamente problemi, ma non in tutti gli Stati membri; è quindi difficile individuare disposizioni particolarmente problematiche. La cosa d’altra parte non deve sorprendere, poiché strutture e sistemi pensionistici degli Stati membri si differenziano ampiamente. Tuttavia vi è motivo di credere che l’applicazione dell’articolo 20 – attività transfrontaliera – sia fonte di difficoltà per numerosi Stati membri. Tuttavia è troppo presto per valutare se l’origine di questi problemi risieda nella formulazione della proposta legislativa adottata dal Parlamento e dal Consiglio, o solo nelle diverse interpretazioni che ne hanno dato i vari Stati membri.
Nel 2006 verrà organizzata una prima riunione per discutere ulteriormente alcuni aspetti che in fase di esame delle misure di attuazione nazionali si sono rivelati problematici e di importanza fondamentale. L’analisi approfondita delle misure nazionali di recepimento della direttiva non è ancora iniziata. In questa fase il lavoro si concentra soprattutto sulla qualità delle notifiche parziali o complete. Solo quando la grande maggioranza degli Stati membri avrà trasmesso le proprie notifiche, sarà possibile valutare in che misura gli Stati membri abbiano adottato norme quantitative addizionali per gli investimenti e altri elementi suscettibili di pregiudicare l’adeguato funzionamento della direttiva. La Commissione ritiene che parecchi Stati membri le comunicheranno i propri provvedimenti legislativi prima della fine di quest’anno, e quindi tale valutazione si potrà effettuare nel corso del 2006.
Alcuni regimi pensionistici assistenziali hanno approfittato della fase rialzista del mercato negli anni ’90 per ridurre il livello dei contributi, o addirittura sospenderli per determinati periodi, anziché aumentare le riserve finanziarie; quando il mercato ha subito l’inevitabile ribasso, alcune di tali riserve si sono rivelate insufficienti. Le imprese promotrici e le autorità di vigilanza degli Stati membri hanno reagito adottando soluzioni differenti: aumento dei contributi, pagamenti integrativi, ridotta indicizzazione dei diritti pensionistici, modifica delle norme dei regimi pensionistici, e chiusura dei regimi stessi a nuovi sottoscrittori.
A prescindere dai rimedi scelti, tutte le parti interessate hanno compreso che un fondo pensione comporta un impegno a lungo termine sia per i lavoratori dipendenti che per i pensionati. Tale consapevolezza è stata rafforzata da altri sviluppi, tra cui l’applicazione di IAS 19 per le imprese promotrici e l’introduzione di norme più rigide per la valutazione delle disposizioni tecniche da parte degli organi di vigilanza. Le imprese promotrici hanno compreso la necessità di migliorare il controllo dei costi e stabilizzare gli introiti per poter tener fede al livello di pensioni promesso.
Si può effettivamente osservare il passaggio dai tradizionali regimi pensionistici assistenziali a pagamento finale, ad altri i cui costi sono più facilmente controllabili. Emerge con chiarezza, però, che questo passaggio non si è indirizzato unicamente verso regimi contributivi puramente individuali; sono reperibili anche regimi ibridi che offrono una combinazione di elementi assistenziali e contributivi. La logica di quest’evoluzione è quella di giungere a un miglior controllo dei costi e a una maggiore stabilità degli introiti per le imprese promotrici.
Vi è la tendenza a sfumare le distinzioni fra i tre pilastri del sistema pensionistico: non solo tra il secondo pilastro – quello occupazionale – e il terzo – quello individuale, ma anche tra il secondo e il primo – quello obbligatorio. Non si tratta in realtà di un problema, poiché la struttura a pilastri rappresenta soltanto un criterio generale di classificazione, e regimi in cui le attività sono attribuite ai singoli si trovano in tutti e tre i pilastri. Questo non avviene però in tutti gli Stati membri, in quanto le pensioni riflettono situazioni specifiche dal punto di vista culturale e storico. Quindi, anche se le differenze tra primo, secondo e terzo pilastro sono destinate a rimanere, le soluzioni escogitate possono essere equivalenti."@it12
"Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@lt14
"Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@lv13
"Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@mt15
".
Mijnheer de Voorzitter, tegen lidstaten die de Commissie geen of slechts gedeeltelijk mededeling hebben gedaan van hun uitvoeringsmaatregelen, zal een inbreukprocedure wegens niet-mededeling krachtens artikel 226 van het EG-Verdrag aanhangig worden gemaakt. Ik benadruk hierbij dat dergelijke inbreukprocedures alleen betrekking hebben op de mededeling van nationale maatregelen en niet op de kwaliteit van de uitvoering. Zodra de volledige mededelingen binnen zijn, onderzoekt de Commissie de nationale uitvoeringsmaatregelen, wat in een later stadium kan leiden tot een inbreukprocedure wegens onjuiste uitvoering van de richtlijn.
De 25 lidstaten hebben verschillende keuzes gemaakt wat betreft het bestaan, het niveau en de financiering van overheids-, beroeps- en individuele pensioenregelingen. Er is geen eensluidend Europees antwoord op de uitdagingen van de vergrijzing van de maatschappij. Oplossingen zullen moeten worden afgestemd op de pensioenstelsels van de afzonderlijke lidstaten. Daarom ligt de eindverantwoordelijkheid bij de lidstaten.
De Commissie kan de lidstaten van dienst zijn door ervoor te zorgen dat het Europese wetgevingskader voor financiële diensten een veilige marktgestuurde respons op pensioenfinanciering stimuleert. Er moeten knelpunten worden opgelost om kapitaal dat is gereserveerd voor pensioenvoorzieningen, zo efficiënt mogelijk te kunnen beheren, zodat Europeanen bij pensionering de hoogst mogelijke uitkeringen en lijfrentes genieten. De richtlijn voorziet in deze doelstelling. De Commissie zal in de tweede helft van volgend jaar een witboek presenteren over UCITS, dat ook een rol speelt in de pensioenarena.
Andere initiatieven gericht op het verbeteren van Europese pensioenvoorzieningen zijn onder andere het onlangs aangenomen voorstel voor een richtlijn over het verbeteren van de mobiliteit van aanvullende pensioenrechten en de lopende inbreukprocedures op het terrein van gelijke belastingheffing op pensioenpremies.
De richtlijn stelt de Commissie niet in staat comitologie toe te passen. Het is geen Lamfalussy-richtlijn. Er worden dus geen mandaten aan CEIOPS gegeven en er worden ook geen uitvoeringsmaatregelen door de Commissie aangenomen. Aangezien we nog geen praktische ervaring met de richtlijn hebben opgedaan, is het nog te vroeg om te bepalen of we comitologie nodig hebben en welke rol CEIOPS hierbij kan spelen.
CEIOPS heeft echter een belangrijke rol te vervullen in het kader van artikel 21, lid 2, van de richtlijn en toezichthouders hebben de taak nauw samen te werken om toezicht op de werking van de beroepspensioeninstellingen mogelijk te maken. In dat verband is de beroepspensioencommissie van CEIOPS bezig een multilateraal samenwerkingsprotocol op te stellen, zoals dat er ook is voor verzekeringen. Er is een ontwerpdocument beschikbaar voor een open raadpleging met belanghebbenden. Naar verwachting wordt het protocol in februari 2006 door de ledenvergadering van CEIOPS aangenomen.
De afgelopen paar jaar heeft de Commissie twee vergaderingen met de lidstaten belegd om ze te helpen bij de uitvoering van de richtlijn. Om die reden richtten de besprekingen zich op kwesties die de lidstaten, de Commissie en andere belanghebbenden als een mogelijke bron van moeilijkheden voor de omzetting hebben aangemerkt en die op een afwijkende manier door de lidstaten zouden kunnen worden geïnterpreteerd. Op basis van die vergaderingen is de Commissie tot de conclusie gekomen dat dit niet voor alle lidstaten geldt, hoewel een aantal artikelen problemen blijkt op te leveren. Het is dus moeilijk specifieke problematische bepalingen te noemen. Dat is niet zo vreemd, aangezien de pensioenstructuren en -regelingen van de lidstaten aanmerkelijk uiteenlopen. Er is desalniettemin reden om aan te nemen dat de uitvoering van artikel 20 – grensoverschrijdende activiteiten – voor veel lidstaten problemen oplevert. Het is echter te vroeg om te kunnen beoordelen of de oorsprong van die problemen ligt in de formulering van het wetgevingsprotocol zoals het Europees Parlement en de Raad dit hebben aangenomen, of slechts in de verschillende interpretaties in de diverse lidstaten.
In 2006 wordt voor het eerst een vergadering gehouden waarin verder zal worden ingegaan op een aantal kwesties die als problematisch zijn aangemerkt en die van belang zijn voor het onderzoek van de nationale uitvoeringsmaatregelen. Er is nog geen begin gemaakt met de diepteanalyse van de nationale maatregelen voor de omzetting van de richtlijn. In dit stadium is het werk toegespitst op de kwaliteit van de gedeeltelijke of volledige mededelingen. Pas als de meeste lidstaten mededeling hebben gedaan, kunnen we aangeven in hoeverre lidstaten extra kwantitatieve beleggingsregels en -elementen hebben aangenomen die de werking van de richtlijn in gevaar brengen. Aangezien de Commissie verwacht dat een groot aantal lidstaten vóór het eind van het jaar mededeling zullen doen van hun wetgeving, kan dit pas in de loop van 2006.
Een aantal pensioenregelingen met vastgelegde uitkeringen heeft tijdens de bullmarkt van de jaren negentig de premies verlaagd of zelfs een premiestop toegepast in plaats van de financiële reserves op te bouwen. Toen de onvermijdelijke omslag in de markt plaatsvond, bleek een aantal van die reserves niet toereikend te zijn. De sponsorende ondernemingen en toezichthoudende instanties van de lidstaten kwamen toen met verschillende oplossingen: premieverhogingen, bovenwettelijke betalingen, lagere indexering van pensioenrechten, aanpassing van de pensioenregels en het niet toelaten van nieuwe deelnemers tot pensioenregelingen.
Ongeacht de toegepaste remedies realiseerden alle belanghebbenden zich opnieuw dat een pensioenfonds een verplichting voor de lange termijn naar werknemers en gepensioneerden met zich meebrengt. Andere ontwikkelingen, waaronder de toepassing van IAS 19 voor sponsorende ondernemingen en strengere regels voor de beoordeling van technische bepalingen, hebben deze erkenning alleen maar versterkt. Sponsorende ondernemingen zijn gaan inzien dat een betere kostenbeheersing en een stabieler inkomstenstroom noodzakelijk zijn om pensioentoezeggingen af te dekken.
Er is inderdaad een verschuiving waarneembaar van traditionele pensioenregelingen op grond van vastgelegde uitkeringen naar regelingen waarvan de kosten eenvoudiger te beheersen zijn. Tekenen wijzen er echter duidelijk op dat het niet alleen gaat om een verschuiving naar zuiver individuele vastgelegde bijdragen. Er zijn ook mengvormen waarbij vastgelegde uitkeringen en vastgelegde bijdragen worden gecombineerd. De grondgedachte achter al deze veranderingen is een betere kostenbeheersing en stabielere inkomsten voor de sponsorende onderneming.
Er is sprake van vervaging van de grens tussen de drie pensioenpijlers, niet alleen tussen de eerste pijler, collectieve pensioenen, en de derde pijler, individuele pensioenen, maar ook tussen de tweede pijler en de eerste pijler, de wettelijke pijler. Dat is geen probleem, aangezien de pijlerstructuur slechts een algemene classificatie is, en we in alle drie de pijlers regelingen tegenkomen waarin kapitaal aan individuen wordt toegekend. Dat is niet in elke lidstaat zo. Pensioenen zijn namelijk een neerslag van specifieke culturele en historische situaties. Hoewel de primaire verschillen tussen de eerste, tweede en derde pijler niet zullen verdwijnen, zijn de voorziene oplossingen wellicht vergelijkbaar."@nl3
"Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@pl16
"Senhor Presidente, os Estados-Membros que não comunicaram, ou comunicaram apenas parcialmente, medidas de execução à Comissão ficarão sujeitos a procedimentos por incumprimento por ausência de notificação, ao abrigo do artigo 226º do Tratado CE. Deve sublinhar-se que estes procedimentos dizem apenas respeito à comunicação de medidas nacionais e não se referem à qualidade da execução. Uma vez recebidas as notificações completas, a Comissão analisará as medidas de execução nacionais, que poderão posteriormente conduzir a procedimentos por incumprimento devido à incorrecta execução da directiva.
Foram feitas escolhas diferentes nos 25 Estados-Membros relativamente à existência, nível e financiamento de regimes estatais, regimes profissionais e disposições individuais. Não há uma resposta a nível de toda a UE aos desafios de uma sociedade que está a envelhecer. As soluções adequadas têm de ser adaptadas aos diferentes sistemas de pensões dos Estados-Membros. Assim, a responsabilidade final é dos Estados-Membros.
A Comissão poderia ajudar os Estados-Membros, garantindo que o quadro regulamentar europeu para os serviços financeiros apoia a emergência de respostas seguras e orientadas para o mercado para o financiamento das reformas. Têm de ser eliminados os estrangulamentos, para que os activos reservados para as reformas possam ser geridos o mais eficientemente possível, permitindo assim aos europeus desfrutarem dos dividendos e anuidades mais elevados possíveis na sua reforma. A directiva cumpre este objectivo. Na segunda metade do próximo ano, a Comissão apresentará um Livro Branco no domínio do OICVM, que desempenha também um papel na questão das pensões.
Outras iniciativas destinadas a melhorar o sistema de pensões europeu incluem a recém-adoptada proposta de directiva sobre a melhoria da portabilidade dos direitos de pensão suplementares e os casos de incumprimento em curso no domínio da igualdade de tratamento fiscal das contribuições para pensões.
A directiva não confere quaisquer poderes de comitologia à Comissão. Não é uma directiva “Lamfalussy”. Assim, não foram atribuídos mandatos ao Comité das Autoridades Europeias de Supervisão dos Seguros e Pensões Complementares de Reforma – CASSPCR – nem serão adoptadas pela Comissão nenhumas medidas de execução. Uma vez que não há ainda experiência prática com a directiva, é demasiado cedo para tomar uma posição sobre a necessidade de comitologia e, por consequência, sobre o papel que o CASSPCR poderia ter nisso.
No entanto, o CASSPCR tem um importante papel a desempenhar no contexto do nº 2 do artigo 21º da directiva e os supervisores têm o dever de “colaborar estreitamente a fim de facilitar a supervisão das operações das instituições de reformas profissionais”. Sob este aspecto, o Comité de Pensões Complementares de Reforma do CASSPCR está actualmente a elaborar um protocolo de cooperação multilateral, como o que já existe para os seguros. Há já um projecto pronto para uma segunda consulta aberta com as partes interessadas. Espera-se que seja adoptado na reunião de membros do CASSPCR de Fevereiro de 2006.
Nos últimos dois anos, a Comissão organizou duas reuniões com os Estados-Membros, para os ajudar a aplicar a directiva. Com esse objectivo, os debates centraram-se nas questões identificadas pelos Estados-Membros, pela Comissão e pelas outras partes interessadas como constituindo uma fonte potencial de dificuldades para a transposição e que poderiam dar origem a uma interpretação divergente por parte dos Estados-Membros. Com base nestas reuniões, a Comissão concluiu que embora alguns artigos pareçam causar problemas, isso não acontece para todos os Estados-Membros. Logo, é difícil definir quaisquer disposições particularmente problemáticas. Isto não é surpreendente, uma vez que as estruturas e disposições relativas a pensões dos Estados-Membros diferem significativamente. No entanto, há razões para acreditar que a aplicação do artigo 20º – actividades transfronteiriças – causa problemas a muitos Estados-Membros. É, contudo, ainda demasiado cedo para avaliar se a origem desses problemas está na formulação da proposta legislativa, tal como foi adoptada pelo Parlamento Europeu e pelo Conselho, ou apenas nas diferentes interpretações dos vários Estados-Membros.
Em 2006, será organizada uma primeira reunião para analisar mais profundamente algumas das questões que foram identificadas como problemáticas e essenciais durante a avaliação das medidas de execução nacionais. A análise aprofundada das medidas nacionais que transpõem a directiva ainda não começou. Nesta fase, o trabalho centra-se na qualidade das notificações integrais ou parciais. Uma indicação de até que ponto cada Estado-Membro adoptou normas e elementos de investimento quantitativo adicionais que possam colocar em risco o adequado funcionamento da directiva só poderá ser fornecida quando a maior parte dos Estados-Membros tiver entregado as suas notificações. Como a Comissão espera que um grande número de Estados-Membros comunique a sua legislação à Comissão antes do final deste ano, essa indicação só poderá ser fornecida no decorrer de 2006.
Um certo número de regimes de prestações definidas aproveitou a bolsa em alta da década de 1990 para reduzir o nível das quotizações ou até para assumir pausas nas quotizações, em vez de aumentar as suas reservas financeiras. Quando sobreveio a inevitável quebra bolsista, descobriu-se que algumas destas reservas eram insuficientes. Em resposta, as empresas contribuintes e as autoridades fiscalizadoras dos Estados-Membros recorreram a diferentes soluções: aumento das quotizações, pagamentos suplementares, redução da indexação dos direitos de pensão, alterações nas normas dos regimes de pensões e encerramento dos regimes a novos participantes.
Independentemente das soluções aplicadas, todas as partes interessadas mais uma vez se deram conta de que um fundo de pensões envolve um compromisso de longo prazo para com os trabalhadores e os pensionistas. Este reconhecimento só tem vindo a ser reforçado por outros desenvolvimentos, incluindo a aplicação das NIC (IAS) 19 para empresas contribuintes e normas mais rigorosas para a avaliação fiscalizadora das disposições técnicas. As empresas contribuintes compreenderam a necessidade de conseguirem um melhor controlo dos custos e receitas mais estáveis, para poderem responder às suas promessas de pensões.
É possível observar-se efectivamente uma mudança dos tradicionais regimes de prestações definidas com pagamento final para regimes de pensões cujos custos possam ser mais facilmente controlados. No entanto, há indicações claras de que esta mudança não foi feita apenas para regimes contributivos definidos puramente individuais. Estão também disponíveis regimes híbridos que combinam prestações definidas com elementos contributivos definidos. A justificação para todas estas mudanças é um melhor controlo dos custos e uma maior estabilidade nas receitas para a empresa contribuinte.
Há uma tendência para alguma indefinição na linha que separa os três pilares de pensões, não só entre o segundo pilar profissional e o terceiro pilar individual, mas também entre o segundo pilar e o primeiro pilar estatutário. Não se trata de um problema, já que a estrutura em pilares é apenas um sistema de classificação geral e os regimes em que os activos estão atribuídos a indivíduos encontram-se em todos os três pilares. Não é isso que acontece em todos os Estados-Membros, uma vez que as pensões reflectem situações culturais e históricas específicas. Assim, embora as diferenças básicas entre o primeiro, o segundo e o terceiro pilares subsistam, as soluções previstas podem ser equivalentes."@pt17
"Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@sk18
"Mr President, the Member States that have not or that have only partially communicated implementing measures to the Commission will be subject to infringement proceedings for non-notification under Article 226 EC. It should be emphasised that such infringement procedures concern only the communication of national measures and do not refer to the quality of the implementation. Once complete notifications have been received, the Commission will examine the national implementing measures, which might at a later stage lead to infringement proceedings due to incorrect implementation of the directive.
Different choices have been made in the 25 Member States as to the existence, level and funding of state schemes, occupational schemes and individual arrangements. There is not one EU-wide answer to the challenges of the ageing society. Appropriate solutions must be adapted to Member States’ different pension systems. Therefore, the final responsibility lies with Member States.
The Commission could be of help to Member States by ensuring that the European regulatory framework for financial services supports the emergence of secure market-driven responses to retirement financing. Bottlenecks must be removed so that assets earmarked for retirement can be managed as efficiently as possible, thus allowing Europeans to enjoy the highest possible payouts and annuities on retirement. The directive fulfils this objective. In the second half of next year, the Commission will present a white paper in the field of UCITS, which also play a role in the pension arena.
Other initiatives that aim at improving European pension provision include the recently adopted proposal for a directive on improving the portability of supplementary pension rights, and the ongoing infringement cases in the field of equal tax treatment of pension contributions.
The directive does not confer any comitology powers on the Commission. It is not a ‘Lamfalussy’ directive. Therefore, no mandates are given to the Committee of European Insurance and Occupational Pensions Supervisors – CEIOPS – nor will any implementing measures be adopted by the Commission. As there is no practical experience with the directive yet, it is too early to take a position on the need for comitology and, therefore, on the role CEIOPS could take in this.
However, CEIOPS has an important role to play in the context of Article 21(2) of the directive and supervisors have the duty ‘to collaborate closely with a view to facilitating supervision of the operations of institutions for occupational retirement provision’. In that respect, CEIOPS’ Occupational Pensions Committee is currently drafting a multilateral cooperation protocol, such as already exists for insurance. A draft is out now for a second open consultation with stakeholders. It is expected to be adopted by the CEIOPS members’ meeting in February 2006.
In the past two years, the Commission has organised two meetings with Member States in order to help them implement the directive. To that end, the discussions focused on issues identified by Member States, the Commission and other stakeholders as a potential source of difficulty for the transposition and which may give rise to a diverging interpretation by the Member States. On the basis of those meetings, the Commission has concluded that although some articles appear to cause problems, that is not the case for all Member States. Hence it is difficult to define any particularly problematic provisions. This is not surprising, since Member States’ pension structures and arrangements differ significantly. Nonetheless, there is reason to believe that the implementation of Article 20 – cross-border activities – causes problems for many Member States. However, it is too early to assess whether the origin of those problems lies in the formulation of the legislative proposal as adopted by the European Parliament and the Council, or just in different interpretations in the various Member States.
In 2006, a first meeting will be organised to discuss further some of the issues which have been identified as problematic and essential during the examination of the national implementing measures. The in-depth analysis of the national measures transposing the directive has not yet begun. At this stage the work focuses on the quality of the partial or full notifications. An indication as to the extent to which Member States have adopted additional quantitative investment rules and elements that might jeopardise the proper functioning of the directive can only be provided once most Member States have notified. As the Commission expects a large number of Member States to communicate their legislation to the Commission before the end of this year, such an indication can only be provided in the course of 2006.
A number of defined benefit pension schemes took advantage of the 1990s bull market to reduce the level of contributions or even take contribution holidays instead of building up their financial reserves. When the inevitable market downturn occurred, some of these reserves were found to be insufficient. In response, sponsoring undertakings and Member States’ supervisory authorities employed different solutions: increased contributions, top-up payments, reduced indexation of pension rights, changes in the pension schemes’ rules and the closure of schemes to new entrants.
Irrespective of the remedies applied, all stakeholders again realised that a pension fund involves a long-term commitment to employees and pensioners. This recognition has only been reinforced by other developments, including the application of IAS 19 for sponsoring undertakings and stricter rules for the supervisory valuation of technical provisions. Sponsoring undertakings have realised the need to achieve improved cost control and more stable earnings in order to match their pension promises.
A shift from traditionally defined benefit final pay schemes to pension schemes whose cost can be more easily controlled can indeed be observed. However, there is clear evidence that this shift has not been solely towards purely individual defined contribution schemes. Hybrid schemes combining defined benefit and defined contribution elements are also available. The rationale behind all these changes is better cost control and more stability in earnings for the sponsoring undertaking.
There is a trend towards some blurring of the borderline between the three pension pillars, not just between the occupational second pillar and the individual third pillar, but also between the second pillar and the statutory first pillar. This is not a problem, as the pillar structure is only a general classification system, and schemes where assets are allocated to individuals are to be found in all three pillars. This is not the case in every Member State, as pensions reflect specific cultural and historical situations. Thus, although the basic differences between the first, second and third pillars will remain, the solutions envisaged may be equivalent."@sl19
".
Herr talman! De medlemsstater som inte har eller bara delvis har meddelat kommissionen om genomförandeåtgärder kommer att bli föremål för överträdelseförfaranden för underlåtenhet att anmäla i enlighet med artikel 226 i EG-fördraget. Det bör understrykas att sådana överträdelseförfaranden endast gäller anmälan av nationella åtgärder och inte kvaliteten på genomförandet. Så fort kommissionen har fått fullständiga anmälningar kommer man att granska de nationella genomförandeåtgärderna som i ett senare skede kan leda till överträdelseförfaranden på grund av felaktigt genomförande av direktivet.
Man har valt olika lösningar i de 25 medlemsstaterna när det gäller förekomsten, nivån och finansieringen av statliga system, yrkesbaserade system och individuella lösningar. Det finns inte en enda lösning för hela EU för att möta utmaningarna med ett samhälle med en åldrande befolkning. Lämpliga lösningar måste anpassas till medlemsstaternas olika pensionssystem. Därför ligger det yttersta ansvaret hos medlemsstaterna.
Kommissionen kan vara till hjälp för medlemsstaterna genom att se till att gemenskapens regelverk för finansiella tjänster stöder uppkomsten av säkra marknadsdrivna lösningar för pensionsfinansiering. Flaskhalsar måste tas bort så att tillgångar som öronmärkts för pensioner kan hanteras så effektivt som möjligt och på så sätt ge EU-medborgarna möjlighet att åtnjuta högsta möjliga utbetalningar och årliga underhåll när de pensioneras. Direktivet uppfyller detta mål. Under andra halvåret nästa år kommer kommissionen att lägga fram en vitbok inom området för kontaktkommittén för fondföretag (UCITS), som också har en funktion att fylla på pensionsområdet.
Andra initiativ som syftar till att förbättra de europeiska pensionsbestämmelserna innefattar det nyligen antagna förslaget till direktiv om bättre möjligheter att överföra kompletterande pensionsrättigheter, och de pågående överträdelseärendena inom området för likvärdig skattemässig behandling av pensionspremier.
I direktivet tilldelas inte kommissionen några befogenheter inom kommittéförfarandet. Det är inget ”Lamfalussydirektiv.” Därför ges Europeiska tillsynskommittén för försäkringar och tjänstepensioner – CEIOPS – inga mandat och inga genomförandeåtgärder kommer heller att antas av kommissionen. Eftersom vi inte har någon praktisk erfarenhet av direktivet ännu är det för tidigt att ta ställning till behovet av kommittéförfarande och således till vilken roll CEIOPS kan få i detta.
CEIOPS har dock en viktig roll när det gäller artikel 21.2 i direktivet tillsynsmyndigheterna är skyldiga att ”ha ett nära samarbete i syfte att underlätta tillsynen av tjänstepensionsinstituts verksamhet.” I det avseendet utarbetar CEIOPS kommitté för tjänstepensioner för närvarande ett multilateralt samarbetsprotokoll, liknande det som redan finns för försäkringar. Ett utkast till förslag är nu ute för ett andra öppet samråd med de berörda aktörerna. Man räknar med att det kommer att antas vid CEIOPS medlemsmöte i februari 2006.
Under de senaste två åren har kommissionen anordnat två möten med medlemsstaterna för att hjälpa dem att genomföra direktivet. För detta ändamål inriktades diskussionerna på frågor som medlemsstaterna, kommissionen och andra aktörer hade identifierat som möjliga svårigheter för genomförandet och som kan ge upphov till motstridiga tolkningar från medlemsstaternas sida. På grundval av dessa möten har kommissionen kommit fram till slutsatsen att trots att vissa artiklar verkar orsaka problem så gäller detta inte alla medlemsstater. Det är därför svårt att definiera några särskilt problematiska bestämmelser. Detta är inte överraskande eftersom tjänstepensionerna struktureras på mycket olika sätt i medlemsstaterna. Det finns i alla fall anledning att anta att genomförandet av artikel 20 – gränsöverskridande verksamhet – orsakar problem för många medlemsstater. Det är dock för tidigt att avgöra om orsaken till problemen är formuleringen i lagförslaget som antogs av parlamentet och rådet eller bara de olika tolkningarna i medlemsstaterna.
Ett första möte för en fortsatt diskussion om vissa av de frågor som har identifierats som problematiska och viktiga under granskningen av de nationella genomförandeåtgärderna kommer att anordnas 2006. Den djupgående analysen av de åtgärder som medlemsstaterna ska vidta för att införliva direktivet har inte påbörjats ännu. På det här stadiet inriktas arbetet på de ofullständiga eller fullständiga uppgifternas kvalitet. Indikationer på i vilken utsträckning medlemsstaterna har antagit ytterligare kvantitativa investeringsregler och faktorer som kan riskera att direktivet inte fungerar ordentligt kan inte ges förrän de flesta medlemsstaterna har lämnat besked. Eftersom kommissionen räknar med att ett stort antal medlemsstater kommer att ge kommissionen besked om sin lagstiftning före årsskiftet kan den inte lämna några indikationer förrän under 2006.
Ett antal pensionssystem med fasta förmåner drog nytta av 1990-talets uppgång för att minska nivån på premieinbetalningar eller till och med temporärt avstå från att göra premieinbetalningar i stället för att bygga upp sina ekonomiska reserver. När den oundvikliga marknadsnedgången inträffade visade det sig att en del av dessa reserver var otillräckliga. Som reaktion på detta använde sig de uppdragsgivande företagen och tillsynsmyndigheterna i medlemsstaterna av olika lösningar: ökade inbetalningar, utfyllnadsbetalningar, minskade indexregleringar av pensionsrättigheterna, ändringar i pensionssystemens regler och stopp för nya deltagare i systemen.
Oavsett vilken metod som användes insåg alla aktörer återigen att en pensionsfond innebär en långsiktig förpliktelse gentemot anställda och pensionärer. Detta erkännande har förstärkts ytterligare av annan utveckling, däribland tillämpningen av redovisningsnormen IAS 19 för uppdragsgivande företag och strängare regler för tillsynsmyndigheternas värdering av tekniska bestämmelser. De uppdragsgivande företagen har insett behovet av att få till stånd en bättre kostnadsuppföljning och mer stabila intäkter för att motsvara deras pensionslöften.
Man kan verkligen konstatera ett skifte från traditionella system med fasta förmåner till tjänstepensionssystem, vars kostnader kan kontrolleras lättare. Det finns emellertid tydliga bevis på att detta skifte inte bara har gått i riktning mot renodlat individuella system med fasta premier. Hybridsystem som kombinerar fasta förmåner med fasta premier finns också tillgängliga. Logiken bakom alla dessa förändringar är bättre kostnadsuppföljning och mer stabila intäkter för de uppdragsgivande företagen.
Det finns en tendens till suddigare gränser mellan de tre pensionspelarna, inte bara mellan den yrkesbaserade andra pelaren och den individuella tredje pelaren, utan även mellan den andra pelaren och den lagstadgade första pelaren. Detta är inte ett problem eftersom pelarstrukturen bara är ett allmänt klassificeringssystem, och system där tillgångar tilldelas individer går att hitta i alla tre pelarna. Detta gäller inte alla medlemsstater, eftersom pensioner återspeglar specifika kulturella och sociala situationer. Trots att de grundläggande skillnaderna mellan den första, andra och tredje pelaren kommer att kvarstå kan de tänkta lösningarna vara likvärdiga."@sv21
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| lpv:unclassifiedMetadata |
"Charlie McCreevy,"5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4
"Member of the Commission"5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,11,13,4
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples