Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-09-26-Speech-1-087"
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". Mr President, I would like to start by thanking Alexander Radwan and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the excellent work done on this dossier. Let me stress that the work on the Capital Requirements Directive has been a very good example of efficient cooperation between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, I think this has been a real achievement.
I welcome the initiative taken by the Presidency to set up a ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group to launch the discussion on the Commission proposal in the Council. This is an important step forward. The European Parliament must confirm urgently whether its support of the Commission proposal still holds and if not, identify clearly what it wants to achieve. The Commission stands ready to cooperate both with Parliament and the Council to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this delicate matter as soon as possible.
Let me make only a few more specific points. I understand the European Parliament’s interest in creating a much stronger sense of urgency with regard to the question of its powers to supervise the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers. But introducing a sunset clause, coming into force on 1 January 2007, would be too short. There is a serious danger that such a drastic reduction in the duration of the sunset clause would send a wrong and dangerous signal to the marketplace that the adoption of the necessary implementing measures could become highly uncertain.
The Council has indicated that a period of at least two years is acceptable. In the light of the discussions that have taken place, the Commission considers that this is a viable period. The introduction of such a reduced period for implementing powers – much shorter than the normal period of four years – clearly emphasizes the need urgently to find a solid, lasting and balanced solution for the supervision of the Commission’s implementing powers by both branches of the legislative authority. All institutions must work together to reach this solution as quickly as possible. In this regard, the Commission notes that in the first half of 2007, the first sunset clauses under the so-called Lamfalussy process will start suspending the Commission’s implementing powers for two directives - the Conglomerates Directive on 11 February 2007 and the Market Abuse Directive on 12 April 2007.
While the Commission lives by the commitments made by the then President, Romano Prodi, and my predecessor Frits Bolkestein, when the European Parliament approved the Lamfalussy process, the Commission understands that a renewal of its implementing powers for those directives would be problematic in the absence of an overall solution on comitology. This very fact should motivate all institutions to make progress. Failure to agree would not only spoil the spirit of cooperation between the institutions, it would also be detrimental to the further development of an integrated financial services market, which relies heavily on the availability of executive powers within the context of framework legislation agreed by codecision. I would also add that other policy areas would be affected from a lack of agreement on comitology.
Before concluding, I would like to reiterate my call on both Parliament and the Council to work constructively towards a solution. The Commission from its side will assist wherever it can to ensure that the sense of urgency that is now being given to this matter does not evaporate. The Commission has long recognized the need for a solution to be found and I believe that the conditions are now ripe for this.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
A state-of-the-art accepted supervisory framework for both credit institutions and investment firms is important for the financial stability of the European market and in creating a level playing field, not just within the European Union, but across the global financial community compared to those countries also following the Basel II process.
Our proposal has been prepared in close cooperation with Member States and the finance industry and was subject to extensive consultation. It is in line with the Basel II Accord, but takes account of European specificities where necessary. Even the latest proposals for the treatment of trading-related activities will be included.
This proposal provides a regulatory framework for financial activities in the EU. It improves the supervisory regime currently in place, which is primarily based on regulatory capital requirements. The new regime will have a solid basis of three pillars. Firstly, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements, which are closer in line with banks’ own practices; secondly, an enhanced supervisory review process to ensure a closer fit of these new requirements; and, thirdly, disclosure requirements which improve transparency and market discipline. This proposal represents a move to an altogether more sophisticated and refined approach to supervision and risk management.
By adopting this proposal, the EU will be the first international organization to implement the new Basel II framework. This will be a major step towards better banking supervision and will foster greater effectiveness of the European financial markets.
Let me now turn to the comitology issue. As we all know, this debate is linked to the wider question of the powers of the Council and the European Parliament in the comitology procedures. We need to make sure that the legislative process does not come to a halt. I do not believe that our citizens and the industry would understand that important legislative proposals, such as those on the table today, are taken hostage on account of an issue such as comitology – important as it may be.
We need to find a pragmatic way to ensure a smooth legislative conclusion to the comitology provisions in the Capital Requirements Directive. I welcome the efforts made by the European Parliament and the Council to find agreement on this issue. I think we all agree that adoption in first reading of this directive is in the interest of all three institutions and it is also what the marketplace wants.
Comitology being a general issue, we must look at it in its general context. The Commission submitted a proposal for a modification of the 1999 Comitology Decision in 2002, followed by an amended proposal in 2004. This proposal already took into account important elements requested by the European Parliament, in particular that the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing as regards their powers in the comitology procedures.
It is in large part thanks to the persistence of Parliament, and of your rapporteur in particular, that the Council will now take up work on revising the Comitology Decision, using the Commission’s revised proposal as a basis."@en4
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". Mr President, I would like to start by thanking Alexander Radwan and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the excellent work done on this dossier. Let me stress that the work on the Capital Requirements Directive has been a very good example of efficient cooperation between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, I think this has been a real achievement.
I welcome the initiative taken by the Presidency to set up a ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group to launch the discussion on the Commission proposal in the Council. This is an important step forward. The European Parliament must confirm urgently whether its support of the Commission proposal still holds and if not, identify clearly what it wants to achieve. The Commission stands ready to cooperate both with Parliament and the Council to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this delicate matter as soon as possible.
Let me make only a few more specific points. I understand the European Parliament’s interest in creating a much stronger sense of urgency with regard to the question of its powers to supervise the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers. But introducing a sunset clause, coming into force on 1 January 2007, would be too short. There is a serious danger that such a drastic reduction in the duration of the sunset clause would send a wrong and dangerous signal to the marketplace that the adoption of the necessary implementing measures could become highly uncertain.
The Council has indicated that a period of at least two years is acceptable. In the light of the discussions that have taken place, the Commission considers that this is a viable period. The introduction of such a reduced period for implementing powers – much shorter than the normal period of four years – clearly emphasizes the need urgently to find a solid, lasting and balanced solution for the supervision of the Commission’s implementing powers by both branches of the legislative authority. All institutions must work together to reach this solution as quickly as possible. In this regard, the Commission notes that in the first half of 2007, the first sunset clauses under the so-called Lamfalussy process will start suspending the Commission’s implementing powers for two directives - the Conglomerates Directive on 11 February 2007 and the Market Abuse Directive on 12 April 2007.
While the Commission lives by the commitments made by the then President, Romano Prodi, and my predecessor Frits Bolkestein, when the European Parliament approved the Lamfalussy process, the Commission understands that a renewal of its implementing powers for those directives would be problematic in the absence of an overall solution on comitology. This very fact should motivate all institutions to make progress. Failure to agree would not only spoil the spirit of cooperation between the institutions, it would also be detrimental to the further development of an integrated financial services market, which relies heavily on the availability of executive powers within the context of framework legislation agreed by codecision. I would also add that other policy areas would be affected from a lack of agreement on comitology.
Before concluding, I would like to reiterate my call on both Parliament and the Council to work constructively towards a solution. The Commission from its side will assist wherever it can to ensure that the sense of urgency that is now being given to this matter does not evaporate. The Commission has long recognized the need for a solution to be found and I believe that the conditions are now ripe for this.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
A state-of-the-art accepted supervisory framework for both credit institutions and investment firms is important for the financial stability of the European market and in creating a level playing field, not just within the European Union, but across the global financial community compared to those countries also following the Basel II process.
Our proposal has been prepared in close cooperation with Member States and the finance industry and was subject to extensive consultation. It is in line with the Basel II Accord, but takes account of European specificities where necessary. Even the latest proposals for the treatment of trading-related activities will be included.
This proposal provides a regulatory framework for financial activities in the EU. It improves the supervisory regime currently in place, which is primarily based on regulatory capital requirements. The new regime will have a solid basis of three pillars. Firstly, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements, which are closer in line with banks’ own practices; secondly, an enhanced supervisory review process to ensure a closer fit of these new requirements; and, thirdly, disclosure requirements which improve transparency and market discipline. This proposal represents a move to an altogether more sophisticated and refined approach to supervision and risk management.
By adopting this proposal, the EU will be the first international organization to implement the new Basel II framework. This will be a major step towards better banking supervision and will foster greater effectiveness of the European financial markets.
Let me now turn to the comitology issue. As we all know, this debate is linked to the wider question of the powers of the Council and the European Parliament in the comitology procedures. We need to make sure that the legislative process does not come to a halt. I do not believe that our citizens and the industry would understand that important legislative proposals, such as those on the table today, are taken hostage on account of an issue such as comitology – important as it may be.
We need to find a pragmatic way to ensure a smooth legislative conclusion to the comitology provisions in the Capital Requirements Directive. I welcome the efforts made by the European Parliament and the Council to find agreement on this issue. I think we all agree that adoption in first reading of this directive is in the interest of all three institutions and it is also what the marketplace wants.
Comitology being a general issue, we must look at it in its general context. The Commission submitted a proposal for a modification of the 1999 Comitology Decision in 2002, followed by an amended proposal in 2004. This proposal already took into account important elements requested by the European Parliament, in particular that the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing as regards their powers in the comitology procedures.
It is in large part thanks to the persistence of Parliament, and of your rapporteur in particular, that the Council will now take up work on revising the Comitology Decision, using the Commission’s revised proposal as a basis."@cs1
"Hr. formand, jeg vil gerne indledningsvis takke Alexander Radwan og Økonomi- og Valutaudvalget for det glimrende arbejde, der er blevet udført i forbindelse med denne sag. Lad mig understrege, at arbejdet med kapitalgrundlagsdirektivet er et meget fint eksempel på effektivt samarbejde mellem Parlamentet, Rådet og Kommissionen. I betragtning af spørgsmålets komplicerede karakter mener jeg, at der virkelig er blevet skabt resultater.
Jeg glæder mig over formandskabets initiativ til at nedsætte en gruppe af formandskabets venner, der har til opgave at få gang i drøftelserne af Kommissionens forslag i Rådet. Det er et vigtigt skridt fremad. Europa-Parlamentet må omgående angive, om Parlamentet fortsat støtter Kommissionens forslag, og hvis ikke dette er tilfældet, må Parlamentet klart angive, hvad man ønsker. Kommissionen er parat til at samarbejde med både Parlamentet og Rådet, således at der hurtigst muligt findes frem til en tilfredsstillende løsning på dette vanskelige spørgsmål.
Lad mig derudover blot komme med enkelte bemærkninger. Jeg forstår Europa-Parlamentets interesse i at gøre spørgsmålet om Parlamentets beføjelser til at overvåge Kommissionens udøvelse af sine gennemførelsesbeføjelser til et langt mere uopsætteligt spørgsmål. Men at indføre en solnedgangsklausul, der træder i kraft den 1. januar 2007, er for kort en tidsfrist. Der er en alvorlig fare for, at en så drastisk nedsættelse af solnedgangsklausulens varighed vil sende et forkert og farligt signal til markedet, således at det bliver meget uvist, om de nødvendige gennemførelsesforanstaltninger vil kunne vedtages.
Rådet har angivet, at en periode på minimum to år er acceptabel. I lyset af de drøftelser, der har fundet sted, mener Kommissionen, at dette er en realistisk periode. Indførelsen af en så kort tidsfrist for udøvelsen af gennemførelsesbeføjelserne - langt kortere end den normale frist på fire år - understreger klart, at der omgående skal findes en sammenhængende, bæredygtig og afbalanceret løsning på spørgsmålet om den overvågning af Kommissionens gennemførelsesbeføjelser, der varetages af lovgivningsmyndighedens to grene. Alle institutioner må samarbejde, således at man kan finde frem til en løsning så hurtigt som muligt. I denne forbindelse bemærker Kommissionen, at i første halvår af 2007 vil de første solnedgangsklausuler i henhold til den såkaldte Lamfalussy-proces medføre en gradvis suspendering af Kommissionens gennemførelsesbeføjelser i henhold til to direktiver - konglomeratdirektivet og markedsmisbrugsdirektivet - af henholdsvis den 11. februar 2007 og den 12. april 2007.
Idet Kommissionen skal overholde de forpligtelser, der er blevet indgået af den forrige kommissionsformand, Romano Prodi, og min forgænger, Frits Bolkestein, som følge af Europa-Parlamentets godkendelse af Lamfalussy-processen, har Kommissionen forståelse for, at det ville være problematisk at få fornyet gennemførelsesbeføjelserne i henhold til disse direktiver, så længe der ikke er fundet frem til en generel løsning på komitologispørgsmålet. Dette faktum bør motivere alle institutioner til at gøre fremskridt. Såfremt der ikke opnås enighed, vil dette ikke kun ødelægge samarbejdsklimaet mellem institutionerne, det ville også være skadeligt for den videre udvikling af et integreret marked for finansielle tjenesteydelser, der er meget afhængigt af, at der i rammelovgivningen vedtaget efter den fælles beslutningsprocedure er indarbejdet effektive gennemførelsesbeføjelser. Jeg ønsker at tilføje, at andre politikområder også vil blive berørt, såfremt der ikke opnås enighed om komitologispørgsmålet.
Inden jeg slutter, vil jeg gerne gentage min opfordring til både Parlamentet og Rådet om at arbejde konstruktivt på at finde frem til en løsning. Kommissionen vil på sin side bistå i det omfang det er muligt, således at den nye forståelse for spørgsmålets uopsættelighed fastholdes. Kommissionen har længe erkendt, at der skal findes en løsning, og det er min opfattelse, at tiden nu er moden.
Jeg glæder mig til at høre Deres bemærkninger.
Med henblik på at sikre den finansielle stabilitet på det europæiske marked og lige vilkår, ikke kun inden for EU, men på de globale, finansielle markeder i forhold til de lande, der også følger Basel II-processen, er det vigtigt, at der sker en almindelig anerkendt modernisering af tilsynsrammen for såvel kreditinstitutter og investeringsselskaber.
Vores forslag er blevet udarbejdet i tæt samarbejde med medlemsstaterne og finanssektoren og har været underlagt en omfattende høringsprocedure. Det er i overensstemmelse med Basel II-aftalen, men der er taget hensyn til særlige europæiske forhold i det omfang, det er nødvendigt. Selv de seneste forslag vedrørende handelsrelaterede aktiviteter vil blive indarbejdet.
Med dette forslag indføres en lovgivningsramme for finansielle aktiviteter i EU. Der er tale om en forbedring af den nugældende tilsynsordning, der primært er baseret på regulatoriske kapitalkrav. Den nye ordning vil være solidt funderet på tre søjler. For det første mere risikofølsomme regulatoriske kapitalkrav, der er mere på linje med bankernes egen praksis, for det andet en forbedret tilsynsproces med henblik på at sikre, at disse nye krav i højere grad tilpasses markedet, og for det tredje oplysningskrav, der vil forbedre gennemsigtigheden og markedsdisciplinen. Dette forslag indebærer en ændring af overvågnings- og risikostyringsstrategien, således at den bliver helt igennem mere avanceret.
Hvis dette forslag vedtages, vil EU være den første internationale organisation, der gennemfører den nye Basel II. Det vil være et vigtigt skridt på vejen mod et bedre tilsyn med bankerne og vil fremme effektiviteten på de europæiske finansielle markeder.
Jeg ønsker nu at drøfte spørgsmålet om komitologi. Som vi alle ved, hænger dette spørgsmål sammen med det generelle spørgsmål om Rådets og Europa-Parlamentets beføjelser i henhold til komitologiprocedurerne. Vi må sikre, at lovgivningsprocessen ikke stopper. Jeg tror ikke, at borgerne i EU og den finansielle sektor vil kunne forstå, at vigtige lovgivningsforslag såsom dem, vi behandler i dag, bremses på grundlag af et spørgsmål om f.eks. komitologiproceduren - hvor vigtigt det end måtte være.
Vi må på pragmatisk vis finde frem til en smidig, lovgivningsmæssig løsning vedrørende de komitologimæssige bestemmelser i kapitalgrundlagsdirektivet. Jeg glæder mig over de bestræbelser, som Europa Parlamentet og Rådet har gjort for at nå til enighed om dette spørgsmål. Jeg tror, at vi alle er enige om, at det er i alle tre institutioners interesse, at dette forslag vedtages under førstebehandlingen, ligesom markedet også ønsker dette.
Idet komitologispørgsmålet er af generel karakter, må vi se på spørgsmålet i dets generelle kontekst. Kommissionen forelagde i 2002 et forslag til ændring af komitologiafgørelsen fra 1999, der blev efterfulgt af et ændret forslag i 2004. Der var i dette forslag allerede blevet taget højde for vigtige punkter i Europa-Parlamentets henstillinger, især at Europa-Parlamentet og Rådet bør have de samme beføjelser i forbindelse med komitologiprocedurerne.
Det skyldes i høj grad Parlamentets, og især ordførerens, stædighed, at Rådet nu vil genoptage arbejdet med at ændre komitologiafgørelsen på grundlag af Kommissionens ændrede forslag."@da2
".
Herr Präsident! Zu Beginn möchte ich Alexander Radwan und dem Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Währung für die exzellente Arbeit zu diesem Thema danken. Lassen Sie mich betonen, dass die Arbeit an der Richtlinie über Eigenkapitalanforderungen ein sehr gutes Beispiel für die effiziente Zusammenarbeit zwischen Parlament, Rat und Kommission ist. Angesichts der komplizierten Fragen, um die es hier ging, war das meines Erachtens eine echte Leistung.
Ich begrüße die Initiative des Ratsvorsitzes, eine Arbeitsgruppe mit dem Namen „Friends of the Presidence“ einzurichten, um im Rat die Beratungen über den Kommissionsvorschlag in Angriff zu nehmen. Dies ist ein wichtiger Schritt vorwärts. Das Europäische Parlament muss unbedingt deutlich machen, ob seine Unterstützung für den Kommissionsvorschlag noch Bestand hat, und falls nicht, klar benennen, was es erreichen will. Die Kommission ist bereit, sowohl mit dem Parlament als auch mit dem Rat zusammenzuarbeiten, um so bald wie möglich zu einem zufrieden stellenden Abschluss in dieser schwierigen Frage zu gelangen.
Lassen Sie mich kurz noch auf einige Dinge konkret eingehen. Ich verstehe durchaus, dass das Europäische Parlament der Frage, welche Vollmachten es hat, die Kommission bei der Ausübung der ihr übertragenen Durchführungsbefugnisse zu überwachen, eine viel größere Dringlichkeit beimisst. Aber die Einführung einer so genannten „Sunset-Klausel“, die bereits zum 1. Januar 2007 in Kraft tritt, wäre zu früh. Es besteht die große Gefahr, dass eine so drastische Verkürzung des Befristungszeitraums ein falsches und gefährliches Signal an den Markt senden würde, sodass der Erlass der erforderlichen Durchführungsmaßnahmen äußerst ungewiss werden könnte.
Der Rat hat zum Ausdruck gebracht, dass ein Zeitraum vom mindestens zwei Jahren akzeptabel sei. Die Kommission ist nach den erfolgten Beratungen zu der Auffassung gelangt, dass dieser Zeitraum realistisch ist. Die Einführung eines solchen verkürzten Zeitraums für die Durchführungsbefugnisse – der viel kürzer ist als der normale Vierjahreszeitraum – unterstreicht die Notwendigkeit, für die Kontrolle der Durchführungsbefugnisse der Kommission durch beide Teile der Legislative dringend eine solide, dauerhafte und ausgewogene Lösung zu finden. Es müssen alle Organe zusammenarbeiten, um so schnell wie möglich diese Lösung herbeizuführen. In diesem Zusammenhang stellt die Kommission fest, dass im ersten Halbjahr 2007 die ersten Sunset-Klauseln im Rahmen des so genannten Lamfalussy-Prozesses greifen und die Durchführungsbefugnisse der Kommission für zwei Richtlinien aufheben werden, nämlich für die Konglomeratrichtlinie am 11. Februar 2007 und die Richtlinie über Marktmissbrauch am 12. April 2007.
Die Kommission steht zu den Verpflichtungen, die ihr damaliger Präsident, Romano Prodi, und mein Vorgänger, Frits Bolkestein, bei der Billigung des Lamfalussy-Prozesses durch das Europäische Parlament eingegangen sind, ist jedoch der Ansicht, dass eine Verlängerung ihrer Durchführungsbefugnisse für diese Richtlinie problematisch wäre, solange es für die Komitologiefrage keine Gesamtlösung gibt. Genau diese Tatsache sollte alle Institutionen zu Fortschritten ermutigen. Bliebe eine Einigung aus, würde nicht nur der Geist der Zusammenarbeit zwischen den Institutionen Schaden erleiden, sondern dies würde sich auch negativ auf die weitere Entwicklung eines integrierten Marktes für Finanzdienstleistungen auswirken, der sehr stark von den Exekutivbefugnissen abhängt, die in der im Mitentscheidungsverfahren vereinbarten Rahmengesetzgebung vorgesehen sind. Ich möchte noch hinzufügen, dass auch andere Politikbereiche betroffen wären, wenn bei der Komitologie keine Einigung erzielt wird.
Bevor ich zum Schluss komme, möchte ich meinen Appell an den Rat wie auch an das Parlament wiederholen, konstruktiv an einer Lösung zu arbeiten. Die Kommission wird ihrerseits alles tun, um sicherzustellen, dass die Dringlichkeit, die dieser Angelegenheit jetzt beigemessen wird, nicht wieder verfliegt. Der Kommission ist seit langem bewusst, dass hier eine Lösung gefunden werden muss, und ich denke, dass die Voraussetzungen dafür jetzt gegeben sind.
Ich freue mich auf Ihre Beiträge.
Ein zeitgemäßer, anerkannter Überwachungsrahmen sowohl für Kreditinstitute als auch Wertpapierfirmen ist wichtig für die finanzielle Stabilität des europäischen Marktes und für die Schaffung gleicher Voraussetzungen, nicht nur innerhalb der Europäischen Union, sondern auch in der internationalen Finanzwelt gegenüber jenen Ländern, die auch dem Basel-II-Prozess folgen.
Unser Vorschlag wurde in enger Zusammenarbeit mit den Mitgliedstaaten und der Finanzwirtschaft erarbeitet und war Gegenstand ausführlicher Konsultationen. Er steht im Einklang mit der Basel-II-Vereinbarung, berücksichtigt jedoch die europäischen Besonderheiten, wo dies erforderlich ist. Sogar die jüngsten Vorschläge zur Behandlung der handelsbezogenen Tätigkeiten werden darin aufgenommen.
Der vorliegende Vorschlag schafft einen Regulierungsrahmen für Finanztätigkeiten in der EU. Er verbessert die derzeitige Aufsichtsregelung, die in erster Linie auf regulatorischen Eigenkapitalanforderungen basiert. Die neue Regelung wird über eine solide Grundlage mit drei Säulen verfügen. Erstens risikosensitivere regulatorische Eigenkapitalanforderungen, die den Praktiken der Banken besser entsprechen; zweitens ein verstärkter Überwachungsprozess, um sicherzustellen, dass diese neuen Anforderungen besser zugeschnitten sind; und drittens Offenlegungspflichten, durch die Transparenz und Marktdisziplin verbessert werden. Dieser Vorschlag ist ein Schritt hin zu einem insgesamt ausgeklügelteren und verfeinerten Konzept zur Bankenaufsicht und zum Risikomanagement.
Mit der Annahme dieses Vorschlags wird die EU die erste internationale Organisation sein, die den neuen Basel-II-Rahmen umsetzt. Dies wird ein wichtiger Schritt auf dem Weg zu einer besseren Bankenaufsicht sein und die Effizienz der europäischen Finanzmärkte verbessern.
Lassen Sie mich nun zur Frage der Komitologie kommen. Wie wir alle wissen, ist diese Debatte mit der allgemeineren Frage verknüpft, welche Befugnisse der Rat und das Europäische Parlament in den Komitologieverfahren haben. Wir müssen sicherstellen, dass der Gesetzgebungsprozess nicht zum Erliegen kommt. Ich glaube nicht, dass unsere Bürger und die Branche Verständnis dafür hätten, wenn wichtige Gesetzesvorschläge, wie sie heute auf dem Tisch liegen, einer Frage wie der Komitologie zum Opfer fallen – so wichtig sie auch sein mag.
Wir müssen einen pragmatischen Weg finden, um sicherzustellen, dass die Komitologievorschriften in der Richtlinie über Eigenkapitalanforderungen reibungslos in Gesetzesform gegossen werden. Ich begrüße die Anstrengungen des Europäischen Parlaments und des Rates, in dieser Frage eine Einigung zu erzielen. Ich denke, wir sind uns alle einig, dass eine Annahme dieser Richtlinie in erster Lesung im Interesse aller drei Organe ist und auch dem entspricht, was der Markt wünscht.
Da es sich bei der Komitologie um eine allgemeine Problematik handelt, müssen wir sie auch in ihrem allgemeinen Kontext sehen. Die Kommission hat 2002 einen Vorschlag zur Änderung des Komitologiebeschlusses von 1999 vorgelegt, dem 2004 ein geänderter Vorschlag folgte. In diesem Vorschlag waren bereits wichtige Forderungen des Europäischen Parlaments berücksichtigt, insbesondere die, dass das Europäische Parlament und der Rat hinsichtlich ihrer Befugnisse in den Komitologieverfahren gleichgestellt werden sollten.
Es ist großenteils der Hartnäckigkeit des Parlaments und insbesondere Ihres Berichterstatters zu verdanken, dass sich der Rat nun daransetzt, den Komitologiebeschluss zu überarbeiten, und dabei den überarbeiteten Vorschlag der Kommission zugrunde legt."@de9
"Κύριε Πρόεδρε, θα ήθελα καταρχάς να ευχαριστήσω τον Alexander Radwan και την Επιτροπή Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Θεμάτων για το εξαίρετο έργο που επιτέλεσαν σε σχέση με αυτόν τον φάκελο. Επιτρέψτε μου να τονίσω ότι οι εργασίες σχετικά με την οδηγία για τις κεφαλαιακές απαιτήσεις ήταν ένα πολύ καλό παράδειγμα αποτελεσματικής συνεργασίας του Κοινοβουλίου, του Συμβουλίου και της Επιτροπής. Δεδομένης της πολυπλοκότητας των εμπλεκομένων θεμάτων, πιστεύω ότι ήταν ένας πραγματικός άθλος.
Επικροτώ την πρωτοβουλία της Προεδρίας να συγκροτήσει μια ομάδα «Φίλων της Προεδρίας» για να ξεκινήσει τη συζήτηση της πρότασης της Επιτροπής στο Συμβούλιο. Αυτό αποτελεί ένα σημαντικό βήμα προόδου. Το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο πρέπει επειγόντως να επιβεβαιώσει αν εξακολουθεί να υποστηρίζει την πρόταση της Επιτροπής και, αν όχι, να προσδιορίσει σαφώς τι θέλει να επιτύχει. Η Επιτροπή είναι πρόθυμη να συνεργαστεί τόσο με το Κοινοβούλιο όσο και με το Συμβούλιο, για να φθάσει αυτό το λεπτό ζήτημα σε μια ικανοποιητική κατάληξη όσο το δυνατόν συντομότερα.
Επιτρέψτε μου μόνο να κάνω μερικές πιο ειδικές παρατηρήσεις. Καταλαβαίνω το ενδιαφέρον του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου να δημιουργήσει πολύ μεγαλύτερη αίσθηση επείγοντος όσον αφορά το ζήτημα των εξουσιών του να εποπτεύει την άσκηση των εκτελεστικών αρμοδιοτήτων της Επιτροπής. Αλλά η εισαγωγή μιας ρήτρας λήξης ισχύος, που θα τεθεί σε εφαρμογή την 1η Ιανουαρίου 2007, δεν παρέχει αρκετό χρόνο. Ελλοχεύει ο σοβαρός κίνδυνος ότι μια τόσο δραστική μείωση της διάρκειας της ρήτρας λήξης ισχύος θα μπορούσε να στείλει το λανθασμένο και επικίνδυνο μήνυμα στην αγορά ότι η υιοθέτηση των αναγκαίων εκτελεστικών μέτρων ενδέχεται να καταστεί εξαιρετικά αβέβαιη.
Το Συμβούλιο έχει δηλώσει ότι μια περίοδος τουλάχιστον δύο ετών είναι αποδεκτή. Μετά τις συζητήσεις που έγιναν, η Επιτροπή θεωρεί ότι αυτή είναι μια εφαρμόσιμη περίοδος. Η καθιέρωση μιας τόσο περιορισμένης περιόδου για τις εκτελεστικές αρμοδιότητες –πολύ μικρότερης από τη συνηθισμένη περίοδο των τεσσάρων ετών– υπογραμμίζει σαφώς την επείγουσα ανάγκη να εξευρεθεί μια σταθερή, μακροχρόνια και ισορροπημένη λύση για την εποπτεία των εκτελεστικών αρμοδιοτήτων της Επιτροπής και από τα δύο σκέλη της νομοθετικής αρχής. Όλα τα θεσμικά όργανα πρέπει να συνεργαστούν, ώστε να βρουν αυτήν τη λύση όσο το δυνατόν συντομότερα. Ως προς αυτό το θέμα, η Επιτροπή επισημαίνει ότι, κατά το πρώτο εξάμηνο του 2007, οι πρώτες ρήτρες λήξης ισχύος υπό την επονομαζόμενη διαδικασία Lamfalussy θα αρχίσουν να καταργούν τις εκτελεστικές αρμοδιότητες της Επιτροπής για δύο οδηγίες: την οδηγία για τους χρηματοπιστωτικούς ομίλους ετερογενών δραστηριοτήτων στις 11 Φεβρουαρίου 2007 και την οδηγία για τις καταχρηστικές πρακτικές στην αγορά στις 12 Απριλίου 2007.
Ενώ η Επιτροπή εξακολουθεί να τηρεί τις δεσμεύσεις του τότε Προέδρου Romano Prodi και του προκατόχου μου Frits Bolkestein, όταν το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο ενέκρινε τη διαδικασία Lamfalussy, η Επιτροπή αντιλαμβάνεται ότι μια ανανέωση των εκτελεστικών της αρμοδιοτήτων για αυτές τις οδηγίες θα ήταν προβληματική, όσο δεν δίνεται συνολική λύση στο θέμα της επιτροπολογίας. Αυτό και μόνο το γεγονός θα πρέπει να υποκινήσει όλα τα θεσμικά όργανα να κινηθούν προς αυτήν την κατεύθυνση. Η μη εξεύρεση συμφωνίας δεν θα έβλαπτε απλώς το πνεύμα της συνεργασίας ανάμεσα στα θεσμικά όργανα, αλλά θα ήταν και καταστροφική για την περαιτέρω ανάπτυξη μιας ενιαίας αγοράς των χρηματοπιστωτικών υπηρεσιών, η οποία συνδέεται άμεσα με τη διαθεσιμότητα των εκτελεστικών αρμοδιοτήτων εντός του νομοθετικού πλαισίου που έχει καθιερωθεί με συναπόφαση. Θα ήθελα επίσης να προσθέσω ότι και άλλοι τομείς πολιτικής θα πλήττονταν από την έλλειψη συμφωνίας για την επιτροπολογία.
Πριν τελειώσω, θα ήθελα να επαναλάβω την έκκληση μου τόσο προς το Κοινοβούλιο όσο και προς το Συμβούλιο να εργαστούν δημιουργικά για την εξεύρεση λύσης. Η Επιτροπή, από την πλευρά της, θα βοηθήσει όπου μπορεί για να διασφαλίσει ότι θα διατηρηθεί ο επείγων χαρακτήρας που δίδεται τώρα σε αυτό το ζήτημα. Η Επιτροπή έχει από καιρό αναγνωρίσει την ανάγκη εξεύρεσης λύσης, και πιστεύω ότι τώρα οι συνθήκες είναι ώριμες για αυτό.
Ανυπομονώ να ακούσω τα σχόλιά σας.
Ένα σύγχρονο, αποδεκτό εποπτικό πλαίσιο τόσο για τα πιστωτικά ιδρύματα όσο και για τις επιχειρήσεις επενδύσεων είναι σημαντικό για την οικονομική σταθερότητα της ευρωπαϊκής αγοράς και, καθώς δημιουργεί ισότιμους όρους ανταγωνισμού, όχι μόνο για την επικράτεια της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης αλλά για όλη την παγκόσμια οικονομική κοινότητα σε σύγκριση με εκείνες τις χώρες που ακολουθούν επίσης τη διαδικασία της Βασιλείας ΙΙ.
Η πρόταση μας προετοιμάστηκε σε στενή συνεργασία με τα κράτη μέλη και τον χρηματοπιστωτικό κλάδο και αποτέλεσε αντικείμενο εκτενών διαβουλεύσεων. Συνάδει με τη Συμφωνία της Βασιλείας ΙΙ, αλλά λαμβάνει υπόψη και τις ευρωπαϊκές ιδιαιτερότητες, όπου είναι απαραίτητο. Θα συμπεριλάβει ακόμα και τις πιο πρόσφατες προτάσεις για τον χειρισμό των δραστηριοτήτων που σχετίζονται με τις συναλλαγές.
Αυτή η πρόταση παρέχει ένα κανονιστικό πλαίσιο για τις χρηματοοικονομικές δραστηριότητες στην ΕΕ. Βελτιώνει το ισχύον εποπτικό καθεστώς, το οποίο βασίζεται πρωταρχικά στις κανονιστικές κεφαλαιακές απαιτήσεις. Το νέο καθεστώς θα έχει μια σταθερή βάση τριών πυλώνων. Πρώτον, τις πιο ευαίσθητες στον κίνδυνο κανονιστικές κεφαλαιακές απαιτήσεις, οι οποίες συμφωνούν περισσότερο με τις πρακτικές των ίδιων των τραπεζών· δεύτερον, μια ενισχυμένη διαδικασία εποπτικής επιθεώρησης που διασφαλίζει μια αμεσότερη εφαρμογή αυτών των νέων απαιτήσεων· και, τρίτον, απαιτήσεις πληροφόρησης που βελτιώνουν τη διαφάνεια και την πειθαρχία της αγοράς. Αυτή η πρόταση αποτελεί μετάβαση σε μια πολύ πιο εξελιγμένη και τελειοποιημένη προσέγγιση της εποπτείας και της διαχείρισης των κινδύνων.
Με την υιοθέτηση αυτής της πρότασης, η ΕΕ θα είναι ο πρώτος διεθνής οργανισμός που εφαρμόζει το νέο πλαίσιο της Βασιλείας ΙΙ. Αυτό θα είναι ένα σημαντικό βήμα προς την καλύτερη εποπτεία των τραπεζικών συναλλαγών και θα φέρει μεγαλύτερη αποτελεσματικότητα στις ευρωπαϊκές χρηματοπιστωτικές αγορές.
Επιτρέψτε μου τώρα να στραφώ στο θέμα της επιτροπολογίας. Όπως γνωρίζουμε όλοι, αυτή η συζήτηση συνδέεται με το ευρύτερο ζήτημα των εξουσιών του Συμβουλίου και του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου στις διαδικασίες της επιτροπολογίας. Πρέπει να διασφαλίσουμε τη συνέχεια της νομοθετικής διαδικασίας. Δεν πιστεύω ότι οι πολίτες μας και η βιομηχανία θα καταλάβαιναν ότι σημαντικές νομοθετικές προτάσεις, όπως αυτές που συζητάμε σήμερα, τελούν υπό καθεστώς ομηρίας εξαιτίας ενός θέματος όπως η επιτροπολογία – όσο σημαντικό και αν είναι αυτό.
Πρέπει να βρούμε έναν ρεαλιστικό τρόπο για να διασφαλίσουμε μια ομαλή νομοθετική κατάληξη στις διατάξεις για την επιτροπολογία στην οδηγία για τις κεφαλαιακές απαιτήσεις. Επικροτώ τις προσπάθειες που κατέβαλε το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και το Συμβούλιο, προκειμένου να καταλήξουν σε συμφωνία για αυτό το θέμα. Πιστεύω ότι όλοι συμφωνούμε ότι η υιοθέτηση αυτής της οδηγίας σε πρώτη ανάγνωση συμφέρει και τα τρία θεσμικά όργανα και ότι επίσης είναι αυτό που θέλει η αγορά.
Καθώς η επιτροπολογία είναι ένα γενικό θέμα, πρέπει να την εξετάσουμε σε σχέση με το γενικό της πλαίσιο. Η Επιτροπή υπέβαλε το 2002 μια πρόταση τροποποίησης της απόφασης για την επιτροπολογία του 1999, την οποία ακολούθησε μια τροποποιημένη πρόταση το 2004. Αυτή η πρόταση λάμβανε ήδη υπόψη τα σημαντικά στοιχεία που είχε ζητήσει το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο, ιδίως ότι το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο και το Συμβούλιο θα έπρεπε να έχουν ίσες εξουσίες στη διαδικασία της επιτροπολογίας.
Οφείλεται σε μεγάλο βαθμό στην επιμονή του Κοινοβουλίου, και ιδιαίτερα, του εισηγητή σας, το γεγονός ότι το Συμβούλιο θα συνεχίσει τώρα να εργάζεται για την αναθεώρηση της απόφασης για την επιτροπολογία, χρησιμοποιώντας ως βάση την αναθεωρημένη πρόταση της Επιτροπής."@el10
".
Señor Presidente, para empezar me gustaría dar las gracias a Alexander Radwan y a la Comisión de Asuntos Económicos y Monetarios por la excelente labor que han realizado en este asunto. Permítanme destacar que los trabajos sobre la Directiva sobre la adecuación del capital constituye un muy buen ejemplo de la eficiente cooperación entre el Parlamento, el Consejo y la Comisión. Si tenemos en cuenta la complejidad de estos temas, creo que ha sido un auténtico logro.
Me complace la iniciativa que ha tomado la Presidencia de crear un grupo de «Amigos de la Presidencia» para lanzar el debate de la propuesta de Comisión que estudia el Consejo. Este es un importante paso adelante. El Parlamento Europeo debe confirmar urgentemente si mantiene su apoyo a la propuesta de la Comisión y, en caso contrario, indicar con claridad lo que desea conseguir. La Comisión está dispuesta a cooperar tanto con el Parlamento como con el Consejo para llegar lo antes posible a una conclusión satisfactoria de este delicado asunto.
Permítanme hacer unas pocas observaciones más concretas. Comprendo que el Parlamento Europeo desee dar un carácter mucho más urgente a la cuestión de sus competencias para supervisar el ejercicio de las competencias de ejecución de la Comisión. Pero la introducción de una cláusula de suspensión, que entraría en vigor el 1 de septiembre de 2007, nos daría un plazo demasiado breve. Existe el grave peligro de que una reducción tan drástica de la duración de la cláusula de suspensión envíe un mensaje equívoco y peligroso al mercado en el sentido de que es poco probable que se adopten las medidas de ejecución necesarias.
El Consejo ya ha indicado que puede aceptar un período de al menos dos años. A la vista de los debates celebrados, la Comisión estima que este es un período viable. La introducción de un período tan reducido para las competencias de ejecución –mucho más breve que el período normal de cuatro años– pone de relieve claramente que es necesario encontrar urgentemente una solución sólida, duradera y equilibrada para la supervisión de las competencias de ejecución de la Comisión por parte de los dos órganos de la autoridad legislativa. Todas las instituciones deben colaborar para llegar a esta solución lo antes posible. La Comisión señala a este respecto que, en el primer semestre de 2007, las primeras cláusulas de suspensión contempladas en el denominado proceso Lamfalussy comenzarán a suspender las competencias de ejecución de la Comisión correspondientes a dos Directivas: la Directiva sobre conglomerados financieros el 11 de febrero de 2007 y la Directiva sobre el abuso del mercado el 12 de abril de 2007.
Si bien la Comisión respetará los compromisos que asumieron el entonces Presidente de la Comisión, Romano Prodi, y mi predecesor en el cargo, Frits Bolkestein, cuando el Parlamento Europeo aprobó el proceso Lamfalussy, también comprende que una renovación de sus competencias de ejecución para dichas directivas resultaría problemática en ausencia de una solución global para la cuestión de la comitología. Este hecho debería impulsar a todas las instituciones a dar pasos adelante. La falta de acuerdo no solo arruinaría el espíritu de cooperación entre las instituciones, sino que también sería perjudicial para el ulterior desarrollo de un mercado integrado de servicios financieros, el cual se basa en gran parte en la existencia de competencias ejecutivas dentro del contexto de la legislación marco acordada a través del procedimiento de codecisión. Me gustaría añadir asimismo que otros ámbitos políticos se verían afectados por la falta de acuerdo en materia de comitología.
Antes de terminar me gustaría repetir mi llamamiento tanto al Parlamento como al Consejo para que colaboren de forma constructiva para alcanzar una solución. Por su parte, la Comisión contribuirá en la medida de lo posible a que no desaparezca la urgencia que se da actualmente a esta cuestión. La Comisión reconoce desde hace mucho que es necesario encontrar una solución y creo que las condiciones actuales son las correctas para alcanzarla.
Quedo a la espera de sus comentarios.
Un marco moderno y aceptado para la supervisión tanto de las entidades de crédito como de las empresas de inversión reviste gran importancia para la estabilidad financiera del mercado europeo y para la igualdad de condiciones, no solo dentro de la Unión Europea, sino en toda la comunidad financiera mundial frente a los países que siguen igualmente el proceso del Acuerdo de Basilea II.
Hemos elaborado nuestra propuesta, que ha sido objeto de amplias consultas, en estrecha colaboración con los Estados miembros y el sector financiero. Está en consonancia con lo dispuesto en el Acuerdo de Basilea II, pero tiene en cuenta, en su caso, aspectos específicamente europeos. Incluso se integrarán las últimas propuestas relativas al tratamiento de las actividades relacionadas con la negociación.
Esta propuesta establece un marco jurídico para las actividades financieras en la UE. Mejora el régimen de supervisión vigente, que se basa primordialmente en la adecuación preceptiva del capital. El nuevo régimen cuenta con una sólida base apoyada en tres pilares. En primer lugar, contempla una adecuación preceptiva del capital más sensible al riesgo, lo que concuerda más con las prácticas de los propios bancos; en segundo lugar, prevé una mejora del proceso de revisión de la supervisión para asegurar un encaje más preciso de estos nuevos requisitos, y, en tercer lugar, postula requisitos de publicación que mejoran la transparencia y la disciplina del mercado. Esta propuesta constituye un paso hacia un planeamiento más sofisticado y refinado de la supervisión y la gestión de riesgos.
Si adopta esta propuesta, la UE será la primera organización internacional que aplique la nueva normativa del Acuerdo de Basilea II. Será un paso importante hacia la mejora de la supervisión bancaria y fomentará una mayor eficacia de los mercados financieros europeos.
Permítanme ahora abordar la cuestión de la comitología. Como todos sabemos, este debate está vinculado con la cuestión más amplia de las competencias del Consejo y del Parlamento Europeo en los procedimientos de comitología. Tenemos que asegurarnos de que el proceso legislativo no se detenga. No creo que los ciudadanos y el sector puedan comprender que importantes propuestas legislativas como la que debatimos hoy sean rehenes de un tema como la comitología, por importante que esta sea.
Tenemos que encontrar una forma pragmática para llevar a buen puerto, en el plano legislativo, disposiciones en materia de comitología de la Directiva sobre la adecuación del capital. Acojo con agrado los esfuerzos realizados por el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo para llegar a un acuerdo al respecto. Creo que todos estamos de acuerdo en que la aprobación en primera lectura de esta Directiva interesa a las tres instituciones, y en que es lo que desea igualmente el mercado.
La comitología es una cuestión de carácter general, por lo que debemos considerarla en su contexto general. La Comisión presentó en 2002 una propuesta para modificar la Decisión sobre la comitología de 1999, seguida de una propuesta modificada en 2004. Esta propuesta ya tenía en cuenta importantes elementos que exigía el Parlamento Europeo, en especial que el Parlamento Europeo y el Consejo tuvieran las mismas competencias en los procedimientos de comitología.
En gran parte fue gracias a la insistencia del Parlamento, y del ponente en particular, que el Consejo comenzara a examinar la Decisión sobre comitología sobre la base de la propuesta revisada de la Comisión."@es20
". Mr President, I would like to start by thanking Alexander Radwan and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the excellent work done on this dossier. Let me stress that the work on the Capital Requirements Directive has been a very good example of efficient cooperation between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, I think this has been a real achievement.
I welcome the initiative taken by the Presidency to set up a ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group to launch the discussion on the Commission proposal in the Council. This is an important step forward. The European Parliament must confirm urgently whether its support of the Commission proposal still holds and if not, identify clearly what it wants to achieve. The Commission stands ready to cooperate both with Parliament and the Council to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this delicate matter as soon as possible.
Let me make only a few more specific points. I understand the European Parliament’s interest in creating a much stronger sense of urgency with regard to the question of its powers to supervise the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers. But introducing a sunset clause, coming into force on 1 January 2007, would be too short. There is a serious danger that such a drastic reduction in the duration of the sunset clause would send a wrong and dangerous signal to the marketplace that the adoption of the necessary implementing measures could become highly uncertain.
The Council has indicated that a period of at least two years is acceptable. In the light of the discussions that have taken place, the Commission considers that this is a viable period. The introduction of such a reduced period for implementing powers – much shorter than the normal period of four years – clearly emphasizes the need urgently to find a solid, lasting and balanced solution for the supervision of the Commission’s implementing powers by both branches of the legislative authority. All institutions must work together to reach this solution as quickly as possible. In this regard, the Commission notes that in the first half of 2007, the first sunset clauses under the so-called Lamfalussy process will start suspending the Commission’s implementing powers for two directives - the Conglomerates Directive on 11 February 2007 and the Market Abuse Directive on 12 April 2007.
While the Commission lives by the commitments made by the then President, Romano Prodi, and my predecessor Frits Bolkestein, when the European Parliament approved the Lamfalussy process, the Commission understands that a renewal of its implementing powers for those directives would be problematic in the absence of an overall solution on comitology. This very fact should motivate all institutions to make progress. Failure to agree would not only spoil the spirit of cooperation between the institutions, it would also be detrimental to the further development of an integrated financial services market, which relies heavily on the availability of executive powers within the context of framework legislation agreed by codecision. I would also add that other policy areas would be affected from a lack of agreement on comitology.
Before concluding, I would like to reiterate my call on both Parliament and the Council to work constructively towards a solution. The Commission from its side will assist wherever it can to ensure that the sense of urgency that is now being given to this matter does not evaporate. The Commission has long recognized the need for a solution to be found and I believe that the conditions are now ripe for this.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
A state-of-the-art accepted supervisory framework for both credit institutions and investment firms is important for the financial stability of the European market and in creating a level playing field, not just within the European Union, but across the global financial community compared to those countries also following the Basel II process.
Our proposal has been prepared in close cooperation with Member States and the finance industry and was subject to extensive consultation. It is in line with the Basel II Accord, but takes account of European specificities where necessary. Even the latest proposals for the treatment of trading-related activities will be included.
This proposal provides a regulatory framework for financial activities in the EU. It improves the supervisory regime currently in place, which is primarily based on regulatory capital requirements. The new regime will have a solid basis of three pillars. Firstly, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements, which are closer in line with banks’ own practices; secondly, an enhanced supervisory review process to ensure a closer fit of these new requirements; and, thirdly, disclosure requirements which improve transparency and market discipline. This proposal represents a move to an altogether more sophisticated and refined approach to supervision and risk management.
By adopting this proposal, the EU will be the first international organization to implement the new Basel II framework. This will be a major step towards better banking supervision and will foster greater effectiveness of the European financial markets.
Let me now turn to the comitology issue. As we all know, this debate is linked to the wider question of the powers of the Council and the European Parliament in the comitology procedures. We need to make sure that the legislative process does not come to a halt. I do not believe that our citizens and the industry would understand that important legislative proposals, such as those on the table today, are taken hostage on account of an issue such as comitology – important as it may be.
We need to find a pragmatic way to ensure a smooth legislative conclusion to the comitology provisions in the Capital Requirements Directive. I welcome the efforts made by the European Parliament and the Council to find agreement on this issue. I think we all agree that adoption in first reading of this directive is in the interest of all three institutions and it is also what the marketplace wants.
Comitology being a general issue, we must look at it in its general context. The Commission submitted a proposal for a modification of the 1999 Comitology Decision in 2002, followed by an amended proposal in 2004. This proposal already took into account important elements requested by the European Parliament, in particular that the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing as regards their powers in the comitology procedures.
It is in large part thanks to the persistence of Parliament, and of your rapporteur in particular, that the Council will now take up work on revising the Comitology Decision, using the Commission’s revised proposal as a basis."@et5
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Arvoisa puhemies, haluan aluksi kiittää Alexander Radwania ja talous- ja raha-asioiden valiokuntaa erinomaisesta työstä tässä asiassa. Haluan korostaa, että vakavaraisuusdirektiivi on erittäin hyvä esimerkki yhteistyön tehokkuudesta parlamentin, neuvoston ja komission välillä. Kun otetaan huomioon kyseessä olevan asian monimutkaisuus, katson, että tämä on hieno saavutus.
Olen tyytyväinen puheenjohtajavaltion aloitteeseen "Puheenjohtajavaltion ystävät" -ryhmän perustamisesta komission ehdotusta koskevan keskustelun aloittamiseksi neuvostossa. Tämä on merkittävä edistysaskel. Euroopan parlamentin on kiireellisesti vahvistettava, tukeeko se edelleen komission ehdotusta, ja jos näin ei ole, sen on määriteltävä selkeästi, mitä se tavoittelee. Komissio on valmis tekemään yhteistyötä sekä parlamentin että neuvoston kanssa, jotta tässä arkaluonteisessa kysymyksessä päästään mahdollisimman pian tyydyttävään lopputulokseen.
Seuraavaksi esitän vain pari täsmennystä. Ymmärrän, minkä vuoksi Euroopan parlamentti pitää paljon kiireellisempänä sitä, että parlamentilla on oltava valta valvoa komissiota sen käyttäessä täytäntöönpanovaltaansa. Peruuntumislausekkeen, joka tulee voimaan 1. tammikuuta 2007, käyttöön ottaminen olisi kuitenkin liian lyhytaikaista. Todellisena vaarana on, että peruuntumislausekkeen voimassaolon näin huomattava lyhentäminen antaisi markkinoille väärän ja vaarallisen merkin siitä, että tarpeellisten täytäntöönpanotoimien hyväksyminen saattaakin olla jatkossa hyvin epävarmaa.
Neuvosto on ilmoittanut, että vähintään kahden vuoden pituinen jakso on hyväksyttävissä. Kun otetaan huomioon käydyt keskustelut, komissio katsoo, että tämä on toimiva aikaraja. Se, että täytäntöönpanovalta olisi voimassa näin lyhyen ajan – jakso on paljon lyhyempi kuin tavanomaiset neljä vuotta – osoittaa selvästi, että on tarpeen löytää kiireellisesti varma, kestävä ja tasapainoinen ratkaisu, jonka nojalla kumpikin lainsäädäntövallan käyttäjä voi valvoa komission täytäntöönpanovaltaa. Kaikkien toimielinten on tehtävä yhteistyötä tämän ratkaisun saavuttamiseksi mahdollisimman pian. Tältä osin komissio panee merkille, että vuoden 2007 ensimmäisellä puoliskolla ensimmäiset niin sanottuun Lamfalussyn prosessiin liittyvät peruuntumislausekkeet alkavat peruuttaa komission täytäntöönpanovaltaa: toimivalta peruuntuu ryhmittymädirektiivin osalta 11. helmikuuta 2007 ja markkinoiden väärinkäyttöä koskevan direktiivin osalta 12. huhtikuuta 2007.
Komissio noudattaa entisen puheenjohtajansa Romano Prodin ja edeltäjäni Frits Bolkesteinin tekemiä sitoumuksia Euroopan parlamentin hyväksyttyä Lamfalussyn prosessin, mutta komissio ymmärtää, että sen täytäntöönpanovallan jatkaminen näiden direktiivien osalta olisi ongelmallista komitologiaa koskevan kokonaisratkaisun puuttuessa. Tämän tosiseikan olisi innostettava kaikkia toimielimiä edistämään asiaa. Yhteisymmärryksen puute tuhoaisi toimielinten välisen yhteistyöhengen, ja lisäksi se olisi vahingollista yhdennettyjen rahoituspalvelumarkkinoiden tulevalle kehittämiselle, jossa on ehdottomasti voitava käyttää yhteispäätösmenettelyssä sovittavaan puitelainsäädäntöön liittyvää täytäntöönpanovaltaa. Huomautan lisäksi, että yhteisymmärryksen puute komitologiasta vaikuttaa muihinkin politiikan aloihin.
Ennen kuin lopetan, toistan vielä kehottavani sekä parlamenttia että neuvostoa tekemään rakentavaa yhteistyötä asian ratkaisemiseksi. Komissio aikoo omasta puolestaan aina niin voidessaan myötävaikuttaa siihen, että asiaa pidetään vastaisuudessa yhtä kiireellisenä kuin nytkin. Komissio on jo pitkään myöntänyt, että ratkaisu on löydettävä, ja mielestäni tilanne on nyt kypsä.
Odotan mielenkiinnolla kommenttejanne.
Luottolaitoksia ja sijoituspalveluyrityksiä koskeva ajanmukainen, yleisesti hyväksytty valvontakehys on tärkeä asia Euroopan rahoitusmarkkinoiden vakaudelle ja yhdenvertaisten olosuhteiden luomiselle Euroopan unionissa, mutta myös maailmanlaajuisessa rahoitusyhteisössä suhteessa niihin maihin, jotka ovat myös mukana Basel II -prosessissa.
Olemme laatineet ehdotuksemme tiiviissä yhteistyössä jäsenvaltioiden ja rahoitusalan kanssa, ja ehdotusta varten toteutettiin laaja kuulemismenettely. Ehdotus on Basel II -sopimuksen mukainen, mutta siinä otetaan tarpeen mukaan huomioon Euroopan erityispiirteet. Siihen sisällytetään myös kaupankäyntiin liittyvien toimien kohtelua koskevat uudet ehdotukset.
Tällä ehdotuksella EU:hun luodaan rahoitustoimintaa varten sääntelykehys, jolla parannetaan tällä hetkellä käytössä olevaa valvontajärjestelmää, joka perustuu ensisijaisesti lakisääteisiin pääomavaatimuksiin. Uusi järjestelmä saa vakaan perustan kolmesta pilarista. Ensimmäinen pilari muodostuu riskit paremmin tunnistavista lakisääteisistä pääomavaatimuksista, jotka soveltuvat paremmin pankkien omiin käytäntöihin. Toinen pilari muodostuu valvojan suorittamasta tehostetusta kokonaisarvioinnista, jolla varmistetaan se, että uudet vaatimukset vastaavat paremmin tarkoitustaan. Kolmas pilari muodostuu avoimuutta ja markkinakuria parantavista julkistamisvaatimuksista. Tämä ehdotus on askel kohti huomattavan paljon kehittyneempää ja hienostuneempaa valvonta- ja riskienhallintastrategiaa.
Tämän ehdotuksen hyväksyessään EU on ensimmäinen kansainvälinen järjestö, joka panee täytäntöön uuden Basel II -kehyksen. Tämä on merkittävä edistysaskel paremman pankkivalvonnan saavuttamisessa, ja tällä edistetään Euroopan rahoitusmarkkinoiden tehokkuutta.
Seuraavaksi siirryn komitologiaan. Kuten me kaikki tiedämme, tämä keskustelu on osa laajempaa kysymystä neuvoston ja Euroopan parlamentin valtaoikeuksista komiteamenettelyissä. Meidän on varmistettava, että lainsäädäntöprosessi ei pysähdy. Kansalaiset ja elinkeinoelämä eivät uskoakseni ymmärtäisi sitä, että tärkeiden lainsäädäntöehdotuksien, kuten tänään käsittelemämme ehdotuksen, käsittely pitkittyisi komitologian kaltaisen kysymyksen takia – sen merkittävyydestä huolimatta.
Meidän on löydettävä käytännöllinen tapa saattaa vakavaraisuusdirektiiviin sisältyvät komiteamenettelyt sujuvasti lainsäädännölliseen päätökseen. Olen tyytyväinen siihen, että Euroopan parlamentti ja neuvosto ovat pyrkineet pääsemään asiasta yhteisymmärrykseen. Luulen, että me kaikki olemme yhtä mieltä siitä, että direktiivin hyväksyminen ensimmäisessä käsittelyssä on kaikkien kolmen toimielimen edun mukaista ja markkinoiden tahdon mukaista.
Koska komitologia on yleinen kysymys, sitä on tarkasteltava yleisesti. Komissio esitti vuonna 2002 ehdotuksen vuonna 1999 tehdyn komitologiapäätöksen tarkistamisesta, ja komissio esitti tarkistetun ehdotuksen vuonna 2004. Jo tässä ehdotuksessa otettiin huomioon Euroopan parlamentin vaatimia tärkeitä seikkoja, joista mainittakoon erityisesti se, että Euroopan parlamentilla ja neuvostolla on oltava yhdenvertaiset valtaoikeudet komiteamenettelyissä.
On pääosin parlamentin sinnikkyyden ja erityisesti esittelijänne ansiota, että neuvosto ryhtyy nyt tarkistamaan komitologiapäätöstä komission tarkistetun ehdotuksen pohjalta."@fi7
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Monsieur le Président, je voudrais commencer par remercier Alexander Radwan ainsi que la commission des affaires économiques et monétaires de l’excellent travail qu’ils ont accompli sur ce dossier. Permettez-moi de souligner que le travail effectué relativement à la directive sur l’adéquation des fonds propres a constitué un très bon exemple de coopération efficace entre le Parlement, le Conseil et la Commission. Au vu de la complexité des thèmes concernés, je pense que cela a été un grand acquis.
Je salue l’initiative prise par la présidence pour mettre en place un groupe d’«Amis de la présidence» destiné à lancer la discussion portant sur la proposition de la Commission au sein du Conseil. Il s’agit d’une avancée importante. Le Parlement européen doit faire savoir de toute urgence si son soutien à la proposition de la Commission est encore valable, et si ce n’est plus le cas, déterminer avec clarté ce qu’il souhaite obtenir. La Commission se tient prête à coopérer, tant avec le Parlement qu’avec le Conseil, pour parvenir dès que possible à une conclusion satisfaisante sur ce sujet si délicat.
Permettez-moi d’insister sur quelques autres points plus spécifiques. Je comprends l’intérêt du Parlement européen à créer un sentiment d’urgence beaucoup plus fort en ce qui concerne la question de ses pouvoirs de supervision de l’exercice, par la Commission, de ses pouvoirs de mise en œuvre. Mais l’introduction d’une clause-couperet, qui entrerait en vigueur le 1er janvier 2007, serait insuffisante. Il existe un grave danger qu’une réduction aussi drastique de la durée de la clause-couperet n’envoie aux marchés un signal erroné et dangereux tendant à suggérer que l’adoption des mesures nécessaire de mise en œuvre pourrait devenir très incertaine.
Le Conseil a indiqué qu’une période d’au moins deux ans est acceptable. À la lumière des discussions qui ont eu lieu, la Commission considère qu’il s’agit d’une période viable. L’introduction de cette période réduite pour la mise en œuvre des pouvoirs - très inférieure à la période normale de quatre ans - vient souligner clairement la nécessité de trouver de toute urgence une solution solide, durable et équilibrée pour ce qui est de la supervision, par les deux branches de l’autorité législative, des pouvoirs de mise en œuvre de la Commission. Toutes les institutions doivent collaborer pour parvenir à cette solution le plus rapidement possible. À cet égard, la Commission observe que durant le premier semestre 2007, les premières clauses-couperets d’extinction relevant du «processus Lamfalussy» commenceront à suspendre les pouvoirs de mise en œuvre de la Commission en ce qui concerne deux directives, à savoir la directive sur les conglomérats, le 11 février 2007, et la directive sur les abus de marché, le 12 avril 2007.
Si la Commission s’en tient aux engagements pris par le président d’alors, Romano Prodi, et par mon prédécesseur Frits Bolkestein, à l’époque où le Parlement européen a approuvé le processus Lamfalussy, elle est bien consciente du fait qu’un renouvellement de ses pouvoirs de mise en œuvre concernant ces directives serait problématique en l’absence d’une solution globale relative à la comitologie. Ce fait devrait à lui seul inciter toutes les institutions à aller de l’avant. Non seulement l’absence d’accord gâcherait l’esprit de coopération entre les institutions, mais elle serait également préjudiciable à la poursuite de l’élaboration d’un marché des services financiers intégré, fortement dépendant de la disponibilité des pouvoirs exécutifs dans le contexte de la législation-cadre convenue par codécision. J’ajouterai également que d’autres domaines politiques se trouveraient affectés par l’absence d’un accord sur la comitologie.
Avant de conclure, je voudrais réitérer mon appel, adressé à la fois au Parlement et au Conseil, à travailler de manière constructive à la recherche d’une solution. Pour sa part, la Commission apportera son aide chaque fois qu’elle le pourra, pour faire en sorte que le sentiment d’urgence actuellement associé à ce sujet ne disparaisse pas. La Commission reconnaît depuis longtemps la nécessité de trouver une solution, et je crois que les conditions sont à présent réunies pour cela.
Je suis impatient d’entendre vos commentaires.
Un cadre de supervision accepté et répondant aux critères les plus élaborés, applicable à la fois aux établissements de crédit et aux entreprises d’investissement, est important pour la stabilité financière du marché européen et pour créer des conditions de jeu équitables, non seulement au sein de l’Union européenne, mais aussi dans l’ensemble de la communauté financière mondiale, par rapport aux pays qui suivent également le processus de Bâle II.
Notre proposition a été élaborée en étroite coopération avec les États membres et le secteur de la finance, et a fait l’objet de consultations étendues. Elle est conforme à l’Accord de Bâle II, mais prend également en considération les spécificités européennes là où c’est nécessaire. Même les toutes dernières propositions concernant le traitement des activités liées au commerce seront incluses.
Cette proposition crée un cadre réglementaire pour les activités financières dans l’UE. Elle améliore le système de supervision actuellement en vigueur, avant tout basé sur les exigences réglementaires en termes de fonds propres. Le nouveau système disposera d’une base solide composée de trois piliers. Premièrement, davantage d’exigences réglementaires en matière de fonds propres à risques, ce qui est plus conforme aux pratiques des banques, deuxièmement, un processus de supervision renforcé afin de garantir une meilleure adéquation de ces nouvelles exigences et, enfin, troisièmement, des exigences en matière de communication des données, qui amélioreront la transparence et la discipline du marché. Cette proposition constitue une étape vers une approche à la fois plus sophistiquée et plus affinée de la supervision et de la gestion des risques.
En adoptant cette proposition, l’UE sera la première organisation internationale à mettre en œuvre le nouveau cadre Bâle II. Cette démarche représentera une avancée très importante sur la voie d’une supervision améliorée du système bancaire et favorisera une efficacité accrue des marchés financiers européens.
Permettez-moi à présent d’aborder la question de la comitologie. Comme nous le savons tous, ce débat est lié à la question plus générale des pouvoirs du Conseil et du Parlement européen dans les procédures de comitologie. Il faut que nous nous assurions que le processus législatif ne subisse pas un coup d’arrêt. Je pense que ni nos citoyens ni l’industrie ne comprendraient que d’importantes propositions législatives comme celles qui sont devant nous aujourd’hui soient prises en otage à cause d’une question telle que la comitologie, aussi importante soit-elle.
Nous nous devons de trouver une solution pragmatique afin de garantir une conclusion législative sans accrocs aux dispositions en matière de comitologie contenues dans la directive sur l’adéquation des fonds propres. Je me félicite des efforts accomplis par le Parlement européen et le Conseil pour trouver un accord à ce sujet. Je pense que nous sommes tous d’accord pour affirmer que l’adoption en première lecture de cette directive est dans l’intérêt des trois institutions, et que c’est aussi ce que souhaite le marché.
La comitologie constituant une question d’ordre général, nous devons examiner son contexte général. La Commission a présenté en 2002 une proposition de modification de la décision de 1999 sur la comitologie, suivie, en 2004, d’une proposition modifiée. Cette proposition tenait déjà compte d’importants éléments exigés par le Parlement européen, notamment du fait que le Parlement européen et le Conseil devaient être placés sur un pied d’égalité en ce qui concerne leurs pouvoirs dans les procédures de comitologie.
C’est en grande partie grâce à la persévérance du Parlement, et notamment de votre rapporteur, que le Conseil va maintenant reprendre ses travaux relatifs à la révision de la décision concernant la comitologie, en se fondant sur la proposition révisée de la Commission."@fr8
". Mr President, I would like to start by thanking Alexander Radwan and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the excellent work done on this dossier. Let me stress that the work on the Capital Requirements Directive has been a very good example of efficient cooperation between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, I think this has been a real achievement.
I welcome the initiative taken by the Presidency to set up a ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group to launch the discussion on the Commission proposal in the Council. This is an important step forward. The European Parliament must confirm urgently whether its support of the Commission proposal still holds and if not, identify clearly what it wants to achieve. The Commission stands ready to cooperate both with Parliament and the Council to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this delicate matter as soon as possible.
Let me make only a few more specific points. I understand the European Parliament’s interest in creating a much stronger sense of urgency with regard to the question of its powers to supervise the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers. But introducing a sunset clause, coming into force on 1 January 2007, would be too short. There is a serious danger that such a drastic reduction in the duration of the sunset clause would send a wrong and dangerous signal to the marketplace that the adoption of the necessary implementing measures could become highly uncertain.
The Council has indicated that a period of at least two years is acceptable. In the light of the discussions that have taken place, the Commission considers that this is a viable period. The introduction of such a reduced period for implementing powers – much shorter than the normal period of four years – clearly emphasizes the need urgently to find a solid, lasting and balanced solution for the supervision of the Commission’s implementing powers by both branches of the legislative authority. All institutions must work together to reach this solution as quickly as possible. In this regard, the Commission notes that in the first half of 2007, the first sunset clauses under the so-called Lamfalussy process will start suspending the Commission’s implementing powers for two directives - the Conglomerates Directive on 11 February 2007 and the Market Abuse Directive on 12 April 2007.
While the Commission lives by the commitments made by the then President, Romano Prodi, and my predecessor Frits Bolkestein, when the European Parliament approved the Lamfalussy process, the Commission understands that a renewal of its implementing powers for those directives would be problematic in the absence of an overall solution on comitology. This very fact should motivate all institutions to make progress. Failure to agree would not only spoil the spirit of cooperation between the institutions, it would also be detrimental to the further development of an integrated financial services market, which relies heavily on the availability of executive powers within the context of framework legislation agreed by codecision. I would also add that other policy areas would be affected from a lack of agreement on comitology.
Before concluding, I would like to reiterate my call on both Parliament and the Council to work constructively towards a solution. The Commission from its side will assist wherever it can to ensure that the sense of urgency that is now being given to this matter does not evaporate. The Commission has long recognized the need for a solution to be found and I believe that the conditions are now ripe for this.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
A state-of-the-art accepted supervisory framework for both credit institutions and investment firms is important for the financial stability of the European market and in creating a level playing field, not just within the European Union, but across the global financial community compared to those countries also following the Basel II process.
Our proposal has been prepared in close cooperation with Member States and the finance industry and was subject to extensive consultation. It is in line with the Basel II Accord, but takes account of European specificities where necessary. Even the latest proposals for the treatment of trading-related activities will be included.
This proposal provides a regulatory framework for financial activities in the EU. It improves the supervisory regime currently in place, which is primarily based on regulatory capital requirements. The new regime will have a solid basis of three pillars. Firstly, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements, which are closer in line with banks’ own practices; secondly, an enhanced supervisory review process to ensure a closer fit of these new requirements; and, thirdly, disclosure requirements which improve transparency and market discipline. This proposal represents a move to an altogether more sophisticated and refined approach to supervision and risk management.
By adopting this proposal, the EU will be the first international organization to implement the new Basel II framework. This will be a major step towards better banking supervision and will foster greater effectiveness of the European financial markets.
Let me now turn to the comitology issue. As we all know, this debate is linked to the wider question of the powers of the Council and the European Parliament in the comitology procedures. We need to make sure that the legislative process does not come to a halt. I do not believe that our citizens and the industry would understand that important legislative proposals, such as those on the table today, are taken hostage on account of an issue such as comitology – important as it may be.
We need to find a pragmatic way to ensure a smooth legislative conclusion to the comitology provisions in the Capital Requirements Directive. I welcome the efforts made by the European Parliament and the Council to find agreement on this issue. I think we all agree that adoption in first reading of this directive is in the interest of all three institutions and it is also what the marketplace wants.
Comitology being a general issue, we must look at it in its general context. The Commission submitted a proposal for a modification of the 1999 Comitology Decision in 2002, followed by an amended proposal in 2004. This proposal already took into account important elements requested by the European Parliament, in particular that the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing as regards their powers in the comitology procedures.
It is in large part thanks to the persistence of Parliament, and of your rapporteur in particular, that the Council will now take up work on revising the Comitology Decision, using the Commission’s revised proposal as a basis."@hu11
"Signor Presidente, per cominciare ringrazio l’onorevole Alexander Radwan e la commissione per i problemi economici e monetari per l’eccellente lavoro portato a termine su questo
. Vorrei sottolineare che ciò che è stato fatto in merito alla direttiva sui requisiti patrimoniali rappresenta un buon esempio di cooperazione efficiente tra Parlamento, Consiglio e Commissione. Data la complessità della questione, ritengo che sia stata una vera conquista.
Accolgo con favore l’iniziativa assunta dalla Presidenza con la formazione del gruppo “Amici della Presidenza”, per avviare la discussione sulla proposta della Commissione in seno al Consiglio; si tratta di un importante passo avanti. Il Parlamento europeo deve confermare con urgenza se intende continuare a sostenere la proposta della Commissione, altrimenti dovrà definire con chiarezza i propri obiettivi. La Commissione è pronta a collaborare sia con il Parlamento che con il Consiglio, per raggiungere quanto prima una conclusione soddisfacente su questa delicata questione.
Consentitemi di fare ancora alcune osservazioni specifiche. Comprendo l’interesse del Parlamento europeo a diffondere un senso di urgenza sulla questione dei propri poteri di vigilanza, da esercitare sulle competenze di esecuzione della Commissione. Ma il termine del 1° gennaio 2007, data prevista per l’entrata in vigore della clausola di caducità, mi sembra troppo ravvicinato; corriamo il rischio che una riduzione così drastica della durata della clausola di caducità trasmetta al mercato un messaggio assai pericoloso, ossia che l’approvazione delle necessarie misure di esecuzione diventi estremamente incerta.
Secondo il Consiglio un periodo di almeno due anni è accettabile. Sulla base delle discussioni che si sono tenute, la Commissione ritiene ammissibile questo periodo. L’introduzione di un periodo più breve per le competenze di esecuzione – assai più breve del normale periodo di quattro anni – sottolinea chiaramente la necessità di trovare una soluzione seria, durevole ed equilibrata per la vigilanza delle competenze di esecuzione della Commissione da parte di entrambi i rami dell’autorità legislativa. Tutte le istituzioni devono collaborare per raggiungere quanto prima questa soluzione. A tale proposito, la Commissione osserva che nella prima metà del 2007, le prime clausole di caducità previste dalla cosiddetta procedura Lamfalussy cominceranno a sospendere le competenze di esecuzione della Commissione per due direttive – la direttiva sui conglomerati l’11 febbraio 2007 e la direttiva sugli abusi di mercato il 12 aprile 2007.
La Commissione tiene fede agli impegni assunti dall’allora Presidente, Romano Prodi, e dal mio predecessore, Frits Bolkestein, quando il Parlamento europeo approvò la procedura Lamfalussy; la Commissione d’altro canto ritiene che il rinnovo delle proprie competenze di esecuzione per tali direttive sarebbe problematico in mancanza di una soluzione globale per la comitatologia. Ciò dovrebbe spingere tutte le Istituzioni a fare progressi in questo settore. La mancanza di un accordo non soltanto rovinerebbe lo spirito di collaborazione tra le Istituzioni, ma sarebbe dannosa per l’ulteriore sviluppo di un mercato integrato dei servizi finanziari, che dipende in larga misura dalla disponibilità di competenze di esecuzione nel contesto di una legislazione quadro concordata mediante codecisione. Vorrei aggiungere che la mancanza di un accordo sulla comitatologia influirebbe su altre aree politiche.
Prima di concludere vorrei invitare nuovamente Parlamento e Consiglio a lavorare in maniera costruttiva per giungere a una soluzione. La Commissione, da parte sua, offrirà il proprio sostegno ogniqualvolta le sarà possibile per garantire che la priorità che adesso viene riconosciuta alla questione non venga meno. La Commissione riconosce ormai da tempo la necessità di individuare una soluzione, e credo che le condizioni siano ormai mature.
Attendo ora i vostri commenti.
Un quadro moderno e generalmente accettato per l’attività di vigilanza, sia per le imprese d’investimento che per gli enti creditizi, è importante per la stabilità finanziaria del mercato europeo e per creare condizioni di parità, non soltanto all’interno dell’Unione europea, ma in tutta la comunità finanziaria globale, nei confronti di quei paesi che aderiscono anche al processo di Basilea II.
La nostra proposta è stata preparata in stretta collaborazione con gli Stati membri e il settore finanziario, e mediante ampie consultazioni. Essa è conforme all’accordo di Basilea II, ma non trascura, se del caso, le specificità europee. Verranno incluse anche le ultime proposte relative al trattamento di attività di negoziazione.
Questa proposta offre un quadro normativo per le attività finanziarie condotte nell’ambito dell’Unione europea; essa migliora il regime di vigilanza attualmente in vigore, che si basa soprattutto sui requisiti patrimoniali. Il nuovo regime poggerà su una solida base formata da tre pilastri. In primo luogo requisiti patrimoniali più sensibili ai rischi, che siano più conformi alle prassi bancarie; in secondo luogo, migliori procedure di vigilanza per garantire una maggiore aderenza a questi nuovi requisiti; e in terzo luogo, requisiti di informazione che migliorino la trasparenza e la disciplina del mercato. Questa proposta, nell’insieme, rappresenta il passaggio ad un approccio più sofisticato e raffinato alla vigilanza e alla gestione dei rischi.
Adottando tale proposta, l’Unione europea sarà la prima organizzazione internazionale ad attuare la nuova Convenzione quadro di Basilea II, un passo importante verso una migliore vigilanza bancaria e una maggiore efficienza dei mercati finanziari europei.
Passiamo ora alla questione della comitatologia. Come sappiamo, la discussione è legata alla più ampia questione dei poteri del Consiglio e del Parlamento europeo nell’ambito delle procedure di comitatologia. Dobbiamo scongiurare in ogni modo il blocco del processo legislativo. Non credo che i nostri cittadini e il settore capirebbero se proposte legislative importanti, come quelle in discussione quest’oggi, diventassero ostaggio di una questione come la comitatologia – per quanto importante questa possa essere.
Dobbiamo trovare il modo di garantire concretamente una conclusione legislativa serena per le disposizioni sulla comitatologia previste dalla direttiva sui requisiti patrimoniali. Mi compiaccio per gli sforzi fatti dal Parlamento europeo e dal Consiglio, nel tentativo di trovare un accordo in materia. Conveniamo tutti, credo, sul fatto che l’approvazione in prima lettura di questa direttiva è nell’interesse di tutte e tre le Istituzioni, ed è anche ciò che il mercato vuole.
La comitatologia è una questione di natura generale, e dobbiamo perciò esaminarla in un contesto generale. Nel 2002 la Commissione ha presentato una proposta di modifica della decisione sulla comitatologia del 1999, seguita da una proposta emendata nel 2004. Questa proposta integrava già alcuni elementi importanti richiesti dal Parlamento europeo, in particolare il fatto che Parlamento e Consiglio devono godere di una posizione paritaria per ciò che riguarda i loro poteri nelle procedure di comitatologia.
Grazie soprattutto all’insistenza del Parlamento, e del vostro relatore in modo particolare, il Consiglio riprenderà l’attività di revisione della decisione sulla comitatologia, basandosi sulla proposta riveduta della Commissione."@it12
". Mr President, I would like to start by thanking Alexander Radwan and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the excellent work done on this dossier. Let me stress that the work on the Capital Requirements Directive has been a very good example of efficient cooperation between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, I think this has been a real achievement.
I welcome the initiative taken by the Presidency to set up a ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group to launch the discussion on the Commission proposal in the Council. This is an important step forward. The European Parliament must confirm urgently whether its support of the Commission proposal still holds and if not, identify clearly what it wants to achieve. The Commission stands ready to cooperate both with Parliament and the Council to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this delicate matter as soon as possible.
Let me make only a few more specific points. I understand the European Parliament’s interest in creating a much stronger sense of urgency with regard to the question of its powers to supervise the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers. But introducing a sunset clause, coming into force on 1 January 2007, would be too short. There is a serious danger that such a drastic reduction in the duration of the sunset clause would send a wrong and dangerous signal to the marketplace that the adoption of the necessary implementing measures could become highly uncertain.
The Council has indicated that a period of at least two years is acceptable. In the light of the discussions that have taken place, the Commission considers that this is a viable period. The introduction of such a reduced period for implementing powers – much shorter than the normal period of four years – clearly emphasizes the need urgently to find a solid, lasting and balanced solution for the supervision of the Commission’s implementing powers by both branches of the legislative authority. All institutions must work together to reach this solution as quickly as possible. In this regard, the Commission notes that in the first half of 2007, the first sunset clauses under the so-called Lamfalussy process will start suspending the Commission’s implementing powers for two directives - the Conglomerates Directive on 11 February 2007 and the Market Abuse Directive on 12 April 2007.
While the Commission lives by the commitments made by the then President, Romano Prodi, and my predecessor Frits Bolkestein, when the European Parliament approved the Lamfalussy process, the Commission understands that a renewal of its implementing powers for those directives would be problematic in the absence of an overall solution on comitology. This very fact should motivate all institutions to make progress. Failure to agree would not only spoil the spirit of cooperation between the institutions, it would also be detrimental to the further development of an integrated financial services market, which relies heavily on the availability of executive powers within the context of framework legislation agreed by codecision. I would also add that other policy areas would be affected from a lack of agreement on comitology.
Before concluding, I would like to reiterate my call on both Parliament and the Council to work constructively towards a solution. The Commission from its side will assist wherever it can to ensure that the sense of urgency that is now being given to this matter does not evaporate. The Commission has long recognized the need for a solution to be found and I believe that the conditions are now ripe for this.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
A state-of-the-art accepted supervisory framework for both credit institutions and investment firms is important for the financial stability of the European market and in creating a level playing field, not just within the European Union, but across the global financial community compared to those countries also following the Basel II process.
Our proposal has been prepared in close cooperation with Member States and the finance industry and was subject to extensive consultation. It is in line with the Basel II Accord, but takes account of European specificities where necessary. Even the latest proposals for the treatment of trading-related activities will be included.
This proposal provides a regulatory framework for financial activities in the EU. It improves the supervisory regime currently in place, which is primarily based on regulatory capital requirements. The new regime will have a solid basis of three pillars. Firstly, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements, which are closer in line with banks’ own practices; secondly, an enhanced supervisory review process to ensure a closer fit of these new requirements; and, thirdly, disclosure requirements which improve transparency and market discipline. This proposal represents a move to an altogether more sophisticated and refined approach to supervision and risk management.
By adopting this proposal, the EU will be the first international organization to implement the new Basel II framework. This will be a major step towards better banking supervision and will foster greater effectiveness of the European financial markets.
Let me now turn to the comitology issue. As we all know, this debate is linked to the wider question of the powers of the Council and the European Parliament in the comitology procedures. We need to make sure that the legislative process does not come to a halt. I do not believe that our citizens and the industry would understand that important legislative proposals, such as those on the table today, are taken hostage on account of an issue such as comitology – important as it may be.
We need to find a pragmatic way to ensure a smooth legislative conclusion to the comitology provisions in the Capital Requirements Directive. I welcome the efforts made by the European Parliament and the Council to find agreement on this issue. I think we all agree that adoption in first reading of this directive is in the interest of all three institutions and it is also what the marketplace wants.
Comitology being a general issue, we must look at it in its general context. The Commission submitted a proposal for a modification of the 1999 Comitology Decision in 2002, followed by an amended proposal in 2004. This proposal already took into account important elements requested by the European Parliament, in particular that the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing as regards their powers in the comitology procedures.
It is in large part thanks to the persistence of Parliament, and of your rapporteur in particular, that the Council will now take up work on revising the Comitology Decision, using the Commission’s revised proposal as a basis."@lt14
". Mr President, I would like to start by thanking Alexander Radwan and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the excellent work done on this dossier. Let me stress that the work on the Capital Requirements Directive has been a very good example of efficient cooperation between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, I think this has been a real achievement.
I welcome the initiative taken by the Presidency to set up a ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group to launch the discussion on the Commission proposal in the Council. This is an important step forward. The European Parliament must confirm urgently whether its support of the Commission proposal still holds and if not, identify clearly what it wants to achieve. The Commission stands ready to cooperate both with Parliament and the Council to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this delicate matter as soon as possible.
Let me make only a few more specific points. I understand the European Parliament’s interest in creating a much stronger sense of urgency with regard to the question of its powers to supervise the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers. But introducing a sunset clause, coming into force on 1 January 2007, would be too short. There is a serious danger that such a drastic reduction in the duration of the sunset clause would send a wrong and dangerous signal to the marketplace that the adoption of the necessary implementing measures could become highly uncertain.
The Council has indicated that a period of at least two years is acceptable. In the light of the discussions that have taken place, the Commission considers that this is a viable period. The introduction of such a reduced period for implementing powers – much shorter than the normal period of four years – clearly emphasizes the need urgently to find a solid, lasting and balanced solution for the supervision of the Commission’s implementing powers by both branches of the legislative authority. All institutions must work together to reach this solution as quickly as possible. In this regard, the Commission notes that in the first half of 2007, the first sunset clauses under the so-called Lamfalussy process will start suspending the Commission’s implementing powers for two directives - the Conglomerates Directive on 11 February 2007 and the Market Abuse Directive on 12 April 2007.
While the Commission lives by the commitments made by the then President, Romano Prodi, and my predecessor Frits Bolkestein, when the European Parliament approved the Lamfalussy process, the Commission understands that a renewal of its implementing powers for those directives would be problematic in the absence of an overall solution on comitology. This very fact should motivate all institutions to make progress. Failure to agree would not only spoil the spirit of cooperation between the institutions, it would also be detrimental to the further development of an integrated financial services market, which relies heavily on the availability of executive powers within the context of framework legislation agreed by codecision. I would also add that other policy areas would be affected from a lack of agreement on comitology.
Before concluding, I would like to reiterate my call on both Parliament and the Council to work constructively towards a solution. The Commission from its side will assist wherever it can to ensure that the sense of urgency that is now being given to this matter does not evaporate. The Commission has long recognized the need for a solution to be found and I believe that the conditions are now ripe for this.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
A state-of-the-art accepted supervisory framework for both credit institutions and investment firms is important for the financial stability of the European market and in creating a level playing field, not just within the European Union, but across the global financial community compared to those countries also following the Basel II process.
Our proposal has been prepared in close cooperation with Member States and the finance industry and was subject to extensive consultation. It is in line with the Basel II Accord, but takes account of European specificities where necessary. Even the latest proposals for the treatment of trading-related activities will be included.
This proposal provides a regulatory framework for financial activities in the EU. It improves the supervisory regime currently in place, which is primarily based on regulatory capital requirements. The new regime will have a solid basis of three pillars. Firstly, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements, which are closer in line with banks’ own practices; secondly, an enhanced supervisory review process to ensure a closer fit of these new requirements; and, thirdly, disclosure requirements which improve transparency and market discipline. This proposal represents a move to an altogether more sophisticated and refined approach to supervision and risk management.
By adopting this proposal, the EU will be the first international organization to implement the new Basel II framework. This will be a major step towards better banking supervision and will foster greater effectiveness of the European financial markets.
Let me now turn to the comitology issue. As we all know, this debate is linked to the wider question of the powers of the Council and the European Parliament in the comitology procedures. We need to make sure that the legislative process does not come to a halt. I do not believe that our citizens and the industry would understand that important legislative proposals, such as those on the table today, are taken hostage on account of an issue such as comitology – important as it may be.
We need to find a pragmatic way to ensure a smooth legislative conclusion to the comitology provisions in the Capital Requirements Directive. I welcome the efforts made by the European Parliament and the Council to find agreement on this issue. I think we all agree that adoption in first reading of this directive is in the interest of all three institutions and it is also what the marketplace wants.
Comitology being a general issue, we must look at it in its general context. The Commission submitted a proposal for a modification of the 1999 Comitology Decision in 2002, followed by an amended proposal in 2004. This proposal already took into account important elements requested by the European Parliament, in particular that the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing as regards their powers in the comitology procedures.
It is in large part thanks to the persistence of Parliament, and of your rapporteur in particular, that the Council will now take up work on revising the Comitology Decision, using the Commission’s revised proposal as a basis."@mt15
"Mijnheer de Voorzitter, om te beginnen wil ik de heer Alexander Radwan en de commissie economische en monetaire zaken graag bedanken voor hun uitmuntende werk aan dit dossier. Ik wil graag benadrukken dat het werk aan de kapitaalvereistenrichtlijn een heel goed voorbeeld is geweest van efficiënte samenwerking tussen het Parlement, de Raad en de Commissie. Gezien de complexiteit van de behandelde kwesties denk ik dat dit echt een prestatie is.
Ik verwelkom het initiatief van het voorzitterschap om een groep “Vrienden van het voorzitterschap” op te zetten om de discussie over het Commissievoorstel op gang te brengen in de Raad. Dit is een belangrijke stap voorwaarts. Het Europees Parlement moet dringend aangeven of het het Commissievoorstel blijft steunen. Indien dat niet het geval is, dient het duidelijk aan te geven wat het wil bereiken. De Commissie is bereid om samen te werken met zowel het Parlement als de Raad om zo snel mogelijk tot een bevredigende oplossing voor deze delicate kwestie te komen.
Ik wil graag nog een aantal specifieke zaken noemen. Ik begrijp hoe belangrijk het is voor het Europees Parlement om een veel groter gevoel van urgentie te verlenen aan de kwestie van zijn bevoegdheden om toezicht te houden op de uitoefening van haar uitvoeringsbevoegdheden door de Commissie. Maar de invoering van een
die op 1 januari 2007 van kracht zou worden, zou te krap worden. Het gevaar bestaat dat zo’n drastische beperking van de duur van de
een verkeerd en gevaarlijk signaal zou afgeven aan de markt, zodat de goedkeuring van de noodzakelijke uitvoeringsbepalingen uitermate onzeker zou kunnen worden.
De Raad heeft aangegeven dat een periode van ten minste twee jaar acceptabel is. In het licht van de gevoerde discussies is de Commissie van mening dat dit een levensvatbare periode is. De introductie van zo’n beperkte periode voor de uitvoeringsbevoegheden – veel korter dan de normale periode van vier jaar – benadrukt duidelijk de urgentie om een solide, blijvende en evenwichtige oplossing te zoeken voor de controle van de uitvoeringsbevoegdheden van de Commissie door beide takken van de wetgevende autoriteit. Alle instellingen moeten samenwerken om zo snel mogelijk tot een oplossing te komen. In dit verband merkt de Commissie op dat in de eerste helft van 2007 de eerste
van het zogenaamde Lamfalussyproces de uitvoeringsbepalingen van de Commissie zullen gaan opschorten bij twee richtlijnen – de conglomeratenrichtlijn op 11 februari 2007 en de marktmisbruikrichtlijn op 12 april 2007.
De Commissie houdt zich aan de beloftes die zijn gedaan door de toenmalige voorzitter, Romano Prodi, en mijn voorganger Frits Bolkestein, toen het Europees Parlement instemde met het Lamfalussyproces, maar de Commissie begrijpt dat de verandering van haar uitvoeringsbevoegdheden bij deze richtlijnen problematisch zal worden bij afwezigheid van een algemene oplossing op het gebied van comitologie. Juist dit feit zou alle instellingen moeten motiveren om vooruitgang te boeken. Het onvermogen om overeenstemming te bereiken zou niet alleen de geest van samenwerking tussen de instellingen aantasten, maar ook nadelig zijn voor de verdere ontwikkeling van een geïntegreerde markt van financiële diensten, die zich sterk verlaat op de beschikbaarheid van uitvoeringsbevoegdheden binnen de context van een wetgevingsraamwerk dat tot stand is gekomen door medebeslissing. Ik wil daar tevens aan toevoegen dat andere beleidsterreinen ook te lijden zouden kunnen hebben onder een gebrek aan overeenstemming inzake comitologie.
Voor ik afsluit, zou ik graag mijn oproep aan zowel het Parlement als de Raad willen herhalen om constructief naar een oplossing toe te werken. De Commissie zal van haar kant waar mogelijk de helpende hand bieden om ervoor te zorgen dat het gevoel van urgentie dat nu wordt verleend aan deze zaak niet vervliegt. De Commissie heeft allang de noodzaak van een oplossing erkend en ik denk dat de voorwaarden daar nu rijp voor zijn.
Ik verheug me op uw commentaar.
Een nieuw raamwerk voor toezicht voor zowel kredietinstellingen als beleggingsondernemingen is belangrijk voor de financiële stabiliteit van de Europese markt en om een gelijk speelveld te creëren, niet enkel binnen de Europese Unie, maar binnen de wereldwijde financiële gemeenschap van landen die ook in het Bazel II-proces meegaan.
Ons voorstel is na intensieve beraadslagingen tot stand gekomen in nauwe samenwerking met de lidstaten en de financiële wereld. Het is in lijn met het Bazel II-akkoord, maar houdt waar nodig rekening met de specifieke Europese kenmerken. Zelfs de laatste voorstellen voor de behandeling van handelsgerelateerde activiteiten zullen erin worden opgenomen.
Dit voorstel biedt een wettelijk kader voor de financiële activiteiten in de EU. Het verbetert het bestaande stelsel van toezicht, dat voornamelijk is gebaseerd op wettelijke kapitaalvereisten. Het nieuwe stelsel zal een solide basis van drie pijlers krijgen. In de eerste plaats meer risicogevoelige wettelijke kapitaalvereisten, die meer in lijn zijn met de bestaande bankpraktijken; ten tweede een versterkt toezichthoudend evaluatieproces om een nauwere aansluiting van deze nieuwe vereisten te bewerkstelligen; en ten derde vereisten voor meer openheid om de transparantie en de marktdiscipline te versterken. Dit voorstel betekent een stap naar een subtielere en verfijndere benadering van het toezicht en het risicomanagement.
Door dit voorstel aan te nemen zal de EU de eerste internationale organisatie worden die het nieuwe Bazel II-stelsel invoert. Dit zal een belangrijke stap zijn naar een beter banktoezicht en zal leiden tot meer effectiviteit van de Europese financiële markten.
Ik wil nu graag overgaan tot de comitologiekwestie. Zoals wij allen weten, is dit debat gelieerd aan de bredere vraag inzake de bevoegdheden van de Raad en het Europees Parlement in de comitologieprocedures. Wij moeten ervoor zorgen dat het wetgevende proces niet tot stand wordt gebracht. Ik denk niet dat onze burgers en het bedrijfsleven het zouden begrijpen als belangrijke wetgevende voorstellen als die vandaag op tafel liggen het onderpand zouden worden bij een kwestie als comitologie – hoe belangrijk die ook mag zijn.
Wij moeten een pragmatische manier zien te vinden om te zorgen voor een soepele wetgevende afronding van de comitologiebepalingen in de kapitaalvereistenrichtlijn. Ik verwelkom de inspanningen van het Europees Parlement en de Raad om overeenstemming te bereiken over deze kwestie. Ik denk dat wij het er allemaal over eens zijn dat aanneming tijdens de eerste lezing van deze richtlijn in het belang is van alledrie de instellingen en dat dat ook is wat de markt wil.
Aangezien comitologie een algemene kwestie is, moeten wij haar ook in haar algemene context bekijken. De Commissie heeft een voorstel ingediend voor wijziging van het comitilogiebesluit uit 1999 in 2002, gevolgd door een geamendeerd voorstel in 2004. In dit voorstel werd al rekening gehouden met belangrijke elementen waar het Europees Parlement om had verzocht, met name dat het Europees Parlement en de Raad op gelijk niveau moesten worden gesteld wat betreft hun bevoegdheden in de comitologieprocedures.
Het is grotendeels te danken aan de volharding van het Parlement, en met name van uw rapporteur, dat de Raad nu werk zal maken van de herziening van het comitologiebesluit, waarbij het herziene Commissievoorstel als basis zal dienen."@nl3
". Mr President, I would like to start by thanking Alexander Radwan and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the excellent work done on this dossier. Let me stress that the work on the Capital Requirements Directive has been a very good example of efficient cooperation between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, I think this has been a real achievement.
I welcome the initiative taken by the Presidency to set up a ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group to launch the discussion on the Commission proposal in the Council. This is an important step forward. The European Parliament must confirm urgently whether its support of the Commission proposal still holds and if not, identify clearly what it wants to achieve. The Commission stands ready to cooperate both with Parliament and the Council to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this delicate matter as soon as possible.
Let me make only a few more specific points. I understand the European Parliament’s interest in creating a much stronger sense of urgency with regard to the question of its powers to supervise the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers. But introducing a sunset clause, coming into force on 1 January 2007, would be too short. There is a serious danger that such a drastic reduction in the duration of the sunset clause would send a wrong and dangerous signal to the marketplace that the adoption of the necessary implementing measures could become highly uncertain.
The Council has indicated that a period of at least two years is acceptable. In the light of the discussions that have taken place, the Commission considers that this is a viable period. The introduction of such a reduced period for implementing powers – much shorter than the normal period of four years – clearly emphasizes the need urgently to find a solid, lasting and balanced solution for the supervision of the Commission’s implementing powers by both branches of the legislative authority. All institutions must work together to reach this solution as quickly as possible. In this regard, the Commission notes that in the first half of 2007, the first sunset clauses under the so-called Lamfalussy process will start suspending the Commission’s implementing powers for two directives - the Conglomerates Directive on 11 February 2007 and the Market Abuse Directive on 12 April 2007.
While the Commission lives by the commitments made by the then President, Romano Prodi, and my predecessor Frits Bolkestein, when the European Parliament approved the Lamfalussy process, the Commission understands that a renewal of its implementing powers for those directives would be problematic in the absence of an overall solution on comitology. This very fact should motivate all institutions to make progress. Failure to agree would not only spoil the spirit of cooperation between the institutions, it would also be detrimental to the further development of an integrated financial services market, which relies heavily on the availability of executive powers within the context of framework legislation agreed by codecision. I would also add that other policy areas would be affected from a lack of agreement on comitology.
Before concluding, I would like to reiterate my call on both Parliament and the Council to work constructively towards a solution. The Commission from its side will assist wherever it can to ensure that the sense of urgency that is now being given to this matter does not evaporate. The Commission has long recognized the need for a solution to be found and I believe that the conditions are now ripe for this.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
A state-of-the-art accepted supervisory framework for both credit institutions and investment firms is important for the financial stability of the European market and in creating a level playing field, not just within the European Union, but across the global financial community compared to those countries also following the Basel II process.
Our proposal has been prepared in close cooperation with Member States and the finance industry and was subject to extensive consultation. It is in line with the Basel II Accord, but takes account of European specificities where necessary. Even the latest proposals for the treatment of trading-related activities will be included.
This proposal provides a regulatory framework for financial activities in the EU. It improves the supervisory regime currently in place, which is primarily based on regulatory capital requirements. The new regime will have a solid basis of three pillars. Firstly, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements, which are closer in line with banks’ own practices; secondly, an enhanced supervisory review process to ensure a closer fit of these new requirements; and, thirdly, disclosure requirements which improve transparency and market discipline. This proposal represents a move to an altogether more sophisticated and refined approach to supervision and risk management.
By adopting this proposal, the EU will be the first international organization to implement the new Basel II framework. This will be a major step towards better banking supervision and will foster greater effectiveness of the European financial markets.
Let me now turn to the comitology issue. As we all know, this debate is linked to the wider question of the powers of the Council and the European Parliament in the comitology procedures. We need to make sure that the legislative process does not come to a halt. I do not believe that our citizens and the industry would understand that important legislative proposals, such as those on the table today, are taken hostage on account of an issue such as comitology – important as it may be.
We need to find a pragmatic way to ensure a smooth legislative conclusion to the comitology provisions in the Capital Requirements Directive. I welcome the efforts made by the European Parliament and the Council to find agreement on this issue. I think we all agree that adoption in first reading of this directive is in the interest of all three institutions and it is also what the marketplace wants.
Comitology being a general issue, we must look at it in its general context. The Commission submitted a proposal for a modification of the 1999 Comitology Decision in 2002, followed by an amended proposal in 2004. This proposal already took into account important elements requested by the European Parliament, in particular that the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing as regards their powers in the comitology procedures.
It is in large part thanks to the persistence of Parliament, and of your rapporteur in particular, that the Council will now take up work on revising the Comitology Decision, using the Commission’s revised proposal as a basis."@pl16
".
Senhor Presidente, desejo começar agradecendo a Alexander Radwan e à Comissão dos Assuntos Económicos e Monetários o excelente trabalho realizado sobre este dossiê. Permitam-me que saliente que o trabalho sobre a Directiva relativa aos requisitos de fundos próprios constituiu um bom exemplo de uma cooperação eficaz entre o Parlamento, o Conselho e a Comissão. Tendo em conta a complexidade dos temas envolvidos, penso tratar-se de um verdadeiro êxito.
Saúdo a iniciativa da Presidência de criação de um grupo de "Amigos da Presidência" para lançar o debate sobre a proposta da Comissão no Conselho. Trata-se de um importante passo em frente. O Parlamento Europeu deve confirmar urgentemente se mantém o seu apoio à proposta da Comissão e, caso não o faça, deve identificar claramente o que deseja alcançar. A Comissão está preparada para cooperar tanto com o Parlamento como com o Conselho para alcançar uma conclusão satisfatória sobre esta matéria sensível o mais brevemente possível.
Permitam-me que faça apenas algumas observações concretas. Entendo o interesse do Parlamento Europeu em criar um sentido muito mais forte de urgência no respeitante ao tema das suas competências de supervisão do exercício da Comissão das suas competências de execução. Mas a introdução de uma cláusula de revisão, que entre em vigor a 1 de Janeiro de 2007, implica um prazo muito curto. Existe um sério perigo de que uma redução drástica do prazo previsto na cláusula de revisão envie um sinal errado e perigoso ao mercado, podendo a adopção da necessária execução das medidas tornar-se, por isso, extremamente incerta.
O Conselho indicou que um período de, pelo menos, dois anos é aceitável. À luz das discussões que tiveram lugar, a Comissão considera que é um período viável. A introdução de um período tão reduzido para as competências de execução - muito mais curto do que o habitual período de quatro anos - coloca claramente em evidência a necessidade de se encontrar urgentemente uma solução sólida, duradoura e equilibrada para a supervisão das competências de execução da Comissão pelos dois ramos da autoridade legislativa. Todas as instituições devem trabalhar em conjunto para alcançar esta solução o mais brevemente possível. A este respeito, a Comissão observa que no primeiro semestre de 2007, as primeiras cláusulas de revisão ao abrigo do designado processo Lamfalussy começarão a suspender as competências de execução da Comissão em relação a duas directivas - a Directiva relativa aos Conglomerados Financeiros, a 11 de Fevereiro de 2007, e a Directiva relativa aos Abusos de Mercado, a 12 de Abril de 2007.
Ao mesmo tempo que respeita os compromissos contraídos pelo então Presidente, Romano Prodi, e pelo meu antecessor Frits Bolkestein, quando o Parlamento Europeu aprovou o processo Lamfalussy, a Comissão compreende que a renovação das suas competências de execução para aquelas directivas seria problemática na ausência de uma solução global sobre a comitologia. Este facto deveria motivar todas as instituições a registar progressos. A ausência de um acordo não só comprometeria o espírito de cooperação entre as instituições, como seria também prejudicial para o futuro desenvolvimento de um mercado de serviços financeiros integrado, que depende fortemente da disponibilidade das competências de execução no contexto de legislação-quadro aprovada por co-decisão. Acrescentaria ainda que a falta de acordo sobre a comitologia afectaria outras áreas desta política.
Antes de concluir, gostaria de reiterar o meu apelo dirigido tanto ao Parlamento como ao Conselho para que trabalhem de forma construtiva para alcançar uma solução. A Comissão, pelo seu lado, prestará assistência no que puder para assegurar que o sentido de urgência que é agora atribuído a esta questão não se esvaneça. Há muito que a Comissão reconheceu a necessidade de se encontrar uma solução, e penso que as condições para isso estão agora reunidas.
Estou muito interessado em ouvir os vossos comentários.
Um quadro de supervisão actual que é aceite tanto para as instituições de crédito como para as empresas de investimento é importante para a estabilidade financeira do mercado europeu e para criar uma igualdade de condições, não exclusivamente no interior da União Europeia, mas em toda a comunidade financeira mundial comparativamente aos países que também seguem o processo de Basileia II.
A nossa proposta foi preparada em estreita cooperação com os Estados-Membros e o sector financeiro e foi sujeita a consultas extensivas. É consentânea com o Acordo de Basileia II, mas tem em conta as especificidades europeias sempre que necessário. Serão incluídas inclusivamente as últimas propostas sobre o tratamento das actividades relacionadas com o comércio.
Esta proposta prevê um quadro regulamentar para as actividades financeiras na União. Melhora o regime de supervisão vigente, que é essencialmente baseado em requisitos de fundos próprios regulamentares. O novo regime terá uma base sólida assente em três pilares. Em primeiro lugar, requisitos de fundos próprios mais sensíveis aos riscos, que são mais acordes com as próprias práticas dos bancos; em segundo lugar, um processo de avaliação da supervisão melhorado para assegurar uma melhor adequação a estes novos requisitos; e, em terceiro lugar, pedidos de divulgação que melhoram a transparência e a disciplina do mercado. A presente proposta representa um passo em direcção a uma abordagem em geral mais sofisticada e específica da supervisão e da gestão do risco.
Com a adopção desta proposta, a União Europeia será a primeira organização internacional a implementar o novo quadro de Basileia II. Isto constituirá um grande passo em direcção a uma melhor supervisão das instituições de crédito e fomentará uma maior eficácia dos mercados financeiros europeus.
Permitam-me que retome a questão da comitologia. Como é do conhecimento de todos nós, este debate está associado à questão mais abrangente das competências do Conselho e do Parlamento Europeu nos processos de comitologia. Precisamos de assegurar que o processo legislativo não é entravado. Não creio que os nossos cidadãos e o sector compreendessem que propostas legislativas importantes, como as que temos hoje sobre a mesa, fossem feitas reféns devido a uma questão como a comitologia – por mais importante que esta possa ser.
Precisamos de encontrar uma forma pragmática de assegurar uma conclusão do processo legislativo sem problemas para as disposições sobre comitologia na Directiva relativa aos requisitos de fundos próprios. Saúdo os esforços envidados pelo Parlamento Europeu e pelo Conselho para chegar a acordo sobre esta matéria. Penso que estamos todos de acordo em que a adopção em primeira leitura desta directiva é do interesse das três instituições e vai também de encontro aos desejos do mercado.
Sendo a comitologia uma questão geral, não a podemos dissociar do seu contexto geral. A Comissão apresentou em 2002 uma proposta de modificação da Decisão sobre Comitologia de 1999, seguindo-se de uma proposta alterada em 2004. Esta proposta já tinha em conta elementos importantes reivindicados pelo Parlamento Europeu, em particular o de que o Parlamento Europeu e o Conselho deveriam ser colocados em igualdade de condições no que diz respeito às suas competências nos procedimentos de comitologia.
É em grande medida graças à persistência do Parlamento, e em particular do vosso relator, que o Conselho irá agora prosseguir o trabalho sobre a revisão da Decisão relativa à Comitologia, tendo por base a proposta revista da Comissão."@pt17
". Mr President, I would like to start by thanking Alexander Radwan and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the excellent work done on this dossier. Let me stress that the work on the Capital Requirements Directive has been a very good example of efficient cooperation between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, I think this has been a real achievement.
I welcome the initiative taken by the Presidency to set up a ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group to launch the discussion on the Commission proposal in the Council. This is an important step forward. The European Parliament must confirm urgently whether its support of the Commission proposal still holds and if not, identify clearly what it wants to achieve. The Commission stands ready to cooperate both with Parliament and the Council to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this delicate matter as soon as possible.
Let me make only a few more specific points. I understand the European Parliament’s interest in creating a much stronger sense of urgency with regard to the question of its powers to supervise the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers. But introducing a sunset clause, coming into force on 1 January 2007, would be too short. There is a serious danger that such a drastic reduction in the duration of the sunset clause would send a wrong and dangerous signal to the marketplace that the adoption of the necessary implementing measures could become highly uncertain.
The Council has indicated that a period of at least two years is acceptable. In the light of the discussions that have taken place, the Commission considers that this is a viable period. The introduction of such a reduced period for implementing powers – much shorter than the normal period of four years – clearly emphasizes the need urgently to find a solid, lasting and balanced solution for the supervision of the Commission’s implementing powers by both branches of the legislative authority. All institutions must work together to reach this solution as quickly as possible. In this regard, the Commission notes that in the first half of 2007, the first sunset clauses under the so-called Lamfalussy process will start suspending the Commission’s implementing powers for two directives - the Conglomerates Directive on 11 February 2007 and the Market Abuse Directive on 12 April 2007.
While the Commission lives by the commitments made by the then President, Romano Prodi, and my predecessor Frits Bolkestein, when the European Parliament approved the Lamfalussy process, the Commission understands that a renewal of its implementing powers for those directives would be problematic in the absence of an overall solution on comitology. This very fact should motivate all institutions to make progress. Failure to agree would not only spoil the spirit of cooperation between the institutions, it would also be detrimental to the further development of an integrated financial services market, which relies heavily on the availability of executive powers within the context of framework legislation agreed by codecision. I would also add that other policy areas would be affected from a lack of agreement on comitology.
Before concluding, I would like to reiterate my call on both Parliament and the Council to work constructively towards a solution. The Commission from its side will assist wherever it can to ensure that the sense of urgency that is now being given to this matter does not evaporate. The Commission has long recognized the need for a solution to be found and I believe that the conditions are now ripe for this.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
A state-of-the-art accepted supervisory framework for both credit institutions and investment firms is important for the financial stability of the European market and in creating a level playing field, not just within the European Union, but across the global financial community compared to those countries also following the Basel II process.
Our proposal has been prepared in close cooperation with Member States and the finance industry and was subject to extensive consultation. It is in line with the Basel II Accord, but takes account of European specificities where necessary. Even the latest proposals for the treatment of trading-related activities will be included.
This proposal provides a regulatory framework for financial activities in the EU. It improves the supervisory regime currently in place, which is primarily based on regulatory capital requirements. The new regime will have a solid basis of three pillars. Firstly, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements, which are closer in line with banks’ own practices; secondly, an enhanced supervisory review process to ensure a closer fit of these new requirements; and, thirdly, disclosure requirements which improve transparency and market discipline. This proposal represents a move to an altogether more sophisticated and refined approach to supervision and risk management.
By adopting this proposal, the EU will be the first international organization to implement the new Basel II framework. This will be a major step towards better banking supervision and will foster greater effectiveness of the European financial markets.
Let me now turn to the comitology issue. As we all know, this debate is linked to the wider question of the powers of the Council and the European Parliament in the comitology procedures. We need to make sure that the legislative process does not come to a halt. I do not believe that our citizens and the industry would understand that important legislative proposals, such as those on the table today, are taken hostage on account of an issue such as comitology – important as it may be.
We need to find a pragmatic way to ensure a smooth legislative conclusion to the comitology provisions in the Capital Requirements Directive. I welcome the efforts made by the European Parliament and the Council to find agreement on this issue. I think we all agree that adoption in first reading of this directive is in the interest of all three institutions and it is also what the marketplace wants.
Comitology being a general issue, we must look at it in its general context. The Commission submitted a proposal for a modification of the 1999 Comitology Decision in 2002, followed by an amended proposal in 2004. This proposal already took into account important elements requested by the European Parliament, in particular that the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing as regards their powers in the comitology procedures.
It is in large part thanks to the persistence of Parliament, and of your rapporteur in particular, that the Council will now take up work on revising the Comitology Decision, using the Commission’s revised proposal as a basis."@sk18
". Mr President, I would like to start by thanking Alexander Radwan and the Economic and Monetary Affairs Committee for the excellent work done on this dossier. Let me stress that the work on the Capital Requirements Directive has been a very good example of efficient cooperation between Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Considering the complexity of the issues involved, I think this has been a real achievement.
I welcome the initiative taken by the Presidency to set up a ‘Friends of the Presidency’ group to launch the discussion on the Commission proposal in the Council. This is an important step forward. The European Parliament must confirm urgently whether its support of the Commission proposal still holds and if not, identify clearly what it wants to achieve. The Commission stands ready to cooperate both with Parliament and the Council to arrive at a satisfactory conclusion on this delicate matter as soon as possible.
Let me make only a few more specific points. I understand the European Parliament’s interest in creating a much stronger sense of urgency with regard to the question of its powers to supervise the Commission’s exercise of its implementing powers. But introducing a sunset clause, coming into force on 1 January 2007, would be too short. There is a serious danger that such a drastic reduction in the duration of the sunset clause would send a wrong and dangerous signal to the marketplace that the adoption of the necessary implementing measures could become highly uncertain.
The Council has indicated that a period of at least two years is acceptable. In the light of the discussions that have taken place, the Commission considers that this is a viable period. The introduction of such a reduced period for implementing powers – much shorter than the normal period of four years – clearly emphasizes the need urgently to find a solid, lasting and balanced solution for the supervision of the Commission’s implementing powers by both branches of the legislative authority. All institutions must work together to reach this solution as quickly as possible. In this regard, the Commission notes that in the first half of 2007, the first sunset clauses under the so-called Lamfalussy process will start suspending the Commission’s implementing powers for two directives - the Conglomerates Directive on 11 February 2007 and the Market Abuse Directive on 12 April 2007.
While the Commission lives by the commitments made by the then President, Romano Prodi, and my predecessor Frits Bolkestein, when the European Parliament approved the Lamfalussy process, the Commission understands that a renewal of its implementing powers for those directives would be problematic in the absence of an overall solution on comitology. This very fact should motivate all institutions to make progress. Failure to agree would not only spoil the spirit of cooperation between the institutions, it would also be detrimental to the further development of an integrated financial services market, which relies heavily on the availability of executive powers within the context of framework legislation agreed by codecision. I would also add that other policy areas would be affected from a lack of agreement on comitology.
Before concluding, I would like to reiterate my call on both Parliament and the Council to work constructively towards a solution. The Commission from its side will assist wherever it can to ensure that the sense of urgency that is now being given to this matter does not evaporate. The Commission has long recognized the need for a solution to be found and I believe that the conditions are now ripe for this.
I look forward to hearing your comments.
A state-of-the-art accepted supervisory framework for both credit institutions and investment firms is important for the financial stability of the European market and in creating a level playing field, not just within the European Union, but across the global financial community compared to those countries also following the Basel II process.
Our proposal has been prepared in close cooperation with Member States and the finance industry and was subject to extensive consultation. It is in line with the Basel II Accord, but takes account of European specificities where necessary. Even the latest proposals for the treatment of trading-related activities will be included.
This proposal provides a regulatory framework for financial activities in the EU. It improves the supervisory regime currently in place, which is primarily based on regulatory capital requirements. The new regime will have a solid basis of three pillars. Firstly, more risk-sensitive regulatory capital requirements, which are closer in line with banks’ own practices; secondly, an enhanced supervisory review process to ensure a closer fit of these new requirements; and, thirdly, disclosure requirements which improve transparency and market discipline. This proposal represents a move to an altogether more sophisticated and refined approach to supervision and risk management.
By adopting this proposal, the EU will be the first international organization to implement the new Basel II framework. This will be a major step towards better banking supervision and will foster greater effectiveness of the European financial markets.
Let me now turn to the comitology issue. As we all know, this debate is linked to the wider question of the powers of the Council and the European Parliament in the comitology procedures. We need to make sure that the legislative process does not come to a halt. I do not believe that our citizens and the industry would understand that important legislative proposals, such as those on the table today, are taken hostage on account of an issue such as comitology – important as it may be.
We need to find a pragmatic way to ensure a smooth legislative conclusion to the comitology provisions in the Capital Requirements Directive. I welcome the efforts made by the European Parliament and the Council to find agreement on this issue. I think we all agree that adoption in first reading of this directive is in the interest of all three institutions and it is also what the marketplace wants.
Comitology being a general issue, we must look at it in its general context. The Commission submitted a proposal for a modification of the 1999 Comitology Decision in 2002, followed by an amended proposal in 2004. This proposal already took into account important elements requested by the European Parliament, in particular that the European Parliament and the Council should be put on an equal footing as regards their powers in the comitology procedures.
It is in large part thanks to the persistence of Parliament, and of your rapporteur in particular, that the Council will now take up work on revising the Comitology Decision, using the Commission’s revised proposal as a basis."@sl19
".
Herr talman! Jag vill börja med att tacka Alexander Radwan och utskottet för ekonomi och valutafrågor för det utmärkta arbete de utfört i ämnet. Låt mig betona att arbetet med direktivet om kapitalkrav har varit ett mycket bra exempel på effektivt samarbete mellan parlamentet, rådet och kommissionen. Med tanke på hur komplicerade dessa frågor är tycker jag att det har varit en verklig prestation.
Jag välkomnar ordförandeskapets initiativ att inrätta en grupp av ”ordförandeskapets vänner” för att inleda diskussionen om kommissionens förslag i rådet. Detta är ett viktigt steg framåt. Europaparlamentet måste snarast bekräfta om dess stöd till kommissionens förslag fortfarande gäller, och om det inte gör tydligt ange vad parlamentet vill uppnå. Kommissionen är beredd att samarbeta med både parlamentet och rådet för att uppnå en tillfredsställande avslutning på denna känsliga fråga så snart som möjligt.
Låt mig bara lämna ytterligare några specifika kommentarer. Jag förstår Europaparlamentets intresse för att påskynda frågan om dess möjligheter att kontrollera hur kommissionen utövar sina befogenheter. Men att en tidsfristklausul skulle träda i kraft redan den 1 januari 2007 är alltför tidigt. Det finns en allvarlig risk för att en sådan drastisk minskning av tidsfristklausulens giltighetstid skulle sända en felaktig och farlig signal till marknaderna om att det är högst osäkert om de nödvändiga åtgärderna för genomförande kommer att antas.
Rådet har angivit att en period om minst två år är acceptabel. Mot bakgrund av de diskussioner som har ägt rum bedömer kommissionen att det är en rimlig period. Införandet av en sådan kortare period för att genomföra befogenheter – mycket kortare än den normala tidsperioden på fyra år – är en tydlig betoning av att det finns ett brådskande behov av att finna en solid, varaktig och balanserad lösning för kontroll av kommissionens genomförandebefogenheter för den lagstiftande maktens båda grenar. Alla institutioner måste samarbeta för att nå denna lösning så snabbt som möjligt. I det hänseendet noterar kommissionen att under den första hälften av 2007 kommer de första tidsfristklausulerna enligt det så kallade Lamfalussyförfarandet att innebära att kommissionens genomförandebefogenheter börjar avskaffas för två direktiv – direktivet om konglomerat den 11 februari 2007 och direktivet om otillbörlig marknadspåverkan den 12 april 2007.
Eftersom kommissionen lever med åtaganden som den dåvarande ordföranden Romano Prodi och min företrädare Frits Bolkestein gjorde när Europaparlamentet godkände Lamfalussyförfarandet, förstår kommissionen att det skulle vara problematiskt att förnya genomförandebefogenheterna för dessa direktiv, eftersom en övergripande lösning om kommittéförfarandet saknas. Redan detta borde motivera alla institutioner att göra framsteg. Om man inte kommer överens skulle det inte bara förstöra andan av samarbete mellan institutionerna, det skulle också vara till skada för vidareutvecklingen av en integrerad marknad för finansiella tjänster, som i stor utsträckning förlitar sig på tillgänglighet för verkställande befogenheter när det gäller ramlagstiftning som fastställts genom medbeslutande. Jag vill också tillägga att andra politikområden skulle påverkas av en brist på överenskommelse om kommittéförfarandet.
Innan jag avslutar vill jag upprepa min uppmaning till både parlamentet och rådet att arbeta konstruktivt i riktning mot en lösning. Kommissionen kommer å sin sida att bistå närhelst den kan för att se till att känslan av skyndsamhet när det gäller den här frågan inte mattas av. Kommissionen har länge erkänt behovet av en lösning, och jag tror att förhållandena nu är mogna för det.
Jag ser fram emot att få höra era kommentarer.
En modern och accepterad tillsynsram för både kreditinstitut och investeringsbolag är viktig för den finansiella stabiliteten på den europeiska marknaden och för att skapa en neutral arena inte bara inom Europeiska unionen utan även i hela den världsomspännande finansiella världen, att likna vid de länder som också följer Basel II-förfarandet.
Vårt förslag har utarbetats i nära samarbete med medlemsstaterna och finansvärlden och var föremål för omfattande samråd. Det är i linje med Basel II-avtalet, men tar också hänsyn till europeiska särdrag vid behov. Till och med de senaste förslagen till behandling av handelsrelaterad verksamhet kommer att ingå.
Förslaget innebär ett regelverk för finansiell verksamhet i EU. Det innebär en förbättring av det tillsynssystem som för närvarande gäller och som huvudsakligen baseras på lagstadgade kapitalkrav. Det nya systemet kommer att ha en solid grund med tre pelare. För det första mer riskkänsliga lagstadgade kapitalkrav som ligger mer i linje med bankernas egen praxis, för det andra ett utvidgat förfarande för tillsyn så att dessa nya krav ska passa bättre och för det tredje informationskrav som innebär större öppenhet och bättre marknadsdisciplin. Förslaget utgör ett steg mot ett totalt sett mer sofistikerat och förfinat synsätt på tillsyn och riskhantering.
Om förslaget antas kommer EU att bli den första internationella organisation som genomför det nya Basel II-ramverket. Det blir ett stort steg i riktning mot bättre tillsyn av bankerna och kommer även att göra de europeiska finansmarknaderna effektivare.
Låt mig nu övergå till frågan om kommittéförfarandet. Som vi alla vet är den här debatten kopplad till den mer omfattande frågan om rådets och Europarlamentets befogenheter i kommittéförfarandena. Vi behöver se till att lagstiftningsprocessen inte stannar upp. Jag tror inte att våra medborgare och näringslivet skulle förstå att viktiga lagstiftningsförslag, såsom de som lagts fram i dag, blir blockerade på grund av en fråga som kommittéförfarandet – hur viktig den än är.
Vi behöver hitta ett pragmatiskt sätt att åstadkomma en smidig lagstiftningslösning om kommittéförfarandebestämmelserna i direktivet om kapitalkrav. Jag välkomnar Europaparlamentets och rådets ansträngningar för att nå en överenskommelse på detta område. Jag tror att vi alla är överens om att det ligger i alla tre institutionernas intresse att direktivet antas vid den första behandlingen, och det är också vad marknaden vill.
Eftersom kommittéförfarandet är en generell fråga måste vi betrakta den i ett generellt sammanhang. Kommissionen lade 2002 fram ett förslag till ändring av 1999 års beslut om kommittéförfarandet, följt av ett ändrat förslag under 2004. Redan i förslaget tog man hänsyn till viktiga beståndsdelar som Europaparlamentet krävde, särskilt att Europaparlamentet och rådet bör stå på jämställd fot när det gäller deras befogenheter i kommittéförfarandet.
Det är i stor utsträckning tack vare parlamentets och framför allt er föredragandes envishet som rådet nu kommer att börja se över beslutet om kommittéförfarandet och använda kommissionens reviderade förslag som grund."@sv21
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