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".
Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@en4
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"Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@cs1
"Hr. formand, jeg vil gerne begynde med at byde hr. Alexander velkommen i hans nye rolle, særlig her i Parlamentet. Vi vil få mange debatter sammen, og det vil blive en fornøjelse at arbejde med ham.
Med hensyn til spændingerne mellem Kina og Japan har vi for nylig benyttet møder på højt niveau - især topmødet mellem EU og Japan den 2. maj i Luxembourg - til at drøfte stabilitetsspørgsmål i Østasien på højeste regeringsplan. I den forbindelse er vi enedes om at intensivere vores politiske dialog, og vi har sagt, at energiproblemer i særdeleshed bør stå meget højt på dagsordenen sammen med Japan. Det vil vi gerne gøre, ikke mindst med henblik på at reagere på Japans bekymringer over en mulig fremtidig ophævelse af EU's våbenembargo mod Kina. Som en første opfølgning har vi holdt et ministermøde i trojkaen sammen med Japan den 6. maj i forbindelse med ASEM-mødet. I vores politiske dialog med Kina ser vi også på problemet med spændinger mellem Kina og Japan og opfordrer til moderation og forsoning.
Med hensyn til våbenembargoen kræves det klart i konklusionerne fra Det Europæiske Råd i december 2005, at der ikke må ske nogen ændring i mængden eller kvaliteten af våbeneksporten til Kina. Derfor bør enhver fremtidig beslutning om at ophæve våbenembargoen ikke ændre sikkerhedssituationen i Østasien.
Desuden har EU påbegyndt en strategisk dialog med USA om Østasien for at tage fat på bekymringen for sikkerheden hos vores partnere, og der er blevet gennemført oplysende missioner til USA, Japan, Sydkorea, Australien og New Zealand for at forklare vores holdning. Vi er ved at lægge sidste hånd på den forstærkede adfærdskodeks for våbeneksperter.
Lad mig sige to ting mere før forhandlingen, og så vil jeg besvare Deres spørgsmål. Med hensyn til Kinas lov mod løsrivelse har EU i sin udtalelse af 15. marts klart givet udtryk for sin bekymring for den lov. Ved den lejlighed gentog EU de principper, der styrer dets politik, dvs. at det går ind for en politik med ét Kina, og at uenighederne bilægges på fredelig vis. Vi har også opfordret begge parter til at tage initiativer til dialog og forståelse. Det må siges, at vi var glade for at se, at lederne af Taiwans opposition tog til det kinesiske fastland. Vi håber, at alle parter i fremtiden vil blive involveret i sådanne kontakter.
Jeg henviser igen til Nordkoreas atomprogram. Jeg vil minde Dem om, at EU - og også Kommissionen - er medlem af bestyrelsen for KEDO (Den Koreanske Halvøs Energiudviklingsorganisation). Vi har finansielt og på anden måde støttet den - i øjeblikket suspenderede - aktivitet med henblik på at finde en fredelig løsning på atomproblemerne. Vi vil fortsat give vores fulde støtte til mulige samtaler mellem de seks parter som en vej frem og har ved forskellige lejligheder givet klart udtryk for vores synspunkter over for den nordkoreanske regering. Jeg hører, at en delegation fra Parlamentet skal til Nordkorea. Vi vil med glæde høre på Dem og lære af Dem, når De kommer tilbage.
Jeg vil standse her. Der er meget at sige, fordi disse spørgsmål, som jeg har sagt, er centrale for vores globale politik for det 21. århundrede.
Jeg er meget glad for denne forhandling, for situationen i Asien og også i Østasien er virkelig et væsentligt strategisk problem. Asien er i dag ikke bare det kontinent, der har den største befolkning, men også den højeste økonomiske vækstrate og de højeste investeringer i forskning og udvikling. De fjernøstlige lande investerer i deres fremtid, og Asien vil utvivlsomt blive det kontinent, der kommer til at stå i centrum på verdens scene i det 21. århundrede. Det må vi vide og forberede os på.
Sikkerhed i Fjernøsten er derfor et spørgsmål, der direkte berører europæiske interesser. Det er en del af det samlede globale ansvar for sikkerhed og stabilitet, som spiller en central rolle i EU's udenrigspolitik. Desuden har stabilitet i Fjernøsten direkte virkninger ikke bare for vores borgeres velstand og velbefindende, men også for dette kontinents borgere. Kina, Japan og Sydkorea er blandt verdens seks førende økonomier, hvis EU tælles som én. De er også blandt vores største handelspartnere og er også de vigtigste modtagere af udenlandske investeringer fra Europa. Japan er også en væsentlig kilde til investering i Europa, ikke mindst i nogle af de nye medlemsstater. Kort sagt: Ustabilitet i den mest dynamiske region i verden vil have alvorlige følger, som vil påvirke Europa stærkt.
Hvad er derfor den europæiske reaktion, og hvilke instrumenter har vi til rådighed, når vi skal tage fat på dette spørgsmål? Det vil jeg gerne se på nu.
Lad os se på det vigtigste spørgsmål, der står på spil i Østasien. På mellemlang sigt vil tre store politiske problemer dominere den politiske dagsorden i Østasien. For det første hvordan man skal reagere på Kinas vækst. For det andet at sikre stabilitet i hele Korea og for det tredje en fredelig løsning på spændingerne mellem Kina og Taiwan. En rigtig håndtering af disse spørgsmål vil få væsentlig indflydelse både på vores regionale sikkerhed og sikkerheden omkring os.
I modsætning hertil er graden af økonomisk integration i Østasien også meget imponerende. Men det alene vil ikke være nok til at gøre Østasien mere stabilt og fredeligt, særlig da Nordkorea stadig er uden for det økonomiske samarbejde, der er ved at vokse frem. I modsætning til, hvad der var tilfældet i Europa i anden halvdel af 1980'erne, har de økonomiske bånd desuden ikke ført til forbedrede politiske forbindelser. Tværtimod har den økonomiske vækst i Kina og Kinas markante udenrigspolitik i visse nabolande ført til bekymring for, at et mere velstående Kina vil bruge sin økonomiske gevinst til i højere grad at forfølge nationale interesser og dominere regionen både politisk og økonomisk.
Rivaliseringen mellem Kina og Japan er dukket tidligere og mere synligt op, end mange iagttagere havde ventet. En tendens i alle østasiatiske lande mod en mere nationalistisk orientering kan bane vej for at benytte bilaterale konflikter som en sikkerhedsventil for det indenlandske forbrug. I Kina er nationalismen f.eks. som en del af processen med at bevæge sig bort fra ideologiske bånd blevet genoplivet som et tema, der forener. Med et generationsskifte i Korea har antikommunisme baseret på den traumatiske erfaring fra Korea-krigen mistet sin tiltrækning. Den nye ledelse synes på linje med synspunkterne i den yngre generation ofte at se en stærk politik over for Nordkorea som en større trussel mod freden end Nordkoreas atomprogram. I Japan kan man iagttage en nationalistisk renæssance, der ikke bygger på en bevægelse blandt de unge, men på en elites ønske om at ændre den såkaldte "selvfornedrende holdning" i Japan. Denne tendens i alle tre lande til at gå ind for nationalistiske politikker lover ikke godt for muligheden af at løse de konkrete politiske problemer, som vil blive mere påtrængende i de kommende år. Desuden kan økonomierne med den teknologiske vækst i Kina faktisk bevæge sig fra komplementaritet til mere intens konkurrence og derved ophede det politiske miljø i stedet for at køle det ned.
Men det er ikke givet, at spændingen vil stige. F.eks. blev mødet i Jakarta den 23. april mellem Japans premierminister Koizumi og Kinas præsident - som jeg deltog i - holdt specielt med henblik på at dæmpe spændingen, og det demonstrerer, at begge parter forstår, at de vil lide økonomiske tab som følge af stigende spænding. Det er derfor uheldigt, at de foranstaltninger, som blev taget for at følge op, komplicerede snarere end neddæmpede situationen, da vicepremierminister Wu Yi brat aflyste et planlagt møde med premierminister Koizumi. Hvis rivaliseringen mellem Tokyo og Beijing bliver håndteret godt, kan den ikke desto mindre føre til en konstruktiv konkurrence, og det vil åbne op for at tage fat på konflikter, der har varet længe, som man f.eks. kan se i tilnærmelsen mellem Indien og Kina efterfulgt af et besøg fra premierminister Koizumi i New Delhi og Tokyos voksende interesse i Sydøstasien. I denne forbindelse er det meget interessant at se, at det europæiske eksempel med at overvinde fjendtligheder under krigen og adskillelsen under den kolde krig er blevet genstand for stærk interesse og undersøgelse i Østasien. Det giver os en åbning, som vi bør benytte til at fremme forbindelserne mellem alle regionale aktører.
Vi tager en række konkrete skridt til at få fat på de forskellige spørgsmål, der venter, for klart at give udtryk for Europas synspunkt vedrørende vejen frem og for vores bekymring over situationen. Der er en politisk dialog. Det er rigtigt, at vi netop fejrer 30-årsdagen for vores diplomatiske forbindelser. Der er også en menneskerettighedsdialog, og alle sikkerhedsspørgsmålene er der og bliver drøftet. Faktisk vil vi under det næste topmøde med Kina, der bliver afholdt i september, forsøge at formulere idéen om en mere omfattende og ambitiøs rammeaftale, for den gamle opfylder ikke længere vores ambitiøse mål. Der er 20 sektordialoger med de forskellige ministre på ministerplan, som skal forberede Kina på dets handelsmæssige forpligtelser i WTO, og også f.eks. på dets pligt med hensyn til den intellektuelle ejendomsret og beskyttelse af arbejdskraften, som vores kollega også har nævnt. Den generelle idé er at få helt gensidige tovejsforbindelser."@da2
".
Herr Präsident! Ich möchte eingangs Herrn Alexander in seiner neuen Funktion hier im Parlament begrüßen. Wir werden zahlreiche Debatten miteinander führen, und es wird eine Freude sein, mit ihm zusammenzuarbeiten.
Was die Spannungen zwischen China und Japan betrifft, so haben wir die jüngsten hochrangigen Begegnungen – insbesondere den EU-Japan-Gipfel am 2. Mai in Luxemburg – genutzt, um auf höchster Regierungsebene über Fragen der Stabilität in Ostasien zu diskutieren. In diesem Zusammenhang sind wir übereingekommen, unseren politischen Dialog zu intensivieren, und wir haben festgestellt, dass im Zusammenhang mit Japan Energiefragen einen besonders hohen Stellenwert erhalten sollten. Dabei geht es uns nicht zuletzt darum, im Hinblick auf japanische Bedenken bezüglich einer potenziellen Aufhebung der EU-Waffenembargos gegenüber China etwas zu unternehmen. Als erste Folgemaßnahme fand am 6. Mai im Rahmen der ASEM eine Troika auf Ministerebene mit Japan statt. Wir befassen uns im Rahmen unseres politischen Dialogs mit China auch mit den japanisch-chinesischen Spannungen und fordern beide Seiten zu Mäßigung und Versöhnung auf.
Was das Waffenembargo betrifft, so stellt der Europäische Rat in seinen Schlussfolgerungen im Dezember 2005 eindeutig fest, dass es weder in quantitativer noch in qualitativer Hinsicht Änderungen in Bezug auf die Waffenexporte nach China geben dürfe. Deshalb dürfte jedweder mögliche Beschluss über eine Aufhebung des Embargos keine Auswirkungen auf die Sicherheitslage in Ostasien haben.
Die Europäische Union hat außerdem einen strategischen Dialog mit den USA über Ostasien eingeleitet, um sicherheitspolitische Bedenken unserer Partner zu thematisieren. Zu diesem Zweck haben wir Informationsreisen in die USA sowie nach Japan, Südkorea, Australien und Neuseeland durchgeführt, um unseren Standpunkt darzulegen. Wir geben derzeit dem überarbeiteten Verhaltenskodex für Waffenausfuhren den letzten Schliff.
Ich möchte vor der eigentlichen Aussprache noch zwei Punkte ansprechen, und dann werde ich Ihre Fragen beantworten. Zunächst zum chinesischen Anti-Sezessionsgesetz. In ihrer Erklärung vom 15. März hat sich die Europäische Union eindeutig besorgt über dieses Gesetzt geäußert. Die Europäische Union verwies darin erneut auf die Grundsätze, von denen sie sich in ihrer Politik leiten lässt, und zwar den Grundsatz der „Ein-China-Politik“ und den der friedlichen Beilegung von Streitigkeiten. Wir haben ferner beide Seiten aufgefordert, Initiativen zur Förderung des Dialogs und der Verständigung einzuleiten. In diesem Zusammenhang ist festzustellen, dass wir uns über den Besuch taiwanesischer Oppositionsführer in China gefreut haben. Wir hoffen, dass künftig alle Parteien an derartigen Kontakten beteiligt sein werden.
Ich möchte nochmals auf das Nuklearprogramm der Demokratischen Volksrepublik Korea zurückkommen. Ich möchte Sie daran erinnern, dass die Europäische Union - und auch die Kommission – Mitglied des Exekutivrates von KEDO ist. Wir haben die - derzeit ausgesetzten – Tätigkeiten dieser Organisation finanziell und anderweitig unterstützt, um eine friedliche Lösung für die Nuklearfrage zu finden. Wir unterstützen auch weiterhin potenzielle Sechs-Parteien-Gespräche als möglichen Lösungsansatz, und wir haben gegenüber der nordkoreanischen Regierung unseren Standpunkt mehrfach sehr deutlich dargelegt. Wie ich höre, wird eine Delegation des Europäischen Parlaments nach Nordkorea reisen. Wir sind sehr auf Ihre Eindrücke gespannt und gern bereit, nach Ihrer Rückkehr aus Ihren Erfahrungen zu lernen.
Damit möchte ich schließen. Es gibt sehr viel zu diesem Themenkomplex zu sagen, der, wie ich bereits festgestellt habe, den Kern unserer globalen Politik für das 21. Jahrhundert bildet.
Ich bin sehr froh über diese Aussprache, denn die Lage in Asien wie auch in Ostasien ist in der Tat von großer strategischer Bedeutung. Asien ist heute nicht nur der bevölkerungsreichste Kontinent, sondern auch der Kontinent mit der höchsten Wirtschaftswachstumsrate und den höchsten Raten bei den Ausgaben im Bereich Forschung und Entwicklung. Die Länder in Fernost investieren in ihre Zukunft, und Asien wird im 21. Jahrhundert ohne Zweifel eine führende Rolle im Weltgeschehen spielen. Das muss uns klar sein, und wir müssen uns darauf entsprechend vorbereiten.
Die Sicherheit im Fernen Osten ist daher ein Thema, das für die europäischen Interessen von direkter Bedeutung ist. Sie ist Teil der globalen Gesamtverantwortung für Sicherheit und Stabilität, die den Kern des außenpolitischen Engagements der Europäischen Union bildet. Hinzu kommt, dass sich die Stabilität im Fernen Osten nicht nur auf den Wohlstand und das Wohlergehen unserer Bürger auswirkt, sondern auch für die Bürger des asiatischen Kontinents von großer Bedeutung ist. Betrachtet man die Europäische Union als ein Wirtschaftsgefüge, dann zählen China, Japan und die Republik Korea zu den sechs führenden Wirtschaftsnationen der Welt. Sie gehören ferner zu unseren wichtigsten Handelspartnern sowie den größten Empfängern europäischer Auslandsinvestitionen. Japan ist seinerseits eine wichtige Quelle von Investitionen in Europa, und zwar nicht zuletzt in einigen der neuen Mitgliedstaaten. Folglich hätte eine instabile Lage in der dynamischsten Region der Welt ernste Konsequenzen, die in Europa sehr deutlich zu spüren wären.
Wie also reagiert die Union auf diese Situation, und welche Mittel stehen ihr dazu zur Verfügung? Mit dieser Frage möchte ich mich jetzt beschäftigen.
Werfen wir zunächst einen Blick auf die wichtigsten Probleme in Ostasien. Mittelfristig wird die politische Agenda in Ostasien von drei Hauptfragen bestimmt. Erstens geht es um unsere Reaktion auf den Aufstieg Chinas. Zweitens geht es um die Gewährleistung der Stabilität auf der koreanischen Halbinsel, und drittens um eine friedliche Lösung der Spannungen zwischen China und Taiwan. Die Lösung dieser Fragen wird deutliche Auswirkungen sowohl auf unsere regionale Sicherheit als auch die Sicherheit in größerem Maßstab haben.
Andererseits kann Ostasien auch auf ein sehr beeindruckendes Maß der wirtschaftlichen Integration verweisen. Das allein wird jedoch für eine stabilere und friedlichere Entwicklung in Ostasien nicht ausreichen, zumal sich die Demokratische Volksrepublik Korea noch nicht an der sich herausbildenden wirtschaftlichen Zusammenarbeit beteiligt. Im Gegensatz zu Europa Ende der 80er Jahre haben die wirtschaftlichen Verbindungen keine Verbesserung der politischen Beziehungen bewirkt. Im Gegenteil. Der wirtschaftliche Aufschwung in China und die selbstbewusste Außenpolitik des Landes haben in einigen Nachbarländern dahingehende Bedenken geschürt, dass ein wohlhabenderes China seine Wirtschaftsmacht einsetzen könnte, um seine nationalen Interessen energischer zu verfolgen und die Region sowohl politisch als auch wirtschaftlich zu beherrschen.
Die Rivalität zwischen China und Japan ist früher und sichtbarer aufgetreten, als viele Beobachter vermuteten. Eine in allen ostasiatischen Ländern zu verzeichnende Tendenz hin zu einer nationalistischeren Ausrichtung könnte dazu führen, dass bilaterale Konflikte als Ventil für den Binnenverbrauch dienen. So lebte beispielsweise in China der Nationalismus als einigendes Thema in dem Maße auf, in dem das Land seine ideologischen Zwänge ablegte. In Korea verliert der auf den traumatischen Erfahrungen des Koreakrieges basierende Antikommunismus mit dem Generationswechsel seine Anziehungskraft. Im Einklang mit den Ansichten der jüngeren Generation stellt eine aggressive Politik gegenüber Nordkorea in den Augen der neuen Führung eine größere Gefahr für den Frieden dar als das nordkoreanische Nuklearprogramm. Die in Japan zu beobachtende Renaissance des Nationalismus wurde nicht von den Bestrebungen einer jungen Generation ausgelöst, sondern basiert auf dem Wunsch einer Elite, eine in Japan verbreitete Haltung, die die eigenen Leistungen herabwürdigt, zu überwinden. Diese in allen drei Ländern zu verzeichnenden nationalistischen Tendenzen bieten keine guten Voraussetzungen für die Lösung der konkreten politischen Probleme, die in den nächsten Jahren an Dringlichkeit gewinnen werden. Die rasche technologische Entwicklung in China könnte zudem dazu führen, dass sich diese Länder von der Komplementarität ab- und einem intensiveren Wettbewerb zuwenden und damit die politischen Spannungen anheizen, anstatt sie abzubauen.
Die Spannungen nehmen jedoch nicht automatisch zu. So bestand beispielsweise das Anliegen des Treffens zwischen Japans Premierminister Koizumi und dem chinesischen Präsidenten, das am 23. April in Jakarta stattfand und an dem ich teilgenommen habe, darin, die Spannungen zu entschärfen. Das verdeutlicht, dass beiden Seiten klar ist, dass eine Verschärfung der Spannungen für sie mit wirtschaftlichen Einbußen verbunden wäre. Daher ist es bedauerlich, dass spätere Schritte, als Wu Yi, der stellvertretende Premierminister, ein geplantes Treffen mit Premierminister Koizumi abrupt absagte, die Lage erschwerten, anstatt sie zu entspannen. Doch bei beiderseits umsichtigem Vorgehen könnte die Rivalität zwischen Tokio und Beijing in einen konstruktiven Wettbewerb münden und den Weg für die Lösung seit langem bestehender Konflikte ebnen. Beispiele dafür sind die Annäherung zwischen Indien und China, gefolgt von einem Besuch von Premierminister Koizumi in Neu-Delhi und Tokios verstärktem Interesse an Südostasien. Sehr interessant ist in diesem Zusammenhang, dass man sich in Ostasien sehr intensiv mit dem europäischen Beispiel der Überwindung kriegerischer Feindseligkeiten und der Trennung aufgrund des kalten Krieges auseinander setzt. Daraus ergibt sich für uns ein Ansatzpunkt, den wir zur Pflege von Beziehungen mit allen regionalen Akteuren nutzen sollten.
Wir ergreifen zur Lösung der anstehenden Probleme eine Reihe konkreter Schritte, um Europas Ansichten in Bezug auf das weitere Vorgehen sowie unsere Bedenken angesichts der entstandenen Lage klar zum Ausdruck zu bringen. Es gibt einen politischen Dialog. Es stimmt, wir feiern gerade den 30. Jahrestag der Aufnahme diplomatischer Beziehungen. Ein Dialog zu den Menschenrechten findet ebenfalls statt, und auch Fragen der Sicherheit stehen auf der Tagesordnung. Auf dem nächsten Gipfel mit China, der im September stattfinden wird, wollen wir eine umfassendere und anspruchsvollere Rahmenvereinbarung vorstellen, weil die bisherige nicht mehr zur Erreichung unserer ehrgeizigsten Ziele taugt. Es laufen 20 sektorale Dialoge mit den verschiedenen Ministern auf Ministerebene, um China für seine Verpflichtungen im Rahmen der WTO sowie im Hinblick auf geistige Eigentumsrechte und Arbeitsschutz, die von unserem Kollegen ebenfalls erwähnt wurden, fit zu machen. Es geht um die Entwicklung von auf Gegenseitigkeit beruhenden bilateralen Beziehungen."@de9
"Κύριε Πρόεδρε, θα ήθελα να ξεκινήσω καλωσορίζοντας τον κ. Alexander στον νέο ρόλο του, ιδίως εδώ στο Κοινοβούλιο. Θα έχουμε πολλές συζητήσεις μαζί και θα είναι χαρά μας να συνεργαστούμε.
Αναφορικά με τις εντάσεις Κίνας-Ιαπωνίας, χρησιμοποιήσαμε τις πρόσφατες υψηλόβαθμες συνόδους –συγκεκριμένα τη σύνοδο ΕΕ-Ιαπωνίας στις 2 Μαΐου στο Λουξεμβούργο– για να συζητήσουμε θέματα σταθερότητας στην Ανατολική Ασία στο ανώτερο κυβερνητικό επίπεδο. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, συμφωνήσαμε να ενισχύσουμε τον πολιτικό μας διάλογο και έχουμε πει ότι τα ενεργειακά θέματα πρέπει κυρίως να βρίσκονται υψηλά στην ατζέντα μας, μαζί με την Ιαπωνία. Θέλουμε να το κάνουμε αυτό με σκοπό κυρίως να καθησυχάσουμε τις ανησυχίες της Ιαπωνίας σχετικά με ενδεχόμενη άρση μελλοντικά του εμπάργκο όπλων της ΕΕ στην Κίνα. Ως συνέχεια αυτού, πραγματοποιήσαμε μια υπουργική τρόικα με την Ιαπωνία στις 6 Μαΐου στο περιθώριο της συνόδου ASEM. Στον πολιτικό μας διάλογο με την Κίνα, αντιμετωπίζουμε το θέμα των σινοϊαπωνικών εντάσεων και απευθύνουμε έκκληση για μετριοπάθεια και συμφιλίωση.
Όσον αφορά το εμπάργκο, τα συμπεράσματα του Ευρωπαϊκού Συμβουλίου τον Δεκέμβριο του 2005 ορίζουν με σαφήνεια ότι δεν πρέπει να υπάρξει αλλαγή στην ποιότητα ή την ποσότητα των εξαγωγών όπλων στην Κίνα. Συνεπώς, οποιαδήποτε μελλοντική απόφαση σχετικά με την άρση του εμπάργκο δεν πρέπει να μεταβάλει την κατάσταση της ασφάλειας στην Ανατολική Ασία.
Επιπρόσθετα, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση έχει ξεκινήσει ένα στρατηγικό διάλογο με τις ΗΠΑ για την Ανατολική Ασία προκειμένου να αντιμετωπίσει τις ανησυχίες για την ασφάλεια των εταίρων μας, ενώ διεξάγονται αποστολές πληροφόρησης στις ΗΠΑ, την Ιαπωνία, τη Νότιο Κορέα, την Αυστραλία και τη Νέα Ζηλανδία για να εξηγήσουν τη θέση μας. Οριστικοποιούμε τον ενισχυμένο κώδικα συμπεριφοράς για τους εμπειρογνώμονες στα όπλα.
Επιτρέψτε μου να αναφέρω δύο ακόμη θέματα πριν από τη συζήτηση και στη συνέχεια θα απαντήσω στα ερωτήματά σας. Αναφορικά με το νόμο της Κίνας για τη μη απόσχιση
στην ανακοίνωση που εκδόθηκε στις 15 Μαρτίου, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση εξέφρασε με σαφήνεια την ανησυχία της σχετικά με τη νομοθεσία. Σε αυτή την περίπτωση, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση επανέλαβε τις αρχές που καθορίζουν την πολιτική της, για παράδειγμα την προσκόλλησή της στην «προνοητική και οικονομική πολιτική» και στην ειρηνική επίλυση των διαφωνιών. Καλέσαμε επίσης και τις δύο πλευρές να αναπτύξουν πρωτοβουλίες για διάλογο και κατανόηση. Πρέπει να ειπωθεί ότι χαρήκαμε από την επίσκεψη των ηγετών της αντιπολίτευσης της Ταϊβάν στην ενδοχώρα της Κίνας. Ελπίζουμε ότι στο μέλλον όλα τα κόμματα θα συμμετάσχουν σε τέτοιου είδους επαφές.
Αναφέρομαι ξανά στο πυρηνικό πρόγραμμα της Λαϊκής Δημοκρατίας της Κορέας. Θα σας υπενθυμίσω ότι η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση –όπως επίσης και η Επιτροπή– αποτελούν μέλη του Οργανισμού για την Ενεργειακή Ανάπτυξη της Κορεατικής Χερσονήσου (KEDO). Έχουμε βοηθήσει οικονομικά και με άλλους τρόπους –αυτή τη στιγμή έχει ανασταλεί– τη δραστηριότητα, προκειμένου να βρούμε μια ειρηνική επίλυση στο θέμα των πυρηνικών όπλων. Συνεχίζουμε να παρέχουμε την απόλυτη στήριξή μας στην κυβέρνηση της Βορείου Κορέας σε διάφορες περιστάσεις. Ακούω ότι μια κοινοβουλευτική αντιπροσωπεία μεταβαίνει στη Βόρειο Κορέα. Θα χαρούμε πολύ να σας ακούσουμε να μας ενημερώσετε για τον χρόνο επιστροφής σας.
Θα σταματήσω σε αυτό το σημείο. Υπάρχουν πολλά να ειπωθούν, γιατί αυτά τα θέματα, όπως έχω αναφέρει, βρίσκονται στο κέντρο της παγκόσμιας πολιτικής για τον 21ο αιώνα.
Χαίρομαι πολύ για αυτή τη συζήτηση, γιατί η κατάσταση στην Ασία και στην Ανατολική Ασία επίσης αποτελεί πράγματι ένα σημαντικό στρατηγικό θέμα. Η Ασία σήμερα δεν είναι μόνο η ήπειρος με τον μεγαλύτερο πληθυσμό, αλλά επίσης με τον υψηλότερο ρυθμό οικονομικής ανάπτυξης και τις υψηλότερες δαπάνες για έρευνα και ανάπτυξη. Οι χώρες της Άπω Ανατολής επενδύουν στο μέλλον τους και η Ασία θα είναι αναμφίβολα η ήπειρος που θα βρίσκεται στο κέντρο του κόσμου τον 21ο αιώνα. Πρέπει να το γνωρίζουμε αυτό και να προετοιμαστούμε ανάλογα.
Η ασφάλεια στην Άπω Ανατολή είναι συνεπώς ένα θέμα άμεσης ανησυχίας για τα ευρωπαϊκά συμφέροντα. Αποτελεί μέρος της καθολικής παγκόσμιας ευθύνης για ασφάλεια και σταθερότητα, τα οποία είναι τα βασικά σημεία του ρόλου που διαδραματίζει η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση στην εξωτερική πολιτική. Επιπρόσθετα, η σταθερότητα στην Άπω Ανατολή έχει άμεσο αντίκτυπο όχι μόνο στην ευημερία και την ευεξία των πολιτών μας αλλά επίσης των πολιτών αυτής της ηπείρου. Η Κίνα, η Ιαπωνία και η Δημοκρατία της Κορέας είναι μεταξύ των έξι μεγαλύτερων οικονομιών του κόσμου, εάν συμπεριλάβουμε την ΕΕ ως μια οντότητα. Κατατάσσονται επίσης ανάμεσα στους μεγαλύτερους εμπορικούς εταίρους μας και είναι παράλληλα βασικοί παραλήπτες ξένων ευρωπαϊκών επενδύσεων. Η Ιαπωνία, από το μέρος της, αποτελεί σημαντική πηγή επενδύσεων στην Ευρώπη, και όχι λιγότερο σε ορισμένα νέα κράτη μέλη. Εν συντομία, η έλλειψη σταθερότητας στην πιο δυναμική περιοχή του κόσμου θα έχει σοβαρές συνέπειες που θα γίνουν ιδιαίτερα αισθητές στην Ευρώπη.
Ποιες είναι, συνεπώς, οι απαντήσεις της Ευρώπης και ποια είναι τα μέσα που έχουμε στη διάθεσή μας για να αντιμετωπίσουμε αυτό το θέμα; Θα ήθελα να διευθετήσω αυτό το ζήτημα τώρα.
Ας κοιτάξουμε τα βασικά ζητήματα που διακυβεύονται στην Ανατολική Ασία. Στο μεσοπρόθεσμο μέλλον, τρία σημαντικά θέματα πολιτικής θα κυριαρχήσουν στην πολιτική ατζέντα της Ανατολικής Ασίας. Πρώτον, ο τρόπος απάντησης στην ανάπτυξη της Κίνας. Δεύτερον, η διασφάλιση της σταθερότητας στην κορεάτικη χερσόνησο και τρίτον η ειρηνική επίλυση των εντάσεων μεταξύ της Κίνας και της Ταϊβάν. Η ορθή διαχείριση αυτών των θεμάτων θα έχει σημαντικές επιπτώσεις τόσο για την περιφερειακή όσο και την ευρύτερη ασφάλεια.
Από την άλλη πλευρά, ο βαθμός της οικονομικής ενοποίησης στην Ανατολική Ασία είναι εξαιρετικά εντυπωσιακός. Ωστόσο, αυτό από μόνο του δεν θα είναι αρκετό για να καταστήσει την Ανατολική Ασία πιο σταθερή και ειρηνική, ιδίως καθώς η Λαϊκή Δημοκρατία της Κορέας παραμένει εκτός της αναδυόμενης οικονομικής συνεργασίας. Επιπλέον, σε αντίθεση με την Ευρώπη το δεύτερο μισό της δεκαετίας του 1980, οι οικονομικοί δεσμοί δεν οδήγησαν σε βελτίωση των πολιτικών σχέσεων. Αντιθέτως, η οικονομική εξέλιξη της Κίνας και η επιθετική εξωτερική πολιτική της έχουν τροφοδοτήσει ανησυχίες σε ορισμένες γειτονικές χώρες ότι μια πιο ισχυρή Κίνα μπορεί να χρησιμοποιήσει τα οικονομικά της οφέλη πιο δυναμικά και να κυριαρχήσει στην περιοχή τόσο πολιτικά όσο και οικονομικά.
Η εχθρότητα μεταξύ Κίνας-Ιαπωνίας βγήκε στην επιφάνεια πιο γρήγορα και πιο εμφανώς από ό,τι ανέμεναν πολλοί παρατηρητές. Η τάση των χωρών της Ανατολικής Ασίας για έναν πιο εθνικιστικό προσανατολισμό μπορεί να ετοιμάσει το έδαφος για τη χρησιμοποίηση των διμερών διαφωνιών ως δικλείδα για την εγχώρια κατανάλωση. Στην Κίνα, για παράδειγμα, στο πλαίσιο της διαδικασίας απομάκρυνσης από τους ιδεολογικούς περιορισμούς, ο εθνικισμός αναβίωσε ως θέμα επανένωσης. Με την αλλαγή γενεών στην Κορέα, ο αντικομμουνισμός που βασίστηκε στην τραυματική εμπειρία του Πολέμου της Κορέας έχασε την ελκυστικότητά του. Η νέα ηγεσία, συμβαδίζοντας με τις απόψεις της νέας γενιάς, μοιάζει συχνά να θεωρεί μια δυναμική πολιτική ενάντια στη Βόρειο Κορέα ως μεγαλύτερη απειλή προς την ειρήνη από ό,τι το πυρηνικό πρόγραμμα της Βορείου Κορέας. Στην Ιαπωνία, παρατηρείται μια εθνικιστική αναγέννηση, η οποία δεν βασίζεται σε ένα κίνημα της νέας γενιάς, αλλά στην επιθυμία μιας μικρής ομάδας να αλλάξει την επονομαζόμενη «αυτο-υποτιμητική στάση» στην Ιαπωνία. Η εν λόγω τάση των τριών χωρών υπέρ εθνικιστικών πολιτικών δεν προοιωνίζεται καλή για την επίλυση των σοβαρών πολιτικών προβλημάτων που θα εξελιχθούν σε πιο επείγοντα τα επόμενα χρόνια. Επιπλέον, με την τεχνολογική ανάπτυξη της Κίνας, οι οικονομίες μπορεί πράγματι να στραφούν από τη φιλοφρόνηση σε πιο έντονο ανταγωνισμό και κατά συνέπεια να αναθερμάνουν το πολιτικό περιβάλλον αντί να το ηρεμήσουν.
Η αύξηση των εντάσεων δεν είναι, ωστόσο, δεδομένη. Για παράδειγμα, η σύνοδος στην Τζακάρτα στις 23 Απριλίου ανάμεσα στον πρωθυπουργό της Ιαπωνίας Koizumi και τον πρόεδρο της Κίνας –στην οποία συμμετείχα– διεξήχθη συγκεκριμένα για να αποκλιμακώσει την ένταση και αυτό δείχνει ότι και οι δύο πλευρές κατανοούν ότι ενδέχεται να αποδειχθούν ζημιωμένες οικονομικά από την αύξηση των εντάσεων. Δυστυχώς, ως εκ τούτου, τα επόμενα βήματα περιέπλεξαν παρά αποσαφήνισαν την κατάσταση όταν ο αντιπρόεδρος Wu Yi ακύρωσε ξαφνικά την προγραμματισμένη συνάντηση με τον πρωθυπουργό Koizumi. Εάν, ωστόσο, γίνει σωστή διαχείριση, η εχθρότητα μεταξύ Τόκυο-Πεκίνου μπορεί να οδηγήσει σε εποικοδομητικό ανταγωνισμό και συνεπώς να ανοίξει το δρόμο για αντιμετώπιση των μακροχρόνιων διαφωνιών, όπως έγινε γνωστό, για παράδειγμα, από την επαναπροσέγγιση Ινδίας-Κίνας μετά την επίσκεψη του πρωθυπουργού Koizumi στο Νέο Δελχί και το αυξημένο ενδιαφέρον του Τόκυο στη νοτιο-ανατολική Ασία. Υπό αυτό το πρίσμα, έχει μεγάλο ενδιαφέρον να δούμε το ευρωπαϊκό παράδειγμα επίλυσης των εχθροπραξιών πολέμου και να γίνει ο διαχωρισμός του Ψυχρού Πολέμου αντικείμενο έντονου ενδιαφέροντος και μελέτης στην Ανατολική Ασία. Αυτό μας προσφέρει τη δυνατότητα για ενίσχυση των σχέσεων με όλους τους περιφερειακούς παράγοντες.
Λαμβάνουμε μια σειρά από συγκεκριμένα βήματα για να αντιμετωπίσουμε τα ποικίλα θέματα που μας απασχολούν και να εκφράσουμε με σαφήνεια τις απόψεις της Ευρώπης για περαιτέρω εξέλιξη και τις ανησυχίες μας σχετικά με την κατάσταση. Υπάρχει πολιτικός διάλογος. Είναι αλήθεια ότι απλώς εορτάζουμε την 30ή επέτειο από την έναρξη των διπλωματικών σχέσεων. Υπάρχει επίσης διάλογος για τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα ενώ όλα τα θέματα ασφάλειας εξακολουθούν να υφίστανται και να συζητούνται. Στην επόμενη σύνοδο με την Κίνα, η οποία θα πραγματοποιηθεί τον Σεπτέμβριο, θα προσπαθήσουμε πράγματι να καταλήξουμε σε κάποια ιδέα για μια πιο λεπτομερή και πιο φιλόδοξη συμφωνία πλαίσιο, γιατί η παλαιά δεν ικανοποιεί πλέον τους πιο φιλόδοξους στόχους μας. Υπάρχουν 20 κλαδικοί διάλογοι με διάφορους υπουργούς σε υπουργικό επίπεδο, προκειμένου να προετοιμαστεί η Κίνα για τις εμπορικές υποχρεώσεις της όπως ορίζονται από τον Παγκόσμιο Οργανισμό Εμπορίου και επίσης για παράδειγμα για τις υποχρεώσεις της όσον αφορά τα δικαιώματα πνευματικής ιδιοκτησίας και την προστασία στην αγορά εργασίας, κάτι το οποίο επεσήμανε ο συνάδελφός μας. Η γενική ιδέα είναι μια απολύτως αμφοτεροβαρής διμερής σχέση."@el10
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Señor Presidente, quiero empezar dando la bienvenida al señor Alexander en su nuevo cargo, especialmente aquí en el Parlamento. Mantendremos muchos debates juntos y será un placer trabajar con él.
En cuanto a las tensiones entre China y Japón, hemos aprovechado las últimas reuniones de alto nivel, especialmente la Cumbre entre la Unión Europea y Japón del 2 de mayo en Luxemburgo, para debatir cuestiones de estabilidad en el este asiático en el máximo nivel gubernamental. En este contexto hemos pactado la intensificación de nuestro diálogo político y hemos dicho que las cuestiones sobre energía en particular deberían ocupar un lugar prioritario en nuestra agenda, junto con Japón. Queremos hacerlo, sobre todo con vistas a responder a la preocupación de Japón por un posible levantamiento futuro del embargo de armas de la Unión Europea sobre China. Como primera medida a este respecto, el 6 de mayo celebramos una troika ministerial con Japón paralelamente a la reunión de la ASEM. En nuestro diálogo político con China también abordamos la cuestión de las tensiones sino-japonesas y pedimos moderación y reconciliación.
En cuanto al embargo armamentístico, las conclusiones del Consejo Europeo de diciembre de 2005 estipulan claramente que no debería haber modificación alguna de la cantidad o la calidad de las exportaciones de armas a China. Por tanto, toda posible decisión futura sobre el levantamiento del embargo no debería alterar la situación de la seguridad en el este asiático.
Además, la Unión Europea ha iniciado un diálogo estratégico con los Estados Unidos sobre el este asiático para abordar las preocupaciones relativas a la seguridad de nuestros socios, y se han enviado delegaciones informativas a los Estados Unidos, Japón, Corea del Sur, Australia y Nueva Zelanda para explicar nuestra posición. Estamos ultimando el refuerzo del Código de Conducta sobre exportaciones de armas.
Permítanme decir dos cosas más antes del debate y después responderé a sus preguntas. En cuanto a la ley antisecesión de China, la Unión Europea expresó claramente su preocupación a este respecto en su declaración del 15 de marzo. En dicha ocasión, la Unión Europea reiteró los principios rectores de su política, a saber, adhesión a una política de «una sola China» y a una resolución pacífica de las disputas. También hemos exhortado a ambas partes a que desarrollen iniciativas de diálogo y entendimiento. Hay que decir que nos complace el hecho de que los líderes de la oposición de Taiwán fueran a la China continental. Esperamos que en el futuro todas las partes se impliquen en dichos contactos.
Me refiero de nuevo al programa nuclear de la República Popular Democrática de Corea. Quiero recordarles que la Unión Europea, al igual que la Comisión, es miembro del consejo de la KEDO. Hemos apoyado financieramente y de otras formas esta actividad, ahora suspendida, con vistas a encontrar una resolución pacífica a la cuestión nuclear. Seguimos prestando todo nuestro apoyo a las posibles conversaciones a seis bandas como solución y en numerosas ocasiones hemos dejado muy clara nuestra opinión ante el Gobierno norcoreano. He oído que una delegación parlamentaria va a ir a Corea del Norte. Nos complacerá gratamente escucharles y conocer sus impresiones cuando regresen.
Esto es todo. Hay mucho que decir, porque estas cuestiones, como ya he señalado antes, forman el núcleo de nuestra política mundial del siglo XXI.
Me alegro mucho de que se debata sobre este asunto, porque la situación en Asia y también en el este asiático es de hecho una cuestión estratégica importante. Hoy en día, Asia no es solo el continente con la mayor población, sino también el que tiene la tasa de crecimiento económico más elevada y los niveles de gasto en investigación y desarrollo más altos. Los países de Extremo Oriente invierten en su futuro y, sin duda alguna, Asia será el continente que ocupe el centro del escenario mundial en el siglo XXI. Hemos de saberlo y prepararnos para ello.
Por tanto, la seguridad en Extremo Oriente es un tema que afecta directamente a los intereses europeos. Forma parte de la responsabilidad mundial global en materia de seguridad y estabilidad, que es la principal función de la Unión Europea en política exterior. Además, la estabilidad en Extremo Oriente afecta directamente no solo a la prosperidad y al bienestar de nuestros ciudadanos, sino también a los ciudadanos de ese continente. China, Japón y la República de Corea se sitúan entre las seis primeras economías del mundo, si se cuenta a la Unión Europea como un conjunto. También se cuentan entre nuestros principales socios comerciales y son, asimismo, importantes receptores de inversión exterior europea. Japón, por su parte, es además una fuente importante de inversión en Europa, sobre todo en algunos de los nuevos Estados miembros. En pocas palabras, la inestabilidad de la región más dinámica del mundo tendría graves consecuencias que se harían sentir profundamente en Europa.
Por tanto, ¿cuáles son las respuestas europeas y de qué instrumentos disponemos para abordar esta cuestión? Voy a tratar esta cuestión ahora.
Echemos un vistazo a las principales cuestiones que hay en juego en el este asiático. En el futuro a medio plazo hay tres cuestiones políticas principales que dominarán la agenda política del este asiático. En primer lugar, cómo responder al ascenso de China. En segundo lugar, garantizar la estabilidad en la península coreana y, en tercer lugar, la resolución pacífica de las tensiones entre China y Taiwán. La gestión apropiada de estas cuestiones tendrá importantes implicaciones en nuestra seguridad regional y más amplia.
En cambio, el grado de integración económica en el este asiático es también muy impresionante. No obstante, ello no bastará para que el este asiático sea más estable o más pacífico, en particular en la medida en que la República Popular Democrática de Corea siga al margen de la nueva cooperación económica. Además, a diferencia de Europa en la última mitad de la década de 1980, los lazos económicos no han propiciado la mejora de las relaciones políticas. Por el contrario, el crecimiento económico de China y su enérgica política exterior han avivado las preocupaciones en algunos países colindantes por que una China más próspera podría utilizar sus ganancias económicas para satisfacer sus intereses nacionales con más fuerza y dominar la región tanto política como económicamente.
La rivalidad entre China y Japón ha aflorado más pronto y más visiblemente de lo que habían previsto numerosos observadores. Una tendencia en todos los países del este asiático hacia una orientación más nacionalista puede propiciar el uso de los conflictos bilaterales como válvula de escape interior. En China, por ejemplo, en el marco del proceso de alejamiento de los imperativos ideológicos, se ha reavivado el nacionalismo como aglutinante. Tras un cambio generacional en Corea, el anticomunismo basado en la experiencia traumática de la Guerra de Corea ha perdido su atractivo. La nueva dirección, en consonancia con las opiniones de la generación más joven, parece a menudo que considera que una política enérgica con respecto a Corea del Norte amenaza más a la paz que el programa nuclear de este país. En Japón puede observarse un renacimiento nacionalista, que no se basa en un movimiento de la generación joven, sino en el deseo de una elite de cambiar una pretendida «actitud autodenigrante» en Japón. Esta tendencia de los tres países de favorecer las políticas nacionalistas no es una buena señal para resolver los problemas políticos concretos que en los próximos años cobrarán más urgencia. Además, con el ascenso tecnológico de China, las economías, de hecho, pueden pasar de la complementariedad a una competición más intensa y, por tanto, a caldear el clima político en lugar de enfriarlo.
Sin embargo, la elevación de las tensiones no es inevitable. Por ejemplo, la reunión de Yakarta del 23 de abril entre el Primer Ministro de Japón, Koizumi, y el Presidente de China, en la que participé, se celebró específicamente para desescalar la tensión, lo que demuestra que ambas partes saben que podrían sufrir pérdidas económicas debido a la creciente tensión. Por tanto, es una pena que las medidas posteriores hayan complicado en lugar de calmado la situación cuando el viceprimer ministro Wu Yi anuló repentinamente una reunión programada con el Primer Ministro Koizumi. Si se gestiona bien, la rivalidad entre Tokio y Pekín podría generar una competencia constructiva y, de esta forma, abrir la vía para abordar conflictos de larga duración, como atestigua, por ejemplo, el acercamiento entre la India y China, a la que siguió una visita del Primer Ministro Koizumi a Nueva Delhi y el mayor interés de Tokio por el sudeste asiático. A este respecto es muy interesante ver que el ejemplo europeo de superar las hostilidades bélicas y la separación durante la guerra fría se convierte en objeto de gran interés y estudio en el este asiático. Esto nos proporciona una vía que deberíamos utilizar para promover las relaciones con todos los protagonistas regionales.
Vamos a adoptar una serie de medidas concretas para abordar las diferentes cuestiones que tenemos entre manos para expresar claramente las opiniones de Europa a favor de un avance y para manifestar nuestras preocupaciones por la situación. Existe un diálogo político. Es cierto que estamos a punto de celebrar nuestro 30 aniversario de relaciones diplomáticas. Existe también un diálogo de derechos humanos que contempla y trata todas las cuestiones sobre seguridad. De hecho, en la próxima cumbre con China, que se celebrará en septiembre, intentaremos plantear la idea de un acuerdo sobre un marco más exhaustivo y ambicioso, porque el antiguo ya ha dejado de cumplir nuestros objetivos más ambiciosos. Existen 20 diálogos sectoriales con los diferentes Ministros para preparar a China de cara a sus obligaciones comerciales de la OMC y, también, por ejemplo, a sus obligaciones con respecto a los derechos de propiedad intelectual y la protección laboral, que ha mencionado también nuestro colega. La idea general son relaciones de doble sentido totalmente recíprocas."@es20
"Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@et5
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Arvoisa puhemies, haluan aluksi toivottaa Douglas Alexanderin tervetulleeksi hänen uuteen tehtäväänsä varsinkin täällä parlamentissa. Keskustelemme yhdessä vielä monta kertaa, ja hänen kanssaan on ilo työskennellä.
Kiinan ja Japanin kiristyneiden suhteiden osalta olemme käyttäneet hyväksemme hiljattain järjestettyjä korkean tason tapaamisia – kuten 2. toukokuuta Luxemburgissa järjestettyä EU:n ja Japanin välistä huippukokousta – keskustellaksemme Itä-Aasian vakauteen liittyvistä kysymyksistä korkeimmalla hallitustasolla. Samassa yhteydessä olemme sopineet tiivistävämme poliittista vuoropuheluamme, ja olemme todenneet, että varsinkin energiakysymykset olisi nostettava Japanin kanssa asialistamme kärkeen. Haluamme tehdä tämän varsinkin vastataksemme Japanin huolestumiseen siitä, että EU mahdollisesti poistaa Kiinaa koskevan asevientikiellon. Ensimmäisenä jatkotoimenpiteenä järjestimme ASEM-kokouksen yhteydessä Japanissa 6. toukokuuta kolmijäsenisen ministerikokouksen. Käsittelemme Kiinan ja Japanin välisiä jännitteitä myös Kiinan kanssa käymässämme poliittisessa vuoropuhelussa vaatien maltillisuutta ja sovintohenkeä.
Joulukuussa 2005 annetuissa Eurooppa-neuvoston päätelmissä todetaan selvästi, että Kiinaan suuntautuvan aseviennin määrää tai laatua ei pitäisi muuttaa. Siksi minkään asevientikiellon poistamisesta tulevaisuudessa mahdollisesti tehtävän päätöksen ei pitäisi muuttaa Itä-Aasian turvallisuustilannetta.
Euroopan unioni on lisäksi aloittanut Itä-Aasian kysymyksestä strategisen vuoropuhelun Yhdysvaltojen kanssa lieventääkseen kumppaniemme huolta alueen turvallisuudesta. Oman kantamme selvittämiseksi olemme myös tehneet tiedustelumatkoja Yhdysvaltoihin, Japaniin, Etelä-Koreaan, Australiaan ja Uuteen-Seelantiin. Aseiden viennistä on parhaillaan valmistumassa tehokkaammat käytännesäännöt.
Ennen keskustelun alkua käsittelen vielä paria asiaa ja vastaan sitten kysymyksiinne. Euroopan unioni toi 15. maaliskuuta antamassaan julkilausumassa selkeästi julki huolestuneisuutensa Kiinan antiseparatistisesta laista. Samassa yhteydessä Euroopan unioni esitti jälleen kerran toimintaansa ohjaavat periaatteet eli sitoumuksensa harjoittaa "yhden Kiinan" politiikkaa ja pyrkiä riitojen rauhanomaiseen ratkaisuun. Olemme myös vaatineet molempia osapuolia laatimaan aloitteita vuoropuhelua ja yhteisymmärrystä varten. Toteamme panneemme tyytyväisinä merkille Taiwanin oppositiojohtajien vierailun Manner-Kiinaan. Toivomme, että kaikki osapuolet ovat tulevaisuudessa mukana tällaisissa yhteyksissä.
Palatkaamme Korean demokraattisen kansantasavallan ydinohjelmaan. Haluaisin muistuttaa teitä siitä, että Euroopan unioni – myös komissio – on Korean niemimaan energiakehitysjärjestön KEDOn hallintoneuvoston jäsen. Olemme tukeneet järjestön tällä hetkellä keskeytettyä toimintaa niin taloudellisesti kuin muillakin keinoin saavuttaaksemme rauhanomaisen ratkaisun ydinohjelmakysymykseen. Annamme vastedeskin täyden tukemme mahdollisille kuuden osapuolen välisille neuvotteluille asian edistämiseksi, ja olemme tuoneet julki kantamme selkein sanamuodoin Pohjois-Korean hallitukselle eri yhteyksissä. Olen kuullut, että parlamenttimme on lähettämässä valtuuskunnan Pohjois-Koreaan. Haluamme mielellämme kuulla matkakokemuksistanne, kun palaatte takaisin.
Päätän puheenvuoroni tähän. Paljon on vielä sanottavaa, koska, kuten jo totesin, nämä aiheet ovat maailmanlaajuisen toimintapolitiikkamme keskiössä 2000-luvulla.
Olen erittäin iloinen tästä keskustelusta, koska Aasian ja myös Itä-Aasian tilanne on todellakin merkittävä strateginen kysymys. Aasia on nykyään väestömäärältään maailman suurin maanosa, mutta sen talouskasvu on myös nopeinta, ja siellä käytetään eniten rahaa tutkimus- ja kehittämistoimintaan. Kaukoidän maat investoivat tulevaisuuteen, ja Aasia on epäilemättä maailman tärkein maanosa 2000-luvulla. Meidän on oltava siitä tietoisia ja valmistauduttava siihen.
Kaukoidän turvallisuus onkin asia, joka koskettaa suoraan eurooppalaisia etuja. Kysymys on osa Euroopan unionin maailmanlaajuista kokonaisvastuuta rauhan ja vakauden säilyttämiseksi, mikä on unionin ulkopoliittisen tehtävän ydinalueita. Vakaus Kaukoidässä vaikuttaa lisäksi suoraan omien kansalaistemme ohella myös kyseisen maanosan kansalaisten hyvinvointiin ja hyvänolontunteeseen. Kiina, Japani ja Korean tasavalta ovat maailman kuuden johtavan talousmahdin joukossa, jos EU lasketaan yhdeksi niistä. Ne ovat myös tärkeimpiä kauppakumppaneitamme ja eurooppalaisten tekemien ulkomaisten sijoitusten pääkohteita. Japanilla puolestaan on myös merkittävä rooli Eurooppaan ja varsinkin joihinkin uusiin jäsenvaltioihin tehdyissä sijoituksissa. Lyhyesti sanottuna epävakaus yhdellä maailman dynaamisimmista alueista johtaisi vakaviin seurauksiin, jotka tuntuisivat voimakkaasti myös Euroopassa.
Mikä siis on Euroopan vastaus tämän kysymyksen ratkaisemiseksi ja mitä keinoja meillä on käytettävissämme? Tämä on asia, jota haluaisin käsitellä seuraavaksi.
Tarkastellaanpa tärkeimpiä kysymyksiä, jotka ovat vaakalaudalla Itä-Aasiassa. Keskipitkällä aikavälillä Itä-Aasian poliittisten asioiden listalla on kolme keskeistä kysymystä. Ensimmäinen kysymys on, miten vastata Kiinan nousuun. Toisena on vakauden takaaminen Korean niemimaalla ja kolmantena Kiinan ja Taiwanin välisten jännitteiden rauhanomainen ratkaiseminen. Näiden kysymysten asianmukainen ratkaiseminen vaikuttaa suuresti turvallisuuteen niin alueellisella kuin laajemmallakin tasolla.
Itä-Aasian taloudellisen yhdentymisen aste on puolestaan myös erittäin merkittävää. Se ei kuitenkaan yksin riitä saamaan Itä-Aasian oloja vakaammiksi tai rauhallisemmiksi varsinkin, kun Korean demokraattinen kansantasavalta on yhä lisääntyvän talousyhteistyön ulkopuolella. Toisin kuin 1980-luvun loppupuolen Euroopassa, taloudelliset siteet eivät lisäksi ole johtaneet poliittisten suhteiden paranemiseen. Kiinan talouden nousu ja sen itsevarma ulkopolitiikka on päinvastoin herättänyt joissakin sen naapurimaissa huolestuneisuutta siitä, että hyvinvointinsa lisääntyessä Kiina saattaisi käyttää taloudellisia voittojaan kansallisten etujensa voimaperäisempään tavoitteluun ja hallita aluetta niin poliittisesti kuin taloudellisesti.
Kiinan ja Japanin välinen kilpailu on noussut esiin aikaisemmin ja näkyvämmin kuin mitä monet tarkkailijat ovat odottaneet. Kaikissa Itä-Aasian maissa havaittu kiihkokansallinen suuntaus saattaa antaa sijaa kahdenvälisten selkkausten käyttämiselle kotimaisen kulutuksen venttiileinä. Kansallismielisyys on herätetty henkiin maata yhdistävänä teemana esimerkiksi Kiinassa osana ideologisten pakotteiden poistamisprosessia. Koreassa tapahtuneen sukupolvenmuutoksen myötä Korean sodan traumaattiseen kokemukseen perustuva kommunismin vastainen suuntaus on menettänyt vetovoimansa. Maan uusi johto, joka mukailee nuoremman sukupolven näkemyksiä, näyttää usein pitävän Pohjois-Korean nähden omaksuttavaa voimapolitiikkaa suurempana uhkana rauhalle kuin Pohjois-Korean ydinohjelmaa. Kansallismielisyyden on havaittu tekevän uutta tuloaan myös Japanissa, mutta siellä se ei perustu nuoren sukupolven liikkeeseen vaan siihen, että eliitti toivoo muutosta niin sanottuun itsekriittiseen asenteeseen Japanissa. Tämä kaikissa kolmessa maassa havaittu suuntaus kansallismielisten politiikkojen suosimisesta ei tiedä hyvää lähivuosina yhä kiireellisemmiksi muuttuvien konkreettisten poliittisten ongelmien ratkaisemiselle. Kiinan teknologisen esiinmarssin myötä maiden talouksissa saatetaan lisäksi siirtyä toistensa täydentämisestä kovempaan kilpailuun, mikä osaltaan kuumentaa poliittista ilmapiiriä sen viilentämisen sijaan.
Jännitteiden lisääntyminen ei kuitenkaan ole itsestään selvää. Esimerkiksi Japanin pääministerin Koizumin ja Kiinan presidentin välillä Jakartassa 23. huhtikuuta järjestetyssä tapaamisessa – johon itsekin osallistuin – pyrittiin juuri lieventämään jännitteitä. Tämä osoittaakin molempien osapuolten ymmärtävän, että jännitteiden lisäämisestä koituu ainoastaan jatkuvia taloudellisia tappioita. Siksi on valitettavaa, että jatkotoimet ovat pikemminkin mutkistaneet kuin rauhoittaneet tilannetta, kun varapääministeri Wu Yi odottamatta peruutti jo sovitun tapaamisen pääministeri Koizumin kanssa. Jos Tokion ja Pekingin välistä kilpailumielialaa hoidetaan kuitenkin oikein, se saattaa johtaa rakentavaan kilpailuun ja avata siten tietä pitkäaikaisten ristiriitojen ratkaisemiselle. Näin on jo tapahtunutkin. Esimerkkeinä mainittakoon Intian ja Kiinan välien lähentyminen, pääministeri Koizumin vierailu New Delhiin ja Tokion lisääntynyt kiinnostus Kaakkois-Aasiaan. Tältä osin onkin erittäin kiinnostavaa havaita, että eurooppalaisten esimerkki sotavihollisuuksien ja kylmän sodan aikaisen jakaantumisen voittamisesta on aiheuttanut paljon kiinnostusta ja tutkimusta Itä-Aasiassa. Tämä tarjoaa meille pelinavauksen, jota meidän on hyödynnettävä edistäessämme suhteita kaikkiin alueellisen yhteistyön osapuoliin.
Toteutamme parhaillaan useita konkreettisia toimenpiteitä ratkaistaksemme käsillä olevat kysymykset, jotta voisimme tuoda selkeästi julki Euroopan näkökannat siihen, miten asioissa on edettävä, ja ilmaista kantavamme huolta tilanteesta. Poliittinen vuoropuhelu on jo käynnissä. Juhlistamme lisäksi parhaillaan diplomaattisuhteidemme 30:ttä vuosipäivää. Vuoropuhelua käydään myös ihmisoikeuskysymyksissä; kaikki turvallisuuskysymykset on huomioitu, ja niistä keskustellaan. Syyskuussa järjestettävässä EU:n ja Kiinan välisessä seuraavassa huippukokouksessa yritämmekin esittää ajatuksen laajemmasta ja kunnianhimoisemmasta puitesopimuksesta, sillä vanha sopimus ei enää vastaa suurisuuntaisimpia päämääriämme. Eri ministerit käyvät vuoropuhelua 20:llä eri sektorilla Kiinan valmistamiseksi ottamaan vastaan WTO:n kauppavelvoitteensa ja myös esimerkiksi kolleganikin mainitsemat teollis- ja tekijänoikeuksiin ja työsuojeluun liittyvät velvoitteensa. Yleisenä ajatuksena on saavuttaa täysin vastavuoroiset kahdenkeskiset suhteet."@fi7
"Monsieur le Président, je souhaite commencer par souhaiter la bienvenue à M. Alexander dans son nouveau rôle, tout particulièrement ici, au Parlement. Nous aurons ensemble de nombreux débats et ce sera un plaisir de travailler avec lui.
À propos des tensions entre la Chine et le Japon, nous avons tiré parti des récentes réunions de haut niveau - notamment le sommet entre l’Union européenne et le Japon du 2 mai à Luxembourg - pour discuter des questions de stabilité en Asie de l’Est au plus haut niveau gouvernemental. Dans ce contexte, nous sommes convenus d’intensifier notre dialogue politique et nous avons déclaré que les questions énergétiques, en particulier, devraient figurer en très bonne place sur notre agenda, de même que le Japon. Nous voulons le faire, notamment en vue de répondre à l’inquiétude du Japon quant à une future levée éventuelle de l’embargo sur les armes imposé par l’Union européenne à la Chine. Comme première mesure de suivi, nous avons organisé une troïka ministérielle avec le Japon le 6 mai, en marge de la réunion de l’ASEM. Dans notre dialogue politique avec la Chine, nous abordons également la question des tensions sino-japonaises et appelons à la modération et à la réconciliation.
En ce qui concerne l’embargo sur les armes, les conclusions du Conseil européen de décembre 2005 affirment clairement qu’il ne devrait pas y avoir de changement, ni quantitatif ni qualitatif, concernant les exportations d’armes vers la Chine. Par conséquent, toute éventuelle décision future concernant la levée de l’embargo ne devrait pas altérer la situation en matière de sécurité en Asie de l’Est.
De plus, l’Union européenne a entamé avec les États-Unis un dialogue stratégique sur l’Asie de l’Est afin d’aborder les préoccupations sécuritaires de nos partenaires, et des missions d’information ont été envoyées aux États-Unis, au Japon, en Corée du Sud, en Australie et en Nouvelle-Zélande afin d’expliquer notre position. Nous sommes en train de finaliser le Code de conduite renforcé sur les experts en armement.
Permettez-moi d’ajouter deux choses avant le débat, et je répondrai ensuite à vos questions. En ce qui concerne la loi chinoise anti-sécession, dans sa déclaration du 15 mars, l’Union européenne a clairement exprimé sa préoccupation quant à cette législation. À cette occasion, l’Union européenne a réaffirmé les principes qui guident sa politique, à savoir son attachement à la politique d’«une seule Chine» et à une résolution pacifique des litiges. Nous avons également appelé les deux parties à élaborer des initiatives en faveur du dialogue et de la bonne entente. Il convient de dire que nous sommes heureux de voir que des dirigeants d’opposition de Taïwan se sont rendus en Chine continentale. Nous espérons qu’à l’avenir, tous les partis participeront à ce type de contacts.
J’évoquerai une nouvelle fois le programme nucléaire de la RPDC. Je vous rappellerai que l’Union européenne - et la Commission également - est membre de la KEDO. Nous avons soutenu financièrement, ainsi que d’autres manières, cette activité - actuellement suspendue - en vue de trouver une solution pacifique à la question nucléaire. Nous continuons d’apporter notre entier soutien aux éventuels pourparlers à six parties pour aller de l’avant et, à plusieurs occasions, nous avons clairement fait connaître notre opinion au gouvernement nord-coréen. J’ai appris qu’une délégation parlementaire va se rendre en Corée du Nord. Nous serons très heureux de vous écouter et de prendre connaissance de votre expérience à votre retour.
Je m’arrêterai ici. Il y a beaucoup à dire, car ces questions, comme je l’ai dit, se trouvent au centre de notre politique mondiale pour le XXIe siècle.
Je suis très contente que nous ayons ce débat, car la situation en Asie, ainsi qu’en Asie de l’Est, est une question véritablement stratégique. L’Asie est aujourd’hui le continent qui présente non seulement la population la plus nombreuse, mais aussi le taux de croissance économique le plus élevé et les niveaux les plus élevés de dépenses pour la recherche et le développement. Les pays d’Extrême-Orient investissent dans leur avenir et le continent asiatique se trouvera sans aucun doute au centre de la scène internationale au XXIe siècle. Nous devons le savoir, et nous devons nous y préparer.
La sécurité en Extrême-Orient est par conséquent un sujet qui concerne directement les intérêts européens. Elle est un élément de la responsabilité globale, au niveau mondial, en matière de sécurité et de stabilité qui se trouve au cœur du rôle de l’Union européenne dans le domaine de la politique étrangère. De plus, la stabilité en Extrême-Orient a une incidence directe, sur la prospérité et le bien-être non seulement de nos citoyens, mais aussi des citoyens de ce continent. La Chine, le Japon et la République de Corée comptent parmi les six premières économies du monde, si l’Union européenne est considérée comme formant une seule économie. Ils comptent également parmi nos principaux partenaires commerciaux et sont des bénéficiaires majeurs des investissements étrangers. Le Japon, pour sa part, est aussi une source majeure d’investissement en Europe, et notamment dans certains des nouveaux États membres. En bref, l’instabilité dans la région la plus dynamique du monde aurait de graves conséquences qui seraient vivement ressenties en Europe.
Quelles sont par conséquent les réponses européennes et quels sont les instruments à notre disposition pour aborder cette question? Je voudrais répondre maintenant à cette question.
Jetons un coup d’œil aux principales questions en jeu en Asie de l’Est. À moyen terme, trois questions politiques majeures domineront l’agenda politique en Asie de l’Est. Premièrement, comment réagir à l’ascension de la Chine? Deuxièmement, garantir la stabilité de la péninsule coréenne et, troisièmement, une résolution pacifique des tensions entre la Chine et Taïwan. Le traitement approprié de ces questions aura des conséquences majeures à la fois pour notre sécurité régionale et pour la sécurité de manière plus générale.
Par contraste, le degré d’intégration économique en Asie de l’Est est également très impressionnant. Toutefois, cela ne sera pas suffisant pour rendre l’Asie de l’Est plus stable ou plus pacifique, particulièrement alors que la RPDC est encore en dehors de la coopération économique émergente. De plus, à la différence de l’Europe à la fin des années 1980, les liens économiques n’ont pas entraîné d’amélioration des relations politiques. Au contraire, l’avènement économique de la Chine et sa politique étrangère très affirmée ont avivé dans certains pays voisins l’inquiétude de voir une Chine plus prospère utiliser ses profits économiques pour poursuivre ses intérêts nationaux avec plus de force et dominer la région à la fois politiquement et économiquement.
La rivalité entre la Chine et le Japon a fait surface plus tôt et de manière plus visible que de nombreux observateurs ne l’attendaient. La tendance constatée dans tous les pays d’Asie de l’Est, à une orientation plus nationaliste pourrait bien préparer la voie pour une utilisation des conflits bilatéraux à des fins de consommation domestique. En Chine, par exemple, dans le cadre du processus d’éloignement par rapport aux contraintes idéologiques, le nationalisme a été ravivé en tant que thème unificateur. Avec le changement des générations en Corée, l’anticommunisme fondé sur l’expérience traumatisante de la guerre de Corée a perdu son attrait. Les nouveaux dirigeants, conformément aux opinions de la jeune génération, paraissent souvent considérer qu’une politique coercitive vis-à-vis de la Corée du Nord poserait une plus grande menace à la paix que le programme nucléaire de cette même Corée du Nord. Au Japon, on peut observer une renaissance nationaliste, qui n’est pas fondée sur un mouvement de la jeune génération, mais sur un désir de l’élite de changer une prétendue «attitude d’autodénigrement « au Japon. Cette tendance, dans les trois pays, à favoriser les politiques nationalistes, n’est pas de bon augure pour la résolution des problèmes politiques concrets, qui deviendront plus pressants au cours des années à venir. Par ailleurs, avec l’ascension technologique de la Chine, les économies pourraient, en fait, passer de la complémentarité à une concurrence plus intensive, et échauffer par là même le contexte politique au lieu de le calmer.
L’augmentation des tensions n’est toutefois pas une évidence. Par exemple, la réunion tenue à Jakarta le 23 avril entre M. Koizumi, le Premier ministre japonais, et le Président chinois - à laquelle j’ai participé - a été tenue spécifiquement dans le but d’apaiser les tensions, et cela démontre que les deux parties comprennent qu’elles perdraient économiquement à une augmentation des tensions. Il est donc regrettable que les démarches de suivi aient compliqué, plutôt que calmé, la situation lorsque le vice-Premier ministre Wu Yi a abruptement annulé une réunion prévue avec le Premier ministre Koizumi. Si toutefois elle est bien gérée, la rivalité entre Tokyo et Pékin pourrait déboucher sur une concurrence constructive, ouvrant ainsi la voie au résolution de conflits anciens, comme en témoigne par exemple le rapprochement entre l’Inde et la Chine, suivi d’une visite du Premier ministre Koizumi à New Delhi et de l’intérêt accru de Tokyo pour l’Asie du Sud-Est. À cet égard, il est très intéressant de voir que l’exemple européen de dépassement des hostilités guerrières et de la séparation due à la guerre froide devient un important sujet d’intérêt et d’étude en Asie de l’Est. Cela nous fournit l’occasion d’une ouverture que nous devrions mettre à profit pour favoriser les relations avec l’ensemble des acteurs régionaux.
Nous entreprenons un certain nombre de démarches concrètes afin d’aborder les différentes questions pendantes, afin d’exprimer clairement les vues de l’Europe sur la manière d’aller de l’avant, et d’exprimer nos inquiétudes quant à la situation. Il y a un dialogue politique. Il est vrai que nous venons de célébrer le 30e anniversaire de nos relations diplomatiques. Il y a aussi un dialogue en matière de droits de l’homme, et toutes les questions de sécurité sont là et font l’objet d’une discussion. De fait, lors du prochain sommet avec la Chine, qui se tiendra au mois de septembre, nous essaierons de présenter l’idée d’un accord-cadre plus complet et plus ambitieux, l’ancien accord ne répondant plus à nos objectifs les plus ambitieux. Il y a, au niveau ministériel, 20 dialogues sectoriels en cours avec différents ministres, pour préparer la Chine à ses obligations en tant que membre de l’OMC ainsi, par exemple, qu’à ses obligations pour ce qui est des droits de propriété intellectuelle et en ce qui concerne la protection de la main-d’œuvre, que notre collègue a également mentionnée. L’idée générale est d’entretenir des relations pleinement réciproques."@fr8
"Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@hu11
"Signor Presidente, vorrei esordire porgendo il benvenuto ad Alexander Douglas, specialmente qui in Parlamento, investito della sua nuova carica. Insieme prenderemo parte a molti dibattiti e sarà un piacere lavorare con lui.
In riferimento alle tensioni tra Cina e Giappone, abbiamo sfruttato i recenti incontri ad alto livello – e in particolare il Vertice UE-Giappone del 2 maggio a Lussemburgo – per discutere della stabilità in Asia orientale ai più alti livelli governativi. In quel contesto, abbiamo convenuto di intensificare il dialogo politico e abbiamo sottolineato in particolare che le questioni energetiche dovrebbero rientrare fra i temi prioritari, insieme al Giappone. Vogliamo muoverci in questa direzione anche per rispondere ai timori espressi dal Giappone riguardo a una possibile futura revoca dell’
sulle armi contro la Cina imposto dall’Unione europea. Come prima misura abbiamo organizzato una
ministeriale con il Giappone il 6 maggio, a margine della riunione dell’ASEM. Nel dialogo politico con la Cina stiamo anche affrontando il problema delle tensioni tra questa e il Giappone, invitandola alla moderazione e alla riconciliazione.
Per quanto riguarda l’
sulle armi, le conclusioni del Consiglio europeo del dicembre 2005 affermano chiaramente che non dovrebbe esservi alcun cambiamento qualitativo o quantitativo nelle esportazioni di armi in Cina. Di conseguenza, una possibile decisione futura di revocare l’
non dovrebbe modificare la situazione della sicurezza in Asia orientale.
L’Unione europea ha altresì dato il via a un dialogo strategico con gli Stati Uniti sull’Asia orientale per rispondere alle paure dei nostri
riguardo alla sicurezza, e sono state organizzate missioni informative negli USA, in Giappone, in Corea del Sud, in Australia e in Nuova Zelanda per spiegare la nostra posizione. Stiamo ultimando la messa a punto del codice di condotta rafforzato per le esportazioni di armi.
Consentitemi di soffermarmi su due ultimi punti prima del dibattito e poi risponderò alle vostre domande. Per quanto riguarda la legge antisecessione della Cina, nella sua dichiarazione rilasciata il 15 marzo l’Unione europea ha chiaramente espresso i propri timori su tale legislazione. In quell’occasione, l’UE ha ribadito i principi che ispirano la sua politica, ossia la sua fedeltà a una politica imperniata su “una Cina” e alla risoluzione pacifica delle controversie. Abbiamo inoltre invitato entrambe le parti a sviluppare iniziative di dialogo e intesa reciproca. Bisogna dire che siamo stati lieti di vedere i
dell’opposizione taiwanese recarsi in visita in Cina. Speriamo che in futuro tutte le parti saranno coinvolte in questi contatti.
Vorrei ora accennare al programma nucleare della Repubblica democratica popolare di Corea. Vi ricordo che l’Unione europea – così come la Commissione – è membro del comitato del KEDO. Abbiamo sostenuto finanziariamente, e non solo, questa attività – al momento sospesa – al fine di giungere a una soluzione pacifica della questione nucleare. Continuiamo a sostenere pienamente eventuali colloqui a sei come possibile soluzione e, in diverse occasioni, abbiamo espresso a chiare lettere il nostro parere al governo nordcoreano. Apprendo che una delegazione parlamentare si recherà in Corea del Nord. Saremo molto felici di ascoltarvi e di avere informazioni al vostro ritorno.
Mi fermo qui. C’è molto da dire perché queste questioni, come ho già sottolineato, sono al cuore della nostra politica globale per il ventunesimo secolo.
Sono molto lieta di questa discussione perché la situazione in Asia e in Asia orientale è indubbiamente di grande importanza strategica. Oggigiorno l’Asia non è solo il continente più popolato, ma anche quello con il più alto tasso di crescita economica e le maggiori percentuali di spesa per la ricerca e lo sviluppo. I paesi dell’Estremo Oriente investono nel proprio futuro e l’Asia, sicuramente, sarà protagonista della scena mondiale nel ventunesimo secolo. Dobbiamo esserne consapevoli e prepararci.
La sicurezza in Estremo Oriente è quindi un argomento che tocca direttamente gli interessi europei. Rientra nelle responsabilità di sicurezza e stabilità a livello mondiale su cui verte la politica estera dell’Unione europea. La stabilità in Estremo Oriente, inoltre, ha un impatto diretto sulla prosperità e il benessere non solo dei nostri cittadini, ma anche dei cittadini dello stesso continente asiatico. La Cina, il Giappone e la Repubblica di Corea rientrano tra le sei più importanti economie a livello mondiale, se contiamo anche l’Unione europea. Questi paesi sono tra i nostri principali
commerciali e i primi beneficiari degli investimenti stranieri europei. Il Giappone, da parte sua, è una delle più importanti fonti di investimento in Europa, anche in alcuni dei nuovi Stati membri. In poche parole, l’instabilità nella regione più dinamica del mondo avrebbe gravi conseguenze che peserebbero profondamente sull’Europa.
Quali sono, quindi, le risposte europee e quali gli strumenti disponibili per affrontare tale questione? Vorrei soffermarmi su questo punto .
Esaminiamo le principali questioni da affrontare in Asia orientale. In un futuro a medio termine, l’agenda politica dell’Asia orientale sarà principalmente caratterizzata da tre temi di natura politica: come rispondere all’ascesa della Cina, garantire la stabilità della penisola coreana e giungere a una risoluzione pacifica delle tensioni tra Cina e Taiwan. La nostra sicurezza regionale e globale trarrà grande beneficio dall’adozione di una strategia adeguata nella soluzione di questi problemi.
Anche il livello di integrazione economica dell’Asia orientale è assai ragguardevole. Questo singolo elemento, però, non sarà sufficiente a garantire maggiore stabilità o pace alla regione, soprattutto perché la Repubblica democratica popolare di Corea non partecipa ancora alla nuova cooperazione economica. Peraltro, a differenza di quanto successo in Europa nell’ultima metà degli anni ’80, i legami economici non hanno comportato un miglioramento delle relazioni politiche. Al contrario, la scalata economica cinese e l’aggressiva politica estera hanno alimentato timori in alcuni paesi confinanti, secondo cui una Cina più fiorente potrebbe sfruttare il vantaggio economico per meglio soddisfare i propri interessi nazionali e dominare l’intera regione a livello politico ed economico.
La rivalità tra Cina e Giappone è emersa prima e più visibilmente di quanto previsto da molti osservatori. La tendenza a un atteggiamento più nazionalista registrata in tutti i paesi dell’Asia orientale potrebbe portare a usare i conflitti bilaterali come valvola di consumo a livello nazionale. In Cina, ad esempio, nel processo di allontanamento dai vincoli ideologici, il nazionalismo è stato riportato in auge come elemento unificante. In Corea, con il cambio generazionale, l’anticomunismo basato sulla traumatica esperienza della guerra coreana ha perso il proprio fascino. La nuova
allineata alle idee della generazione più giovane, spesso sembra considerare la politica di forza verso la Corea del Nord una minaccia alla pace ben più grave di quanto non sia lo stesso programma nucleare della Corea del Nord. In Giappone si osserva una rinascita nazionalista che non si basa su un movimento di giovani, bensì sul desiderio di un’
di cambiare il cosiddetto “atteggiamento autodenigratorio” giapponese. La tendenza dei tre paesi a favorire le politiche nazionaliste non è di buon auspicio per la soluzione dei concreti problemi politici che diventeranno più urgenti nei prossimi anni. Inoltre, con l’ascesa tecnologica cinese le economie potrebbero, in realtà, passare dalla complementarità a una più energica concorrenza infiammando, e non placando, il contesto politico.
Le crescenti tensioni non sono, tuttavia, un fatto accettato. L’incontro del 23 aprile a Giacarta, a cui ho preso parte, tra il Primo Ministro giapponese Koizumi e il Presidente cinese è stato organizzato proprio a scopi distensivi, e ciò dimostra che entrambe le parti comprendono che un inasprimento delle tensioni le danneggerebbe economicamente. E’ quindi deprecabile che gli avvenimenti successivi non abbiano calmato la situazione, bensì l’abbiano complicata, quando il vice Primo Ministro Wu Yi ha improvvisamente cancellato un incontro previsto con il Primo Ministro Koizumi. Tuttavia, se gestita in maniera adeguata, la rivalità tra Tokyo e Pechino potrebbe portare a una concorrenza costruttiva, aprendo così la via alla soluzione di annosi conflitti, come comprovato, ad esempio, dal ravvicinamento tra India e Cina, seguito da una visita del Primo Ministro Koizumi a Nuova Delhi e dal crescente interesse di Tokyo per l’Asia sudorientale. A tale proposito, è molto interessante vedere come l’esempio dato dall’Europa nel superare le ostilità e la separazione della guerra fredda sia diventato oggetto di studio e di forte interesse in Asia orientale. Ciò testimonia un’apertura che dovremmo sfruttare per consolidare i rapporti con i vari attori della regione.
Stiamo attuando una serie di iniziative concrete per affrontare le varie questioni all’esame, allo scopo di spiegare chiaramente cosa pensa l’Europa su una possibile soluzione ed esprimere i nostri timori al riguardo. C’è un dialogo politico. E’ vero che stiamo appena celebrando il trentesimo anniversario delle nostre relazioni diplomatiche. C’è anche un dialogo sui diritti umani, in cui sono presenti e vengono discussi tutti i temi legati alla sicurezza. In occasione del prossimo vertice con la Cina, a settembre, cercheremo di mettere a punto un accordo quadro più ambizioso e completo, perché quello vecchio non soddisfa più i nostri più grandi obiettivi. Vi sono 20 dialoghi settoriali, a cui partecipano diversi ministri a livello ministeriale, per aiutare la Cina a rispettare gli obblighi commerciali dell’OMC e anche, ad esempio, gli obblighi relativi ai diritti di proprietà intellettuale e alla tutela dei lavoratori, anch’essi menzionati dal collega. L’idea è quella di instaurare relazioni bilaterali caratterizzate da una piena reciprocità."@it12
"Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@lt14
"Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@lv13
"Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@mt15
".
Mijnheer de Voorzitter, om te beginnen zou ik de heer Alexander in zijn nieuwe rol willen verwelkomen, vooral wat betreft zijn rol hier in het Parlement. Wij zullen samen veel debatten voeren en het zal een genoegen zijn om met hem te werken.
Wat de spanningen tussen China en Japan betreft, hebben wij onlangs ontmoetingen op hoog niveau aangegrepen – met name de Top tussen de EU en Japan van 2 mei in Luxemburg – om zaken rond stabiliteit in Oost-Azië op het hoogste regeringsniveau te bespreken. In deze context zijn wij overeengekomen onze politieke dialoog te intensiveren, en wij hebben aangegeven dat met name kwesties rond energie zeer hoog op de agenda zouden moeten staan, wat ook voor Japan geldt. Wij willen de dialoog met name versterken in verband met de Japanse bezorgdheid over een mogelijke opheffing in de toekomst van het wapenembargo van de EU tegen China. Als eerste vervolgstap hebben wij op 6 mei in de marge van de ASEM-ontmoeting een ministeriële trojka met Japan gehouden. Ook in onze politieke dialoog met China stellen wij de kwestie van de Chinees-Japanse spanningen aan de orde en roepen wij op tot verzoening en een gematigde houding.
Omtrent het wapenembargo wordt in de conclusies van de Europese Raad van december 2004 duidelijk gesteld dat er noch in kwantitatief noch in kwalitatief opzicht verandering zou mogen komen in de wapenexport naar China. Daarom zou een toekomstige beslissing over opheffing van het embargo geen verandering mogen betekenen voor de veiligheid in Oost-Azië.
Bovendien heeft de Europese Unie een begin gemaakt met een strategische dialoog met de Verenigde Staten over Oost-Azië, om de bezorgdheid van onze partners met betrekking tot veiligheid aan de orde te stellen. Om onze positie uit te leggen, zijn informatiemissies uitgevoerd in de VS, Japan, Zuid-Korea, Australië en Nieuw-Zeeland. We leggen op dit moment de laatste hand aan de bijgewerkte gedragscode inzake wapenexport.
Ik zou nog twee dingen willen zeggen voordat het debat begint, waarna ik uw vragen zal beantwoorden. De Europese Unie heeft in haar verklaring van 15 mei duidelijk haar bezorgdheid omtrent de anti-afscheidingswet van China tot uitdrukking gebracht. Bij die gelegenheid heeft de Europese Unie de principes herhaald die ten grondslag liggen aan haar beleid, dat wil zeggen: gehechtheid aan een ‘één China’-beleid en gehechtheid aan een vreedzame oplossing van de geschillen. Ook hebben wij beide partijen opgeroepen om initiatieven te ontplooien op het gebied van dialoog en begrip. Ik kan u zeggen dat wij blij zijn dat Taiwanese oppositieleiders naar het vasteland van China hebben kunnen reizen. Wij hopen dat alle partijen in de toekomst bij dergelijke contacten betrokken zullen zijn.
Ik zou nogmaals de aandacht willen vestigen op de kwestie van het nucleaire programma van de Democratische Volksrepubliek Korea. Ik wil u eraan herinneren dat de Europese Unie – en ook de Commissie – deel uitmaakt van het dagelijks bestuur van KEDO. Wij hebben deze activiteit, die momenteel opgeschort is, onder meer financieel ondersteund om het nucleaire vraagstuk op vreedzame wijze op te kunnen lossen. Wij blijven onze volledige steun geven aan eventuele zespartijengesprekken en beschouwen deze als de weg die gevolgd moet worden. Ook hebben wij onze standpunten bij verschillende gelegenheden duidelijk overgebracht aan de Noord-Koreaanse regering. Ik heb gehoord dat er een parlementaire delegatie naar Noord-Korea gaat. Wanneer u terug bent, zullen wij graag van u vernemen wat uw ervaringen en bevindingen zijn.
Hier laat ik het bij. Er valt nog veel te zeggen, omdat deze zaken, zoals ik al zei, de kern uitmaken van ons mondiale beleid voor de 21e eeuw.
Ik ben erg blij met dit debat, omdat de situatie in Azië, en ook in Oost-Azië, zeker een belangrijke strategische kwestie vormt. Tegenwoordig is Azië niet alleen het continent met de meest omvangrijke bevolking, maar ook het continent met de hoogste cijfers voor economische groei en de hoogste uitgaven voor onderzoek en ontwikkeling. De landen in het Verre Oosten investeren in hun toekomst en Azië zal in de 21e eeuw ongetwijfeld een hoofdrol vervullen op het wereldtoneel. Wij moeten ons hiervan bewust zijn en ons daarop voorbereiden.
Daarom is de veiligheid in het Verre Oosten een onderwerp dat rechtstreeks raakt aan de Europese belangen. Ze is onderdeel van de algehele verantwoordelijkheid voor veiligheid en stabiliteit in de wereld die de kern vormt van het buitenlands beleid van de Europese Unie. Bovendien heeft stabiliteit in het Verre Oosten niet alleen rechtstreekse gevolgen voor de welvaart en het welzijn van onze burgers, maar ook voor de burgers van het Aziatische continent. China, Japan en de Republiek Zuid-Korea behoren tot de zes belangrijkste economieën ter wereld, als men de EU als één economie beschouwt. Ook behoren ze tot onze grootste handelspartners en zijn ze grote ontvangers van buitenlandse investeringen uit Europa. Voor Japan geldt tevens dat dit land een belangrijke leverancier van investeringen in Europa is, niet het minst in een aantal nieuwe lidstaten. Om kort te gaan: instabiliteit in de meest dynamische regio ter wereld zou ernstige gevolgen hebben, en die zouden ook in Europa nadrukkelijk te voelen zijn.
De vraag is dus: wat is de lijn die Europa volgt in deze kwestie, en welke middelen staan ons ter beschikking om de zaken goed aan te pakken? Dit zijn de vragen die ik nu aan de orde zou willen stellen.
Laten we eens kijken naar de belangrijkste kwesties in Oost-Azië. Voor de middellange termijn zijn er drie belangrijke beleidsterreinen die de politieke agenda in Oost-Azië domineren. Ten eerste gaat het erom hoe men moet omgaan met de opkomst van China; ten tweede moet de stabiliteit van het Koreaanse schiereiland worden gewaarborgd; en ten derde is een vreedzame oplossing voor de spanningen tussen China en Taiwan van belang. Een juiste aanpak van deze kwesties zal van grote invloed zijn op zowel onze regionale veiligheid als onze veiligheid in een breder verband.
Positief is natuurlijk dat er ook in Oost-Azië inmiddels grote vooruitgang is geboekt op het vlak van economische integratie. Maar dit is op zichzelf niet voldoende om Oost-Azië stabieler of vreedzamer te maken, met name omdat de Democratische Volksrepubliek Korea zich nog steeds afzijdig houdt van de toenemende economische samenwerking. Bovendien hebben de economische banden, anders dan in Europa in de tweede helft van de jaren tachtig, niet geresulteerd in verbeterde politieke betrekkingen. Integendeel, de economische opkomst van China en de zelfverzekerdheid in het buitenlands beleid hebben in sommige buurlanden de vrees versterkt dat een welvarender China zijn economisch gewin zou kunnen gebruiken om het behartigen van zijn nationale belangen krachtiger ter hand te nemen en de regio zowel economisch als politiek te domineren.
De rivaliteit tussen China en Japan is eerder en duidelijker aan het oppervlak gekomen dan veel waarnemers hadden verwacht. De trend naar een meer nationalistische opstelling die in alle Oost-Aziatische landen zichtbaar is, zou ertoe kunnen leiden dat bilaterale conflicten gebruikt worden als middel om in het eigen land de zaken in een bepaalde richting te sturen. In China bijvoorbeeld is men bezig afstand te nemen van het ideologische keurslijf, en als onderdeel van dit proces probeert men het nationalisme als bindend element te laten herleven. Door een generatiewisseling in Korea heeft het anticommunisme, dat gebaseerd was op de traumatische ervaringen uit de Koreaanse oorlog, zijn aantrekkingskracht verloren. In overeenstemming met de denkbeelden van de jongere generatie lijken de nieuwe leiders een hard beleid tegenover Noord-Korea veelal als een grotere bedreiging voor de vrede te zien dan het nucleaire programma van dat land. In Japan zien we een opleving van nationalistische tendensen die niet voortkomt uit de jongerenbeweging, maar uit de wens van de elite om de ‘zelfkritische houding’ die het land kenmerkt te veranderen. De trend naar een nationalistisch beleid in deze drie landen belooft weinig goeds voor het oplossen van de concrete politieke problemen die in de komende jaren steeds urgenter zullen worden. Bovendien zullen de economieën als gevolg van de technologische opkomst van China steeds heviger met elkaar gaan concurreren en zal de complementariteit op dat vlak dus gaandeweg verloren gaan. Hierdoor zal het politieke klimaat eerder verhitten dan afkoelen.
Het staat echter niet vast dat de spanningen zullen toenemen. Zo vond er op 23 april in Jakarta een ontmoeting plaats tussen premier Koizumi van Japan en de president van China, waaraan ik deelnam. Het doel hiervan was expliciet een deëscalatie van de spanningen, waaruit blijkt dat beide partijen zich realiseren dat zij op economisch vlak alleen maar kunnen verliezen als de spanningen oplopen. Het is daarom betreurenswaardig dat de hieropvolgende stappen eerder een complicerende dan een kalmerende uitwerking hadden, toen vice-premier Wu Yi plotseling een geplande ontmoeting met premier Koizumi afzegde. Als de zaken verstandig aangepakt worden, kan de rivaliteit tussen Tokio en Peking evenwel leiden tot een constructieve vorm van wedijver die de weg vrij zou maken voor het aanpakken van reeds langlopende conflicten, zoals we bijvoorbeeld gezien hebben bij de toenadering tussen India en China, waarop Japan heeft geantwoord met een bezoek van premier Koizumi aan New Delhi en meer aandacht voor Zuidoost-Azië. In dit verband is het bijzonder interessant te zien dat het voorbeeld van Europa, waar men erin is geslaagd de gewapende strijd achter zich te laten en de scheidslijnen uit de Koude Oorlog ongedaan te maken, nauwkeurig wordt bestudeerd in Oost-Azië. Dit biedt ons een kans, een kans die wij zouden moeten grijpen om de betrekkingen met alle regionale actoren te bevorderen.
Wij zetten nu een aantal concrete stappen om de verschillende belangrijke kwesties in dit verband aan te pakken, en om heel duidelijk Europa’s opvattingen naar voren te brengen over de weg die gevolgd moet worden. Ook kunnen wij zo onze bezorgdheid over de situatie tot uitdrukking brengen. Er is sprake van een politieke dialoog. Laten we niet vergeten dat we dit jaar al dertig jaar diplomatieke betrekkingen met het land onderhouden. Ook is er sprake van een dialoog rond het onderwerp mensenrechten en worden alle zaken met betrekking tot veiligheid besproken. Sterker nog, bij de volgende top in China, die in september plaatsvindt, zullen wij proberen steun te vinden voor een uitgebreidere en ambitieuzere kaderovereenkomst, omdat we met de bestaande overeenkomst onze zeer ambitieuze doelstellingen niet meer kunnen verwezenlijken. Op ministerieel niveau vinden er op twintig verschillende gebieden regelmatige besprekingen plaats om China te helpen de handelsverplichtingen in het kader van de Wereldhandelsorganisatie na te komen, en ook, bijvoorbeeld, de verplichtingen op het gebied van intellectueel eigendom en arbeidsrecht, die onze collega reeds vermeldde. Het algehele streven is te komen tot op volledige wederkerigheid gebaseerde betrekkingen tussen China en de EU."@nl3
"Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@pl16
"Senhor Presidente, gostaria de começar por felicitar o Senhor Ministro Douglas Alexander nas suas novas funções, especialmente, neste Parlamento. Teremos vários debates juntos e será um prazer trabalhar com ele.
Relativamente às tensões entre a China e o Japão, aproveitámos as últimas reuniões de alto nível – nomeadamente a Cimeira UE-Japão, em 2 de Maio, no Luxemburgo – para discutir questões de estabilidade na Ásia Oriental ao mais alto nível governamental. Nesse quadro, acordámos, em conjunto com o Japão, em intensificar o nosso diálogo político e afirmámos que, em especial, as questões relativas à energia devem ser uma prioridade de topo na nossa agenda. Queremos fazê-lo, sobretudo para responder à preocupação do Japão quanto a um possível futuro levantamento do embargo de venda de armas à China pela UE. Como primeiro acto de seguimento, realizámos uma Tróica ministerial com o Japão, em 6 de Maio, à margem do encontro ASEM. No nosso diálogo político com a China, a questão das tensões Sino-Japoneses também é abordada e instamos à moderação e reconciliação.
Quanto ao embargo de venda de armas, as Conclusões do Conselho Europeu de Dezembro de 2005 estipulam claramente que não haverá qualquer mudança na quantidade ou qualidade das exportações de armas à China. Por conseguinte, qualquer futura decisão sobre o levantamento do embargo não vai alterar a situação da segurança na Ásia Oriental.
Além disso, a União Europa entabulou um diálogo estratégico com os Estados Unidos sobre a Ásia Oriental para abordar as questões de segurança dos nossos parceiros, tendo sido levadas a cabo missões de informação nos EUA, Japão, Coreia do Sul, Austrália e Nova Zelândia para explicar a nossa posição. Estamos a terminar o Código de Conduta reforçado relativo à exportação de armas.
Permitam-me que diga mais duas coisas antes do debate e depois responderei às vossas perguntas. No que toca à Lei anti-secessão, na sua declaração publicada a 15 de Março, a União Europeia manifestou claramente a sua preocupação face a esta legislação. Nessa ocasião, a União Europeia reiterou os princípios orientadores da sua política, a saber, a importância que atribui à política de “uma só China” e à resolução pacífica dos conflitos. Exortámos também ambas partes ao desenvolvimento de iniciativas que favoreçam o diálogo e o entendimento. Há que dizer que acolhemos com grande satisfação o facto de os líderes da oposição de Taiwan se terem deslocado ao continente chinês. Esperamos que, de futuro, todas as partes estejam envolvidas nesses contactos.
Volto de novo ao programa nuclear da RDPC. Recordar-vos-ia que a União Europeia – e a Comissão também – é um membro do Conselho de Administração da Organização para o Desenvolvimento Energético da Península da Coreia (KEDO). Apoiámos financeiramente e de outras formas esta actividade – actualmente suspensa – com vista a uma solução pacífica para o problema nuclear. Continuamos a dar o nosso inteiro apoio a possíveis Conversações entre as Seis Partes como um caminho a seguir e, em diversas ocasiões, deixámos muito claro qual a nossa opinião junto do Governo da Coreia do Norte. Sei que uma delegação parlamentar irá deslocar-se à Coreia do Norte. É com grande prazer que os ouviremos e aprenderemos convosco quando regressarem.
Vou ficar por aqui. Há ainda muito por dizer, porque estas questões, como já disse, estão no centro da nossa política global para o século XXI.
Congratulo-me com a realização deste debate, pois a situação na Ásia e na Ásia Oriental é de facto uma questão estratégica de grande importância. A Ásia não só é o continente com a mais elevada taxa demográfica como é o continente com o maior índice de crescimento económico e também com os mais elevados níveis de despesa na investigação e desenvolvimento. Os países do Extremo Oriente investem no seu futuro, e a Ásia será, sem dúvida alguma, o continente a ocupar o centro da cena mundial no século XXI. Temos de entender isso e preparar-nos.
Por conseguinte, a segurança no Extremo Oriente é um tema que diz directamente respeito aos interesses europeus. Faz parte da responsabilidade global pela segurança e estabilidade, responsabilidade essa que ocupa o lugar central no trabalho que a União Europa desenvolve no âmbito da política externa. Além do mais, a estabilidade no Extremo Oriente repercute-se directamente não só na prosperidade e no bem-estar dos nossos cidadãos como também na dos cidadãos daquele continente. A China, o Japão e a República da Coreia estão entre as seis economias de topo no mundo, se é que a União Europa conta como uma. Estão também entre os nossos maiores parceiros comerciais e são destinatários chave do investimento externo europeu. O Japão, por seu turno, é também uma fonte de investimento considerável na Europa, sobretudo em alguns dos novos Estados-Membros. Em suma, a instabilidade na região mais dinâmica do mundo teria consequências que seriam profundamente sentidas na Europa.
Quais são, portanto, as respostas da UE e quais os instrumentos à nossa disposição para abordar a questão. Gostaria de me debruçar desde já sobre essa questão.
Olhemos para as principais questões que estão em jogo na Ásia Oriental. Num futuro a médio prazo, há três grandes questões políticas que dominarão a agenda política na Ásia Oriental. Em primeiro lugar, como responder à ascensão da China. Em segundo lugar, assegurar a estabilidade na Península da Coreia e, em terceiro lugar, como resolver pacificamente as tensões que prevalecem entre a China e Taiwan. A própria abordagem a estas questões terá implicações de monta na nossa segurança regional e não só.
Em contrapartida, o grau de integração económica na Ásia Oriental é também absolutamente impressionante. Contudo, isto só não chega para tornar a Ásia Oriental mais estável ou mais pacífica, especialmente porque a RDPC não participa ainda da cooperação económica emergente. Além disso, ao contrário da Europa, na última metade da década de oitenta, os laços económicos não desencadearam melhores relações políticas. Pelo contrário, a ascensão económica da China e a sua assertiva política externa levaram a que alguns países vizinhos se sentissem apreensivos diante de uma China mais próspera, em posição de usar os seus proventos económicos para prosseguir os seus interesses nacionais de forma mais vigorosa e dominar a região, quer do ponto de vista político, quer económico.
A rivalidade entre a China e Japão veio à tona mais cedo e de uma forma mais visível do que a esperada por muitos observadores. A tendência em todos os países da Ásia Oriental para uma orientação mais nacionalista pode preparar o terreno para que se usem os conflitos bilaterais como uma válvula para consumo interno. Na China, por exemplo, como parte do processo de fuga às pressões ideológicas, o nacionalismo ressuscitou como um tema unificador. Com a mudança geracional na Coreia, o anticomunismo baseado na experiência traumática da Guerra da Coreia perdeu os seus atractivos. A nova liderança, alinhada com as opiniões da geração mais jovem, parece frequentemente considerar que uma política dura face à Coreia do Norte é mais sintomática de uma ameaça à paz do que o programa nuclear da Coreia do Norte. No Japão, pode observar-se um renascimento nacionalista, não assente num movimento da nova geração, mas no desejo de uma certa elite de mudar a chamada “a atitude de se auto-denegrir” no Japão. Esta tendência em todos os três países para políticas nacionalistas não augura nada de bom para a solução dos problemas políticos concretos, que se tornarão mais prementes nos próximos anos. Além do mais, com a ascensão tecnológica da China, as economias podem, de facto, passar da complementaridade para uma concorrência mais intensa e, com isso, aquecer o ambiente político em vez de o arrefecer.
No entanto, o aumento das tensões não é um dado adquirido. Por exemplo, a reunião em Jacarta, em 23 de Abril, entre o Primeiro-Ministro japonês, Junichiro Koizumi, e o Presidente da China – na qual participei – realizou-se especificamente para reduzir a tensão, o que demonstra que ambos os lados compreendem que só terão a perder, do ponto de vista económico, com o aumento das tensões. É pois pena que a seguir a situação viesse a complicar-se em vez de acalmar, quando o vice Primeiro-Ministro Wu Yi cancelou abruptamente uma reunião agendada com o Primeiro-Ministro Junichiro Koizumi. Se a questão fosse bem gerida, a rivalidade entre Tóquio e Pequim poderia levar a uma concorrência construtiva, abrindo assim caminho à solução de conflitos de longa data, como o testemunham, por exemplo, a aproximação entre a Índia e a China, seguida de uma visita do Primeiro-Ministro Junichiro Koizumi a Nova Delhi e do crescente interesse de Tóquio no Sudeste Asiático. A este respeito, é muito interessante ver que o exemplo Europeu de superar as hostilidades da guerra e a divisão da guerra-fria se tornou objecto de grande interesse e estudo na Ásia Oriental. Isto proporciona uma abertura que devíamos aproveitar para promover as relações com todos os actores regionais.
Há uma série de passos concretos que estamos a dar no intuito de abordar as várias questões em mãos e transmitir claramente os pontos de vista da Europa relativamente ao caminho a seguir, bem como de expressar as nossas preocupações face à situação. Existe um diálogo político. É verdade que apenas celebramos os nossos trinta anos de relações diplomáticas. Existe também um diálogo para os direitos humanos e todas as questões de segurança estão na mesa e a ser discutidas. De facto, na próxima cimeira com a China, a realizar em Setembro, tentaremos lançar a ideia de um acordo-quadro mais abrangente e mais ambicioso, atendendo a que o antigo já não responde aos nossos objectivos mais ambiciosos. Existem 20 diálogos sectoriais com os vários ministros para preparar a China para as suas obrigações comerciais no âmbito da OMC e também, por exemplo, para as suas obrigações no que toca aos direitos relativos à propriedade intelectual e à protecção laboral, factos que o nosso colega também mencionou. A ideia geral é estabelecer relações absolutamente mútuas e recíprocas."@pt17
"Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@sk18
"Mr President, I wish to begin by welcoming Mr Alexander in his new role, especially here in Parliament. We will have many debates together and it will be a pleasure to work with him.
On the China-Japan tensions, we have used recent high-level meetings – notably the EU-Japan Summit on 2 May in Luxembourg – to discuss stability issues in East Asia at the highest governmental level. In that context, we have agreed to intensify our political dialogue and we have said that energy issues in particular should be very high on our agenda, together with Japan. We want to do this, not least with a view to responding to Japan’s concern over a possible future lifting of the EU’s arms embargo on China. As a first follow-up, we held a ministerial Troika with Japan on 6 May in the margin of the ASEM meeting. In our political dialogue with China, we are also addressing the issue of Sino-Japanese tensions and calling for moderation and reconciliation.
On the arms embargo, the European Council Conclusions of December 2005 clearly stipulate that there should not be any change in the quantity or quality of arms exports to China. Therefore, any possible future decision on lifting the embargo should not alter the security situation in East Asia.
Moreover, the European Union has started a strategic dialogue with the United States on East Asia to address the security concerns of our partners, and information missions have been carried out to the US, Japan, South Korea, Australia and New Zealand to explain our position. We are finalising the reinforced Code of Conduct on arms experts.
Let me say two more things before the debate and then I will answer your questions. Regarding China’s Anti-Secession Law, in its statement issued on 15 March, the European Union clearly expressed its concern about this legislation. On that occasion, the European Union reiterated the principles guiding its policy, i.e. its attachment to a ‘one China’ policy and to the peaceful resolution of disputes. We have also called on both sides to develop initiatives for dialogue and understanding. It must be said that we were happy to see that Taiwan opposition leaders went to mainland China. We hope that in the future all parties will be involved in such contacts.
I refer again to the DPRK’s nuclear programme. I would remind you that the European Union – and the Commission also – is a board member of KEDO. We have financially and otherwise supported this – currently suspended – activity with a view to finding a peaceful resolution of the nuclear issue. We continue to give our full support to possible six-party talks as a way forward and have impressed our view very clearly on the North Korean Government on various occasions. I hear that a parliamentary delegation is going to North Korea. We will be very happy to listen to you and to learn from you when you come back.
I will stop here. There is a lot to be said, because these issues, as I have said, are at the centre of our global policy for the 21st century.
I am very happy about this debate, because the situation in Asia and also in East Asia is indeed a major strategic issue. Asia is today not only the continent with the largest population but also with the highest economic growth rate and the highest rates of spending for research and development. The Far Eastern countries invest in their future and Asia will, no doubt, be the continent at the centre of the world stage in the 21st century. We have to know that and prepare for it.
Security in the Far East is a topic, therefore, of direct concern to European interests. It is part of the overall global responsibility for security and stability that lies at the heart of the European Union’s role in foreign policy. Moreover, stability in the Far East directly impacts not only on the prosperity and the well-being of our citizens but also of the citizens of this continent. China, Japan and the Republic of Korea are among the world’s top six economies, if the EU is counted as one. They also count among our major trading partners and are also key recipients of European foreign investment. Japan, for its part, is also a major source of investment in Europe, not least in some of the new Member States. In short, instability in the most dynamic region in the world would have serious consequences that would be deeply felt in Europe.
What, therefore, are the European responses and what are the instruments at our disposal to address this issue? I would like to tackle that question now.
Let us look at the main issues at stake in East Asia. Over the medium-term future, three major policy issues will dominate the political agenda in East Asia. Firstly, how to respond to the rise of China. Secondly, ensuring stability on the Korean peninsula and, thirdly, a peaceful resolution of tensions between China and Taiwan. The proper handling of these issues will have major implications both for our regional and wider security.
By contrast, the degree of economic integration in East Asia is also very impressive. However, this alone will not be sufficient to make East Asia more stable or more peaceful, particularly as the DPRK is still outside the emerging economic cooperation. Moreover, unlike in Europe in the later half of the 1980s, economic ties have not resulted in improved political relations. On the contrary, the economic rise of China and its assertive foreign policy have fanned concerns in some neighbouring countries that a more prosperous China could use its economic gains to pursue its national interests more forcefully and dominate the region both politically and economically.
The China-Japan rivalry has surfaced earlier and more visibly than expected by many observers. A trend in all East Asian countries towards a more nationalistic orientation may set the stage for using bilateral conflicts as a valve for domestic consumption. In China, for instance, as part of the process to move away from ideological constraints, nationalism has been revived as a unifying theme. With a generational change in Korea, anti-Communism based on the traumatic experience of the Korean War has lost its appeal. The new leadership, in line with the views of the younger generation often appears to see a forceful policy vis-à-vis North Korea as more of a threat to peace than North Korea’s nuclear programme. In Japan, a nationalistic renaissance can be observed, not founded on a young generation movement, but on an elite’s wish to change a so-called ‘self-denigrating attitude’ in Japan. This tendency in all three countries to favour nationalistic policies does not bode well for solving the concrete political problems that will become more urgent in the years to come. Moreover, with the technological rise of China, the economies may, in fact, move from complementarity to more intense competition and thereby heat up the political environment rather than cool it down.
Rising tensions are not a given, however. For instance, the meeting in Jakarta on 23 April between Japan’s Prime Minister Koizumi and China’s President – at which I participated – was held specifically to de-escalate the tension and that demonstrates that both sides understand that they would stand to lose economically from rising tensions. It is unfortunate, therefore, that the follow-up steps complicated rather than calmed down the situation when Vice Prime Minister Wu Yi abruptly cancelled a scheduled meeting with Prime Minister Koizumi. If nonetheless managed well, the Tokyo-Beijing rivalry could lead to constructive competition and thus would open the way to addressing long-standing conflicts, as witnessed, for instance, by the India-China rapprochement, followed by a visit of Prime Minister Koizumi to New Delhi and Tokyo’s increased interest in South East Asia. In this regard, it is very interesting to see the European example of overcoming war hostilities and cold war separation become a object of strong interest and study in East Asia. This provides us with an opening that we should use to foster relations with all regional players.
We are taking a number of concrete steps to address the various issues at hand in order to clearly voice Europe’s views for a way forward and to express our concerns about the situation. There is a political dialogue. It is true that we are just celebrating our 30th anniversary of diplomatic relations. There is also a human rights dialogue and all the security issues are there and are being discussed. Indeed, at the next summit with China, which will be held in September, we will try to come up with the idea of a more comprehensive and more ambitious framework agreement, because the old one is no longer fulfilling our most ambitious goals. There are 20 sectoral dialogues with the various ministers at ministerial level to prepare China for its WTO trade obligations and also, for example, for its obligations as regards intellectual property rights and as regards labour protection, which our colleague also mentioned. The general idea is fully reciprocal two-way relations."@sl19
".
Herr talman! Jag skulle vilja börja med att välkomna Douglas Alexander i hans nya roll, i synnerhet här i parlamentet. Vi kommer att ha många debatter tillsammans, och det skall bli ett nöje att arbeta med honom.
Vad gäller spänningarna mellan Kina och Japan har vi använt den senaste tidens möten på hög nivå – i synnerhet toppmötet mellan EU och Japan den 2 maj i Luxemburg – till att diskutera stabiliteten i östra Asien på högsta regeringsnivå. I det sammanhanget har vi enats om att intensifiera vår politiska dialog, och vi har sagt att i synnerhet energifrågor bör stå högt på dagordningen, tillsammans med Japan. Vi vill göra detta inte minst för att svara på Japans oro över ett möjligt framtida upphävande av EU:s vapenembargo mot Kina. Som en första uppföljning genomfördes en ministertrojka med Japan den 6 maj inom ramen för ASEM-mötet. I vår politiska dialog med Kina hanterar vi också frågan om spänningarna mellan Kina och Japan och efterlyser besinning och försoning.
I fråga om vapenembargot framgår det tydligt av Europeiska rådets slutsatser i december 2005 att det inte bör ske några förändringar i kvantitet eller kvalitet beträffande export av vapen till Kina. Därför bör inget eventuellt framtida beslut om upphävandet av embargot innebära någon förändring för säkerhetssituationen i östra Asien.
EU har dessutom inlett en strategisk dialog med Förenta staterna om östra Asien för att ta itu med våra partners säkerhetsfrågor, och informationsuppdrag har genomförts i Förenta staterna, Japan, Sydkorea, Australien och Nya Zeeland i syfte att redogöra för vår ståndpunkt. Vi håller på att slutföra den förstärkta uppförandekoden för vapenexport.
Jag vill bara ta upp två saker till före debatten, och sedan skall jag svara på era frågor. Beträffande Kinas lagar om ”anti-separation” gav Europeiska unionen tydligt uttryck för sin oro över denna lagstiftning i det uttalande som utfärdades den 15 mars. Vid det tillfället upprepade Europeiska unionen riktlinjerna för sin politik, dvs. sitt engagemang för en politik för ett enda Kina och för en fredlig lösning av dispyter. Vi har också uppmanat båda sidor att utveckla initiativ till dialog och förståelse. Det måste påpekas att vi var mycket glada över att se att taiwanesiska oppositionsledare reste till det kinesiska fastlandet. Vi hoppas att alla parter kommer att vara engagerade i sådana kontakter i framtiden.
Jag skulle återigen vilja hänvisa till Nordkoreas kärnvapenprogram. Jag vill påminna om att Europeiska unionen – och även kommissionen – är styrelsemedlem i Organisationen för energiutveckling på Koreahalvön (KEDO). Vi har stött denna verksamhet, som för närvarande är upplöst, såväl finansiellt som på andra sätt i syfte att finna en fredlig lösning på kärnvapenfrågan. Vi fortsätter att ge vårt fulla stöd till eventuella sexpartssamtal som en väg framåt, och har uttryckt vår åsikt mycket tydligt för Nordkoreas regering vid olika tillfällen. Jag har fått veta att en parlamentarisk delegation skall åka till Nordkorea. Vi skall med glädje lyssna till er och lära av er när ni kommer tillbaka.
Här slutar jag. Det finns mycket att säga, för dessa frågor står, som jag nämnt tidigare, i centrum för vår globala politik för 2000-talet.
Jag gläder mig mycket åt den här debatten, eftersom situationen i Asien, och även i östra Asien, verkligen är en viktig strategisk fråga. Asien är i dag inte enbart den kontinent som har störst befolkning, utan också den som har högst ekonomisk tillväxttakt och den som lägger mest pengar på forskning och utveckling. Länderna i Fjärran Östern investerar i sin framtid, och Asien kommer utan tvekan att vara kontinenten i centrum på världsarenan under 2000-talet. Vi måste känna till detta och förbereda oss för det.
Säkerheten i Fjärran Östern är därför en fråga av direkt betydelse för EU:s intressen. Den är en del av det övergripande ansvar för säkerhet och stabilitet som är kärnan i EU:s roll inom utrikespolitiken. Stabiliteten i Fjärran Östern har dessutom en direkt påverkan inte enbart på välståndet och välbefinnandet hos våra medborgare, utan också hos dem på denna kontinent. Kina, Japan och Republiken Korea hör till de sex främsta ekonomierna i världen, om EU räknas som en ekonomi. De hör också till våra viktigaste handelspartner och är huvudmottagare av europeiska utländska investeringar. Japan å sin sida är också en viktig investeringskälla för EU, inte minst i några av de nya medlemsstaterna. Instabilitet inom den mest dynamiska regionen i världen skulle kort sagt få allvarliga konsekvenser som skulle kännas ordentligt i Europa.
Vad är då EU:s svar på detta, och vilka instrument har vi till vårt förfogande för att hantera den här frågan? Jag skulle vilja gripa mig an den frågan nu.
Låt oss se på de huvudfrågor som det rör sig om i östra Asien. På medellång sikt kommer tre viktiga politiska frågor att dominera den politiska dagordningen i östra Asien. Den första är hur man skall svara på Kinas tillväxt. Den andra gäller säkerställandet av stabiliteten på Koreahalvön och den tredje en fredlig lösning på spänningarna mellan Kina och Taiwan. Hanteringen av de här frågorna kommer att vara av stor betydelse för såväl vår regionala som för den mer övergripande säkerheten.
Å andra sidan är nivån av ekonomisk integration i östra Asien också mycket imponerande. Men enbart detta kommer inte att vara tillräckligt för att göra östra Asien mer stabilt eller mer fredligt, i synnerhet som Nordkorea fortfarande står utanför det ekonomiska samarbete som är under utveckling. De ekonomiska banden har till skillnad från situationen i Europa under den senare delen av 1980-talet inte heller lett till förbättrade politiska förbindelser. Kinas ekonomiska tillväxt och landets självsäkra utrikespolitik har tvärtom underblåst oron i vissa grannländer för att ett mer välbärgat Kina skulle kunna använda sina ekonomiska vinster till att fortsätta sträva efter sina nationella intressen på ett mer kraftfullt sätt och dominera regionen såväl politiskt som ekonomiskt.
Rivaliteten mellan Kina och Japan har stigit upp till ytan tidigare och blivit tydligare än många betraktare hade förväntat sig. En utveckling i alla östasiatiska länder mot en mer nationalistisk inriktning kan bädda för ett användande av bilaterala konflikter som en ventil för inhemsk konsumtion. Exempelvis har nationalismen som en del av processen att komma bort från ideologiska begränsningar fått nytt uppsving i Kina som en enande faktor. Med ett generationsskifte i Korea är antikommunism grundad på traumatiska erfarenheter från Koreakriget inte längre lika lockande. Det nya ledarskapet verkar ofta, i linje med den yngre generationens åsikter, se en kraftfull politik gentemot Nordkorea som ett större hot mot fred än Nordkoreas kärnvapenprogram. I Japan märks en återfödelse av nationalismen som inte grundas på hållningen hos en ung generation utan på en elits önskan att förändra den så kallade ”självnedsättande attityden” i Japan. Den här tendensen till gynnande av nationalistisk politik i alla tre länderna bådar inte gott för lösningen av de konkreta politiska problem som kommer att bli mer akuta under de kommande åren. Dessutom kan ekonomierna i och med Kinas teknologiska uppgång faktiskt komma att röra sig från komplementaritet i riktning mot en mer intensiv konkurrens, och därmed hetsa upp stämningen i den politiska miljön snarare än att lugna ned den.
Ökade spänningar är emellertid inte något självklart. Exempelvis hölls mötet mellan Japans premiärminister Junichiro Koizumi och Kinas president den 23 april i Jakarta – där jag själv deltog – särskilt för att avtrappa spänningen, och detta visar att båda sidor inser att de skulle förlora ekonomiskt på ökade spänningar. Det är därför olyckligt att de uppföljande åtgärderna snarare komplicerade än lugnade situationen när vice premiärminister Wu Yi plötsligt ställde in ett inplanerat möte med premiärminister Koizumi. Om detta likväl sköts väl skulle rivaliteten mellan Tokyo och Peking kunna leda till konstruktiv konkurrens och därmed kunna bana väg för hantering av långvariga konflikter, vilket närmandet mellan Indien och Kina är ett exempel på, som följdes av ett besök i New Dehli av premiärminister Koizumi och ett ökat intresse från Tokyos sida för sydöstra Asien. I detta avseende är det mycket intressant att se det europeiska exemplet på att övervinna fiendskap efter krig och splittring efter kalla kriget bli föremål för stort intresse och studium i östra Asien. Detta ger oss en öppning som vi bör använda för att främja förbindelser med alla regionala aktörer.
Vi håller på att genomföra ett flertal konkreta åtgärder för att hantera olika frågor som står för dörren för att tydligt ge röst åt EU:s åsikter om vilken väg som bör tas och för att uttrycka vår oro över situationen. En politisk dialog existerar. Det stämmer att vi för närvarande firar vårt 30-årsjubileum av diplomatiska förbindelser. En dialog om mänskliga rättigheter existerar också, och samtliga säkerhetsfrågor har tagits upp och diskuteras. Under nästa toppmöte med Kina, som kommer att hållas i september, kommer vi i själva verket att försöka komma med en idé för ett mer heltäckande och ambitiöst ramavtal, eftersom det gamla inte längre uppfyller våra mest ambitiösa mål. Det förs 20 sektorsvisa dialoger mellan de olika ministrarna på ministernivå för att förbereda Kina för sina åtaganden i samband med anslutningen till Världshandelsorganisationen och också för exempelvis landets åtaganden vad gäller immaterialrätter och arbetarskydd, vilket vår kollega också nämnde. Idén som helhet är helt ömsesidiga tvåvägsförbindelser."@sv21
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