Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-07-05-Speech-2-300"

Predicate	Value (sorted: default)
rdf:type	lpv_eu:Speech6
dcterms:Date	"2005-07-05"^^xsd:date6
dcterms:Is Part Of	lp_eu:Lennukeelunimekirjad/reisijateregister (PNR)6
dcterms:Language	"en"^^xsd:language6
lpv:document identification number	"en.20050705.31.2-300"6
lpv:hasSubsequent	lp_eu:2005-07-05-Speech-2-3016
lpv:speaker	lp:Franco Frattini6
lpv:spoken text	". Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from and to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@en4
lpv:translated text	"Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@cs1 "Hr. formand, som De ved, meddelte de amerikanske myndigheder i en velkendt sag om et KLM-fly, at flyet ikke måtte flyve ind i amerikansk luftrum, efter at to passagerer var blevet identificeret på grundlag af API-oplysninger (forhåndsoplysninger om passagerer). API-data er normalt oplysninger om pas og billet, som indsamles ved check-in med henblik på hurtigere immigrationskontrol på bestemmelsesstedet. Luftfartsselskabernes overførsel af API-data før ankomst til bestemmelsesstedet er normal praksis. Ifølge Kommissionens oplysninger sender luftfartsselskaberne kun API-data til grænsekontrolmyndighederne. De amerikanske myndigheder har ikke hentet oplysningerne via det elektroniske reservationssystem. Kommissionen vil også gerne gøre det klart en gang til, at de berørte passagerer ikke kan være blevet identificeret på grundlag af passagerlister (PNR-data). Sådanne instrumenter omfatter kun flyvninger til og fra USA og ikke flyvninger over USA. Derfor er dette ikke relevant i sager som KLM-sagen. Kommissionen mener ikke, at de amerikanske myndigheders brug af API-data er en omgåelse af PNR-aftalen. Kommissionen vil være særligt opmærksom på eventuelle omgåelser af aftalen og vil tage sagen op under den fælles evaluering. Kommissionen understreger, at der i øjeblikket ikke er nogen krav om, at luftfartsselskaberne skal forsyne de amerikanske myndigheder med API-data om passagerer på overflyvninger. Flyveforbudslisten er udarbejdet af de amerikanske myndigheder og indeholder navnene på de mennesker, som ifølge myndighederne ikke må flyve ind i USA på grundlag af amerikanske efterretningsoplysninger samt risiko- og trusselskriterier. Listen udarbejdes af USA, som alene bærer ansvaret for den. EU har en streng politik om luftfartssikkerhed, som dog ikke omfatter en flyveforbudsliste. Efter Kommissionens mening betyder en flyveforbudsliste ikke, at de pågældende personer nødvendigvis er mistænkt for noget. USA har simpelthen besluttet, at de af forskellige grunde ikke må komme ind i landet ud fra en række ret generelle kritierier. Det er selvfølgelig meget irriterende at blive nægtet indrejse i USA, fordi ens navn står på flyveforbudslisten. I den forbindelse vil Kommissionen søge afklaring af den amerikanske flyveforbudsliste under forhandlingerne med USA. Et centralt element er f.eks. tidlig og effektiv fremsendelse af en opdateret flyveforbudsliste til luftfartsselskaberne. Kommissionen vil derfor søge at få disse kriterier afklaret med de amerikanske myndigheder for at forhindre yderligere tilfælde af falske positiver. Siden begyndelsen af forhandlingerne mellem USA og EU i marts 2003 har Kommissionen modtaget forsikringer fra USA om, at den amerikanske kongres vil kræve, at der nedsættes en databeskyttelsesansvarlig ( ) under Department of Home Security (DHS), som årligt skal rapportere til kongressen, og hvis konstateringer er bindende for DHS. Den databeskyttelsesansvarlige har accepteret at modtage og hastebehandle henvendelser, som databeskyttelsesmyndigheder i EU fremsender på vegne af borgere, der mener, at DHS ikke har behandlet deres klage på tilfredsstillende vis. EU-borgere har således større garanti for en fair behandling. Den fælles evaluering af USA's forpligtelseserklæringer vedrører gennemførelsen af erklæringerne, som skal evalueres af de amerikanske myndigheder og Kommissionen, idet sidstnævnte bistås af repræsentanter for europæiske retshåndhævende myndigheder og datatilsynsmyndigheder. Den fælles evaluering udføres efter sommerferien, sandsynligvis i september. Evalueringen har til formål at give et tydeligt billede af, hvordan forpligtelseserklæringerne fungerer. Kommissionen agter at informere Europa-Parlamentet om resultaterne af den fælles evaluering og eventuelle andre vigtige resultater. Endelig skal nationale databeskyttelsesmyndigheder indgå i det hold, der under ledelse af Kommissionen skal udføre den fælles evaluering. Det vil give de nationale databeskyttelsesmyndigheder, den såkaldte artikel 29-arbejdsgruppe, mulighed for i fuldt omfang at evaluere gennemførelsen af forpligtelseserklæringerne. Det glæder mig at kunne sige, at der trods meningsforskelle i forbindelse med den amerikanske PNR-pakke er et udmærket samarbejde om gennemførelsen af pakken mellem artikel 29-arbejdsgruppen og Kommissionen, og at dette samarbejde fortsætter."@da2 "Herr Präsident! Wie Sie wissen, haben die US-amerikanischen Behörden im Hinblick auf den uns allen bekannten Zwischenfall mit einem KLM-Flug darauf hingewiesen, dem Flugzeug sei die Nutzung des Luftraums der USA verweigert worden, nachdem zwei der Passagiere über die erweiterten Fluggastdaten (API) identifiziert worden waren. Bei den erweiterten Fluggastdaten handelt es sich im Wesentlichen um Pass- und Ticket-Informationen, die beim Check-in erfasst werden, um am Zielort die Einreiseformalitäten zu beschleunigen. Die Übertragung der erweiterten Fluggastdaten durch die Fluggesellschaften vor der Ankunft am Zielort ist gängige Praxis. Laut den der Kommission zur Verfügung stehenden Informationen senden die Fluggesellschaften diese Daten jedoch nur an die Grenzkontrollbehörden. Diese Informationen werden von den US-Behörden jedoch nicht über computergesteuerte Buchungssysteme eingesehen. Die Kommission möchte zudem erneut klarstellen, dass die betreffenden Passagiere nicht auf Grundlage der Fluggastdatensätze (PNR) identifiziert werden konnten. Denn dieses Instrument gilt nicht für Flugzeuge, die die USA überfliegen, sondern nur für Flüge mit Ausgangs- und Endpunkt in den USA. Daher ist es auch für den KLM-Zwischenfall nicht von Belang. Die Kommission vertritt die Ansicht, dass die Verwendung der erweiterten Fluggastdaten durch die US-Behörden kein Unterlaufen des PNR-Abkommens darstellt, sie wird die Angelegenheit jedoch aufmerksam verfolgen und im Rahmen einer gemeinsamen Bewertung zur Sprache bringen. Die Kommission möchte betonen, dass die Fluggesellschaften gegenwärtig nicht verpflichtet sind, den USA erweiterte Fluggastdaten auch von Passagieren zur Verfügung zu stellen, die die USA überfliegen. „No Fly“-Listen werden von den US-Behörden erstellt und enthalten die Namen von Passagieren, denen sie die Einreise in die USA aufgrund von internen Informationen und risikorelevanten Bewertungskriterien nicht gestatten möchten. Diese Listen werden von den USA erstellt, und daher sind nur die USA dafür verantwortlich. Die Europäische Union verfügt über eine strenge Politik zur Sicherheit in der Luftfahrt, doch die „No Fly“-Listen gehören nicht dazu. Nach Ansicht der Kommission bedeutet die Existenz einer „No Fly“-Liste nicht, dass die darin enthaltenen Passagiere irgendeines Vergehens verdächtigt werden. Die USA haben einfach beschlossen, dass sie die Einreise der entsprechenden Passagiere in ihr Land aus verschiedenen Gründen und aufgrund von Kriterien, die eher allgemeiner Natur sind, nicht wünschen. Natürlich ist es für diejenigen, denen die Einreise in die USA nicht gestattet wird, sehr ärgerlich, dass ihre Namen auf der „No Fly“-Liste stehen. Deshalb wird die Kommission bei ihren Gesprächen mit den USA um eine entsprechende Klärung bitten. So ist zum Beispiel die frühzeitige und effektive Weiterleitung von aktualisierten „No Fly“-Listen an die Fluggesellschaften ein entscheidender Punkt. Die Kommission wird daher mit den US-Behörden über die Bedeutung dieser Kriterien sprechen, um in Zukunft Fälle einer irrtümlichen Aufnahme in die Liste zu vermeiden. Seit Beginn der EU-USA-Gespräche im März 2003 konnte die Kommission von den USA über ihren Kongress die Ernennung eines Datenschutzbeauftragten erwirken. Dieser gehört zum Ministerium für innere Sicherheit und muss jährlich vor dem Kongress Bericht erstatten. Seine Entscheidungen sind für das Ministerium verbindlich. Der Datenschutzbeauftragte hat zugesagt, solche Fälle besonders zügig zu bearbeiten, die von Datenschutzbehörden in der Europäischen Union im Namen von Bürgern eingereicht werden, die der Meinung sind, ihre Klagen seien durch das Ministerium für innere Sicherheit nicht zufrieden stellend bearbeitet worden. So sollen sich die Bürger der EU einer fairen Behandlung sicher sein. Die gemeinsame Bewertung der von den USA ergriffenen Maßnahmen wird durch die US-amerikanischen Behörden und die Kommission erfolgen, wobei Letztere von Vertretern der europäischen Strafverfolgungsbehörden und des Datenschutzes unterstützt werden wird. Die gemeinsame Bewertung wird nach der Sommerpause stattfinden, voraussichtlich im September. Ziel ist es, ein klares Bild von den ergriffenen Maßnahmen zu erhalten. Die Kommission hat vor, das Parlament über das Ergebnis der gemeinsamen Beurteilung und bedeutende Entwicklungen zu informieren. Abschließend möchte ich erwähnen, dass nationale Datenschutzbehörden Teil des von der Kommission geleiteten Teams sein werden, das die gemeinsame Bewertung vornehmen wird. Das dürfte es den nationalen Datenschutzbehörden, der so genannten Artikel-29-Gruppe, ermöglichen, die Umsetzung der Maßnahmen umfassend zu beurteilen. Ich freue mich, Ihnen mitteilen zu können, dass die Zusammenarbeit zwischen der Artikel-29-Gruppe und der Kommission trotz unterschiedlicher Meinungen zum PNR-Paket der USA ausgezeichnet ist und wir auch weiter zusammenarbeiten werden."@de9 ". Κύριε Πρόεδρε, όπως γνωρίζετε, όσον αφορά το πολύ γνωστό περιστατικό της πτήσης της εταιρείας KLM, οι αρχές των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών ισχυρίστηκαν ότι δεν επιτράπηκε στο αεροσκάφος να εισέλθει στον εναέριο χώρο των ΗΠΑ λόγω της παρουσίας δύο επιβατών οι οποίοι είχαν εντοπιστεί μέσω στοιχείων από το Σύστημα εκ των προτέρων Πληροφοριών για τους Επιβάτες (APIS). Τα στοιχεία του εν λόγω συστήματος είναι ουσιαστικά πληροφορίες οι οποίες περιλαμβάνονται στα διαβατήρια και τα εισιτήρια και συλλέγονται κατά τον έλεγχο εισιτηρίων για την επιτάχυνση των μεταναστευτικών ελέγχων στον προορισμό. Η διαβίβαση των στοιχείων αυτών από τις αεροπορικές εταιρείες πριν από την άφιξη στον προορισμό αποτελεί συνήθη πρακτική στις αερομεταφορές. Σύμφωνα με τις πληροφορίες που έχει στη διάθεσή της η Επιτροπή, οι αερομεταφορείς στέλνουν παρόμοιες πληροφορίες μόνο στις αρχές ελέγχου των συνόρων. Τις πληροφορίες αυτές δεν τις λαμβάνουν οι αρχές των ΗΠΑ μέσω του ηλεκτρονικού συστήματος κρατήσεων. Η Επιτροπή επιθυμεί επίσης να διασαφηνίσει για μία ακόμη φορά ότι οι επιβάτες της συγκεκριμένης πτήσης δεν μπορούσαν να ταυτοποιηθούν βάσει στοιχείων από την κατάσταση ονομάτων επιβατών (PNR). Το μέσο αυτό δεν καλύπτει τις πτήσεις οι οποίες διέρχονται από τον εναέριο χώρο των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, αλλά μόνον τις πτήσεις με προέλευση ή προορισμό τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες. Ως εκ τούτου, δεν σχετίζεται με περιπτώσεις όπως το συμβάν που αφορούσε την πτήση της KLM. Κατά τη γνώμη της Επιτροπής, η χρήση στοιχείων από το Σύστημα εκ των προτέρων Πληροφοριών για τους Επιβάτες (APIS) από τις αρχές των ΗΠΑ δεν φαίνεται να συνιστά καταστρατήγηση της συμφωνίας PNR. Η Επιτροπή θα παρακολουθεί με ιδιαίτερη προσοχή τυχόν καταστρατήγηση της συμφωνίας και θα εγείρει το θέμα στο πλαίσιο της κοινής αναθεώρησης. Η Επιτροπή επιθυμεί να υπογραμμίσει ότι δεν υφίσταται επί του παρόντος υποχρέωση των αεροπορικών εταιρειών να διαβιβάζουν στις ΗΠΑ στοιχεία επιβατών για πτήσεις πάνω από τον εναέριο χώρο των ΗΠΑ. Ο κατάλογος απαγόρευσης πτήσεων («no-fly list») καταρτίζεται από τις αμερικανικές αρχές και περιλαμβάνει τα ονόματα ατόμων τα οποία οι ΗΠΑ δεν επιθυμούν να εισέλθουν στη χώρα βάσει κριτηρίων τα οποία στηρίζονται σε πληροφορίες και αξιολόγηση απειλών και κινδύνων από τις ίδιες τις ΗΠΑ. Η λίστα καταρτίζεται από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες, οι οποίες είναι και οι μόνες υπεύθυνες γι’ αυτήν. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση διαθέτει μια αυστηρή πολιτική ως προς την ασφάλεια των αερομεταφορών, η οποία όμως δεν περιλαμβάνει λίστα απαγόρευσης πτήσεων. Κατά τη γνώμη της Επιτροπής, η ύπαρξη μιας λίστας απαγόρευσης πτήσεων δεν σημαίνει ότι τα άτομα που περιλαμβάνονται σε αυτήν είναι οπωσδήποτε ύποπτοι για την τέλεση κάποιου αδικήματος. Οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες αποφάσισαν, απλώς, ότι δεν επιθυμούν την είσοδό τους στη χώρα για διάφορους λόγους, βάσει μιας σειράς μάλλον γενικών κριτηρίων. Βεβαίως, είναι πολύ ενοχλητικό να απαγορεύεται η πρόσβαση ενός ατόμου στις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες επειδή το όνομά του βρίσκεται στη λίστα απαγόρευσης πτήσεων. Ως εκ τούτου, η Επιτροπή θα ζητήσει διευκρινίσεις σχετικά με τη λίστα απαγόρευσης πτήσεων των ΗΠΑ στις συζητήσεις τις με τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες. Για παράδειγμα, μια αναγκαία πτυχή είναι η πρώιμη και αποτελεσματική προώθηση στις αεροπορικές εταιρείες μιας ενημερωμένης λίστας απαγόρευσης πτήσεων. Η Επιτροπή επιδιώκει, συνεπώς, την αποσαφήνιση αυτών των κριτηρίων από τις αμερικανικές αρχές, προκειμένου να αποτραπούν μελλοντικές περιπτώσεις εσφαλμένων αναγνωρίσεων. Μετά την έναρξη των συνομιλιών ΕΕ-ΗΠΑ τον Μάρτιο του 2003, η Επιτροπή μπόρεσε να αποσπάσει από τις Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες τη δέσμευση ότι το αμερικανικό Κογκρέσο θα ζητήσει τη θέσπιση θέσης αρμοδίου για τα θέματα ιδιωτικής ζωής στο Υπουργείο Εσωτερικής Ασφάλειας, ο οποίος θα παρουσιάζει, σε ετήσια βάση, έκθεση στο Κογκρέσο, ενώ τα ευρήματά του θα είναι δεσμευτικά για το υπουργείο. Ο αρμόδιος για τα θέματα ιδιωτικής ζωής συμφώνησε να δέχεται και να χειρίζεται με ταχύτητα περιπτώσεις τις οποίες θα θέτουν υπόψη του οι αρχές προστασίας δεδομένων της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης εξ ονόματος των πολιτών οι οποίοι θεωρούν ότι οι ενστάσεις τους δεν έχουν αντιμετωπιστεί κατά τρόπο ικανοποιητικό από το Υπουργείο Εσωτερικής Ασφάλειας. Συνεπώς, ο πολίτης της ΕΕ έχει μεγαλύτερες διασφαλίσεις δίκαιης μεταχείρισης. Όσον αφορά την κοινή αναθεώρηση των δεσμεύσεων των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών, προβλέπεται η κοινή αναθεώρηση της εφαρμογής τους, η οποία θα πραγματοποιηθεί από τις αρχές των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών και την Επιτροπή, η οποία θα έχει τη συνδρομή εκπροσώπων των ευρωπαϊκών αρχών επιβολής του νόμου και των εποπτών προστασίας δεδομένων. Η κοινή αναθεώρηση θα πραγματοποιηθεί μετά τις καλοκαιρινές διακοπές, μάλλον τον Σεπτέμβριο. Στόχος της αναθεώρησης είναι να προσφέρει μια σαφή εικόνα του τρόπου λειτουργίας των δεσμεύσεων. Η Επιτροπή σκοπεύει να ενημερώσει το Κοινοβούλιο για τα αποτελέσματα αυτής της κοινής αναθεώρησης και για κάθε σημαντική εξέλιξη. Τέλος, οι εθνικές αρχές προστασίας δεδομένων θα μετέχουν στην ομάδα η οποία, υπό την ηγεσία της Επιτροπής, θα είναι υπεύθυνη για την κοινή αναθεώρηση. Αυτό αναμένεται να επιτρέψει στις εθνικές αρχές προστασίας δεδομένων, στη λεγόμενη ομάδα εργασίας του άρθρου 29, να αξιολογήσουν πλήρως την υλοποίηση των δεσμεύσεων. Είμαι δε στην ευχάριστη θέση να σας πληροφορήσω ότι, παρά τις διαφορές απόψεων σχετικά με τη δέσμη PNR των ΗΠΑ, υπάρχει άριστη συνεργασία κατά την υλοποίηση της εν λόγω δέσμης μεταξύ της ομάδας εργασίας του άρθρου 29 και της Επιτροπής, και αυτή η συνεργασία θα συνεχιστεί."@el10 ". Señor Presidente, como usted sabe, respecto al conocido incidente con un vuelo de KLM, las autoridades estadounidenses prohibieron que el vuelo entrara en su espacio aéreo después de que dos pasajeros fueran identificados por los datos API, la información anticipada sobre pasajeros. La API comprende esencialmente los datos del pasaporte y del billete de avión, registraos en el momento de la facturación para agilizar los controles de inmigración en destino. La transferencia de estos datos por las aerolíneas antes de la llegada a destino es una práctica habitual en el transporte aéreo. Según la información de que dispone la Comisión, los transportistas solo envían la API a las autoridades de control de fronteras. No es una información que recopilen las autoridades de los Estados Unidos a través de los sistemas informáticos de reservas. La Comisión también desea aclarar una vez más que los pasajeros afectados no pudieron ser identificados sobre la base del expediente de los pasajeros (PNR). Este instrumento no incluye los vuelos que sobrevuelan los Estados Unidos, sino solo los que tienen ese país como origen o destino. Por tanto, no tiene nada que ver con casos como el incidente de KLM. A juicio de la Comisión, el uso de la API por las autoridades de los Estados Unidos no parece constituir un incumplimiento del acuerdo sobre los PNR. La Comisión prestará especial atención a todo incumplimiento de ese acuerdo y planteará este asunto en el marco de la revisión conjunta. La Comisión desea subrayar que actualmente las líneas aéreas no están obligadas a comunicar a los Estados Unidos los datos API sobre los pasajeros en los sobrevuelos. La lista de exclusión aérea la elaboran las autoridades estadounidenses y contiene los nombres de personas que no se desea que vuelen a los Estados Unidos por criterios de la inteligencia de ese país y de evaluación de riesgos. La elaboran los Estados Unidos y es responsabilidad exclusiva de ese país. La Unión Europea mantiene una rigurosa política de seguridad aérea, pero no incluye una lista de exclusión. A juicio de la Comisión, esa lista no significa que las personas incluidas sean necesariamente sospechosas de delito alguno. Los Estados Unidos simplemente deciden que no quieren que entren en el país por diversas razones basadas en una serie de criterios generales. Pro supuesto, es muy molesto para cualquiera que se le niegue la entrada en los Estados Unidos por estar su nombre en la lista. Por eso, la Comisión tratará de obtener una aclaración de la lista de exclusión aérea de los Estados Unidos en sus conversaciones con ese país. Por ejemplo, un aspecto esencial es la comunicación puntual y efectiva de la lista actualizada a las líneas aéreas. Por eso, la Comisión pretende esclarecer los criterios con las autoridades estadounidenses, para prevenir futuros casos de falsos positivos. Desde el inicio de las conversaciones con los Estados Unidos en marzo de 2003, la Comisión ha obtenido el compromiso de ese país de que su Congreso exigirá el nombramiento de un funcionario jefe de privacidad dentro del Departamento de Seguridad Nacional, quien informará anualmente al Congreso y cuyas conclusiones serán vinculantes para el departamento. El funcionario jefe de privacidad se ha mostrado de acuerdo con recibir y tratar con urgencia los casos amparados por las autoridades de protección de datos en la Unión Europea con respecto a ciudadanos que consideren que sus quejas no han sido correctamente atendidas por el Departamento de Seguridad Nacional. Así, los ciudadanos de la UE tienen mayores garantías de un trato justo. En cuanto a la revisión conjunta de los compromisos estadounidenses, estos ofrecen una revisión conjunta de su aplicación, que correrá a cargo de las autoridades estadounidenses y la Comisión, asistida esta por representantes de autoridades policiales europeas y supervisores de protección de datos. La revisión conjunta tendrá lugar después de la pausa veraniega, probablemente en septiembre. La revisión tratará de aportar una clara imagen de cómo están funcionando los compromisos. La Comisión tiene previsto informar a este Parlamento del resultado de esta revisión conjunta y de toda novedad importante. Por último, las autoridades nacionales de protección de datos formarán parte del equipo dirigido por la Comisión que participará en la revisión conjunta. Esto permitirá a esas autoridades nacionales, el llamado Grupo de Trabajo del Artículo 29, evaluar plenamente la aplicación de los compromisos. Me complace decirles que, pese a las discrepancias sobre el paquete PNR de los Estados Unidos, existe una excelente colaboración en la aplicación de este paquete dentro del Grupo de Trabajo del Artículo 29 y la Comisión, y esta colaboración va a continuar."@es20 "Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@et5 ". Arvoisa puhemies, tiedätte varmasti KLM-yhtiön lennolla sattuneen kuuluisan välikohtauksen, jossa Yhdysvaltojen viranomaiset ilmoittivat, ettei lento saa tulla Yhdysvaltojen ilmatilaan, koska kaksi matkustajaa tunnistettiin etukäteen lentomatkustajien tunnistustietojen (API) perusteella. API-tiedot ovat pääasiassa lähtöselvityksessä kerättyjä passi- ja matkalipputietoja siirtolaisvalvonnan nopeuttamiseksi määränpäässä. Se, että lentoyhtiöt toimittavat API-tietoja ennen lentojen saapumista määränpäähän, on niiden normaali käytäntö. Komission käytettävissä olevien tietojen perusteella lentoyhtiöt toimittavat API-tiedot ainoastaan rajavalvontaviranomaisille. Yhdysvaltojen viranomaiset eivät saa näitä tietoja tietokonevarausjärjestelmästä. Komissio haluaa myös selventää jälleen kerran, ettei asianomaisia matkustajia voi tunnistaa matkustajaluettelon eli PNR-tietojen perusteella. Tämä järjestelmä ei koske Yhdysvaltojen yli lentäviä lentoja vaan ainoastaan Yhdysvalloista lähteviä ja sinne saapuvia lentoja. Näin ollen sillä ei ole tekemistä edellä mainitun KLM-tapauksen kaltaisten välikohtausten kanssa. Komission mielestä se, että Yhdysvaltojen viranomaiset käyttävät API-tietoja, ei näytä olevan PNR-sopimuksen vastaista. Komissio aikoo kiinnittää eritystä huomiota kaikkiin sopimusrikkomuksiin sekä ottaa tämän asian esiin yhteisessä tarkastelussa. Komissio haluaa korostaa, ettei tällä hetkellä ole voimassa vaatimusta, jonka mukaan lentoyhtiöiden on toimitettava Yhdysvaltojen viranomaisille API-tietoja ylilennolla olevista matkustajista. Mustat listat ovat Yhdysvaltojen viranomaisten laatimia, ja ne sisältävät niiden ihmisten nimet, joiden he eivät halua lentävän Yhdysvaltoihin Yhdysvaltojen viranomaisten tiedustelutietojen ja riskinarviointiperusteiden nojalla. Lista on Yhdysvaltojen laatima, ja vain kyseinen maa on vastuussa siitä. Euroopan unionilla on tiukka lentoturvallisuuspolitiikka, mutta siihen eivät kuulu mustat listat. Komission mielestä musta lista ei tarkoita sitä, että listalla olevia henkilöitä välttämättä epäiltäisiin rikoksesta. Yhdysvallat vain päätti, ettei se halua kyseisten henkilöiden saapuvan maahan erilaisista yleisiin perusteisiin liittyvistä syistä. Tuntuu luonnollisesti erittäin kiusalliselta, jos joltakin kielletään pääsy Yhdysvaltoihin, koska hänen nimensä on mustalla listalla. Tältä osin komissio haluaa, että Yhdysvallat antaa lisäselvennystä mustista listoista EU:n ja Yhdysvaltojen välisissä keskusteluissa. Esimerkiksi ajoissa ja tehokkaasti lentoyhtiölle toimitettu ajantasainen musta lista on keskeinen asia, josta haluamme keskustella. Tästä syystä komissio pyrkii selkeyttämään näitä perusteita yhdessä Yhdysvaltojen viranomaisten kanssa, jotta erehdyksessä listalla -tapauksilta voitaisiin tulevaisuudessa välttyä. Yhdysvaltojen ja EU:n maaliskuussa 2003 alkaneiden keskusteluiden aikana komissio on onnistunut saamaan Yhdysvalloilta sitoumuksen, jonka mukaan Yhdysvaltojen kongressi vaatisi yksityisyyden suojasta vastaavan päävirkamiehen (CPO) nimittämistä sisäisen turvallisuuden ministeriöön (Department of Homeland Security). Tämän päävirkamiehen on vuosittain raportoitava kongressille, ja hänen päätöksensä sitovat koko ministeriötä. CPO on suostunut vastaanottamaan ja käsittelemään kiireellisesti EU:n tietosuojaviranomaisten esiin tuomat kysymykset niiden kansalaisten puolesta, joiden mielestä ministeriö ei ole tyydyttävällä tavalla ratkaissut heidän valituksiaan. EU:n kansalaiset saavat näin vahvemmat takeet oikeudenmukaisesta kohtelusta. Yhdysvallat lupautui Yhdysvaltojen viranomaisten ja komission johdolla toteutettavaan yhteiseen tarkasteluun sen selvittämiseksi, miten Yhdysvallat on noudattanut sitoumuksiaan. Tarkastelussa komissiota auttavat unionin lainvalvontaviranomaiset ja tietosuojavaltuutetut. Yhteinen tarkastelu suoritetaan kesätauon jälkeen, todennäköisesti syyskuussa. Tarkastelun tavoitteena on saada tarkka kuva siitä, miten Yhdysvallat noudattaa sitoumuksiaan. Komission aikomuksena on informoida parlamenttia yhteisen tarkastelun tuloksista ja merkittävistä edistysaskeleista. Lopuksi totean vielä, että kansalliset tietosuojaviranomaiset osallistuvat komission johtamaan ryhmään, joka suorittaa yhteisen tarkastelun. Näin kansallisten tietosuojavaltuutettujen, eli niin kutsutun 29 artiklan mukaisen työryhmän, pitäisi pystyä arvioimaan täysimääräisesti sitoumusten noudattamista. Voin tyytyväisenä kertoa teille, että huolimatta Yhdysvaltojen matkustajarekisteritietopakettia koskevista erimielisyyksistä 29 artiklan mukaisen työryhmän ja komission välinen yhteistyö paketin täytäntöönpanossa on erinomaista, ja tämä yhteistyö jatkuu."@fi7 "Monsieur le Président, comme vous le savez, concernant le fameux incident du vol KLM, les autorités américaines ont indiqué que le vol s’était vu interdire l’entrée dans l’espace aérien des USA après que deux passagers ont été identifiés à partir des informations anticipées sur les voyageurs - données API. Les données API sont principalement constituées par les informations des passeports et des billets d’avion collectées à l’enregistrement afin d’accélérer les contrôles d’immigration à destination. Le transfert des données API par les compagnies aériennes avant l’arrivée à destination constitue une pratique normale. Selon les informations dont la Commission dispose, les compagnies aériennes n’envoient des informations API qu’aux autorités de contrôle aux frontières. Ces informations ne sont pas obtenues par les autorités américaines à partir des systèmes informatiques de réservation. La Commission souhaite également clarifier une fois encore que les passagers concernés n’ont pas pu être identifiés sur la base des données des dossiers passagers ou données PNR. Cet instrument ne couvre pas les vols survolant les États-Unis, mais uniquement ceux à partir et vers les USA. En tant que tel, cet instrument n’est pas pertinent dans des affaires telles que l’incident du vol KLM. Selon la Commission, l’utilisation des données API par les autorités des États-Unis ne semble pas constituer un contournement de l’accord PNR. La Commission sera particulièrement attentive à tout contournement de l’accord et soulèvera cette question dans le cadre de la révision conjointe. La Commission souhaite souligner que les compagnies aériennes n’ont actuellement aucune obligation de fournir aux USA des données API pour des passagers qui survolent ce pays. La «no-fly list» est dressée par les autorités américaines et comprend les noms de personnes qu’ils ne souhaitent pas voir prendre un vol vers les USA sur la base des critères des services américains de renseignement et d’évaluation des risques et menaces. La liste est compilée par les États-Unis et seul ce pays en est responsable. L’Union européenne a une politique rigoureuse en matière de sécurité aérienne, mais elle ne comprend pas une telle liste. Aux yeux de la Commission, une «no-fly list» ne signifie pas que les personnes qui y apparaissent sont nécessairement soupçonnées de méfait. Les États-Unis ont simplement décidé qu’ils ne voulaient pas laisser entrer celles-ci sur leur territoire pour différentes raisons, sur la base d’une série de critères assez généraux. Il est, bien évidemment, extrêmement agaçant pour quelqu’un de se voir refuser l’accès aux États-Unis parce que son nom est sur la «no-fly list». À cet égard, la Commission demandera des éclaircissements quant à cette liste dans le cadre de ses discussions avec les États-Unis. La transmission rapide et efficace aux compagnies aériennes d’une «no-fly list» à jour est, par exemple, un point essentiel. La Commission cherche donc à mieux clarifier ces critères avec les autorités américaines afin de prévenir tout faux positif à l’avenir. Depuis le début des discussions USA-UE en mars 2003, la Commission a été en mesure d’obtenir des États-Unis que le Congrès américain s’engage à désigner un responsable de la confidentialité au sein du département de la sécurité nationale, chargé de présenter un rapport annuel au Congrès et dont les conclusions sont contraignantes pour le département. Le responsable de la confidentialité a accepté de recevoir et de traiter de manière accélérée des dossiers déposés par des autorités de protection des données de l’UE au nom de citoyens qui estiment que leurs plaintes n’ont pas été traitées de manière satisfaisante par le département de la sécurité nationale. Les citoyens européens sont donc davantage assurés d’un traitement juste de leur plainte. S’agissant de la révision conjointe des engagements des États-Unis, ces derniers prévoyant une révision conjointe de leur mise en œuvre, elle doit être réalisée par les autorités américaines et la Commission, cette dernière assistée par des représentants d’autorités européennes de police et des contrôleurs de la protection des données. La révision conjointe aura lieu après la pause estivale, vraisemblablement au mois de septembre. La révision vise à fournir une description claire de la manière dont les engagements fonctionnent. La Commission a l’intention d’informer le Parlement des résultats de cette révision conjointe et de toute évolution importante. Enfin, les autorités nationales de protection des données feront partie de l’équipe dirigée par la Commission lors de cette révision conjointe. Cela devrait permettre aux autorités nationales de protection des données, le dénommé groupe de travail «Article 29», d’accéder pleinement à la mise en œuvre des engagements. Je suis heureux de vous annoncer que malgré les divergences concernant le paquet PNR des États-Unis, il existe une excellente coopération quant à la mise en œuvre de celui-ci entre le groupe de travail «Article 29» et la Commission, et cette coopération continuera."@fr8 "Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@hu11 ". Signor Presidente, a proposito del noto caso del volo come lei sa le autorità degli Stati Uniti hanno indicato che al volo è stato negato l’ingresso nello spazio aereo statunitense a seguito dell’identificazione di due passeggeri sulla base dei dati API – informazioni preventive sui passeggeri. I dati API sono sostanzialmente le informazioni su passaporto e biglietto raccolte al per accelerare i controlli dell’immigrazione al punto di destinazione. La consegna da parte delle compagnie aeree dei dati API precedentemente all’arrivo al punto di destinazione fa parte della normale prassi delle compagnie. Secondo le informazioni in possesso della Commissione, i vettori aerei inviano le informazioni API solo alle autorità di controllo doganale. Le autorità statunitensi non possono avere accesso a tali informazioni dai sistemi di prenotazione via informatica. La Commissione ribadisce ancora una volta che i passeggeri in questione non possono essere stati identificati sulla base dei dati delle pratiche passeggeri – PNR. Tale strumento non concerne i voli che sorvolano gli Stati Uniti, ma soltanto i voli per e dagli Stati Uniti. Pertanto non ha alcuna rilevanza in casi come quello della . E’ parere della Commissione che l’utilizzo dei dati API da parte delle autorità statunitensi non costituisca un raggiro dell’accordo sul trattamento dei dati PNR. La Commissione presterà particolare attenzione a qualunque forma di raggiro dell’accordo e solleverà la questione nel quadro dell’analisi congiunta. La Commissione desidera sottolineare che non viene attualmente richiesto ai vettori aerei di fornire agli Stati Uniti dati API su passeggeri nel caso di sorvolo degli Stati Uniti. La viene stilata dalle autorità statunitensi e contiene i nomi di persone non gradite negli Stati Uniti sulla base del lavoro dell’ statunitense e di criteri di valutazione della minaccia di rischio. Viene redatta dagli Stati Uniti che ne sono gli unici responsabili. L’Unione europea ha una politica per la sicurezza aerea rigorosa, ma non contempla nessuna . Per la Commissione, la non implica che le persone in esso iscritte nell’elenco siano necessariamente sospettate di atti illeciti. Gli Stati Uniti hanno semplicemente deciso di non accettarle nel proprio paese per ragioni diverse, sulla base di criteri piuttosto generali. E’ ovviamente molto seccante per chiunque vedersi negato l’accesso agli Stati Uniti perché il proprio nome è sulla . A tale proposito, la Commissione cercherà di avere dei chiarimenti sulla americana nel corso dei prossimi colloqui con gli Stati Uniti. Un aspetto essenziale è, ad esempio, l’inoltro rapido ed effettivo di una aggiornata alle compagnie aeree. La Commissione sta pertanto cercando di chiarire questi criteri con le autorità americane, in modo da prevenire in futuro casi di falsi allarmi. Fin dall’inizio dei colloqui USA-UE nel marzo 2003, la Commissione è riuscita ad assicurarsi l’impegno da parte degli Stati Uniti che il Congresso americano avrebbe richiesto la nomina di un responsabile della protezione della vita privata presso il ministero della Sicurezza interna, con l’obbligo di rendere conto ogni anno al Congresso e i cui accertamenti sono vincolanti per il ministero. Il responsabile della protezione della vita privata ha acconsentito di ricevere e trattare con procedura d’urgenza i casi trasmessi dalle autorità incaricate della protezione dei dati dell’Unione europea a nome di cittadini che ritengono che i propri reclami non siano stati trattati in modo soddisfacente dal ministero della Sicurezza interna. In questo modo il cittadino europeo ha una maggiore certezza di un trattamento equo. Per quanto concerne la verifica degli impegni con gli Stati Uniti, questi ultimi prevedono un’analisi congiunta della loro applicazione, che sarà svolta dalle autorità statunitensi e dalla Commissione, assistita dai rappresentanti delle autorità europee preposte all’applicazione della legge, nonché dai supervisori responsabili della protezione dei dati. L’analisi congiunta si svolgerà dopo la pausa estiva, probabilmente in settembre. L’analisi vuole offrire un quadro chiaro del funzionamento dell’accordo. E’ intenzione della Commissione informare il Parlamento sull’esito dell’analisi congiunta e di ogni eventuale sviluppo importante. Infine, le autorità nazionali incaricate della protezione dei dati faranno parte del gruppo guidato dalla Commissione che condurrà l’analisi congiunta. Ciò permetterà alle autorità nazionali incaricate della protezione dei dati, il cosiddetto gruppo di lavoro di cui all’articolo 29, di valutare appieno l’attuazione dell’accordo. Sono lieto di annunciare che, nonostante la diversità di vedute, vi è un’ottima collaborazione fra il gruppo di lavoro di cui all’articolo 29 e la Commissione sull’attuazione del pacchetto PNR americano, e tale collaborazione è destinata a continuare."@it12 "Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@lt14 "Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@lv13 "Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@mt15 "Mijnheer de Voorzitter, zoals u weet hebben de Amerikaanse autoriteiten met betrekking tot het bekende incident met de KLM-vlucht aangegeven dat deze vlucht geen toegang heeft gekregen tot het Amerikaanse luchtruim nadat twee passagiers waren geïdentificeerd op basis van tevoren doorgegeven passagiersgegevens – API-gegevens. API-gegevens zijn in essentie paspoort- en ticketgegevens die bij de check-in worden geregistreerd om de immigratiecontrole op de plaats van bestemming te versnellen. Het is normale luchtvaartpraktijk dat luchtvaartmaatschappijen deze API-gegevens vóór landing op de plaats van bestemming doorgeven. Volgens de informatie van de Commissie geven luchtvaartmaatschappijen deze API-gegevens uitsluitend door aan grenscontroleautoriteiten. De Amerikaanse autoriteiten kunnen deze gegevens niet uit computerboekingssystemen ophalen. De Commissie wenst ook nogmaals te verduidelijken dat de betrokken passagiers niet op basis van PNR-gegevens (passagiersnaamregistratiegegevens) konden worden geïdentificeerd. Onder de PNR-overeenkomst vallen geen vluchten die het luchtruim van de Verenigde Staten oversteken, maar alleen vluchten van en naar de Verenigde Staten. Als zodanig is ze niet relevant in gevallen als het KLM-incident. Naar de mening van de Commissie wordt de PNR-overeenkomst door het gebruik van API-gegevens door de Amerikaanse autoriteiten niet ontdoken. De Commissie zal met name attent zijn op eventuele ontduikingen van de overeenkomst en de zaak in het kader van de gezamenlijke evaluatie aan de orde stellen. De Commissie onderstreept dat luchtvaartmaatschappijen momenteel niet verplicht zijn de VS API-gegevens te verstrekken van passagiers van vluchten die hun luchtruim doorkruisen. De vliegverbodlijst is opgesteld door de Amerikaanse autoriteiten en bevat namen van mensen die niet naar de VS mogen vliegen op basis van criteria van Amerikaanse inlichtingendiensten en risicobeoordeling. De lijst wordt opgesteld door de Verenigde Staten en zij alleen zijn er verantwoordelijk voor. De Europese Unie heeft een rigoureus luchtvaartveiligheidsbeleid, maar daaronder is geen vliegverbodlijst. Naar de mening van de Commissie betekent een vliegverbodlijst niet dat de personen op de lijst noodzakelijkerwijs worden verdacht van enig vergrijp. De Verenigde Staten hebben eenvoudig besloten dat zij niet willen dat deze personen het land in komen, om verschillende redenen, gebaseerd op een aantal tamelijk algemene criteria. Het is natuurlijk heel vervelend voor iemand die op de vliegverbodlijst staat dat hem daarom de toegang tot de Verenigde Staten wordt geweigerd. De Commissie zal in haar besprekingen met de Verenigde Staten duidelijkheid proberen te krijgen over de Amerikaanse vliegverbodlijst. De tijdige en doeltreffende doorzending van een actuele vliegverbodlijst aan luchtvaartmaatschappijen is bijvoorbeeld een essentieel aspect. De Commissie probeert daarom van de Amerikaanse autoriteiten meer duidelijkheid te krijgen over deze criteria om gevallen van vals-positieve resultaten in de toekomst te voorkomen. Sinds de start van de besprekingen tussen de VS en EU in maart 2003 heeft de Commissie de toezegging van de Verenigde Staten weten te krijgen dat het Amerikaanse Congres de aanstelling zou eisen van een privacyfunctionaris bij het ministerie van Binnenlandse Veiligheid, die jaarlijks verslag moet uitbrengen aan het Congres en wiens bevindingen bindend zijn voor het ministerie. De privacyfunctionaris heeft toegezegd gevallen in behandeling te nemen en vlot af te handelen die door gegevensbeschermingsautoriteiten uit de Europese Unie worden voorgelegd namens burgers die van mening zijn dat hun klachten door het ministerie van Binnenlandse Veiligheid niet naar tevredenheid zijn afgehandeld. EU-burgers hebben dus betere garanties dat zij billijk zullen worden behandeld. De verbintenissen van de Verenigde Staten voorzien in een gemeenschappelijke evaluatie van de tenuitvoerlegging ervan door de Amerikaanse autoriteiten en de Commissie; de Commissie zal daarbij terzijde worden gestaan door vertegenwoordigers van Europese wetshandhavingsautoriteiten en gegevensbeschermingstoezichthouders. De gemeenschappelijke evaluatie vindt plaats na het zomerreces, vermoedelijk in september. De bedoeling ervan is een duidelijk beeld te geven van de manier waarop de verbintenissen functioneren. De Commissie is voornemens dit Parlement op de hoogte te stellen van de resultaten van deze gemeenschappelijke evaluatie en van eventuele belangrijke ontwikkelingen. Tot slot zullen nationale gegevensbeschermingsautoriteiten deel uitmaken van het team onder leiding van de Commissie dat de gemeenschappelijke evaluatie verricht. Daardoor kunnen de nationale gegevensbeschermingsautoriteiten, de zogenoemde artikel 29-werkgroep, de tenuitvoerlegging van de verbintenissen ten volle beoordelen. Het doet me genoegen u te kunnen zeggen dat de samenwerking tussen de artikel 29-werkgroep en de Commissie bij de tenuitvoerlegging van het Amerikaanse PNR-pakket uitstekend is, ondanks de meningsverschillen over het pakket, en dat we deze samenwerking zullen voortzetten."@nl3 "Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@pl16 "Senhor Presidente, como sabe, no que se refere ao conhecido incidente com um voo da KLM, as autoridades dos Estados Unidos disseram que o voo foi impedido de entrar no espaço aéreo americano após a identificação de dois passageiros com base em informações prévias sobre os passageiros - os chamados dados API ( ). Os dados API consistem essencialmente em informações sobre passaportes e bilhetes, que são recolhidas durante o a fim de acelerar os procedimentos de controlo de imigração no destino. A transferência de dados API pelas companhias aéreas antes da chegada ao destino é uma prática normal das mesmas. Segundo a informação de que a Comissão dispõe, as transportadores aéreas apenas enviam dados API para as autoridades responsáveis pelo controlo de fronteiras. Essa informação não é recuperada pelas autoridades americanas através dos sistemas informatizados de reservas. A Comissão também quer esclarecer, mais uma vez, que os passageiros em causa não podiam ser identificados com base no registo do nome dos passageiros, ou dados PNR. Este instrumento não abrange os voos que sobrevoam os Estados Unidos, mas apenas os voos de e para os Estados Unidos. Assim sendo, não são relevantes em casos como o incidente da KLM. A Comissão é da opinião de que a utilização de dados API pelas autoridades americanas não parece constituir uma evasão ao acordo PNR. A Comissão vai estar particularmente atenta a eventuais evasões a esse acordo e levantará a questão no quadro da revisão conjunta. A Comissão gostaria de sublinhar que não existe actualmente qualquer requisito que obrigue as transportadoras aéreas a fornecerem aos EUA dados API sobre passageiros em caso de sobrevoo do seu território. A "lista " é elaborada pelas autoridades americanas e contém os nomes de pessoas que essas autoridades não desejam que voem para o seu país com base em informação recolhida pelos serviços americanos e em critérios de avaliação de risco. É preparada pelos Estados Unidos e é da sua exclusiva responsabilidade. A União Europeia tem uma política rigorosa em matéria de segurança da aviação, que não prevê "listas ". Na opinião da Comissão, uma "lista " não significa que se suspeite que as pessoas nela incluídas cometeram qualquer delito. Os Estados Unidos decidem simplesmente que não querem que essas pessoas entrem no seu país por várias razões, com base numa série de critérios bastante gerais. É, evidentemente, muito desagradável para uma pessoa ser-lhe negado acesso aos Estados Unidos pelo facto de o seu nome figurar numa "lista ". Relativamente a este aspecto, a Comissão procurará obter esclarecimentos sobre a "lista " americana nas suas conversações com os Estados Unidos. Por exemplo, a transmissão antecipada e efectiva às companhias aéreas de uma "lista " actualizada é um aspecto essencial. A Comissão irá, portanto, procurar esclarecer melhor estes critérios junto das autoridades americanas, a fim de evitar futuros casos de falsas identificações positivas. Desde que se iniciaram as conversações UE-EUA em Março de 2003, a Comissão já conseguiu obter dos Estados Unidos o compromisso de que o Congresso americano exigisse a nomeação de um director responsável pela confidencialidade ( ) no Departamento de Segurança Interna, que tem de prestar informação anualmente ao Congresso e cujas decisões são vinculatórias para aquele departamento. O director responsável pela confidencialidade concordou em receber e apreciar rapidamente os casos que lhe sejam apresentados pelas autoridades responsáveis pela protecção dos dados na União Europeia, em nome de cidadãos que considerem que as suas queixas não foram satisfatoriamente resolvidas pelo Departamento de Segurança Interna dos EUA. Os cidadãos da UE dispõem, assim, de uma garantia mais firme de que serão tratados de uma forma justa. Relativamente à revisão conjunta da declaração de compromissos dos Estados Unidos, a referida declaração prevê uma revisão conjunta da sua aplicação, a ser realizada pelas autoridades dos Estados Unidos e pela Comissão, sendo esta última assistida por representantes das autoridades europeias responsáveis pela aplicação da lei e pela Autoridade Europeia para a Protecção dos Dados. A revisão conjunta terá lugar após as férias do Verão, possivelmente em Setembro. A sua finalidade é proporcionar uma imagem clara da forma como a declaração de compromissos está a funcionar. É intenção da Comissão informar o Parlamento dos resultados da referida revisão conjunta e de outros acontecimentos importantes. Por último, as autoridades nacionais responsáveis pela protecção dos dados farão parte da equipa chefiada pela Comissão que irá realizar a revisão conjunta. Isto permitirá que as referidas autoridades, o chamado Grupo de Trabalho do Artigo 29º, avaliem plenamente a forma como está a ser implementada a declaração de compromissos. Congratulo-me por vos poder dizer que, apesar das divergências de opinião quanto ao pacote PNR dos Estados Unidos, existe uma excelente cooperação ao nível da implementação desse pacote entre o Grupo de Trabalho do Artigo 29º e a Comissão, e essa cooperação irá prosseguir."@pt17 "Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@sk18 "Mr President, as you know, with regard to the well-known incident with a KLM flight, the United States authorities indicated that the flight was prevented from entering US airspace after two passengers were identified from advance passenger information – API data. API data is essentially passport and ticket information collected at check-in to speed up immigration controls at the destination. The transfer of API data by airlines prior to arrival at the point of destination constitutes normal airline practice. According to the information available to the Commission, air carriers only send API information to border control authorities. That information is not retrieved by the US authorities from computer reservation systems. The Commission also wishes to clarify once again that the passengers concerned could not be identified on the basis of passenger name record – PNR – data. That instrument does not cover flights overflying the United States, but only flights from a! nd to the United States. As such, it is not relevant with regard to cases such as the KLM incident. In the Commission’s view, the use of API data by the United States authorities does not seem to constitute a circumvention of the PNR agreement. The Commission will be particularly attentive to any circumvention of the agreement and will raise this issue in the framework of the joint review. The Commission wishes to underline that there is no current requirement for air carriers to provide the US with API data on passengers for over-flights. The no-fly list is drawn up by the US authorities and contains the names of people they do not wish to fly into the US on the basis of US intelligence and risk-threat assessment criteria. It is produced by the United States and that country alone is responsible for it. The European Union has a rigorous policy on aviation security, but that does not include a no-fly list. In the Commission’s view, a no-fly list does not mean that the people included are necessarily suspected of any wrongdoing. The United States simply decided that it does not want them to enter the country for various reasons, based on a number of rather general criteria. It is, of course, very annoying for somebody to be denied access to the United States because his or her name is on the no-fly list. In this regard, the Commission will seek clarification of the US no-fly list in its talks with the United States. For example, the early and effective forwarding to airlines of an up-to-date no-fly list is an essential aspect. The Commission is, therefore, seeking to better clarify these criteria with the American authorities, in order to prevent future cases of false positives. Since the start of the US-EU talks in March 2003, the Commission has been able to secure from the United States the undertaking that the American Congress would require the appointment of a chief privacy officer within the Department of Homeland Security who has to report annually to Congress and whose findings are binding on the department. The chief privacy officer has agreed to receive and handle in an expedited manner cases lodged by data protection authorities in the European Union on behalf of citizens who consider that their complaints have not been satisfactorily addressed by the Department of Homeland Security. So the EU citizen has stronger assurance of fair treatment. As regards the joint review of the United States Undertakings, the latter provide for a joint review of their implementation, to be conducted by the United States authorities and the Commission, the latter assisted by representatives of European law enforcement authorities and data protection supervisors. The joint review will take place after the summer break, presumably in September. The review aims to provide a clear picture of the way the Undertakings function. It is the Commission’s intention to inform this Parliament of the outcome of this joint review and any important developments. Finally, national data protection authorities will be part of the Commission-led team conducting the joint review. This should allow the national data protection authorities, the so-called Article 29 Working Party, to assess fully the implementation of the Undertakings. I am pleased to tell you that despite differences in view of the United States PNR package, there is excellent cooperation on the implementation of this package between the Article 29 Working Party and the Commission, and this cooperation will continue."@sl19 ". Herr talman! När det gäller den välkända incidenten med en KLM-flygning är ni medveten om att myndigheterna i Förenta staterna antydde att planet hindrades från att flyga in i deras luftrum sedan två passagerare hade identifierats med hjälp av förhandsinformation om passagerare – API-uppgifter. API-uppgifter utgörs huvudsakligen av uppgifter om pass och biljetter som samlas in vid incheckningen för att påskynda invandringskontrollen på bestämmelseorten. Överföringen av API-uppgifter av flygbolag före ankomsten till bestämmelseorten är en normal rutin bland flygbolag. Enligt den information kommissionen fått tillgång till skickar lufttrafikföretag bara API-uppgifter till gränskontrollerande myndigheter. De uppgifterna hämtar myndigheter i Förenta staterna inte från datoriserade bokningssystem. Kommissionen vill också än en gång klargöra att de berörda passagerarna inte kunde identifieras med hjälp av passageraruppgifter (PNR). Det instrumentet omfattar inte flygningar som korsar Förenta staterna utan endast flygningar till och från Förenta staterna. Som sådant är det inte tillämpligt när det gäller fall som KLM-incidenten. Enligt kommissionens uppfattning tycks användningen av API-uppgifter av myndigheter i Förenta staterna inte utgöra ett kringgående av PNR-överenskommelsen. Kommissionen kommer att ge särskild akt på varje kringgående av överenskommelsen och kommer att ta upp frågan inom ramen för den gemensamma översynen. Kommissionen vill betona att det inte finns något gällande krav på lufttrafikföretag att förse Förenta staterna med API-uppgifter om passagerare för överflygningar. ”No fly”-listan har gjorts upp av myndigheterna i Förenta staterna och innehåller namnen på personer som de inte vill skall flyga in i Förenta staterna på grundval av Förenta staternas underrättelser och kriterier för bedömning av risker och hot. Den skapas av Förenta staterna och det är bara det landet som har ansvaret för den. Europeiska unionen har en rigorös politik för flygsäkerhet men den innefattar inte en ”no fly”-lista. Enligt kommissionens uppfattning behöver en ”no fly”-lista inte innebära att de som finns upptagna på den är misstänkta för några missgärningar. Förenta staterna har helt enkelt beslutat att de inte vill att de skall komma in i landet på grund av olika skäl utifrån ett antal ganska allmänna kriterier. Det är naturligtvis mycket förargligt för någon att nekas tillträde till Förenta staterna därför att hans eller hennes namn finns med på ”no fly”-listan. I detta avseende kommer kommissionen i sina samtal med Förenta staterna att begära förtydligande av deras ”no fly”-lista. En viktig aspekt är till exempel att en aktuell ”no fly”-lista når flygbolagen på ett effektivt sätt och i god tid. Kommissionen försöker därför att klargöra dessa kriterier bättre tillsammans med myndigheterna i Förenta staterna för att undvika felaktigt positiva träffar i framtiden. Sedan samtalen mellan Förenta staterna och EU inleddes i mars 2003 har kommissionen lyckats utverka löftet från Förenta staterna att den amerikanska kongressen skall begära att en chefstjänsteman med ansvar för konfidentialitet utnämns vid departementet för inrikes säkerhet (Department of Homeland Security), som årligen skall avlägga en rapport inför kongressen och vars slutsatser är bindande för departementet. Chefstjänstemannen med ansvar för konfidentialitet har gått med på att ta mot och skyndsamt behandla fall som framförs av myndigheter för skydd av personuppgifter i EU för de medborgares räkning som anser att deras klagomål inte har fått en tillfredsställande behandling av departementet för inrikes säkerhet. Således har EU-medborgarna fått starkare garantier för en rättvis behandling. När det gäller den gemensamma översynen av Förenta staternas åtaganden, förutses i dessa en gemensam översyn av deras genomförande som skall ledas av myndigheterna i Förenta staterna och av kommissionen, vilken skall biträdas av EU:s brottsbekämpande myndigheter och datatillsynsman. Den gemensamma översynen kommer att genomföras efter sommaruppehållet, förmodligen i september. Översynen syftar till att ge en klar bild av vilken verkan dessa åtaganden har. Kommissionen avser att informera parlamentet om resultatet av denna gemensamma översyn och vidare utveckling av betydelse. Slutligen kommer nationella datatillsynsmyndigheter att delta i den grupp som genomför översynen och som leds av kommissionen. Detta bör göra det möjligt för de nationella datatillsynsmyndigheterna, den så kallade Artikel 29-arbetsgruppen, att ge en fullständig bedömning av hur dessa åtaganden genomförs. Jag är glad över att kunna tala om för er att trots olika uppfattningar om Förenta staternas PNR-paket så förekommer ett utmärkt samarbete om genomförandet av det här paketet mellan Artikel 29-arbetsgruppen och kommissionen, ett samarbete som kommer att fortsätta."@sv21
lpv:unclassifiedMetadata	"Franco Frattini,"5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,7,13,4 "Vice-President of the Commission"5,19,15,1,18,14,11,16,13,4 "chief privacy officer"2,17 "intelligence"12 "komission varapuheenjohtaja"7 "no-fly"17 "no-fly list"12

Named graphs describing this resource:

The resource appears as object in 2 triples

Context graph