Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-05-25-Speech-3-236"
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".
Madam President, I will avoid making this a purely Dutch discussion, and speak in English so that others can participate directly in this interesting debate.
It is regrettable that this debate is being held at such a late hour, but I thank the Commissioners for being here and wish Mr McCreevy, who was supposed to be here, all the best with his health. I also hope, of course, that we can continue the debate in the committee.
The possibility of a takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse or Euronext has ignited debates in the European Parliament over whether such a takeover can be assessed at national level alone. At present, the two cases are being dealt with by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK. Legally speaking, the takeover of the LSE may be the responsibility of the relevant Member State’s competition authorities, since European competition rules do not apply as long as the national regulators deem the relevant markets to be their respective Member States and the turnover level to be below the thresholds set for European competition rules to apply.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has tabled this oral question to the Commission to ask it to play a more proactive role. We would like the Commission to consider the different scenarios that might arise and assess the effects that they might bring to competition in, and the pricing of, listing services, trading services, information services and, not least, important post
trade services, clearing and settlement.
We are aware of the detailed studies undertaken by the Competition Commission in the UK, prepared by the British Office of Fair Trading. The standpoint of that assessment is, however, primarily or maybe even exclusively the impact for the UK markets, and we would like to see that broadened in the Commission’s assessment.
You may remember the shock caused in 2002
2003 when some traders in Dutch blue
chip equities challenged Euronext Amsterdam to lower prices and to providing improvements in services, by looking for an alternative trading venue with Deutsche Börse and the LSE. This showed that competition really makes a difference. This characterises the situation we have at present of an open integrated European market with crossborder competition. The question is whether different scenarios increase this competitive tendency, or go in the opposite direction and tend to create monopolies
situations for which, by the way
competition regulation might be a more appropriate answer.
Another related issue is the aspect of regulation and supervision. From the moment the possible take
over of the LSE appeared on the pages of the financial papers, speculation started as to where the headquarters of the merged entity would be based and which regulator would get the power to supervise it. That was more than speculation. I tend to believe there was truth in the stories that the issue of the regulatory regime was a major subject in the merger talks. Who knows, it might even have been part of the background of the rebellion against the Deutsche Börse leadership, which you in Germany have such nice nicknames for.
As the rapporteur of subsequent reports on prudential supervision and the FSAP, I would not dare to express my preferences for one or other national regulatory regimes. My far greater concern is that there will be counterproductive competition between national regimes, instead of further coordination and cooperation. That is one of my strongest arguments for a European level supervisor. In the reports I prepared in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, and which were adopted in the previous plenary sitting, this is again stressed as an option for the near future.
Such a European level supervisor should execute the application of the European regulatory framework of the FSAP developed in previous years. As regards the part of the financial market which is already supranational and operates crossborder and often cross
sector, one of our main messages is to create real convergence in the implementation of the European directives and real convergence of supervisory practice, thereby avoiding regulatory arbitrage and possible competition on other factors for establishment such as fiscal and cost aspects.
Therefore, the possible effects of the Commission’s ambitions as regards integration of the financial markets and the regulation and supervision of different scenarios should also be part of the assessment we are asking for. In that context I would ask you to focus your attention on scenarios in which merger activity is not restricted to EU countries alone. There may also be conceivable scenarios in which the New York stock exchange and a newly formed one joint with the LSE or, on the other hand Euronext and Deutsche Börse might get together. There might then be a disintegration rather than a further convergence of European regulations. This should also be taken into account in your assessment and expectations."@en4
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"Madam President, I will avoid making this a purely Dutch discussion, and speak in English so that others can participate directly in this interesting debate.
It is regrettable that this debate is being held at such a late hour, but I thank the Commissioners for being here and wish Mr McCreevy, who was supposed to be here, all the best with his health. I also hope, of course, that we can continue the debate in the committee.
The possibility of a takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse or Euronext has ignited debates in the European Parliament over whether such a takeover can be assessed at national level alone. At present, the two cases are being dealt with by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK. Legally speaking, the takeover of the LSE may be the responsibility of the relevant Member State’s competition authorities, since European competition rules do not apply as long as the national regulators deem the relevant markets to be their respective Member States and the turnover level to be below the thresholds set for European competition rules to apply.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has tabled this oral question to the Commission to ask it to play a more proactive role. We would like the Commission to consider the different scenarios that might arise and assess the effects that they might bring to competition in, and the pricing of, listing services, trading services, information services and, not least, important post-trade services, clearing and settlement.
We are aware of the detailed studies undertaken by the Competition Commission in the UK, prepared by the British Office of Fair Trading. The standpoint of that assessment is, however, primarily or maybe even exclusively the impact for the UK markets, and we would like to see that broadened in the Commission’s assessment.
You may remember the shock caused in 2002-2003 when some traders in Dutch blue-chip equities challenged Euronext Amsterdam to lower prices and to providing improvements in services, by looking for an alternative trading venue with Deutsche Börse and the LSE. This showed that competition really makes a difference. This characterises the situation we have at present of an open integrated European market with crossborder competition. The question is whether different scenarios increase this competitive tendency, or go in the opposite direction and tend to create monopolies - situations for which, by the way
competition regulation might be a more appropriate answer.
Another related issue is the aspect of regulation and supervision. From the moment the possible take-over of the LSE appeared on the pages of the financial papers, speculation started as to where the headquarters of the merged entity would be based and which regulator would get the power to supervise it. That was more than speculation. I tend to believe there was truth in the stories that the issue of the regulatory regime was a major subject in the merger talks. Who knows, it might even have been part of the background of the rebellion against the Deutsche Börse leadership, which you in Germany have such nice nicknames for.
As the rapporteur of subsequent reports on prudential supervision and the FSAP, I would not dare to express my preferences for one or other national regulatory regimes. My far greater concern is that there will be counterproductive competition between national regimes, instead of further coordination and cooperation. That is one of my strongest arguments for a European level supervisor. In the reports I prepared in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, and which were adopted in the previous plenary sitting, this is again stressed as an option for the near future.
Such a European level supervisor should execute the application of the European regulatory framework of the FSAP developed in previous years. As regards the part of the financial market which is already supranational and operates crossborder and often cross-sector, one of our main messages is to create real convergence in the implementation of the European directives and real convergence of supervisory practice, thereby avoiding regulatory arbitrage and possible competition on other factors for establishment such as fiscal and cost aspects.
Therefore, the possible effects of the Commission’s ambitions as regards integration of the financial markets and the regulation and supervision of different scenarios should also be part of the assessment we are asking for. In that context I would ask you to focus your attention on scenarios in which merger activity is not restricted to EU countries alone. There may also be conceivable scenarios in which the New York stock exchange and a newly formed one joint with the LSE or, on the other hand Euronext and Deutsche Börse might get together. There might then be a disintegration rather than a further convergence of European regulations. This should also be taken into account in your assessment and expectations."@cs1
"Fru formand, jeg vil undgå at gøre dette til en rent nederlandsk diskussion, og jeg vil tale på engelsk, så andre kan deltage direkte i denne interessante forhandling.
Det er beklageligt, at denne forhandling finder sted så sent, men jeg takker kommissærerne for Deres tilstedeværelse og ønsker hr. McCreevy, der skulle have været her, god bedring. Jeg håber selvfølgelig også, at vi kan fortsætte forhandlingen i udvalget.
Muligheden for, at London Stock Exchange overtages af Deutsche Börse eller Euronext, har startet forhandlinger i Europa-Parlamentet om, hvorvidt en sådan overtagelse udelukkende kan vurderes på nationalt plan. I øjeblikket behandles to sager af Office of Fair Trading og The Competition Commission i Det Forenede Kongerige. Juridisk set kan overtagelsen af London Stock Exchange høre ind under den relevante medlemsstats konkurrencemyndigheder, da europæiske konkurrenceregler ikke finder anvendelse, så længe de nationale myndigheder skønner, at de relevante markeder er deres respektive medlemsstater, og omsætningen samtidig holder sig under de tærskler, for hvilke EU's konkurrenceregler finder anvendelse.
Ikke desto mindre har Udvalget om Økonomi og Valutaspørgsmål stillet dette mundtlige spørgsmål til Kommissionen og bedt den om at spille en mere proaktiv rolle. Vi vil gerne have Kommissionen til at overveje de forskellige scenarier, der kan opstå, og vurdere deres potentielle betydning for konkurrencen på og prissætningen af noteringstjenester, handelstjenester, informationstjenester samt ikke mindst vigtige efterhandelstjenester, clearing og afregning.
Vi er opmærksomme på de grundige undersøgelser, der er foretaget af The Competition Commission i Det Forenede Kongerige efter forberedelse af det britiske Office of Fair Trading. Udgangspunktet for den vurdering er imidlertid primært eller måske udelukkende indvirkningen på det britiske marked, og det vil vi gerne have udvidet i Kommissionens vurdering.
De husker måske chokket i 2002-2003, da nogle handlende i nederlandske
aktier pressede Euronext Amsterdam til at sænke priserne og forbedre tjenesterne ved at søge efter et alternativt handelssted i form af Deutsche Börse og London Stock Exchange. Det viste, at konkurrence virkelig gør en forskel. Det karakteriserer den aktuelle situation med et åbent integreret europæisk marked med grænseoverskridende konkurrence. Spørgsmålet er, om forskellige scenarier øger denne konkurrence, eller om de tværtimod vil fremme monopoldannelser - situationer, hvor forudgående konkurrenceregulerende bestemmelser kunne være et mere hensigtsmæssigt svar.
Et andet beslægtet emne er aspektet vedrørende regulering og tilsyn. Fra det øjeblik, hvor historien om den mulige overtagelse af London Stock Exchange fandt vej til finansavisernes spalter, begyndte spekulationerne om, hvor den fusionerede enheds hovedsæde skulle ligge, og hvilken myndighed der ville få beføjelser til at føre tilsyn hermed. Der var tale om ren spekulation. Jeg hælder til den anskuelse, at der var hold i historierne om, at spørgsmålet om reguleringsordningen var et vigtigt emne i fusionsforhandlingerne. Hvem ved, måske har det været en del af grunden til oprøret imod Deutsche Börses ledende rolle, som De har så fine øgenavne for i Tyskland.
Som ordfører for efterfølgende betænkninger om tilsyn og handlingsplanen for finansielle tjenesteydelser tør jeg ikke udtrykke mine præferencer for den ene eller den anden reguleringsordning. Jeg er langt mere bekymret for, at der kan være ufrugtbar konkurrence mellem nationale ordninger i stedet for yderligere koordinering og samarbejde. Det er et af mine stærkeste argumenter for en tilsynsførende på fællesskabsniveau. I de betænkninger, jeg udarbejdede i Udvalget om Økonomi og Valutaspørgsmål, og som blev vedtaget under det foregående plenarmøde, understreges det atter som en mulighed i den nærmeste fremtid.
En sådan tilsynsførende på fællesskabsniveau skulle gennemføre det europæiske regelsæt for handlingsplanen for finansielle tjenesteydelser, der er udviklet i de foregående år. Hvad angår den del af det finansielle marked, der allerede er overstatslig og opererer på tværs af grænser samt ofte på tværs af sektorer, er et af vores vigtigste budskaber at skabe reel konvergens i tilsynspraksis og dermed undgå tilsynsarbitrage og mulig konkurrence om andre etableringsfaktorer som f.eks. skatte- og omkostningsmæssige aspekter.
Derfor skal de mulige virkninger af Kommissionens ambitioner vedrørende integrationen af de finansielle markeder samt regulering og tilsyn af forskellige scenarier også være en del af den vurdering, vi beder om. I denne forbindelse vil jeg bede Dem om at rette opmærksomheden imod scenarier, hvor fusionsaktiviteter ikke udelukkende er begrænset til EU-lande. Man kan også forestille sig scenarier, hvor fondsbørsen i New York og en nydannet børs slår sig sammen med London Stock Exchange, eller hvor f.eks. Euronext og Deutsche Börse går sammen. Der kunne også være tale om opløsning i stedet for en yderligere overensstemmelse mellem europæiske love. Det skal De også tage højde for i Deres vurderinger og forventninger."@da2
".
Frau Präsidentin! Ich möchte vermeiden, dass dies eine rein niederländische Diskussion wird, und daher englisch sprechen, damit sich auch andere unmittelbar an dieser interessanten Aussprache beteiligen können.
Es ist bedauerlich, dass diese Aussprache zu so später Stunde stattfindet, aber ich danke den Kommissionsmitgliedern für ihre Teilnahme und wünsche Herrn McCreevy, der eigentlich auch hier sein sollte, alles Gute für die Gesundheit. Natürlich hoffe ich auch, dass wir die Aussprache im Ausschuss fortsetzen können.
Die Möglichkeit der Übernahme der Londoner Börse LSE durch die Deutsche Börse oder Euronext hat im Europäischen Parlament Diskussionen darüber ausgelöst, ob eine solche Übernahme allein auf nationaler Ebene bewertet werden kann. Momentan werden zwei Fälle von der Kartellbehörde und der Wettbewerbskommission des Vereinigten Königreichs bearbeitet. Rechtlich gesehen könnte die Übernahme der LSE in die Zuständigkeit der Wettbewerbsbehörden der betreffenden Mitgliedstaaten fallen, da die europäischen Wettbewerbsregeln nicht zur Anwendung kommen, solange die nationalen Regulierungsbehörden der Auffassung sind, dass es sich bei den betreffenden Märkten um ihre jeweiligen Mitgliedstaaten handelt und dass der Umsatz unter dem Schwellenwert liegt, von dem an die europäischen Wettbewerbsregeln gelten.
Dennoch hat der Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Währung diese mündliche Anfrage an die Kommission gerichtet, um sie zu einem offensiveren Vorgehen zu bewegen. Wir möchten, dass sich die Kommission mit den verschiedenen denkbaren Szenarien auseinandersetzt und deren mögliche Auswirkungen beurteilt, was den Wettbewerb und die Preise bei Dienstleistungen im Bereich der Börsennotierung, des Börsenhandels, der Information und nicht zuletzt bei wichtigen Dienstleistungen nach dem Handelsabschluss, nämlich Clearing und Abrechnung, anbelangt.
Uns ist bekannt, dass die Wettbewerbskommission des Vereinigten Königreichs gründliche Studien in Auftrag gegeben hat, die von der britischen Kartellbehörde durchgeführt wurden. Bei dieser Bewertung wurden jedoch überwiegend oder vielleicht sogar ausschließlich die Auswirkungen auf die britischen Märkte betrachtet, und wir möchten gerne, dass die Bewertung der Kommission darüber hinausgeht.
Vielleicht erinnern Sie sich noch daran, welchen Schock es 2002-2003 auslöste, als Händler niederländischer Spitzenwerte Euronext Amsterdam zur Senkung der Preise und Verbesserung der Dienstleistungen veranlassten, indem sie sich bei der Deutschen Börse und der LSE nach alternativen Handelsplätzen umschauten. Daran hat sich gezeigt, was Wettbewerb vermag. Das bestätigt sich auch heute, wo wir einen offenen integrierten europäischen Markt mit grenzüberschreitendem Wettbewerb haben. Die Frage ist, ob unterschiedliche Szenarien diese Wettbewerbstendenzen fördern oder aber genau die entgegengesetzte Wirkung haben und zur Monopolbildung führen – eine Entwicklung, der man übrigens durch die Ex-ante-Regelung des Wettbewerbs eventuell wirksamer begegnen könnte.
Damit im Zusammenhang steht auch die Frage der Aufsicht und Überwachung. Sobald in den Finanzmagazinen die ersten Berichte über die mögliche Übernahme der LSE erschienen, begannen auch schon die Spekulationen darüber, wo sich der Sitz der fusionierten Börse befinden würde und welche Behörde die Aufsicht erhalten würde. Das war mehr als nur Spekulation. Ich möchte meinen, dass es nicht aus der Luft gegriffen ist, wenn erzählt wird, dass die Frage des Aufsichtssystems bei den Fusionsgesprächen ein vorrangiges Thema war. Wer weiß, ob sie nicht sogar einer der Auslöser der Revolte gegen die Führungsspitzen der Deutschen Börse war, für die Sie in Deutschland so hübsche Spitznamen haben.
Als Berichterstatterin für die nachfolgenden Berichte über aufsichtsrechtliche Fragen und den Aktionsplan für Finanzdienstleistungen möchte ich lieber davon Abstand nehmen, mich für das eine oder andere nationale Aufsichtssystem auszusprechen. Viel mehr beschäftigt mich die Sorge, dass es anstelle weiterer Koordinierung und Zusammenarbeit einen kontraproduktiven Wettbewerb zwischen den nationalen Systemen geben könnte. Dies ist eines meiner stärksten Argumente zugunsten einer Aufsichtsbehörde auf europäischer Ebene. In den Berichten, die ich im Ausschuss für Wirtschaft und Währung erarbeitet habe und die auf der letzten Plenartagung angenommen wurden, wird dies erneut als Option für die nahe Zukunft herausgestellt.
Eine solche europäische Aufsichtsbehörde sollte für die praktische Umsetzung des europäischen Regulierungsrahmens zuständig sein, der in den letzten Jahren mit dem Aktionsplan für Finanzdienstleistungen entwickelt wurde. Was den Teil des Finanzmarktes anbelangt, der bereits supranational sowie grenzüberschreitend und oft auch sektorübergreifend tätig ist, so lautet eine unserer wichtigsten Aussagen, dass es auf echte Konvergenz bei der Durchführung der europäischen Richtlinien und echte Konvergenz in der Aufsichtspraxis ankommt, um regulatorische Arbitrage und einen möglichen Wettbewerb bei anderen niederlassungsrelevanten Faktoren wie steuerlichen und Kostenaspekten zu verhindern.
Daher sollte die von uns geforderte Bewertung auch auf die möglichen Folgen der Bestrebungen der Kommission eingehen, was die Integration der Finanzmärkte und die Regulierung und Aufsicht bei den unterschiedlichen Szenarien angeht. In diesem Zusammenhang möchte ich Sie bitten, ihre Aufmerksamkeit auf die Szenarien zu richten, bei denen die Fusionstätigkeit nicht allein auf die EU-Länder beschränkt bleibt. Denkbar sind vielleicht auch Szenarien, bei denen die New Yorker Börse und eine neue geschaffene Börse mit der LSE fusionieren; andererseits könnten auch Euronext und die Deutsche Börse zusammengehen. Dies könnte zu einer Aufsplitterung anstatt zu einer weiteren Annäherung der europäischen Regelungen führen. Dem sollten Ihre Bewertung und Ihre Erwartungen ebenfalls Rechnung tragen."@de9
"Κυρία Πρόεδρε, θα αποφύγω να μετατρέψω τη συζήτηση σε αμιγώς ολλανδική, και θα μιλήσω στα αγγλικά ούτως ώστε να μπορούν να συμμετάσχουν άμεσα και άλλοι σε αυτή την ενδιαφέρουσα συζήτηση.
Είναι λυπηρό που αυτή η συζήτηση διεξάγεται τόσο αργά, αλλά ευχαριστώ τα μέλη της Επιτροπής για την παρουσία τους και εύχομαι στον κ. McCreevy, που υποτίθεται ότι θα ήταν εδώ, το καλύτερο για την υγεία του. Ελπίζω επίσης ότι θα μπορέσουμε να συνεχίσουμε τη συζήτηση στην επιτροπή.
Η πιθανότητα εξαγοράς του Χρηματιστηρίου του Λονδίνου (LSE) από το Γερμανικό Χρηματιστήριο ή το Euronext πυροδότησε συζητήσεις στο Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο σχετικά με το εάν μια τέτοια εξαγορά μπορεί να αποτιμηθεί μόνο σε εθνικό επίπεδο. Επί του παρόντος, οι δύο περιπτώσεις αντιμετωπίζονται από την Υπηρεσία Θεμιτών Συναλλαγών και την Επιτροπή Ανταγωνισμού στο Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο. Από νομική άποψη, η εξαγορά του LSE ίσως να είναι ευθύνη των αρμόδιων αρχών ανταγωνισμού του κράτους μέλους, καθόσον οι ευρωπαϊκοί κανόνες ανταγωνισμού δεν εφαρμόζονται εφόσον οι εθνικές ρυθμιστικές αρχές θεωρούν ότι οι σχετικές αγορές αφορούν τα αντίστοιχα κράτη μέλη τους και ότι το επίπεδο του όγκου συναλλαγών είναι χαμηλότερο των ορίων που έχουν τεθεί για την εφαρμογή των ευρωπαϊκών κανόνων ανταγωνισμού.
Εντούτοις, η Επιτροπή Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων έχει υποβάλει αυτή την προφορική ερώτηση στην Επιτροπή προκειμένου να της ζητήσει να διαδραματίσει πιο προορατικό ρόλο. Θα θέλαμε να εξετάσει η Επιτροπή τα διαφορετικά σενάρια που ενδεχομένως ανακύψουν και να αποτιμήσει τις επιπτώσεις που ίσως αναγκάσουν σε ανταγωνισμό και τιμολόγηση των υπηρεσιών εισαγωγής στο χρηματιστήριο, των υπηρεσιών συναλλαγών, των υπηρεσιών πληροφόρησης και, τελευταίο αλλά εξίσου σημαντικό, των σημαντικών υπηρεσιών ολοκλήρωσης των συναλλαγών, του συμψηφισμού και διακανονισμού.
Είμαστε ενήμεροι για τις λεπτομερείς μελέτες που ανέλαβε η Επιτροπή Ανταγωνισμού στο Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο, και οι οποίες εκπονήθηκαν από τη Βρετανική Υπηρεσία Θεμιτών Συναλλαγών. Αυτή η αξιολόγηση, ωστόσο, ερευνά το θέμα κυρίως, ή ίσως αποκλειστικά, από την άποψη του αντικτύπου στις αγορές του Ηνωμένου Βασιλείου, ενώ θα θέλαμε η αξιολόγηση της Επιτροπής να ακολουθεί ευρύτερη προοπτική.
Ίσως θυμάστε την κρίση που προκλήθηκε το 2002-2003, όταν ορισμένοι επενδυτές σε ολλανδικούς τίτλους πρώτης τάξης προκάλεσαν το Χρηματιστήριο Euronext του Άμστερνταμ να μειώσει τις τιμές και να βελτιώσει τις υπηρεσίες, αναζητώντας εναλλακτικό σύστημα συναλλαγών με το Γερμανικό Χρηματιστήριο και το LSE. Αυτό έδειξε ότι ο ανταγωνισμός όντως κάνει τη διαφορά. Αυτό χαρακτηρίζει την κατάσταση που επικρατεί σήμερα: μια ανοικτή ολοκληρωμένη ευρωπαϊκή αγορά με διασυνοριακό ανταγωνισμό. Το ζήτημα είναι αν τα διαφορετικά σενάρια αυξάνουν αυτή την ανταγωνιστική τάση, ή αν οδηγούν στην αντίθετη κατεύθυνση και τείνουν να δημιουργήσουν μονοπώλια – καταστάσεις για τις οποίες, παρεμπιπτόντως, η
ρύθμιση του ανταγωνισμού ενδεχομένως να ήταν πιο ενδεδειγμένη απάντηση.
Ένα άλλο σχετικό θέμα είναι η πτυχή της ρύθμισης και της εποπτείας. Από τη στιγμή που η ενδεχόμενη εξαγορά του LSE εμφανίστηκε στις σελίδες των οικονομικών εφημερίδων, άρχισαν οι εικασίες για το πού θα ήταν η έδρα των κεντρικών γραφείων του συγχωνευμένου φορέα και για το ποια ρυθμιστική αρχή θα αναλάμβανε την ευθύνη της εποπτείας του. Αυτό ήταν περισσότερο από εικασία. Τείνω να πιστέψω ότι υπήρχε αλήθεια στις ιστορίες ότι το θέμα του ρυθμιστικού συστήματος ήταν μείζον ζήτημα στις συζητήσεις για τη συγχώνευση. Ποιος ξέρει, ίσως ακόμη να αποτέλεσε μέρος του παρασκηνίου της εξέγερσης κατά της ηγεσίας του Γερμανικού Χρηματιστηρίου, για την οποία εσείς στη Γερμανία έχετε τόσο ωραία παρατσούκλια.
Ως εισηγήτρια επακόλουθων εκθέσεων σχετικά με την προληπτική εποπτεία και το FSAP (Πρόγραμμα Δράσης για τις Χρηματοπιστωτικές Υπηρεσίες), δεν θα τολμούσα να εκφράσω τις προτιμήσεις μου υπέρ ενός ή άλλου εθνικού ρυθμιστικού συστήματος. Η κατά πολύ σοβαρότερη ανησυχία μου είναι ότι θα υπάρξει αντιπαραγωγικός ανταγωνισμός μεταξύ των εθνικών συστημάτων, αντί περαιτέρω συντονισμού και συνεργασίας. Αυτό είναι ένα από τα ισχυρότερα επιχειρήματά μου για μια εποπτική αρχή σε ευρωπαϊκό επίπεδο. Στις εκθέσεις τις οποίες εκπόνησα εξ ονόματος της Επιτροπής Οικονομικών και Νομισματικών Υποθέσεων, και οι οποίες εγκρίθηκαν στην προηγούμενη συνεδρίαση της Ολομέλειας, αυτό τονίζεται πάλι ως επιλογή για το εγγύς μέλλον.
Μια τέτοια εποπτική αρχή ευρωπαϊκού επιπέδου πρέπει να εκτελεί την εφαρμογή του ευρωπαϊκού ρυθμιστικού πλαισίου του FSAP που αναπτύχθηκε τα προηγούμενα χρόνια. Όσον αφορά το τμήμα της χρηματοπιστωτικής αγοράς που είναι ήδη υπερεθνικό και λειτουργεί διασυνοριακά και συχνά διατομεακά, ένα από τα κυριότερα μηνύματά μας είναι η δημιουργία πραγματικής σύγκλισης στην εφαρμογή των ευρωπαϊκών οδηγιών και πραγματικής σύγκλισης εποπτικής πρακτικής, αποφεύγοντας κατ’ αυτόν τον τρόπο τη ρυθμιστική αυθαιρεσία και τον ενδεχόμενο ανταγωνισμό σε άλλους παράγοντες εγκατάστασης, όπως φορολογικές πτυχές και πτυχές κόστους.
Συνεπώς, οι ενδεχόμενες επιπτώσεις των φιλοδοξιών της Επιτροπής όσον αφορά την ολοκλήρωση των χρηματοπιστωτικών αγορών και τη ρύθμιση και εποπτεία των διαφορετικών σεναρίων θα έπρεπε να αποτελούν επίσης μέρος της αξιολόγησης την οποία ζητούμε. Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, θα ήθελα να σας ζητήσω να εστιάσετε την προσοχή σας σε σενάρια στα οποία η δραστηριότητα συγχώνευσης δεν περιορίζεται μόνο σε χώρες της ΕΕ. Ενδεχομένως να υπάρχουν νοητά σενάρια στα οποία το Χρηματιστήριο της Νέας Υόρκης και ένα νέο σχήμα που θα ιδρυθεί από κοινού με το LSE ή, από την άλλη πλευρά, το Euronext και το Γερμανικό Χρηματιστήριο ίσως να ενωθούν. Ενδεχομένως τότε να υπάρξει αποσύνθεση και όχι περαιτέρω σύγκλιση των ευρωπαϊκών ρυθμίσεων. Αυτό θα έπρεπε επίσης να ληφθεί υπόψη στην αξιολόγηση και τις προσδοκίες σας."@el10
".
Señora Presidenta, trataré de evitar que esto se convierta en una discusión puramente neerlandesa y por tanto hablaré en inglés, para que otras personas puedan participar directamente en este interesante debate.
Es lamentable que este debate se esté celebrando tan tarde, pero quiero dar las gracias a los Comisarios por su presencia y deseo al señor McCreevy, que tendría que haber estado aquí, una pronta recuperación. También espero, por supuesto, que podamos continuar el debate en comisión.
La posibilidad de una absorción de la Bolsa de Londres (LSE) por Deutsche Börse o Euronext ha desencadenado debates en el Parlamento Europeo con respecto a la cuestión de si este tipo de absorciones pueden evaluarse a escala puramente nacional. En la actualidad se tramitan dos casos en el Servicio de protección del consumidor y la Comisión de defensa de la competencia del Reino Unido. Desde el punto de vista jurídico, puede que la absorción de la LSE sea de la incumbencia de las autoridades responsables de la competencia del Estado miembro en cuestión, dado que las normas europeas en materia de competencia no son aplicables mientras los reguladores nacionales consideren que los mercados afectados son sus respectivos Estados miembros y que el nivel de la cifra de negocios está por debajo de los umbrales establecidos para que se apliquen las normas europeas en materia de competencia.
No obstante, la Comisión de Asuntos Económicos y Monetarios ha presentado esta pregunta oral a la Comisión para pedirle que muestre más iniciativa. Nos gustaría que la Comisión analizara los diferentes escenarios que pudieran producirse y que evaluara los efectos que podrían tener para la competencia y los precios de los servicios de admisión a bolsa, los servicios de contratación, los servicios de información y los servicios post-negociación, de compensación y liquidación.
Conocemos los estudios detallados realizados por la Comisión de defensa de la competencia en el Reino Unido, elaborados por el Servicio de protección del consumidor de este país. No obstante, el punto de vista de esa evaluación es principalmente o puede ser incluso exclusivamente el efecto en los mercados del Reino Unido, y nos gustaría que en la evaluación de la Comisión se ampliara la panorámica.
Puede que recuerden el efecto causado en 2002–2003 cuando algunos de los inversores en acciones de grandes empresas neerlandesas desafiaron a Euronext de Ámsterdam a que bajase los precios y mejorase los servicios, poniéndose a buscar lugares alternativos para sus operaciones en la Deutsche Börse y la LSE. Esto demostró que la competencia realmente marca una diferencia. Esto caracteriza la situación que tenemos actualmente de un mercado europeo integrado abierto con competencia transfronteriza. La cuestión es si las diferentes hipótesis refuerzan esta tendencia competitiva o si apuntan en la dirección opuesta y tienden a crear monopolios, situaciones para las que, por cierto, la legislación preexistente en materia de competencia podría ser una respuesta más apropiada.
Otra cuestión afín es el aspecto de la regulación y la supervisión. Desde el momento en el que la posible absorción de la LSE apareció en las páginas de los periódicos financieros, comenzaron las especulaciones relativas al lugar donde se situaría la sede central de la entidad fusionada y qué regulador tendría competencia para supervisarla. Eso era más que simple especulación. Me inclino a pensar que había algo de verdad en las historias de que la cuestión del régimen regulador fue un tema importante en las conversaciones sobre la fusión. Quién sabe, incluso podría haber estado detrás de la rebelión contra la dirección de la Deutsche Börse, para la que en Alemania tienen esos simpáticos apodos.
Como ponente de posteriores informes sobre la supervisión cautelar y el Plan de acción para los servicios financieros, yo no me atrevería a expresar mis preferencias por un régimen regulador nacional u otro. Lo que más me preocupa es que haya una competencia contraproducente entre regímenes nacionales, en lugar de una mayor coordinación y cooperación. Este es uno de mis argumentos más sólidos a favor de un supervisor a escala europea. En los informes que elaboré en la Comisión de Asuntos Económicos y Monetarios, que fueron aprobados en el último Pleno, esto aparece de nuevo como una opción para el futuro próximo.
Este supervisor europeo se encargaría de la aplicación del marco regulador europeo del Plan de acción para los servicios financieros desarrollado en años anteriores. Con respecto a la parte del mercado financiero que ya es supranacional y que opera por encima de las fronteras nacionales y a menudo sectoriales, uno de nuestros principales mensajes es el impulso de una convergencia real en la aplicación de las directivas europeas y de la práctica supervisora, eludiendo así el arbitraje regulador y la posible competencia relativa a otros factores que influyen en el establecimiento, como los aspectos fiscales y de costes.
Por lo tanto, los posibles efectos de las ambiciones de la Comisión con respecto a la integración de los mercados financieros y la regulación y supervisión de diferentes escenarios deberían formar parte también de la evaluación que estamos pidiendo. En ese contexto, le pediría que centrara usted su atención en escenarios en los que la actividad de fusiones no se limita solamente a los países de la Unión Europea. También puede haber escenarios concebibles en los que la Bolsa de Nueva York y una recién creada se una a la LSE o, por otra parte, que Euronext y Deutsche Börse se fusionaran. Entonces podría producirse una desintegración en lugar de una mayor convergencia de las normativas europeas. Esto también debería tenerse en cuenta en su evaluación y sus expectativas."@es20
"Madam President, I will avoid making this a purely Dutch discussion, and speak in English so that others can participate directly in this interesting debate.
It is regrettable that this debate is being held at such a late hour, but I thank the Commissioners for being here and wish Mr McCreevy, who was supposed to be here, all the best with his health. I also hope, of course, that we can continue the debate in the committee.
The possibility of a takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse or Euronext has ignited debates in the European Parliament over whether such a takeover can be assessed at national level alone. At present, the two cases are being dealt with by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK. Legally speaking, the takeover of the LSE may be the responsibility of the relevant Member State’s competition authorities, since European competition rules do not apply as long as the national regulators deem the relevant markets to be their respective Member States and the turnover level to be below the thresholds set for European competition rules to apply.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has tabled this oral question to the Commission to ask it to play a more proactive role. We would like the Commission to consider the different scenarios that might arise and assess the effects that they might bring to competition in, and the pricing of, listing services, trading services, information services and, not least, important post-trade services, clearing and settlement.
We are aware of the detailed studies undertaken by the Competition Commission in the UK, prepared by the British Office of Fair Trading. The standpoint of that assessment is, however, primarily or maybe even exclusively the impact for the UK markets, and we would like to see that broadened in the Commission’s assessment.
You may remember the shock caused in 2002-2003 when some traders in Dutch blue-chip equities challenged Euronext Amsterdam to lower prices and to providing improvements in services, by looking for an alternative trading venue with Deutsche Börse and the LSE. This showed that competition really makes a difference. This characterises the situation we have at present of an open integrated European market with crossborder competition. The question is whether different scenarios increase this competitive tendency, or go in the opposite direction and tend to create monopolies - situations for which, by the way
competition regulation might be a more appropriate answer.
Another related issue is the aspect of regulation and supervision. From the moment the possible take-over of the LSE appeared on the pages of the financial papers, speculation started as to where the headquarters of the merged entity would be based and which regulator would get the power to supervise it. That was more than speculation. I tend to believe there was truth in the stories that the issue of the regulatory regime was a major subject in the merger talks. Who knows, it might even have been part of the background of the rebellion against the Deutsche Börse leadership, which you in Germany have such nice nicknames for.
As the rapporteur of subsequent reports on prudential supervision and the FSAP, I would not dare to express my preferences for one or other national regulatory regimes. My far greater concern is that there will be counterproductive competition between national regimes, instead of further coordination and cooperation. That is one of my strongest arguments for a European level supervisor. In the reports I prepared in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, and which were adopted in the previous plenary sitting, this is again stressed as an option for the near future.
Such a European level supervisor should execute the application of the European regulatory framework of the FSAP developed in previous years. As regards the part of the financial market which is already supranational and operates crossborder and often cross-sector, one of our main messages is to create real convergence in the implementation of the European directives and real convergence of supervisory practice, thereby avoiding regulatory arbitrage and possible competition on other factors for establishment such as fiscal and cost aspects.
Therefore, the possible effects of the Commission’s ambitions as regards integration of the financial markets and the regulation and supervision of different scenarios should also be part of the assessment we are asking for. In that context I would ask you to focus your attention on scenarios in which merger activity is not restricted to EU countries alone. There may also be conceivable scenarios in which the New York stock exchange and a newly formed one joint with the LSE or, on the other hand Euronext and Deutsche Börse might get together. There might then be a disintegration rather than a further convergence of European regulations. This should also be taken into account in your assessment and expectations."@et5
".
Arvoisa puhemies, välttääkseni sen, että keskustelua kävisivät vain hollantilaiset, puhun englanniksi, jotta muut voivat suoraan osallistua tähän kiinnostavaan keskusteluun.
On valitettavaa, että tätä keskustelua käydään näin myöhäisenä ajankohtana, mutta kiitän komission jäseniä heidän läsnäolostaan ja toivotan pikaista paranemista komission jäsen McCreevylle, jonka oli tarkoitus olla tänään täällä. Toivon tietysti myös, että voimme jatkaa tätä keskustelua valiokunnassa.
Deutsche Börsen tai Euronextin mahdolliset osakevaltaukset London Stock Exchangessa (LSE) ovat synnyttäneet Euroopan parlamentissa keskustelua siitä, voidaanko tuollaisia yritysostoja arvioida yksinomaan kansallisella tasolla. Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan kuluttajavirasto (Office of Fair Trading) ja kilpailukomissio (Competition Commission) käsittelevät parhaillaan näitä kahta tapausta. LSE:n osto saattaa oikeudellisesti kuulua kyseisen jäsenvaltion kilpailuviranomaisten tehtäviin, sillä unionin kilpailusäännöt eivät päde silloin kun kansalliset lainsäätäjät katsovat, että markkinoina ovat kyseiset jäsenvaltiot ja yritysten liikevaihto jää unionin kilpailusääntöjen noudattamiselle asetettujen kynnysten alapuolelle.
Talous- ja raha-asioiden valiokunta on joka tapauksessa esittänyt komissiolle tämän suullisen kysymyksen pyytääkseen sitä toimimaan asiassa aktiivisemmin. Toivoisimme komission tarkastelevan tilanteen mahdollisesti synnyttämiä erilaisia vaihtoehtoja ja arvioimaan niiden vaikutusta kilpailuun ja hinnoitteluun, joka koskee listautumispalveluita, kaupankäyntipalveluita, tietopalveluita – eikä vähiten – merkittäviä kaupan jälkeisiä palveluita, kuten selvitystoimintaa.
Tiedämme Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan kilpailukomission tilanneen maan kuluttajavirastolta yksityiskohtaisia selvityksiä. Koska tuon arvion painopisteenä kuitenkin on ensisijaisesti tai ehkä jopa yksinomaan tilanteen vaikutus Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan markkinoihin, toivoisimme komission laajentavan tarkastelutapaa omassa arviossaan.
Ehkä muistattekin, minkälainen järkytys aiheutui vuosina 2002
2003, kun hollantilaisten blue chip -yhtiöiden osakkeiden välittäjät ryhtyivät etsimään vaihtoehtoista kauppapaikkaa Deutsche Börsestä ja LSE:stä ja haastoivat siten Euronext Amsterdamin alentamaan hintoja ja parantamaan palveluita. Se osoitti, että kilpailulla todella on merkitystä. Tämä kuvaa nykyistä tilannetta, jossa meillä on avoimet ja yhdentyneet eurooppalaiset markkinat ja kilpailu ulottuu rajojen yli. Ydinkysymyksenä on, lisäävätkö erilaiset vaihtoehdot tätä kilpailuhakuisuutta vai johtavatko ne päinvastaiseen tilanteeseen ja ovat omiaan luomaan monopoleja. Tuollaisia tilanteita varten kilpailun säänteleminen etukäteen saattaisikin olla sopivampi ratkaisu.
Toinen tähän liittyvä asia koskee sääntelyä ja valvontaa. Sillä hetkellä, kun tieto LSE:n mahdollisesta ostamisesta julkaistiin talouslehdissä, käynnistyi arvailuja siitä, missä fuusioituneen yksikön päätoimipaikka sijaitsisi ja mikä sääntelyviranomainen saisi valtuudet valvoa sen toimintaa. Kyse ei ollut pelkästä spekuloinnista. Tiedoissa, joiden mukaan kysymys sovellettavasta sääntelyjärjestelmästä oli keskeisellä sijalla fuusioneuvotteluissa, oli käsittääkseni perää. Se saattoi jopa olla taustatekijänä kapinoinnissa Deutsche Börsen johtoasemaa vastaan, josta te Saksassa käytätte niin mukavia nimityksiä.
Toiminnan vakauden valvontaa ja rahoituspalveluiden toimintasuunnitelmaa koskevien tulevien mietintöjen esittelijänä en tohdi tuoda julki, mitä kansallista sääntelyjärjestelmää pitäisin parhaimpana. Mielestäni huolestuttavampaa on, että kansallisten järjestelmien välillä syntyy paremman koordinoinnin ja yhteistyön sijasta kielteisesti vaikuttavaa kilpailua. Tämä on vahvimpia perusteitani Euroopan tasolla toimivan valvojan nimeämiseksi. Talous- ja raha-asioiden valiokunnassa valmistelemissani mietinnöissä, jotka hyväksyttiin edellisessä täysistunnossa, tätä korostetaan jälleen vaihtoehtona lähitulevaisuutta varten.
Euroopan tason valvojan pitäisi panna täytäntöön aiempina vuosina luodun rahoituspalveluiden toimintasuunnitelman eurooppalaisen sääntelyjärjestelmän soveltaminen. Mitä tulee rahoitusmarkkinoiden siihen osaan, joka on jo ylikansallinen ja toimii rajojen yli ja usein myös eri sektoreiden välillä, yhtenä tärkeimmistä viesteistämme on se, että olisi saatava aikaan todellista lähentymistä eurooppalaisten direktiivien täytäntöönpanossa ja valvontakäytännöissä, jotta voitaisiin välttää toiminnan siirtäminen sinne, missä valvonta on heikompaa, ja mahdollinen kilpailu muista perustamistekijöistä kuten verotus- ja kustannusnäkökohdista.
Pyytämässämme arviossa pitäisi siksi käsitellä myös niitä mahdollisia vaikutuksia, joita on komission pyrkimyksillä rahoitusmarkkinoiden yhdentymiseen sekä eri vaihtoehtojen sääntelyyn ja valvontaan nähden. Tässä yhteydessä pyydän teitä keskittämään huomionne vaihtoehtoihin, joissa fuusioitumista ei rajata yksinomaan EU:n jäsenvaltioihin. Mahdollisten vaihtoehtoisten suunnitelmien mukaan New Yorkin pörssi ja jokin uusi yksikkö yhdistäisivät voimansa Lontoon pörssin kanssa tai toisaalta Euronext ja Deutsche Börse saattaisivat yhdistyä. Siinä tapauksessa eurooppalaiset määräykset saattaisivat paremminkin etääntyä toisistaan kuin edelleen lähentyä toisiaan. Tämä pitäisi myös ottaa huomioon arviossanne ja odotuksissanne."@fi7
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Madame la Présidente, j’éviterai de transformer cette question en une discussion purement néerlandaise et je m’exprimerai en anglais pour permettre aux autres de participer directement à cet intéressant débat.
Il est regrettable que ce débat ait lieu à une heure aussi tardive, mais je remercie les commissaires de leur présence et je souhaite à M. McCreevy, qui devait être parmi nous, un prompt rétablissement. J’espère également, bien entendu, que nous poursuivrons la discussion au sein de la commission parlementaire.
La possibilité d’une acquisition de la London Stock Exchange Ltd par la Deutsche Börse AG
ou par Euronext a déclenché un débat au sein du Parlement européen autour de la question de savoir si une telle acquisition peut être évaluée à l’échelon national uniquement. À l’heure actuelle, les deux cas sont traités par l’Office of Fair Trading et la Competition Commission au Royaume-Uni. D’un point de vue juridique, l’acquisition de la Bourse de Londres peut relever de la responsabilité des autorités compétentes de l’État membre en matière de concurrence, étant donné que les règles européennes de la concurrence ne s’appliquent pas tant que les régulateurs nationaux estiment que les marchés concernés dépendent des États membres respectifs et que le niveau des chiffres d’affaires est inférieur aux seuils fixés pour l’application des règles européennes de concurrence.
Néanmoins, la commission des affaires économiques et monétaires a soumis cette question orale à la Commission pour lui demander de jouer un rôle plus proactif. Nous voudrions que la Commission étudie les différents scénarios susceptibles de se produire et évalue leurs effets potentiels sur la concurrence et les tarifs des services de cotation, de courtage, d’information et surtout des importants services post-négociation que sont la compensation et le règlement.
Nous sommes au courant des études approfondies menées par la Competition Commission au Royaume-Uni et préparées par l’Office of Fair Trading. Le point de vue de cette évaluation est toutefois essentiellement, voire exclusivement, l’impact pour les marchés britanniques et nous voudrions que la Commission élargisse ce point de vue dans sa propre évaluation.
Vous vous souvenez peut-être du choc causé en 2002-2003 par le fait que certains courtiers négociant des titres néerlandais de premier ordre ont défié Euronext Amsterdam de baisser les prix et d’améliorer les services, en recherchant un lieu de négociation alternatif auprès de la Deutsche Börse et de la London Stock Exchange. Ce cas illustre à quel point la concurrence peut avoir une influence. C’est précisément dans cette situation que nous nous trouvons aujourd’hui, avec un marché européen ouvert intégré et caractérisé par une concurrence transfrontalière. La question est de savoir si les différents scénarios augmentent cette tendance concurrentielle ou, à l’inverse, créent des monopoles - des situations pour lesquelles une réglementation ex ante
de la concurrence pourrait être une réponse plus appropriée.
Un autre problème connexe est la régulation et la surveillance. Pour l’instant, l’éventuelle acquisition de la Bourse de Londres a fait les gros titres des journaux financiers, une certaine spéculation est née concernant le futur siège de l’entité fusionnée et le régulateur qui aurait le pouvoir de surveillance sur celle-ci. Mais ce n’est pas que de la pure spéculation. J’ai tendance à croire qu’il y a un fond de vérité dans les histoires racontant que la question du régime de régulation fut un sujet majeur des pourparlers relatifs à la fusion. Qui sait, peut-être cela explique-t-il même l’origine de la rébellion contre la direction de la Bourse allemande, pour laquelle vous avez en Allemagne de si jolis surnoms.
En tant que rapporteur des futurs rapports sur la surveillance prudentielle et le PASF, je n’oserais pas exprimer mes préférences pour l’un ou l’autre régime national de régulation. Ma plus grande crainte est qu’il y ait une concurrence contreproductive entre les régimes nationaux, au lieu d’un renforcement de la coordination et de la coopération. C’est l’un de mes plus solides arguments plaidant en faveur d’un organe de surveillance à l’échelle européenne. Dans les rapports que j’ai préparés au sein de la commission des affaires économiques et monétaires et qui ont été adoptés lors de la séance plénière précédente, cette option pour l’avenir proche est également plébiscitée.
Cet organe de surveillance au niveau européen veillerait à l’application du cadre réglementaire européen du PASF, imaginé au cours des années précédentes. S’agissant de la partie du marché financier qui est déjà supranationale et dont la portée est transfrontalière et souvent intersectorielle, l’un de nos principaux messages est qu’il faut créer une véritable convergence pour la mise en œuvre des directives européennes mais aussi pour les pratiques de surveillance, ce qui permet d’éviter l’arbitrage prudentiel et l’éventuelle concurrence sur d’autres facteurs d’établissement, tels que la fiscalité et les coûts.
Par conséquence, les effets potentiels des ambitions de la Commission sur le plan de l’intégration des marchés financiers et de la régulation, ainsi que de la surveillance des différents scénarios doivent également faire partie de l’évaluation que nous sollicitons. Dans ce contexte, je vous demanderais de vous concentrer sur les scénarios dans lesquels l’activité de fusion n’est pas limitée aux pays de l’UE uniquement. Nous pourrions également imaginer des scénarios dans lesquels la Bourse de New York et une place nouvellement créée s’uniraient avec la Bourse de Londres ou bien, à l’opposé, Euronext et la Deutsche Börse qui s’allieraient. Il y aurait alors un risque de désintégration plutôt qu’une convergence des réglementations européennes. Vous devriez également prendre cet élément en considération dans votre évaluation et vos attentes."@fr8
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Signora Presidente, vorrei evitare una discussione prettamente olandese e intervengo in inglese affinché altri possano partecipare direttamente a questa interessante discussione.
E’ un peccato che questa discussione si svolga a così tarda ora, ma ringrazio i Commissari per la loro presenza e vorrei rivolgere al Commissario McCreevy, che sarebbe dovuto essere in Aula, i migliori auguri per una pronta guarigione. Naturalmente, mi auguro che potremo proseguire la discussione in sede di commissione.
La possibile acquisizione della
da parte della
o dell’
ha suscitato accesi dibattiti in seno al Parlamento europeo sull’ipotesi che tale fusione possa essere valutata soltanto a livello nazionale. Al momento, i due casi sono trattati dall’
e dalla
del Regno Unito. In termini giuridici, l’acquisizione della
può essere di competenza delle autorità garanti della concorrenza dello Stato membro interessato, in quanto le norme europee in materia di concorrenza non si applicano se le autorità di regolamentazione nazionali reputano che il mercato rilevante sia il rispettivo Stato membro e se il livello di fatturato è inferiore alle soglie fissate dal diritto europeo della concorrenza.
Nondimeno, la commissione per i problemi economici e monetari ha presentato un’interrogazione orale alla Commissione per chiederle di svolgere un ruolo più attivo. Chiediamo alla Commissione di esaminare i diversi scenari che potrebbero emergere e valutare gli effetti che essi potrebbero esercitare sulla concorrenza e sulla fissazione dei prezzi nei servizi di quotazione, di negoziazione, d’informazione e, non ultimo, negli importanti servizi postnegoziazione di compensazione e regolamento.
Siamo a conoscenza degli studi approfonditi svolti dalla
nel Regno Unito, preparati dall’
britannico. Tuttavia, tale valutazione esamina principalmente o forse persino esclusivamente l’impatto sui mercati del Regno Unito, mentre noi vorremmo che fosse ampliata nella valutazione della Commissione.
Forse ricorderete la crisi causata nel 2002-2003, allorché alcuni operatori che trattavano titoli guida olandesi indussero la
di Amsterdam ad abbassare i prezzi e migliorare i servizi, ricercando una sede di negoziazione alternativa con la
e la
. Ciò ha dimostrato che la concorrenza fa davvero la differenza. Questo è ciò che caratterizza la situazione attuale di un mercato europeo integrato e aperto, con una concorrenza a livello transfrontaliero. Il punto è se i diversi scenari rafforzino questa tendenza concorrenziale, o vadano invece nella direzione opposta e tendano a creare monopoli, situazioni per le quali, tra l’altro, le norme di concorrenza
possono fornire una risposta più appropriata.
Un altro aspetto collegato riguarda la regolamentazione e la vigilanza. Non appena la notizia della possibile acquisizione della
è comparsa sulle pagine dei quotidiani finanziari, sono cominciate le congetture sul luogo in cui sarebbe stata ubicata l’entità risultante dalla fusione e sull’autorità di regolamentazione competente per la vigilanza. Erano più che congetture. Sono propensa a credere che le voci secondo cui la questione del regime normativo figurava tra i principali argomenti in discussione nelle trattative relative alla fusione fossero fondate. Chissà, potrebbe persino essere stata tra i motivi all’origine della ribellione contro la
della
per la quale in Germania esistono simpatici nomignoli.
In veste di relatrice per diverse relazioni sulla vigilanza prudenziale e sul PASF, non oserei esprimere preferenza per l’uno o l’altro regime normativo nazionale. Mi preoccupa molto di più che si dia origine a una concorrenza controproducente tra regimi nazionali, anziché tendere verso un maggiore coordinamento e una migliore cooperazione. Questo è uno dei miei principali argomenti a favore di un’autorità di vigilanza a livello europeo. Nelle relazioni che ho preparato in sede di commissione per i problemi economici e monetari, adottate nella precedente seduta plenaria, si dà nuovamente risalto a questa possibilità per il futuro.
Tale autorità di vigilanza europea dovrebbe dare applicazione al quadro normativo europeo del PASF messo a punto negli anni precedenti. Per quanto riguarda la parte del mercato finanziario che è già soprannazionale e opera a livello transfrontaliero e spesso transettoriale, uno dei nostri principali messaggi è creare una convergenza reale nell’applicazione delle direttive europee e una convergenza reale delle prassi di vigilanza, evitando così l’arbitraggio normativo e la possibile concorrenza basata su altri fattori riguardanti lo stabilimento, quali i regimi fiscali e gli aspetti legati ai costi.
I possibili effetti delle ambizioni della Commissione in materia di integrazione dei mercati finanziari e di regolamentazione e vigilanza nei diversi scenari dovrebbero quindi far parte della valutazione che chiediamo. In questo contesto, vorrei chiedervi di concentrare l’attenzione sugli scenari in cui l’attività di fusione non si limiti ai soli paesi dell’Unione europea. Si possono anche prevedere scenari plausibili in cui la borsa valori di New York e una borsa valori di nuova costituzione si uniscano alla
o, d’altro canto, l’
e la
potrebbero procedere a una fusione. Si potrebbe quindi verificare una disintegrazione, anziché una maggiore convergenza delle normative europee. Dovrete prendere in considerazione anche questo aspetto nella vostra valutazione e nelle vostre previsioni."@it12
"Madam President, I will avoid making this a purely Dutch discussion, and speak in English so that others can participate directly in this interesting debate.
It is regrettable that this debate is being held at such a late hour, but I thank the Commissioners for being here and wish Mr McCreevy, who was supposed to be here, all the best with his health. I also hope, of course, that we can continue the debate in the committee.
The possibility of a takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse or Euronext has ignited debates in the European Parliament over whether such a takeover can be assessed at national level alone. At present, the two cases are being dealt with by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK. Legally speaking, the takeover of the LSE may be the responsibility of the relevant Member State’s competition authorities, since European competition rules do not apply as long as the national regulators deem the relevant markets to be their respective Member States and the turnover level to be below the thresholds set for European competition rules to apply.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has tabled this oral question to the Commission to ask it to play a more proactive role. We would like the Commission to consider the different scenarios that might arise and assess the effects that they might bring to competition in, and the pricing of, listing services, trading services, information services and, not least, important post-trade services, clearing and settlement.
We are aware of the detailed studies undertaken by the Competition Commission in the UK, prepared by the British Office of Fair Trading. The standpoint of that assessment is, however, primarily or maybe even exclusively the impact for the UK markets, and we would like to see that broadened in the Commission’s assessment.
You may remember the shock caused in 2002-2003 when some traders in Dutch blue-chip equities challenged Euronext Amsterdam to lower prices and to providing improvements in services, by looking for an alternative trading venue with Deutsche Börse and the LSE. This showed that competition really makes a difference. This characterises the situation we have at present of an open integrated European market with crossborder competition. The question is whether different scenarios increase this competitive tendency, or go in the opposite direction and tend to create monopolies - situations for which, by the way
competition regulation might be a more appropriate answer.
Another related issue is the aspect of regulation and supervision. From the moment the possible take-over of the LSE appeared on the pages of the financial papers, speculation started as to where the headquarters of the merged entity would be based and which regulator would get the power to supervise it. That was more than speculation. I tend to believe there was truth in the stories that the issue of the regulatory regime was a major subject in the merger talks. Who knows, it might even have been part of the background of the rebellion against the Deutsche Börse leadership, which you in Germany have such nice nicknames for.
As the rapporteur of subsequent reports on prudential supervision and the FSAP, I would not dare to express my preferences for one or other national regulatory regimes. My far greater concern is that there will be counterproductive competition between national regimes, instead of further coordination and cooperation. That is one of my strongest arguments for a European level supervisor. In the reports I prepared in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, and which were adopted in the previous plenary sitting, this is again stressed as an option for the near future.
Such a European level supervisor should execute the application of the European regulatory framework of the FSAP developed in previous years. As regards the part of the financial market which is already supranational and operates crossborder and often cross-sector, one of our main messages is to create real convergence in the implementation of the European directives and real convergence of supervisory practice, thereby avoiding regulatory arbitrage and possible competition on other factors for establishment such as fiscal and cost aspects.
Therefore, the possible effects of the Commission’s ambitions as regards integration of the financial markets and the regulation and supervision of different scenarios should also be part of the assessment we are asking for. In that context I would ask you to focus your attention on scenarios in which merger activity is not restricted to EU countries alone. There may also be conceivable scenarios in which the New York stock exchange and a newly formed one joint with the LSE or, on the other hand Euronext and Deutsche Börse might get together. There might then be a disintegration rather than a further convergence of European regulations. This should also be taken into account in your assessment and expectations."@lt14
"Madam President, I will avoid making this a purely Dutch discussion, and speak in English so that others can participate directly in this interesting debate.
It is regrettable that this debate is being held at such a late hour, but I thank the Commissioners for being here and wish Mr McCreevy, who was supposed to be here, all the best with his health. I also hope, of course, that we can continue the debate in the committee.
The possibility of a takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse or Euronext has ignited debates in the European Parliament over whether such a takeover can be assessed at national level alone. At present, the two cases are being dealt with by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK. Legally speaking, the takeover of the LSE may be the responsibility of the relevant Member State’s competition authorities, since European competition rules do not apply as long as the national regulators deem the relevant markets to be their respective Member States and the turnover level to be below the thresholds set for European competition rules to apply.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has tabled this oral question to the Commission to ask it to play a more proactive role. We would like the Commission to consider the different scenarios that might arise and assess the effects that they might bring to competition in, and the pricing of, listing services, trading services, information services and, not least, important post-trade services, clearing and settlement.
We are aware of the detailed studies undertaken by the Competition Commission in the UK, prepared by the British Office of Fair Trading. The standpoint of that assessment is, however, primarily or maybe even exclusively the impact for the UK markets, and we would like to see that broadened in the Commission’s assessment.
You may remember the shock caused in 2002-2003 when some traders in Dutch blue-chip equities challenged Euronext Amsterdam to lower prices and to providing improvements in services, by looking for an alternative trading venue with Deutsche Börse and the LSE. This showed that competition really makes a difference. This characterises the situation we have at present of an open integrated European market with crossborder competition. The question is whether different scenarios increase this competitive tendency, or go in the opposite direction and tend to create monopolies - situations for which, by the way
competition regulation might be a more appropriate answer.
Another related issue is the aspect of regulation and supervision. From the moment the possible take-over of the LSE appeared on the pages of the financial papers, speculation started as to where the headquarters of the merged entity would be based and which regulator would get the power to supervise it. That was more than speculation. I tend to believe there was truth in the stories that the issue of the regulatory regime was a major subject in the merger talks. Who knows, it might even have been part of the background of the rebellion against the Deutsche Börse leadership, which you in Germany have such nice nicknames for.
As the rapporteur of subsequent reports on prudential supervision and the FSAP, I would not dare to express my preferences for one or other national regulatory regimes. My far greater concern is that there will be counterproductive competition between national regimes, instead of further coordination and cooperation. That is one of my strongest arguments for a European level supervisor. In the reports I prepared in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, and which were adopted in the previous plenary sitting, this is again stressed as an option for the near future.
Such a European level supervisor should execute the application of the European regulatory framework of the FSAP developed in previous years. As regards the part of the financial market which is already supranational and operates crossborder and often cross-sector, one of our main messages is to create real convergence in the implementation of the European directives and real convergence of supervisory practice, thereby avoiding regulatory arbitrage and possible competition on other factors for establishment such as fiscal and cost aspects.
Therefore, the possible effects of the Commission’s ambitions as regards integration of the financial markets and the regulation and supervision of different scenarios should also be part of the assessment we are asking for. In that context I would ask you to focus your attention on scenarios in which merger activity is not restricted to EU countries alone. There may also be conceivable scenarios in which the New York stock exchange and a newly formed one joint with the LSE or, on the other hand Euronext and Deutsche Börse might get together. There might then be a disintegration rather than a further convergence of European regulations. This should also be taken into account in your assessment and expectations."@lv13
"Madam President, I will avoid making this a purely Dutch discussion, and speak in English so that others can participate directly in this interesting debate.
It is regrettable that this debate is being held at such a late hour, but I thank the Commissioners for being here and wish Mr McCreevy, who was supposed to be here, all the best with his health. I also hope, of course, that we can continue the debate in the committee.
The possibility of a takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse or Euronext has ignited debates in the European Parliament over whether such a takeover can be assessed at national level alone. At present, the two cases are being dealt with by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK. Legally speaking, the takeover of the LSE may be the responsibility of the relevant Member State’s competition authorities, since European competition rules do not apply as long as the national regulators deem the relevant markets to be their respective Member States and the turnover level to be below the thresholds set for European competition rules to apply.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has tabled this oral question to the Commission to ask it to play a more proactive role. We would like the Commission to consider the different scenarios that might arise and assess the effects that they might bring to competition in, and the pricing of, listing services, trading services, information services and, not least, important post-trade services, clearing and settlement.
We are aware of the detailed studies undertaken by the Competition Commission in the UK, prepared by the British Office of Fair Trading. The standpoint of that assessment is, however, primarily or maybe even exclusively the impact for the UK markets, and we would like to see that broadened in the Commission’s assessment.
You may remember the shock caused in 2002-2003 when some traders in Dutch blue-chip equities challenged Euronext Amsterdam to lower prices and to providing improvements in services, by looking for an alternative trading venue with Deutsche Börse and the LSE. This showed that competition really makes a difference. This characterises the situation we have at present of an open integrated European market with crossborder competition. The question is whether different scenarios increase this competitive tendency, or go in the opposite direction and tend to create monopolies - situations for which, by the way
competition regulation might be a more appropriate answer.
Another related issue is the aspect of regulation and supervision. From the moment the possible take-over of the LSE appeared on the pages of the financial papers, speculation started as to where the headquarters of the merged entity would be based and which regulator would get the power to supervise it. That was more than speculation. I tend to believe there was truth in the stories that the issue of the regulatory regime was a major subject in the merger talks. Who knows, it might even have been part of the background of the rebellion against the Deutsche Börse leadership, which you in Germany have such nice nicknames for.
As the rapporteur of subsequent reports on prudential supervision and the FSAP, I would not dare to express my preferences for one or other national regulatory regimes. My far greater concern is that there will be counterproductive competition between national regimes, instead of further coordination and cooperation. That is one of my strongest arguments for a European level supervisor. In the reports I prepared in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, and which were adopted in the previous plenary sitting, this is again stressed as an option for the near future.
Such a European level supervisor should execute the application of the European regulatory framework of the FSAP developed in previous years. As regards the part of the financial market which is already supranational and operates crossborder and often cross-sector, one of our main messages is to create real convergence in the implementation of the European directives and real convergence of supervisory practice, thereby avoiding regulatory arbitrage and possible competition on other factors for establishment such as fiscal and cost aspects.
Therefore, the possible effects of the Commission’s ambitions as regards integration of the financial markets and the regulation and supervision of different scenarios should also be part of the assessment we are asking for. In that context I would ask you to focus your attention on scenarios in which merger activity is not restricted to EU countries alone. There may also be conceivable scenarios in which the New York stock exchange and a newly formed one joint with the LSE or, on the other hand Euronext and Deutsche Börse might get together. There might then be a disintegration rather than a further convergence of European regulations. This should also be taken into account in your assessment and expectations."@mt15
"Mevrouw de Voorzitter, ik zal, om te voorkomen dat dit een volledig Nederlands debat wordt, Engels spreken, zodat ook anderen direct kunnen deelnemen aan dit interessante debat.
Het valt te betreuren dat dit debat zo laat plaatsvindt, maar ik wil de commissaris bedanken voor haar aanwezigheid en ik wens de heer McCreevy, die hier eigenlijk had moeten zitten, veel beterschap. Ik hoop uiteraard dat we het debat in de commissie zullen kunnen voortzetten.
De mogelijkheid van een overname van de London Stock Exchange (LSE) door Deutsche Börse of Euronext heeft tot debatten geleid in het Europees Parlement over de vraag of een dergelijke overname alleen op nationaal niveau zou moeten worden beoordeeld. Op dit moment worden de twee zaken in het Verenigd Koninkrijk behandeld door het Bureau voor eerlijke handel (Office of Fair Trading) en de mededingingscommissie (Competition Commissie). Juridisch gezien is de overname van de LSE misschien wel de verantwoordelijkheid van de bevoegde mededingingsautoriteiten van de lidstaten, aangezien de Europese mededingingsvoorschriften niet van toepassing zijn, zolang de nationale toezichthouders van mening zijn dat de relevante markten slechts bestaan uit hun respectieve lidstaten en de omzet onder de drempelwaarden blijft waarboven de Europese mededingingsvoorschriften van toepassing zijn.
Desalniettemin heeft de Commissie economische en monetaire zaken deze mondelinge vraag ingediend om de Commissie te verzoeken een proactievere rol te spelen. We zouden graag zien dat de Commissie haar licht laat schijnen over de verschillende scenario's die zich zouden kunnen ontvouwen en dat zij hun eventuele gevolgen beoordeelt voor de concurrentie en prijzen op de markt voor diensten op het gebied van notering, handel, informatie en, niet te vergeten, belangrijke "post-trade"-diensten, zoals clearing en settlement.
We zijn op de hoogte van de gedetailleerde studies die de mededingingscommissie in het Verenigd Koninkrijk is gestart en die zijn voorbereid door het Britse Bureau voor eerlijke handel. Bij die beoordeling wordt echter primair, of misschien zelfs wel uitsluitend, gekeken naar de gevolgen voor de markten in het Verenigd Koninkrijk, en we zouden graag zien dat de beoordeling van de Commissie een breder uitgangspunt neemt.
U zult zich wellicht de schok herinneren die in 2002-2003 veroorzaakt werd toen een aantal handelaren in zogenaamde blue chips Euronext Amsterdam onder druk zette om de prijzen te verlagen en de dienstverlening te verbeteren, door met de Deutsche Börse en de LSE de mogelijkheden voor een alternatieve handelsmarkt te onderzoeken. Hieruit bleek dat concurrentie echt verschil maakt. Dit is kenmerkend voor de huidige situatie waarbij sprake is van een open, geïntegreerde Europese markt met grensoverschrijdende concurrentie. De vraag is of deze neiging tot concurrentie door de verschillende scenario's vergroot wordt, of dat hiermee juist het tegenovergestelde wordt bereikt, namelijk dat er monopolies ontstaan. Overigens zijn dit situaties waarin mededingingsvoorschriften
een betere oplossing zouden zijn.
Een andere kwestie in dit verband is regelgeving en toezicht. Vanaf het moment dat de mogelijke overname van de LSE in de financiële pers opdook, begonnen de speculaties over de vraag waar de hoofdvestiging van de gefuseerde beurs zou komen en welke toezichthouder hiervoor de bevoegdheid zou krijgen. Dat was meer dan alleen speculatie. Ik ben geneigd geloof te hechten aan de verhalen dat het regelgevingskader een belangrijk onderwerp was tijdens de fusiebesprekingen. Wie weet zou het op de achtergrond zelfs een rol gespeeld kunnen hebben bij de opstand tegen de leiding van de Deutsche Börse, waarvoor jullie in Duitsland zulke aardige bijnamen hebben.
Als rapporteur van opeenvolgende verslagen over zorgvuldig toezicht en het Actieplan Financiële diensten (APFD), zou ik geen voorkeur durven uitspreken voor een van beide nationale regelgevingskaders. Waarover ik mij veel meer zorgen maak, is dat er sprake zal zijn van averechtse concurrentie tussen nationale kaders, in plaats van verdere coördinatie en samenwerking. Dat is een van mijn voornaamste redenen om te pleiten voor een toezichthouder op Europees niveau. In de verslagen die ik heb voorbereid in de Commissie economische en monetaire zaken, en die tijdens de vorige plenaire vergadering zijn aangenomen, wordt dit wederom benadrukt als een optie voor de nabije toekomst.
Een dergelijke Europese toezichthouder zou de toepassing ter hand moeten nemen van het Europese regelgevingskader dat de afgelopen jaren is ontwikkeld in het kader van het APFD. Met betrekking tot dat deel van de financiële markt dat al supranationaal is en waarin men grensoverschrijdend en vaak sectoroverschrijdend werkt, is een van onze voornaamste boodschappen dat er echte convergentie moet worden gecreëerd in de tenuitvoerlegging van de Europese richtlijnen en het praktisch uitoefenen van toezicht. Daardoor wordt namelijk voorkomen dat er sprake is van arbitraire regelgeving en eventueel van concurrentie op basis van andere vestigingsfactoren, zoals fiscale en kostenaspecten.
Daarom dienen ook de mogelijke gevolgen van de ambities van de Commissie op het gebied van de integratie van de financiële markten en de regelgeving en het toezicht deel uit te maken van de beoordeling van de verschillende scenario's waar wij om vragen. Tegen deze achtergrond verzoek ik u, uw aandacht te richten op scenario's waarin de fusieactiviteit niet slechts beperkt blijft tot EU-landen. Er zijn wellicht ook scenario's denkbaar, waarin de New York Stock Exchange en een nieuw te vormen beurs zouden fuseren met de LSE of waarin Euronext en de Deutsche Börse samen zouden gaan. In die gevallen zou er sprake kunnen zijn van een desintegratie in plaats van een verdere convergentie van de Europese regelgeving. Ook hiermee moet dus rekening worden gehouden in uw beoordeling en verwachtingen."@nl3
"Senhora Presidente, pretendo evitar limitar esta discussão aos Países Baixos, pelo que vou falar em Inglês, de modo a que outros possam participar directamente neste interessante debate.
É lamentável que este debate tenha lugar a horas tão tardias, mas agradeço a presença dos Senhores Comissários e desejo ao senhor Comissário McCreevy, que deveria aqui estar, as melhoras da sua saúde. Espero também, como é óbvio, que continuemos este debate em sede de comissão.
A possibilidade de uma aquisição da Bolsa de Valores de Londres (LSE) pela Deutsche Börse (Bolsa Alemã) ou pela Euronext desencadeou debates no Parlamento Europeu sobre a questão de saber se uma tal aquisição pode ser avaliada apenas a nível nacional. De momento, os dois casos estão a ser tratados pelo Gabinete do Comércio Justo e pela Autoridade da Concorrência no Reino Unido. Juridicamente falando, a aquisição da LSE pode ser da responsabilidade das autoridades da concorrência dos respectivos Estados-Membros, uma vez que a regras europeias da concorrência não se aplicam enquanto os reguladores nacionais considerarem que os mercados relevantes são os seus respectivos Estados-Membros e o nível de volume de transacções se situar abaixo dos limiares fixados para a aplicação das regras da concorrência europeias.
Não obstante, a Comissão dos Assuntos Económicos e Monetários apresentou esta pergunta oral à Comissão com o objectivo de lhe solicitar que desempenhasse um papel mais pró-activo. Gostaríamos que a Comissão considerasse os vários cenários que poderão surgir e avaliasse os efeitos que podem representar para a concorrência a fixação de preços, os serviços de cotação, os serviços de transacção, os serviços de informação e, sobretudo, importantes serviços pós-transacção, compensação e pagamento.
Estamos cientes dos estudos circunstanciados levados a cabo pela Autoridade da Concorrência do Reino Unido, preparado pelo Gabinete Britânico para o Comércio Justo. Contudo, o ponto de vista dessa avaliação é, em primeiro lugar ou talvez exclusivamente, ter a percepção do impacto para os mercados do Reino Unido, e nós gostaríamos que a avaliação da Comissão considerasse uma perspectiva mais alargada.
Recordar-se-ão do choque causado em 2002-2003 quando alguns operadores de capitais de primeira categoria
holandeses desafiaram a Euronext Amsterdam a baixar os preços e a introduzir melhorias nos serviços, procurando um local alternativo para as transacções junto da Deutsche Börse (Bolsa Alemã) e da LSE. Isto mostrou que a concorrência faz de facto diferença e caracteriza a situação que temos presentemente de um mercado europeu aberto e integrado com uma concorrência transfronteiriça. A questão é saber se cenários diferentes aumentam esta tendência concorrencial, ou se apontam na direcção oposta e tendem a criar monopólios – situações para as quais, a propósito, uma regulamentação
para a concorrência poderia ser uma resposta adequada.
Uma outra questão relacionada é a da regulação e supervisão. A partir do momento em que a eventual aquisição da LSE apareceu nas páginas dos jornais financeiros, começou a especulação quanto à localização das sedes da entidade fundida e a que entidade reguladora passaria a ter o poder de a supervisionar. Isso foi mais do que especulação. Estou em crer que havia verdade nas histórias de que a questão do regime regulador era o assunto principal nas conversas sobre a fusão. Quem sabe se não fez parte dos antecedentes da rebelião contra a liderança da Deutsche Börse, a que, na Alemanha, se referem de forma caricatural.
Como relator dos posteriores relatórios sobre supervisão prudencial e o FSAP (Plano Europeu de Acção para os Serviços Financeiros) não ousaria manifestar as minhas preferências por um ou outro regime regulador nacional. A minha grande preocupação é que passe a haver uma concorrência contraproducente entre os regimes nacionais, em vez de uma maior coordenação e cooperação. Esse é um dos argumentos mais fortes a favor de um supervisor a nível europeu. Nos relatórios que elaborei na Comissão dos Assuntos Económicos e Monetários, e que foram aprovados nas anteriores sessão plenárias, esta questão é novamente realçada como uma opção para um futuro próximo.
Um tal supervisor a nível europeu deve proceder à aplicação do quadro regulamentar europeu da FSAP desenvolvido nos anos anteriores. No que se refere à parte do mercado financeiro que já é supranacional e opera a nível transfronteiriço e frequentemente em todos os sectores, uma das nossas principais mensagens é criar uma convergência na implementação das directivas europeias e uma convergência real nas práticas de supervisão, evitando assim arbitragens reguladoras e uma possível concorrência em relação a outros factores de estabelecimento, como os aspectos ligados ao custo e ao fisco.
Por conseguinte, os possíveis efeitos das ambições da Comissão no que respeita à integração dos mercados financeiros, bem como da regulação e supervisão dos vários cenários, deve também fazer parte da avaliação que solicitamos. Gostaria de pedir que centrassem a vossa atenção em cenários em que a actividade ligada a fusões não se limite apenas aos países da UE. Poderão também conceber-se cenários em que a Bolsa de Valores de Nova Iorque e uma formada recentemente se associem à LSE ou, por outro lado, a Euronext e Deutsche Börse possam reunir-se. Sucede que se poderia então dar uma desintegração em vez de uma maior convergência das regulações europeias. Isto também deverá ser tomado em conta na vossa avaliação, bem como expectativas."@pt17
"Madam President, I will avoid making this a purely Dutch discussion, and speak in English so that others can participate directly in this interesting debate.
It is regrettable that this debate is being held at such a late hour, but I thank the Commissioners for being here and wish Mr McCreevy, who was supposed to be here, all the best with his health. I also hope, of course, that we can continue the debate in the committee.
The possibility of a takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse or Euronext has ignited debates in the European Parliament over whether such a takeover can be assessed at national level alone. At present, the two cases are being dealt with by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK. Legally speaking, the takeover of the LSE may be the responsibility of the relevant Member State’s competition authorities, since European competition rules do not apply as long as the national regulators deem the relevant markets to be their respective Member States and the turnover level to be below the thresholds set for European competition rules to apply.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has tabled this oral question to the Commission to ask it to play a more proactive role. We would like the Commission to consider the different scenarios that might arise and assess the effects that they might bring to competition in, and the pricing of, listing services, trading services, information services and, not least, important post-trade services, clearing and settlement.
We are aware of the detailed studies undertaken by the Competition Commission in the UK, prepared by the British Office of Fair Trading. The standpoint of that assessment is, however, primarily or maybe even exclusively the impact for the UK markets, and we would like to see that broadened in the Commission’s assessment.
You may remember the shock caused in 2002-2003 when some traders in Dutch blue-chip equities challenged Euronext Amsterdam to lower prices and to providing improvements in services, by looking for an alternative trading venue with Deutsche Börse and the LSE. This showed that competition really makes a difference. This characterises the situation we have at present of an open integrated European market with crossborder competition. The question is whether different scenarios increase this competitive tendency, or go in the opposite direction and tend to create monopolies - situations for which, by the way
competition regulation might be a more appropriate answer.
Another related issue is the aspect of regulation and supervision. From the moment the possible take-over of the LSE appeared on the pages of the financial papers, speculation started as to where the headquarters of the merged entity would be based and which regulator would get the power to supervise it. That was more than speculation. I tend to believe there was truth in the stories that the issue of the regulatory regime was a major subject in the merger talks. Who knows, it might even have been part of the background of the rebellion against the Deutsche Börse leadership, which you in Germany have such nice nicknames for.
As the rapporteur of subsequent reports on prudential supervision and the FSAP, I would not dare to express my preferences for one or other national regulatory regimes. My far greater concern is that there will be counterproductive competition between national regimes, instead of further coordination and cooperation. That is one of my strongest arguments for a European level supervisor. In the reports I prepared in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, and which were adopted in the previous plenary sitting, this is again stressed as an option for the near future.
Such a European level supervisor should execute the application of the European regulatory framework of the FSAP developed in previous years. As regards the part of the financial market which is already supranational and operates crossborder and often cross-sector, one of our main messages is to create real convergence in the implementation of the European directives and real convergence of supervisory practice, thereby avoiding regulatory arbitrage and possible competition on other factors for establishment such as fiscal and cost aspects.
Therefore, the possible effects of the Commission’s ambitions as regards integration of the financial markets and the regulation and supervision of different scenarios should also be part of the assessment we are asking for. In that context I would ask you to focus your attention on scenarios in which merger activity is not restricted to EU countries alone. There may also be conceivable scenarios in which the New York stock exchange and a newly formed one joint with the LSE or, on the other hand Euronext and Deutsche Börse might get together. There might then be a disintegration rather than a further convergence of European regulations. This should also be taken into account in your assessment and expectations."@sk18
"Madam President, I will avoid making this a purely Dutch discussion, and speak in English so that others can participate directly in this interesting debate.
It is regrettable that this debate is being held at such a late hour, but I thank the Commissioners for being here and wish Mr McCreevy, who was supposed to be here, all the best with his health. I also hope, of course, that we can continue the debate in the committee.
The possibility of a takeover of the London Stock Exchange by Deutsche Börse or Euronext has ignited debates in the European Parliament over whether such a takeover can be assessed at national level alone. At present, the two cases are being dealt with by the Office of Fair Trading and the Competition Commission in the UK. Legally speaking, the takeover of the LSE may be the responsibility of the relevant Member State’s competition authorities, since European competition rules do not apply as long as the national regulators deem the relevant markets to be their respective Member States and the turnover level to be below the thresholds set for European competition rules to apply.
Nevertheless, the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs has tabled this oral question to the Commission to ask it to play a more proactive role. We would like the Commission to consider the different scenarios that might arise and assess the effects that they might bring to competition in, and the pricing of, listing services, trading services, information services and, not least, important post-trade services, clearing and settlement.
We are aware of the detailed studies undertaken by the Competition Commission in the UK, prepared by the British Office of Fair Trading. The standpoint of that assessment is, however, primarily or maybe even exclusively the impact for the UK markets, and we would like to see that broadened in the Commission’s assessment.
You may remember the shock caused in 2002-2003 when some traders in Dutch blue-chip equities challenged Euronext Amsterdam to lower prices and to providing improvements in services, by looking for an alternative trading venue with Deutsche Börse and the LSE. This showed that competition really makes a difference. This characterises the situation we have at present of an open integrated European market with crossborder competition. The question is whether different scenarios increase this competitive tendency, or go in the opposite direction and tend to create monopolies - situations for which, by the way
competition regulation might be a more appropriate answer.
Another related issue is the aspect of regulation and supervision. From the moment the possible take-over of the LSE appeared on the pages of the financial papers, speculation started as to where the headquarters of the merged entity would be based and which regulator would get the power to supervise it. That was more than speculation. I tend to believe there was truth in the stories that the issue of the regulatory regime was a major subject in the merger talks. Who knows, it might even have been part of the background of the rebellion against the Deutsche Börse leadership, which you in Germany have such nice nicknames for.
As the rapporteur of subsequent reports on prudential supervision and the FSAP, I would not dare to express my preferences for one or other national regulatory regimes. My far greater concern is that there will be counterproductive competition between national regimes, instead of further coordination and cooperation. That is one of my strongest arguments for a European level supervisor. In the reports I prepared in the Committee on Economic and Monetary Affairs, and which were adopted in the previous plenary sitting, this is again stressed as an option for the near future.
Such a European level supervisor should execute the application of the European regulatory framework of the FSAP developed in previous years. As regards the part of the financial market which is already supranational and operates crossborder and often cross-sector, one of our main messages is to create real convergence in the implementation of the European directives and real convergence of supervisory practice, thereby avoiding regulatory arbitrage and possible competition on other factors for establishment such as fiscal and cost aspects.
Therefore, the possible effects of the Commission’s ambitions as regards integration of the financial markets and the regulation and supervision of different scenarios should also be part of the assessment we are asking for. In that context I would ask you to focus your attention on scenarios in which merger activity is not restricted to EU countries alone. There may also be conceivable scenarios in which the New York stock exchange and a newly formed one joint with the LSE or, on the other hand Euronext and Deutsche Börse might get together. There might then be a disintegration rather than a further convergence of European regulations. This should also be taken into account in your assessment and expectations."@sl19
".
Fru talman! Jag skall undvika att göra en ren nederländsk diskussion av detta och tala på engelska, så att andra kan delta direkt i denna intressanta debatt.
Det är synd att denna debatt hålls så sent, men jag tackar kommissionsledamoten för att hon är här och önskar Charlie McCreevy, som skulle ha varit här, all välgång med sin hälsa. Jag hoppas naturligtvis också att vi kan fortsätta debatten i utskottet.
Möjligheten att Deutsche Börse eller Euronext tar över Londonbörsen (LSE) har väckt debatt i Europaparlamentet om huruvida ett sådant övertagande endast kan bedömas på nationell nivå. För närvarande behandlar Förenade kungarikets konkurrensmyndighet Office of Fair Trading och konkurrenskommissionen i Förenade kungariket dessa två fall. Rättsligt sett kan övertagandet av LSE höra till ansvarsområdet för de berörda medlemsstaternas konkurrensmyndigheter, eftersom EU:s konkurrensregler inte är tillämpliga så länge som nationella tillsynsmyndigheter anser att de relevanta marknaderna tillhör deras respektive medlemsstater och omsättningsnivån ligger under tröskeln för EU:s konkurrensregler.
Trots detta har utskottet för ekonomi och valutafrågor lagt fram denna muntliga fråga till kommissionen för att uppmana den att spela en mer aktiv roll. Vi skulle vilja att kommissionen övervägde de olika scenarier som skulle kunna inträffa och utvärdera de effekter som de skulle kunna få på konkurrensen och prissättningen vad gäller noteringstjänster, börshandelstjänster, informationstjänster och inte minst, viktiga efterhandelstjänster, clearing och avveckling.
Vi känner till de noggranna studier som har genomförts av konkurrenskommissionen i Förenade kungariket och som har förberetts av British Office of Fair Trading. Den ståndpunkt som framträder i den utvärderingen är dock främst eller till och med uteslutande effekten på Förenade kungarikets marknad, och vi skulle vilja se att detta utvidgades i kommissionens utvärdering.
Ni kanske minns den chock som några mäklare inom nederländska säkra värdepapper förorsakade 2002-2003, när de utmanade Euronext Amsterdam att sänka priserna och tillhandahålla bättre tjänster, genom att leta efter en alternativ handelsplats med Deutsche Börse och LSE. Detta visade att konkurrens verkligen har betydelse. Detta karakteriserar vår nuvarande situation med en öppen integrerad EU-marknad med gränsöverskridande konkurrens. Frågan är om olika scenarier ökar denna tendens till konkurrens eller leder i motsatt riktning och tenderar att skapa monopol – situationer i vilka konkurrenslagstiftning på förhand skulle vara ett lämpligt svar, i förbigående sagt.
En annan relaterad fråga är reglerings- och övervakningsaspekten. I samma ögonblick som det eventuella övertagandet av LSE dök upp på finanstidningarnas sidor, började spekulationerna om var huvudkontoret för den sammanslagna enheten skulle ligga och vilken regleringsmyndighet som skulle få befogenhet att övervaka den. Detta var mer än spekulationer. Jag är böjd att tro att det låg sanning i historierna om att frågan om regleringssystemet var ett viktigt ämne i fusionssamtalen. Vem vet, det kanske till och med var en del av bakgrunden till upproret mot Deutsche Börses ledande ställning, som ni i Tyskland har sådana fina smeknamn för.
Som föredragande för flera betänkanden om omdömesgill övervakning och handlingsplanen för finansiella tjänster (FSAP), vågar jag inte ge uttryck för om jag föredrar något av de nationella regleringssystemen. Jag är avsevärt mer bekymrad över att det kommer att finnas kontraproduktiv konkurrens mellan nationella system, i stället för ytterligare samordning och samarbete. Det är ett av mina starkaste argument för en övervakare på EU-nivå. I det betänkande som jag utarbetade i utskottet för ekonomi och valutafrågor, och som antogs under det förra plenarsammanträdet, betonas detta åter som ett alternativ för den närmaste framtiden.
En sådan övervakare på EU-nivå borde verkställa tillämpningen av FSAP:s europeiska rättsliga ram, som utvecklats under tidigare år. När det gäller finansmarknadens del, som redan är överstatlig och fungerar gränsöverskridande och ofta sektorsövergripande, är ett av våra viktigaste budskap att skapa verklig konvergens i samband med tillämpningen av EU:s direktiv och verklig konvergens när det gäller övervakningspraxis, och därmed undvika tillsynsarbitrage och möjlig konkurrens om andra etableringsfaktorer som skatter och kostnader.
De möjliga effekterna av kommissionens ambitioner när det gäller integrering av finansmarknaderna samt regleringen och övervakningen av olika scenarier borde därför också utgöra en del av den utvärdering som vi efterfrågar. Mot denna bakgrund skulle jag vilja uppmana er att koncentrera er uppmärksamhet på scenarier där fusionsverksamhet inte är begränsad till enbart EU-länder. Det kan också finnas tänkbara scenarier i vilka New York-börsen och en annan nyligen inrättad börs förbunden med LSE eller, å andra sidan Euronext och Deutsche Börse, kanske går samman. Det kan då bli tal om en upplösning snarare än ytterligare konvergens i europeiska förordningar. Detta borde tas med i beräkningen i er utvärdering och i era förväntningar."@sv21
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