Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2005-01-12-Speech-3-213"
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".
Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@en4
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"Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@cs1
"Hr. formand, vi er alle enige om, at for visse udviklingslande er gæld en væsentlig hindring for vækst og udvikling. Vi bør anerkende de gode sider ved det gældssaneringsinitiativ, der i øjeblikket anvendes, de stærkt gældsplagede fattige landes initiativ - eller HIPC-initiativet - der blev iværksat i 1996. Det er det mest omfattende gældssaneringsinitiativ, der nogensinde er taget. Det vil reducere gældsbyrden for de stærkt forgældede fattige lande med ca. to tredjedele og viser derved et engagement i reduktion af fattigdom.
Så gældssanering er en dårlig bistandsfordelingsmekanisme, men det kan være en god måde at levere bistand på, da det giver en hurtig metode til udbetaling og sikrer en hurtig overførsel af ressourcer direkte ind på budgettet med begrænsede transaktionsomkostninger.
Det kan også benyttes til at beskytte sårbare lavindkomstlande mod virkningerne af udefrakommende stød. I disse tilfælde kunne en midlertidig gældssanering hjælpe med at mildne de skadelige virkninger af ydre påvirkninger af modtagerlandes strategier til reduktion af fattigdom. Det er også tilfældet med hensyn til moratorierne, der som allerede omtalt blev drøftet i dag af formandskabet i Paris i forbindelse med de tsunami-ramte lande.
For at opsummere, så er gældssanering ikke et universalmiddel, som af sig selv skaber nye ressourcer, ej heller omsættes det automatisk til tjenesteydelser til fattige mennesker eller økonomisk vækst. Men det kan være en effektiv måde at give støtte på og en god måde, hvorpå man kan yde hurtig bistand efter katastrofer. Hvis man skal håndtere fattigdom og nå millenniumudviklingsmålene, så er den virkelige udfordring at sikre passende niveauer af udviklingsfinansiering. Vi må nå til en aftale om nye og tilstrækkelig ambitiøse mål for den officielle udviklingsbistand inden udgangen af 2009, hvis vi skal have en reel mulighed for at nå disse mål. Gældssanering kan være et nyttigt redskab til at nå dette mål, men det kan på ingen måde være hele svaret.
Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne er gået ud over kravene i HIPC. De fleste medlemsstater har forpligtet sig til at slette 100 % af de bilaterale krav. Kommissionen har gjort det samme med alle særlige lån i de mindst udviklede lande, der er kvalificerede til gældssanering fra HIPC. Men det anerkendes nu vidt og bredt, at denne sanering ikke vil sikre langsigtet bæredygtighed for gæld. Det er klart, at der må gøres mere for de fattige lande, der falder ind under HIPC-initiativet. Der er et voksende pres for at udstrække gældssanering til de andre udviklingslande.
Verdensbanken og IMF er ved at udvikle en ny ramme for bæredygtighed for langsigtet gæld i lavindkomstlande. Vi bør hjælpe med til at forhindre ophobningen af ny gæld. Kommissionen følger denne forhandling tæt for at sikre gennemskuelighed i beslutningsproceduren. Kreditorregeringerne i Paris-klubben har udviklet den såkaldte Evian-tilgang til at håndtere lande, der ikke falder ind under HIPC. Den tager hensyn til overvejelser om bæredygtig gæld og gør det herved muligt for Paris-klubben at vælge sin reaktion i den økonomiske situation, som det forgældede land befinder sig i, og at gøre afhjælpningen af kriser mere systematisk, betimelig og forudsigelig. Et tilfælde, hvor disse nye regler er blevet anvendt, er Irak.
Kommissionen er ikke a priori imod gældssanering for lande med mellemindkomster. Den støtter Paris-klubbens Evian-tilgang, som ser på det enkelte lands økonomiske situation i stedet for at definere standardtermer, som det er sket i Iraks tilfælde. Irak står ikke i gæld til Kommissionen, men som et tegn på solidaritet med det irakiske folk lovede Fællesskabet ved Madrid-konferencen et bidrag på 200 millioner euro til fonden for genopbygning af Irak. Men Kommissionen ønsker ikke hjælp til Irak, hvad enten det sker gennem gældssanering eller andre mekanismer, den ønsker ikke, at det skal gives på bekostning af de fattigste lande.
For nylig har både Det Forenede Kongerige og USA opfordret til, at den internationale gæld for lavindkomstlande slettes med 100 %, selv om der er forskellige holdninger til, hvordan dette skal finansieres. Forslaget om fuld slettelse kan forekomme attraktivt, men det indebærer risici med hensyn til tildeling af bistand.
Kommissionens finansielle undersøgelse viste, at HIPC-initiativet allerede har forvredet tildelingen af bistand, fordi det niveau, gældssaneringen har, ikke er forbundet med indikatorer for fattigdom og ej heller - og det er meget vigtigt - afspejler succesen med at håndtere fattigdom. De lande, der får størst fordel af initiativet, er på ingen måde de, der klarede sig bedst, og de er heller ikke de fattigste lande i gruppen.
Nogle eksempler vil illustrere, hvad jeg vil sige. Det land, der har haft størst fordel regnet pr. indbygger fra HIPC's gældssanering, er Guyana, som har modtaget 769 amerikanske dollars pr. indbygger. Det ligger som nr. 92 på Human Development Index. Men Niger, der ligger som nr. 174 på det indeks, får kun bistand i et omfang af 48 dollars pr. indbygger.
Den totale slettelse af al gæld for alle afrikanske lande ville føre til en betydelig ulighed i forvridning af bistand blandt dem, målt efter deres relative fattigdomsniveau. Eritrea - som er et af de fattigste lande i Afrika - ville få 56 dollars pr. indbygger, mens Seychellerne, der er et af de rigeste lande på kontinentet, ville få 2.572 dollars pr. indbygger, hvilket gør en meget stor forskel.
Yderligere gældssanering kunne føre til yderligere forvridning af tildelingen af bistand. I en verden med begrænsede ressourcer bør gældssanering for mellemindkomstlande ikke trækkes fra de beløb, der er til rådighed til de hårdest trængende."@da2
".
Herr Präsident, wir stimmen alle überein, dass Auslandsverschuldung für einige Entwicklungsländer ein großes Hindernis für Wachstum und Entwicklung darstellt. Wir sollten die Vorteile des derzeit angewendeten Mechanismus zur Verringerung der Schuldenlast – des von der Weltbank 1996 eingeführten HIPC-Verfahrens für den Abbau der Schulden der hoch verschuldeten armen Länder – anerkennen. Es handelt sich um die umfassendste Entschuldungsinitiative, die jemals eingeleitet wurde. Sie wird zu einem Abbau der Schuldenlast der hoch verschuldeten armen Länder um etwa zwei Drittel beitragen und das Engagement für die Armutsbekämpfung deutlich machen.
Dies führt dazu, dass Schuldenerlass zwar ein schlechtes Verteilungssystem darstellt, jedoch eine gute Möglichkeit bieten kann, Hilfe zu leisten, da es eine schnelle Auszahlung und einen vorhersehbaren Mittelfluss direkt in den Haushalt bei geringen Transaktionskosten gewährleistet.
Er könnte ferner genutzt werden, gefährdete Länder mit niedrigem Einkommen vor Fremdeinwirkungen zu schützen. In diesen Fällen könnte eine Form des vorübergehenden Schuldenerlasses dazu beitragen, die nachteiligen Folgen von Fremdeinwirkungen auf die Armutsbekämpfungsstrategien der Empfängerländer zu mildern. Dies trifft auch auf die Moratorien zu, die der Rat, wie bereits erwähnt wurde, heute in Paris im Zusammenhang mit den von der Flutkatastrophe betroffenen Ländern erörtert hat.
Zusammenfassend sei gesagt, dass der Schuldenerlass weder ein Allheilmittel ist, aus dem ohne weiteres Zutun neue Mittel erwachsen, noch trägt er zwangsläufig zum Wohlergehen armer Menschen oder zum Wirtschaftswachstum bei. Er mag jedoch eine wirksame Möglichkeit der Unterstützung und eine gute Form der Soforthilfe im Anschluss an Krisen sein. Wenn wir tatsächlich die Armut bekämpfen und die Millennium-Entwicklungsziele verwirklichen wollen, müssen wir jedoch Entwicklungshilfe in ausreichender Höhe leisten. Wir müssen uns bis 2009 auf neue und ausreichend ehrgeizige Zielvorgaben für die offizielle Entwicklungshilfe einigen, damit wir diese Ziele auch wirklich erreichen können. Bei diesen Bemühungen kann der Schuldenerlass ein nützliches Instrument, auf keinen Fall jedoch eine umfassende Lösung darstellen.
Die Kommission und die Mitgliedstaaten sind über die Anforderungen des HIPC-Verfahrens hinausgegangen. Die Mehrzahl der Mitgliedstaaten hat sich dazu verpflichtet, auf alle bilateralen Forderungen zu verzichten. Die Kommission hat dies ebenfalls für alle Sonderdarlehen an am wenigsten entwickelte Länder vorgesehen, für die der HIPC-Entschuldungsmechanismus in Frage kommt. Mittlerweile ist jedoch allgemein anerkannt, dass es mit dem HIPC-Verfahren nicht möglich sein wird, die Schulden auf lange Sicht tragbar zu machen. Es muss ganz eindeutig mehr für die armen Länder unternommen werden, die in den Genuss der HIPC-Initiative kommen. Es gibt immer mehr Druck, die Schuldenerleichterung auch auf andere Entwicklungsländer auszuweiten.
Weltbank und IWF entwickeln einen neuen Rahmen zur Verwirklichung des Ziels, die Schulden für Länder mit geringem Einkommen auf lange Sicht tragbar zu machen. Dies sollte dazu beitragen, die Anhäufung von Neuschulden zu vermeiden. Die Kommission verfolgt diese Debatte aufmerksam, um die Transparenz der Entscheidungsfindung sicherzustellen. Der Pariser Club der Gläubigerstaaten hat das so genannte „Evian-Verfahren“ für Länder entwickelt, die nicht durch die Entschuldungsinitiative HIPC begünstigt sind. Es berücksichtigt Überlegungen zur Schuldentragbarkeit und ermöglicht so dem Pariser Club, seine Reaktion an die finanzielle Situation des Schuldners anzupassen und die Krisenbewältigung koordinierter, zeitgerechter und vorhersehbarer zu gestalten. Diese neuen Regeln kamen beispielsweise im Irak zur Anwendung.
Die Kommission spricht sich nicht von vornherein gegen einen Schuldenerlass für Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen aus. Sie unterstützt das Evian-Verfahren des Pariser Clubs, bei dem keine Standardbedingungen aufgestellt werden, sondern die finanzielle Situation der einzelnen Länder berücksichtigt wird, wie es im Falle des Irak geschehen ist. Der Irak ist kein Schuldner der Kommission, aber die Kommission hat als Zeichen der Solidarität mit dem irakischen Volk auf der Madrider Konferenz einen Beitrag in Höhe von 200 Millionen Euro für den Wiederaufbaufonds für Irak zugesagt. Sie will jedoch verhindern, dass eine Unterstützung des Irak in Form eines Schuldenerlasses oder anderer Mechanismen auf Kosten der ärmsten Länder geht.
Sowohl das Vereinigte Königreich als auch die USA haben kürzlich einen vollständigen Erlass der multilateralen Schulden von Ländern mit geringem Einkommen gefordert, allerdings unterscheiden sich die Finanzierungsansätze voneinander. Der Vorschlag eines vollständigen Erlasses mag attraktiv erscheinen, doch birgt er Gefahren im Bereich der Zuweisung von Hilfsleistungen.
Aus der Finanzierungsstudie der Kommission geht hervor, dass die HIPC-Initiative bereits zu einer Verzerrung der Zuweisung von Hilfsleistungen geführt hat, da die Höhe des Schuldenerlasses weder etwas über die Armut eines Landes aussagt noch – und dies ist besonders entscheidend – seine Bemühungen um Armutsbekämpfung widerspiegelt. Diejenigen Staaten, die am meisten von dieser Initiative profitieren, unternehmen bei weitem nicht die größten Anstrengungen und sind nicht die ärmsten Staaten der Gruppe.
Diese Aussage lässt sich anhand einiger Beispiele veranschaulichen. Das Land, dem die HIPC-Entschuldungsmechanismen pro Kopf betrachtet am meisten zugute kommen, ist Guyana, das pro Kopf 769 US-Dollar erhalten hat. Im Index zur menschlichen Entwicklung nimmt das Land Rang 92 ein. Dagegen erhält Niger, das sich in diesem Index auf Rang 174 befindet, pro Kopf lediglich einen Schuldenerlass in Höhe von 48 US-Dollar.
Legt man die jeweilige Armutsgrenze zugrunde, so würde ein vollständiger Schuldenerlass für alle afrikanischen Staaten zu einem deutlichen Ungleichgewicht bei der Vergabe von Hilfsleistungen führen. Eines der ärmsten Länder Afrikas – Eritrea – würde pro Kopf 56 US-Dollar erhalten, während die Seychellen als eines der reichsten Länder des Kontinents pro Kopf 2 572 US-Dollar erhielten, und das ist schon ein großer Unterschied.
Ein weiterer Schuldenerlass könnte zu zusätzlichen Verzerrungen bei den Hilfszahlungen führen. In einer Welt mit begrenzten Mitteln sollte ein Schuldenerlass für Länder mit mittlerem Einkommen nicht die Beträge beeinträchtigen, die den bedürftigsten Ländern zur Verfügung gestellt werden."@de9
"Κύριε Πρόεδρε, συμφωνούμε όλοι ότι για ορισμένες αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες το εξωτερικό χρέος είναι μέγιστο εμπόδιο για την ανάπτυξη και εξέλιξή τους. Οφείλουμε να αναγνωρίσουμε τα οφέλη της πρωτοβουλίας μείωσης του χρέους που εφαρμόζεται επί του παρόντος, της πρωτοβουλίας για τις φτωχές και υπερχρεωμένες χώρες –ή ΦΥΧ– η οποία εγκαινιάστηκε το 1996. Αυτή είναι η πιο ευρεία πρωτοβουλία μείωσης χρέους που έχει αναληφθεί ποτέ. Θα μειώσει το βάρος του χρέους από τις υπερχρεωμένες φτωχές χώρες περίπου κατά τα δύο τρίτα, δείχνοντας τη δέσμευση για τη μείωση της φτώχειας.
Συνεπώς, η μείωση του χρέους είναι ένας κακός μηχανισμός κατανομής βοήθειας, αλλά μπορεί να είναι ένας καλός τρόπος παροχής βοήθειας, καθώς προβλέπει μια γρήγορη μέθοδο πληρωμής, διασφαλίζοντας μια προβλεπόμενη ροή πόρων κατευθείαν στον προϋπολογισμό με περιορισμένο κόστος συναλλαγών.
Θα μπορούσε επίσης να χρησιμοποιηθεί για να προστατέψει ευάλωτες χώρες με χαμηλό εισόδημα από τα αποτελέσματα εξωγενών κλυδωνισμών. Σε αυτές τις περιπτώσεις, κάποιο είδος προσωρινής μείωσης του χρέους θα μπορούσε να βοηθήσει να μετριαστούν οι δυσμενείς συνέπειες των εξωτερικών κλυδωνισμών στις στρατηγικές μείωσης της φτώχειας των δικαιούχων χωρών. Αυτό ισχύει επίσης όσον αφορά τα μορατόριουμ, τα οποία, όπως έχει ήδη αναφερθεί, συζητήθηκαν σήμερα από την Προεδρία στο Παρίσι σχετικά με τις πληγείσες από το παλιρροϊκό κύμα χώρες.
Εν κατακλείδι, η μείωση του χρέους δεν είναι πανάκεια η οποία δημιουργεί από μόνη της νέους πόρους, ούτε μεταφράζεται αυτόματα σε υπηρεσίες για τους φτωχούς ή την οικονομική ανάπτυξη. Εντούτοις, μπορεί να είναι ίσως ένας αποτελεσματικός τρόπος για παροχή στήριξης και ένας καλός τρόπος για εξασφάλιση άμεσης βοήθειας μετά από κλυδωνισμούς. Για να αντιμετωπιστεί η φτώχεια και να επιτευχθούν οι αναπτυξιακοί στόχοι της Χιλιετίας, η αληθινή πρόκληση είναι η διασφάλιση των κατάλληλων επιπέδων χρηματοδότησης της ανάπτυξης. Για να έχουμε μια πραγματική προοπτική επίτευξης αυτών των στόχων πρέπει να καταλήξουμε σε συμφωνία για νέους και ικανοποιητικά φιλόδοξους στόχους της επίσημης αναπτυξιακής βοήθειας μέχρι το 2009. Η μείωση του χρέους μπορεί να αποτελέσει χρήσιμο εργαλείο σε αυτή την αναζήτηση, αλλά δεν μπορεί σε καμία περίπτωση να προσφέρει μια πραγματικά πλήρη απάντηση.
Η Επιτροπή και τα κράτη μέλη έχουν προχωρήσει πέραν των απαιτήσεων των φτωχών και υπερχρεωμένων χωρών. Τα περισσότερα κράτη μέλη έχουν δεσμευτεί ότι θα διαγράψουν το 100% των διμερών απαιτήσεων. Η Επιτροπή έχει κάνει το ίδιο για όλα τα ειδικά δάνεια προς τις λιγότερο αναπτυγμένες χώρες που δικαιούνται μείωση χρέους στο πλαίσιο της ΠΦΥΧ. Εντούτοις, αναγνωρίζεται τώρα ευρέως ότι η μείωση υπέρ των ΦΥΧ δεν θα μπορέσει να διασφαλίσει τη βιωσιμότητα του μακροπρόθεσμου χρέους. Είναι προφανές ότι πρέπει να γίνουν περισσότερα για τις φτωχές χώρες οι οποίες επωφελούνται από την ΠΦΥΧ. Αυξάνεται η πίεση για να επεκταθεί η μείωση του χρέους και στις άλλες αναπτυσσόμενες χώρες.
Η Παγκόσμια Τράπεζα και το ΔΝΤ αναπτύσσουν ένα νέο πλαίσιο για τη βιωσιμότητα του μακροπρόθεσμου χρέους στις χώρες με χαμηλό εισόδημα. Αυτό θα συμβάλει στην αποτροπή της συσσώρευσης νέου χρέους. Η Επιτροπή παρακολουθεί στενά αυτή τη συζήτηση για να διασφαλίσει τη διαφάνεια στη διαδικασία λήψης αποφάσεων. Η Λέσχη των Παρισίων, στην οποία μετέχουν οι κυβερνήσεις των πιστωτριών χωρών, έχει αναπτύξει τη λεγόμενη προσέγγιση Evian για τις χώρες που δεν συγκαταλέγονται στις φτωχές και υπερχρεωμένες. Λαμβάνει υπόψη τις μελέτες για τη βιωσιμότητα του χρέους, επιτρέποντας στη Λέσχη των Παρισίων να προσαρμόσει την προσέγγισή της στη δημοσιονομική κατάσταση της χώρας οφειλέτη και η επίλυση των κρίσεων να είναι πιο μεθοδική, έγκαιρη και αναμενόμενη. Μια εφαρμογή των νέων αυτών κανόνων ήταν και η υπόθεση του Ιράκ.
Η Επιτροπή δεν είναι
κατά της μείωσης του χρέους των χωρών μέσου εισοδήματος. Στηρίζει την προσέγγιση Evian της Λέσχης των Παρισίων, η οποία εξετάζει την οικονομική κατάσταση κάθε χώρας και δεν καθορίζει πάγιους όρους όπως έγινε στην περίπτωση του Ιράκ. Το Ιράκ δεν έχει οφειλές έναντι της Επιτροπής αλλά, ως ένδειξη αλληλεγγύης στον λαό του Ιράκ, η Επιτροπή υποσχέθηκε μια συνεισφορά 200 εκατομμυρίων ευρώ στο ταμείο για την ανοικοδόμηση του Ιράκ στη διάσκεψη της Μαδρίτης. Ωστόσο, η Επιτροπή δεν επιθυμεί η βοήθεια για το Ιράκ, μέσω της μείωσης του χρέους ή άλλων μηχανισμών, να δοθεί εις βάρος των φτωχών χωρών.
Πιο πρόσφατα, το Ηνωμένο Βασίλειο και οι ΗΠΑ ζήτησαν ολοσχερή διαγραφή του πολυμερούς χρέους των χωρών με χαμηλό εισόδημα, αν και με διαφορετικές προσεγγίσεις έναντι της χρηματοδότησής της. Η πρόταση για πλήρη διαγραφή ίσως φαίνεται ελκυστική, αλλά συνεπάγεται κινδύνους από την άποψη της κατανομής βοήθειας.
Η χρηματοδοτική μελέτη της Επιτροπής δείχνει ότι η πρωτοβουλία για τις φτωχές και υπερχρεωμένες χώρες έχει ήδη στρεβλώσει την κατανομή βοήθειας επειδή τα επίπεδα μείωσης του χρέους δεν συνδέονται με τους δείκτες φτώχειας, ούτε –και αυτό είναι πολύ σημαντικό– αντανακλούν την αποτελεσματικότητα στην αντιμετώπιση της φτώχειας. Οι χώρες οι οποίες επωφελούνται από την πρωτοβουλία δεν είναι σε καμία περίπτωση οι χώρες με τις καλύτερες επιδόσεις ή οι πιο φτωχές χώρες στην ομάδα.
Παραθέτω μερικά παραδείγματα. Η χώρα η οποία επωφελείται περισσότερο ανά κάτοικο από την ελάφρυνση του χρέους των ΦΥΧ είναι η Γουιάνα, με 769 δολάρια κατά κεφαλήν. Κατατάσσεται 92η στον Δείκτη Ανθρώπινης Ανάπτυξης. Ωστόσο, η Νιγηρία, η οποία κατατάσσεται 174η στον ίδιο κατάλογο, λαμβάνει μόνο 48 δολάρια μείωση κατά κεφαλήν.
Η ολοσχερής διαγραφή του χρέους όλων των αφρικανικών χωρών θα οδηγούσε σε σημαντικές ανισότητες στη στρέβλωση της βοήθειας μεταξύ τους, η οποία θα υπολογίζεται από τα σχετικά επίπεδα φτώχειας τους. Η Ερυθραία –μια από τις φτωχότερες χώρες στην Αφρική– θα λαμβάνει 56 δολάρια κατά κεφαλή, ενώ οι Σεϋχέλλες, μια από τις πλουσιότερες χώρες της ηπείρου, θα λαμβάνει 2 572 δολάρια κατά κεφαλή, γεγονός το οποίο κάνει τη διαφορά τεράστια.
Η περαιτέρω μείωση του χρέους θα μπορούσε να οδηγήσει σε περαιτέρω στρεβλώσεις στην κατανομή της βοήθειας. Σε έναν κόσμο περιορισμένων πόρων, η μείωση χρέους η οποία παρέχεται σε χώρες με μέσο εισόδημα δεν θα έπρεπε να αφαιρείται από τα διαθέσιμα ποσά για όσες έχουν μεγαλύτερη ανάγκη."@el10
".
Señor Presidente, todos estamos de acuerdo en que para algunos países en vías de desarrollo la deuda externa es un importante obstáculo para el crecimiento y el desarrollo. Deberíamos reconocer los méritos de la iniciativa de alivio de la deuda que se lleva a cabo actualmente, la Iniciativa a favor de los Países Pobres Altamente Endeudados, o HIPC, lanzada en 1996. Esta es la iniciativa de alivio de la deuda más completa jamás emprendida. Reducirá cerca de dos tercios la carga de la deuda de los países pobres altamente endeudados, lo que demuestra la voluntad de mitigar la pobreza.
Por tanto, el alivio de la deuda es un mal mecanismo de asignación de ayuda, pero puede ser un buen sistema para prestar ayuda, ya que proporciona un método rápido de desembolso, garantizando un flujo predecible de recursos directamente al presupuesto, con unos costes de transacción limitados.
También podría utilizarse para proteger a los países vulnerables de renta baja frente al efecto de impactos exógenos. En estos casos, una especie de alivio temporal de la deuda podría ayudar a mitigar los efectos adversos de los impactos externos sobre las estrategias de reducción de la pobreza de los países beneficiarios. Lo mismo ocurre con las moratorias, que, como ya se ha dicho, han sido debatidas hoy en París por la Presidencia en relación con los países afectados por el tsunami.
Resumiendo, el alivio de la deuda no es una panacea que por sí misma cree nuevos recursos, ni se traduce automáticamente en servicios para los pobres o en crecimiento económico. Sin embargo, puede ser una forma eficaz de prestar apoyo y puede ser un buen método para prestar asistencia rápida tras una adversidad. A fin de abordar la pobreza y lograr los Objetivos de Desarrollo del Milenio, el verdadero desafío es garantizar niveles apropiados de financiación del desarrollo. Tenemos que alcanzar un acuerdo en torno a nuevos objetivos que sean suficientemente ambiciosos para la ayuda oficial al desarrollo para 2009, de modo que tengamos una posibilidad real de conseguir esos objetivos. El alivio de la deuda puede ser una herramienta útil en esta búsqueda, pero de ningún modo ofrece una respuesta realmente completa.
La Comisión y los Estados miembros han ido más allá de las exigencias de los HIPC. La mayoría de los Estados miembros se han comprometido a cancelar el 100 % de la deuda bilateral. La Comisión ha hecho lo mismo con todos los préstamos especiales en los países menos desarrollados que pueden acogerse a la iniciativa de alivio de la deuda de los HIPC. Sin embargo, ahora todo el mundo sabe que el alivio de la deuda de los HIPC no conseguirá garantizar la sostenibilidad de la deuda a largo plazo. Evidentemente, hay que hacer más por los países pobres que se benefician de la Iniciativa HIPC. Aumentan las presiones a favor de extender el alivio de la deuda a los demás países en desarrollo.
El Banco Mundial y el FMI están desarrollando un nuevo marco para la sostenibilidad a largo plazo de la deuda en los países de renta baja. Este marco debería contribuir a impedir la acumulación de nueva deuda. La Comisión sigue muy de cerca este debate para garantizar la transparencia del proceso de toma de decisiones. El Club de París de los Gobiernos acreedores ha desarrollado el llamado enfoque Evian para tratar con países no incluidos entre los HIPC. Tiene en cuenta criterios de sostenibilidad de la deuda, permitiendo al Club de París adaptar su respuesta a la situación financiera del país deudor y resolver las crisis de forma más ordenada, puntual y predecible. Una aplicación de estas nuevas normas ha sido el caso iraquí.
La Comisión no está de antemano en contra de aliviar la deuda de los países de renta media. Apoya el enfoque Evian del Club de París, que examina la situación financiera de cada uno de los países en lugar de definir condiciones generales aplicables a todos, como se hizo en el caso de Iraq. Iraq no tiene ninguna deuda con la Comisión, pero, en señal de solidaridad con el pueblo iraquí, la Comunidad prometió en la Conferencia de Madrid una contribución de 200 millones de euros al Fondo para la Reconstrucción de Irak. Sin embargo, la Comisión no quiere que la asistencia a Iraq, ya sea a través del alivio de la deuda o de otros mecanismos, se preste a expensas de los países más pobres.
Hace poco, el Reino Unido y los Estados Unidos han solicitado la cancelación del 100 % de la deuda multilateral para países de renta baja, aunque con diferentes enfoques de su financiación. La propuesta de cancelación total puede parecer atractiva, pero implica cierto riesgo desde el punto de vista de la asignación de la ayuda.
El estudio financiero de la Comisión demuestra que la Iniciativa HIPC ya ha distorsionado la asignación de la ayuda, porque los niveles de alivio de la deuda no son indicadores asociados de pobreza, ni, y esto es muy importante, reflejan los logros a la hora de abordar la pobreza. Los países que se benefician más de la iniciativa no son en absoluto los que mejor luchan contra la pobreza o los más pobres del grupo.
Citaré algunos ejemplos para ilustrar esta cuestión. El país que más se beneficia por habitante del alivio de la deuda de los HIPC es Guyana, que recibe 769 dólares per cápita. Ocupa el puesto 92 en el Índice de Desarrollo Humano. Sin embargo, Nigeria, que ocupa el puesto 174 en el mismo índice, recibe solamente 48 dólares per cápita.
La cancelación total de la deuda de todos los países africanos acarrearía grandes desigualdades entre ellos en la asignación de la ayuda en función de sus niveles de pobreza relativos. Eritrea, uno de los países más pobres de África, recibiría 56 dólares per cápita, mientras que Seychelles, uno de los países más ricos del continente, recibiría 2 572 dólares per cápita, cosa que supone una gran diferencia.
A más alivio de la deuda, mayores serían las distorsiones en la asignación de la ayuda. En un mundo de recursos limitados, el alivio de la deuda concedido a países de renta media no debería ir en detrimento de las cantidades asignadas a los más necesitados."@es20
"Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@et5
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Arvoisa puhemies, olemme kaikki samaa mieltä siitä, että joillekin kehitysmaille ulkomainen velka on merkittävä kasvua ja kehitystä haittaava este. Lisäksi on myönnettävä, että parhaillaan sovellettavalla velkahelpotusaloitteella eli voimakkaasti velkaantuneita köyhiä maita (HIPC) koskevalla aloitteella, joka sai alkunsa vuonna 1996, on saavutettu paljon. Kyseessä on laajin koskaan toteutettu velkahelpotusaloite. Aloitteen avulla voimakkaasti velkaantuneiden köyhien maiden velkataakkaa pienennetään suunnilleen kahdella kolmasosalla, mikä kertoo sitoutumisesta köyhyyden vähentämiseen.
Näin ollen velkahuojennus on avun jakautumisen kannalta huono tapa, mutta se voi olla hyvä tapa toimittaa apua, koska niiden maksuunpano on nopeaa ja niillä taataan ennustettavissa oleva rahavirta suoraan budjettiin vähäisin oheiskustannuksin.
Lisäksi velanhuojennuksia voidaan käyttää haavoittuvien ja alhaisen tulotason maiden suojelemiseen ulkoisilta häiriöiltä. Näissä tapauksissa jonkinlainen tilapäinen velkojen huojentaminen saattaisi osaltaan lievittää ulkoisten häiriöiden vahingollisia vaikutuksia edunsaajamaiden köyhyyden vähentämiseen tähtääviin strategioihin. Tämä koskee myös lykkäyksiä, joista neuvoston puheenjohtaja keskusteli tänään Pariisissa hyökyaallon kohteeksi joutuneiden maiden osalta, kuten äsken mainittiin.
Yhteenvetona voidaan todeta, että velkojen huojentaminen ei ole ihmelääke, jolla luodaan uusia resursseja itsestään, eivätkä ne automaattisesti palvele köyhiä tai lisää taloudellista kasvua. Velkojen huojentaminen voi kuitenkin olla tehokas tapa toimittaa apua ja hyvä tapa toimittaa apua nopeasti häiriöiden jälkeen. Köyhyyden voittamisessa ja vuosituhannen kehitystavoitteiden saavuttamisessa todellisena haasteena on kehitykseen tarkoitetun rahoituksen saattaminen asianmukaiselle tasolle. Meidän on päästävä yhteisymmärrykseen vuoteen 2009 mennessä uusista ja riittävän kunnianhimoisista tavoitteista virallisen kehitysavun alalla, jotta näiden tavoitteiden saavuttaminen on meille todella mahdollista. Velkojen huojentaminen voi olla hyödyllinen väline tähän pyrittäessä, mutta se ei voi tosiasiassa millään muotoa olla täydellinen vastaus.
Komissio ja jäsenvaltiot ovat tehneet enemmän kuin HIPC-aloitteessa edellytetään. Monet jäsenvaltiot ovat sitoutuneet peruuttamaan sataprosenttisesti kahdenväliset lainat. Komissio on toiminut samoin kaikkien niiden erityislainojen osalta, jotka koskevat HIPC-velkahuojennuskriteerit täyttäviä, vähiten kehittyneitä maita. Tällä hetkellä on kuitenkin laajasti tunnustettu, että HIPC-velkahuojennuksella ei voida taata lainojen siedettävää tasoa pitkällä aikavälillä. On selvää, että HIPC-aloitteesta hyötyvien köyhien maiden hyväksi on tehtävä enemmän. Paine kasvaa jatkuvasti siihen suuntaan, että velkahelpotusohjelmaa olisi sovellettava muihinkin kehitysmaihin.
Maailmanpankki ja IMF kehittävät parhaillaan uutta kehystä alhaisen tulotason maiden velkatilanteen pitkäaikaisen kestävyyden takaamiseksi. Kehyksen avulla pyritään ehkäisemään uuden velan kertymistä. Komissio seuraa keskustelua tiiviisti varmistaakseen päätöksentekoprosessin avoimuuden. Velkojina olevista hallituksista koostuva Pariisin klubi on kehittänyt HIPC-maita varten niin sanotun Evian-lähestymistavan. Tässä strategiassa otetaan huomioon velan siedettävyyteen liittyvät seikat, jolloin Pariisin klubi voi mukauttaa toimensa vastaamaan velallisena olevan maan taloudellista tilannetta ja ratkaista kriisit hallitummin, oikea-aikaisemmin ja ennustettavammin. Näitä uusia sääntöjä on sovellettu esimerkiksi Irakin tapauksessa.
Komissio ei lähtökohtaisesti vastusta keskituloisten maiden velkahuojennusta. Komissio tukee Pariisin klubin Evian-lähestymistapaa, jonka mukaisesti ei määritellä pelkästään vakioedellytyksiä, vaan arvioidaan pikemminkin kunkin maan taloudellista tilannetta, kuten Irakin tapauksessa tapahtui. Irak ei ole velkaa komissiolle, mutta osoittaakseen solidaarisuutta Irakin kansaa kohtaan yhteisö lupautui Madridissa pidetyssä kokouksessa maksamaan 200 miljoonaa euroa Irakin kansainväliseen jälleenrakennusrahastoon (International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq). Komissio ei kuitenkaan halua, että Irakia tuetaan velkahuojennuksen tai muun mekanismin kautta köyhimpien maiden kustannuksella.
Yhdistynyt kuningaskunta ja Yhdysvallat ovat äskettäin kumpikin vaatineet alhaisen tulotason maiden monenvälisen velan peruuttamista sataprosenttisesti, vaikka ne ovat esittäneet sen rahoittamiseksi eri malleja. Ehdotus täydellisestä peruuttamisesta voi kuulostaa houkuttelevalta, mutta siihen sisältyy avun jakautumiseen liittyviä riskejä.
Komission rahoitustutkimuksista ilmenee, että HIPC-aloite on jo vääristänyt avun jakautumista, koska velkahuojennuksen määrä ei ole verrannollinen köyhyysindikaattoreihin, eivätkä ne – ja tämä on hyvin tärkeä asia – kuvasta saavutuksia köyhyyden lievittämisessä. Aloitteesta eniten hyötyvät maat eivät ole millään muotoa parhaiten suoriutuneita maita tai ryhmän köyhimpiä maita.
Seuraavat esimerkit havainnollistavat hyvin tätä asiaa. Asukasta kohden laskettuna Guyana hyötyy eniten HIPC-velkahuojennusohjelmasta: sen saama huojennus on 769 Yhdysvaltain dollaria asukasta kohden. Guyana on inhimillisen kehityksen indeksin mukaan sijalla 92. Niger, joka on tämän indeksin mukaan sijalla 174, saa huojennuksena ainoastaan 48 Yhdysvaltain dollaria asukasta kohden.
Kaikkien Afrikan maiden velan täydellinen peruuttaminen aiheuttaisi näiden maiden kesken huomattavaa eriarvoisuutta ja avun jakautumista väärin suhteessa maiden suhteelliseen köyhyyteen. Eritrea, joka on yksi Afrikan köyhimmistä maista, saisi ainoastaan 56 Yhdysvaltain dollaria asukasta kohden, kun taas maanosan rikkaimpiin maihin kuuluva Seychellit saisi 2 572 Yhdysvaltain dollaria asukasta kohden, mikä on valtavan paljon enemmän.
Velkojen huojentamisen jatkaminen johtaisi avun jakautumisen vääristymiseen entisestään. Maailmassa, jossa voimavarat ovat rajalliset, keskituloisille maille myönnetyt velkahuojennukset eivät saa olla pois kaikkein eniten tukea tarvitsevien määrärahoista."@fi7
".
Monsieur le Président, nous sommes tous d’accord pour déclarer que l’endettement extérieur représente pour certains pays en développement un obstacle majeur à la croissance et au développement. Force nous est de reconnaître les mérites de l’initiative actuelle en faveur de l’allégement de la dette lancée en 1996 - l’initiative PPLE, c’est-à-dire en faveur des pays pauvres lourdement endettés. Il s’agit de la plus vaste initiative en faveur de l’allégement de la dette jamais réalisée. Elle réduira d’environ deux-tiers la charge de la dette des pays pauvres lourdement endettés, démontrant de la sorte l’engagement envers la réduction de la pauvreté.
L’allégement de la dette représente donc un mauvais mécanisme de distribution de l’aide, mais il peut avoir des aspects positifs dans la mesure où il permet une méthode rapide de déboursement et garantit une injection prévisible de moyens directement dans le budget avec des coûts de transaction restreints.
Ce mécanisme peut également être utilisé dans le but de protéger des pays à bas revenu vulnérables contre les effets de crises exogènes. Dans ces cas, une sorte d’allégement provisoire de la dette pourrait aider à atténuer les effets contraires de chocs externes sur les stratégies de réduction de la pauvreté des pays bénéficiaires. C’est également le cas en ce qui concerne les moratoires qui, comme je l’ai déjà signalé, ont été aujourd’hui abordés par la présidence à Paris en vue d’aider les pays touchés par les tsunamis.
En résumé, l’allégement de la dette ne constitue pas une panacée susceptible d’engendrer par elle-même de nouvelles ressources. Elle ne se traduit pas non plus automatiquement en services en faveur des pauvres ni par une croissance économique. Il peut, par contre, s’agir d’une manière efficace de fournir une aide rapide à la suite de crises. Si nous voulons nous attaquer à au problème de la pauvreté et atteindre les objectifs de développement du millénaire, le véritable défi consiste à garantir des niveaux appropriés de financement du développement. Si nous voulons avoir une chance d’atteindre ces objectifs, nous devons convenir de nouveaux objectifs suffisamment ambitieux en matière d’aide au développement d’ici 2009. L’allégement de la dette peut représenter un instrument utile dans cette quête, mais il ne peut en aucun cas tenir lieu de solution à part entière.
La Commission et les États membres vont au-delà des exigences de l’initiative PPLE. La plupart des États membres se sont engagés à annuler la totalité des créances bilatérales. La Commission a fait de même pour l’ensemble des prêts spéciaux accordés aux pays les moins développés pouvant bénéficier de l’allégement de la dette en tant que pays pauvres lourdement endettés. Il ne fait toutefois aucun doute désormais que l’allégement de la dette des PPLE ne garantira pas une viabilité de la dette à long terme. Il est évident que d’autres actions devront être menées en faveur des pays pauvres bénéficiant de l’initiative PPLE. L’extension de l’initiative d’allégement de la dette aux autres pays en développement est soumise à une pression de plus en plus forte.
La Banque mondiale et le FMI sont en train d’élaborer un nouveau cadre pour la viabilité de la dette à long terme dans les pays à bas revenu, une démarche qui devrait contribuer à empêcher l’accumulation de nouvelles dettes. La Commission surveille attentivement cet examen afin de garantir la transparence du processus décisionnel. Le Club de Paris, composé des gouvernements créditeurs, a mis au point l’approche dite d’Evian en faveur des pays non-PPLE. Elle prend en considération la viabilité de la dette en permettant au Club de Paris d’adapter sa réponse à la situation financière du pays débiteur et de résoudre les crises de façon plus méthodique, plus opportune et plus prévisible. Le cas de l’Irak est un exemple de l’application de ces nouvelles règles.
La Commission n’est pas a priori opposée à l’allégement de la dette en faveur des pays à moyen revenu. Elle est favorable à la méthode d’Evian imaginée par le Club de Paris, qui tient compte de la situation financière de chaque pays plutôt que du respect de critères communs, comme cela a été le cas pour l’Irak. L’Irak n’a pas de dettes à l’égard de la Commission, mais, en signe de solidarité avec le peuple irakien, la Communauté a promis, lors de la conférence de Madrid, une contribution de 200 millions d’euros en faveur du fonds pour la reconstruction de l’Irak. La Commission refuse cependant que l’aide fournie à l’Irak, que ce soit par le biais de l’allégement de la dette ou par d’autres mécanismes, se fasse au détriment des pays les plus pauvres.
Plus récemment, le Royaume-Uni et les États-Unis ont tous deux demandé l’annulation totale de la dette multilatérale des pays à bas revenu, bien que leur opinion diverge quant au mode de financement. La proposition d’annuler complètement la dette peut paraître séduisante, mais elle comporte des risques en ce qui concerne la distribution de l’aide.
L’étude financière réalisée par la Commission montre que l’initiative PPLE a déjà faussé la distribution de l’aide dans la mesure où les niveaux de l’allégement de la dette ne sont pas des indicateurs liés au niveau de pauvreté et ils ne reflètent pas non plus - et ce point est très important - la manière dont la lutte contre la pauvreté est menée. Les pays qui bénéficient le plus de l’initiative ne sont en aucun cas les meilleurs acteurs de la lutte contre la pauvreté ni les pays les plus pauvres du groupe.
Je vous citerai quelques exemples pour illustrer mon point de vue. Le principal bénéficiaire, par tête d’habitant, du programme d’allégement de la dette en faveur des PPLE est la Guyane, qui reçoit 769 dollars américains par tête d’habitant. Ce pays se classe en 92e position dans l’indice de développement humain. En revanche, le Niger, qui se classe en 174e position dans cet indice, ne reçoit que 48 dollars américains par tête d’habitant au titre de l’allégement de la dette.
Une suppression totale de la dette pour l’ensemble des pays africains entraînerait d’importantes inégalités dans la répartition de l’aide, qui se mesure sur la base de leur niveau de pauvreté relative. L’Érythrée, l’un des pays les plus pauvres d’Afrique, ne recevrait que 56 dollars américains par tête d’habitant alors que les Seychelles, l’un des pays les plus riches du continent, recevrait 2 572 dollars américains par tête d’habitant, ce qui représente une différence énorme.
Un allégement supplémentaire de la dette pourrait entraîner de nouvelles distorsions en matière de distribution de l’aide. Dans un monde aux ressources limitées, il ne faudrait pas que les montants versés en faveur de pays à revenu moyen au titre de l’allégement de la dette affectent les pays les plus nécessiteux."@fr8
"Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@hu11
"Signor Presidente, concordiamo tutti sul fatto che per alcuni paesi in via di sviluppo il debito estero costituisce un grave ostacolo sulla strada della crescita e dello sviluppo. Dobbiamo riconoscere i meriti dell’iniziativa di cancellazione del debito HIPC, destinata ai paesi poveri altamente indebitati. Quest’iniziativa, lanciata nel 1996, è ora in corso di attuazione e rappresenta l’azione di riduzione del debito più ampia mai adottata finora. Grazie ad essa, sarà possibile ridurre di circa due terzi il debito dei paesi poveri altamente indebitati e in tal modo potremo dimostrare la serietà dell’impegno nella lotta contro la povertà.
Si può pertanto affermare che la riduzione del debito è un meccanismo che provoca una scorretta distribuzione degli aiuti; però può essere anche un mezzo valido per la fornitura di aiuti, dato che costituisce uno strumento rapido di erogazione e una fonte sicura e prevedibile di risorse che affluiscono direttamente al bilancio, a fronte di costi di transazione limitati.
La riduzione del debito potrebbe essere utilizzata anche per proteggere i paesi vulnerabili a reddito basso dagli effetti di avvenimenti traumatici esterni. In casi del genere, una qualche forma di riduzione temporanea del debito potrebbe contribuire a mitigare le conseguenze negative di eventi straordinari sulle strategie di riduzione della povertà attuate dai paesi beneficiari. Lo stesso vale per le moratorie, di cui, come già detto, la Presidenza ha discusso oggi a Parigi in riferimento ai paesi colpiti dallo
.
Riassumendo, possiamo dire che la riduzione del debito non è una soluzione capace di creare spontaneamente nuove risorse, né di tradursi automaticamente in servizi a favore dei più poveri o a favore della crescita economica. Non di meno, può rappresentare uno strumento efficace per fornire aiuti e un mezzo valido per intervenire rapidamente in caso di emergenze. Per combattere la povertà e per raggiungere gli obiettivi di sviluppo del millennio, la vera sfida consiste nel garantire adeguati livelli di finanziamento dello sviluppo. Dobbiamo trovare un accordo su obiettivi nuovi e sufficientemente ambiziosi per gli aiuti ufficiali allo sviluppo per il 2009, se vogliamo avere una possibilità concreta di raggiungere gli scopi fissati. La cancellazione del debito può essere uno strumento utile a tal fine, ma non può in alcun caso rappresentare una panacea.
Nell’ambito dell’iniziativa HIPC, la Commissione e gli Stati membri hanno fatto più di quanto fosse stato loro chiesto; infatti, la maggior parte dei paesi membri si sono impegnati a cancellare il 100 per cento dei crediti bilaterali e la Commissione ha fatto lo stesso in relazione a tutti i prestiti speciali nei paesi meno sviluppati in possesso dei requisiti necessari per beneficiare dell’iniziativa di riduzione del debito. E’ tuttavia ampiamente riconosciuto che l’iniziativa HIPC non sarà in grado di garantire la sostenibilità del debito a lungo termine e che occorrerà fare di più per i paesi poveri che ne beneficiano. Si stanno quindi intensificando le pressioni per estendere l’iniziativa HIPC agli altri paesi in via di sviluppo.
La Banca mondiale e il Fondo monetario internazionale stanno elaborando un nuovo quadro volto a garantire la sostenibilità del debito a lungo termine nei paesi a reddito basso, allo scopo di evitare nuovi indebitamenti. La Commissione segue con attenzione la discussione al riguardo, onde garantire la trasparenza del processo decisionale. Il
che riunisce i paesi creditori, ha adottato il cosiddetto approccio Evian per affrontare la questione con i paesi non aderenti all’iniziativa HIPC. Tale approccio tiene conto di considerazioni inerenti alla sostenibilità del debito e consente al
di adattare la propria risposta alla situazione finanziaria di ciascun paese debitore, nonché di rendere più ordinata, puntuale e prevedibile la risoluzione delle crisi. Un esempio dell’applicazione di queste nuove regole è stato il caso iracheno.
La Commissione non è contraria
alla riduzione del debito dei paesi a reddito medio e condivide l’approccio di Evian assunto dal
di Parigi, che tiene conto della specifica situazione finanziaria di ciascun paese – invece di stabilire criteri indifferenziati validi per tutti, come è avvenuto nel caso dell’Iraq. L’Iraq non è indebitato con la Commissione, ma, in segno di solidarietà con il popolo iracheno, alla Conferenza di Madrid l’Unione si è impegnata a contribuire con 200 milioni di euro al fondo per la ricostruzione del paese. Tuttavia la Commissione non vuole che gli aiuti all’Iraq – che si tratti di riduzione del debito o di altri strumenti – vadano a scapito dei paesi più poveri.
Più recentemente, il Regno Unito e gli Stati Uniti hanno proposto la cancellazione totale dei debiti multilaterali dei paesi a reddito basso, pur se con approcci diversi riguardo al finanziamento. La proposta di cancellazione totale può sembrare attraente, ma comporta rischi per l’assegnazione degli aiuti.
Lo studio finanziario della Commissione rivela che l’iniziativa HIPC ha già prodotto distorsioni nella collocazione degli aiuti perché i livelli di riduzione del debito non sono collegati agli indicatori di povertà né – e questo è un punto molto importante – riflettono i risultati ottenuti nella lotta contro la povertà. I paesi che beneficiano di più dell’iniziativa non sono affatto quelli che si sono impegnati maggiormente nel contrastare la povertà né quelli più poveri.
Citerò ora alcuni esempi per illustrare queste mie affermazioni. Il paese che trae maggiore vantaggio, in termini
dall’iniziativa HIPC è la Guyana, con un importo di 769 dollari statunitensi
; il paese occupa il 92o posto nell’Indice dello sviluppo umano. Il Niger, invece, che si trova al 174o posto dello stesso Indice, beneficia di una riduzione del debito
pari a soli 48 dollari statunitensi.
Tenendo conto dei livelli di povertà relativa, la cancellazione totale del debito di tutti i paesi africani provocherebbe notevoli sperequazioni e distorsioni nella distribuzione degli aiuti. L’Eritrea, uno dei paesi più poveri dell’Africa, otterrebbe una cancellazione del debito pari a 56 dollari statunitensi
mentre le Seychelles, uno dei paesi più ricchi di quel continente, avrebbe una riduzione di 2 572 dollari
: una differenza enorme.
Un’ulteriore riduzione del debito potrebbe causare ulteriori distorsioni nella distribuzione degli aiuti. In un mondo in cui le risorse sono limitate, la concessione di una riduzione del debito ai paesi a reddito medio non dovrebbe essere finanziata con le somme di danaro destinate ai paesi maggiormente bisognosi."@it12
"Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@lt14
"Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@lv13
"Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@mt15
".
Mijnheer de Voorzitter, we zijn het er allemaal over eens dat buitenlandse schuld in sommige ontwikkelingslanden een enorm obstakel is voor groei en ontwikkeling. We moeten erkennen dat het in 1996 gelanceerde initiatief voor arme landen met een zware schuldenlast (HIPC) zijn vruchten afwerpt. Het is tot op heden het meest ingrijpende initiatief voor schuldverlichting. Het zal de schuldenlast van de zwaar verschuldigde arme landen met ongeveer twee derden doen dalen en is dus duidelijk gericht op armoedebestrijding.
Schuldverlichting is daarom een slecht mechanisme waar het gaat om de verdeling van steun, maar het kan een goede manier zijn om steun te bieden. Er kan namelijk snel worden betaald en het geld vloeit direct, overzichtelijk en met beperkte transactiekosten naar de begroting.
Schuldverlichting kan ook worden gebruikt om kwetsbare lage-inkomenslanden te beschermen tegen externe schokken. Hierbij kan een soort tijdelijke schuldverlichting helpen om de schadelijke effecten op de armoedebestrijdingsstrategieën van de begunstigde landen binnen de perken te houden. Dit geldt ook voor de moratoria in verband met door de tsunami getroffen landen. Zoals gezegd, is hier vandaag door het voorzitterschap in Parijs over gesproken.
Kortom, schuldverlichting is geen wondermiddel dat zelf nieuwe gelden genereert. Het levert evenmin automatisch diensten ten behoeve van armen of economische groei op. Het kan echter een doeltreffende manier zijn om hulp te verlenen en een goede manier om snelle bijstand te bieden na schokken. Met het oog op armoedebestrijding en de millenniumdoelstellingen moeten correcte niveaus van ontwikkelingsfinanciering worden gegarandeerd. Dat is de werkelijke uitdaging. Als we een reële kans willen maken om deze doelstellingen te halen, moeten we het eens worden over nieuwe, voldoende ambitieuze doelstellingen voor officiële ontwikkelingshulp tegen 2009. Schuldverlichting kan hierbij een nuttig instrument zijn, maar biedt zeker geen volledige oplossing.
De Commissie en de lidstaten zijn verder gegaan dan de HIPC-vereisten. De meeste lidstaten hebben toegezegd om 100 procent van de bilaterale schulden kwijt te schelden. De Commissie heeft dit gedaan voor alle bijzondere leningen in de minst ontwikkelde landen die in aanmerking komen voor schuldverlichting via het HIPC-initiatief. Het is op dit moment echter duidelijk dat dit initiatief op de lange termijn niet zal leiden tot een houdbare schuldenlast. Er moet meer worden gedaan voor de arme landen die van het initiatief gebruikmaken. Bovendien moet de schuldverlichting dringend worden uitgebreid naar de andere ontwikkelingslanden.
De Wereldbank en het IMF ontwikkelen een nieuw kader voor duurzaam houdbare schuldniveaus in lage-inkomenslanden. Dit moet accumulatie van nieuwe schulden tegengaan. De Commissie volgt het debat aandachtig om toe te zien op de transparantie van het besluitvormingsproces. De Club van Parijs van kredietverlenende landen heeft voor de niet-HIPC-landen de zogenaamde Evian-aanpak ontwikkeld. Dit betekent dat wordt gestreefd naar houdbare schuldenlasten, door de Club van Parijs in te laten spelen op de financiële situatie van het debiteurland. Zo kunnen crises soepeler, sneller en voorspelbaarder worden opgelost. Deze nieuwe methode is onder andere toegepast op Irak.
De Commissie is niet a-priori tegen schuldverlichting voor middeninkomenslanden. Zij steunt de Evian-aanpak van de Club van Parijs. Dit betekent dat de financiële situatie per land wordt bekeken, zonder dat men standaardvoorwaarden opstelt. Irak is hiervan een voorbeeld. Dit land heeft geen schulden bij de Commissie, maar de Gemeenschap heeft als teken van solidariteit met het Irakese volk op de conferentie in Madrid een bijdrage van tweehonderd miljoen euro toegezegd aan het internationale wederopbouwfonds voor Irak. De Commissie wil echter voorkomen dat bijstand aan Irak, via schuldverlichting of andere mechanismen, ten koste gaat van de armste landen.
Het Verenigd Koninkrijk en de Verenigde Staten hebben onlangs voorgesteld om alle multilaterale schulden van lage-inkomenslanden kwijt te schelden, weliswaar met verschillende ideeën over de financiering hiervan. Dit voorstel lijkt aantrekkelijk, maar het brengt risico’s met zich mee op het gebied van steuntoewijzing.
Uit het financiële onderzoek van de Commissie blijkt dat het HIPC-initiatief de steuntoewijzing al verstoord heeft. Het schuldverlichtingsniveau is namelijk geen armoede-indicator en zegt ook niets over de succesvolle bestrijding van armoede. Dit laatste is zeer belangrijk. De landen die het meest gebruikmaken van het initiatief zijn absoluut niet de meest succesvolle of de armste landen binnen de groep.
Ik zal een aantal voorbeelden geven. Binnen het HIPC-initiatief ontvangt Guyana per hoofd van de bevolking de grootste schuldverlichting, namelijk 769 dollar. Het land staat op de 92ste plaats op de
. Niger staat op de 174ste plaats, maar ontvangt slechts 48 dollar schuldverlichting per capita.
Algemene schuldenkwijtschelding voor alle Afrikaanse landen zou leiden tot grote ongelijkheden in de steunverdeling op basis van hun onderlinge armoedeniveaus. Eritrea, een van de armste Afrikaanse landen, zou 56 dollar per capita ontvangen, terwijl de Seychellen, een van de rijkste landen van het continent, 2572 dollar per capita zou ontvangen. Dit is een enorm verschil.
Meer schuldverlichting kan dus leiden tot een grotere verstoring van de steuntoewijzing. In een wereld met beperkte middelen mag schuldverlichting voor middeninkomenslanden niet gefinancierd worden met geld voor de meest hulpbehoevende landen."@nl3
"Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@pl16
"Senhor Presidente, todos estamos de acordo em que para alguns países em desenvolvimento a dívida externa constitui um importante obstáculo ao crescimento e ao desenvolvimento. Devíamos reconhecer os méritos da iniciativa do alívio da dívida actualmente aplicada, Iniciativa a favor dos Países Pobres Altamente Endividados – ou PPAE -, lançada em 1996, a iniciativa mais global em matéria de redução da dívida jamais adoptada. Esta iniciativa irá reduzir em cerca de dois terços o ónus da dívida externa dos países pobres altamente endividados, demonstrando o seu compromisso com a redução da pobreza.
Logo, o alívio da dívida constitui um mau mecanismo de atribuição de ajuda, podendo, no entanto, constituir um bom processo da sua distribuição, uma vez que proporciona um método rápido de pagamento, assegurando um fluxo previsível de recursos directamente para o orçamento, com limitados custos de transacção.
Além disso, podia ser utilizado para proteger países vulneráveis, de baixos rendimentos, dos efeitos de choques exógenos. Em tais casos, algum alívio temporário da dívida podia ajudar a mitigar os efeitos adversos dos choques externos sobre as políticas de redução da pobreza dos países beneficiários. O mesmo acontece com as moratórias que, como já foi referido, foram hoje objecto de discussão por parte da Presidência em Paris, a respeito dos países afectados pelo
.
Em resumo, o alívio da dívida não constitui uma panaceia que, por si mesma, crie novos recursos, nem se traduz automaticamente em serviços destinados a pessoas necessitadas, nem em crescimento económico. Pode, contudo, constituir um processo eficaz de entrega do apoio e um bom processo de proporcionar ajuda rápida após choques. Para fazer frente à pobreza e atingir os objectivos de desenvolvimento do milénio, o verdadeiro desafio é assegurar níveis adequados de financiamento do desenvolvimento. Temos de chegar a acordo sobre novos objectivos, suficientemente ambiciosos, em matéria de ajuda oficial para o desenvolvimento por volta de 2009, para termos uma verdadeira perspectiva de os atingir. O alívio da dívida pode constituir um instrumento útil nessa procura, mas de modo algum pode oferecer uma resposta verdadeiramente global.
A Comissão e os Estados-Membros foram além dos desejos dos PPAE. A maior parte dos Estados-Membros comprometeram-se a anular 100% das dívidas bilaterais. A Comissão fez o mesmo em relação aos empréstimos especiais aos países menos desenvolvidos elegíveis para a iniciativa de alívio da dívida dos PPAE. Todavia, actualmente é amplamente reconhecido que o alívio da dívida dos PPAE não garantirá a sustentabilidade da dívida a longo prazo. É evidente que é necessário fazer mais em prol dos países pobres que beneficiam da Iniciativa PPAE. Está a aumentar a pressão no sentido de se alargar o alívio da dívida a outros países em desenvolvimento.
O Banco Mundial e o FMI estão a desenvolver um novo plano para sustentabilidade da dívida a longo prazo em países de baixos rendimentos, o que devia ajudar a evitar a acumulação de novas dívidas. A Comissão está a acompanhar de perto este debate a fim de assegurar a transparência do processo de tomada de decisões. O Clube de Paris, constituído por governos credores, desenvolveu a chamada abordagem de Evian para tratar com países não PPAE. Essa abordagem tem em conta considerações em matéria de sustentabilidade da dívida, o que permite ao Clube de Paris ajustar a sua resposta à situação financeira do país devedor e tornar a solução das crises mais ordenada, oportuna e previsível. Exemplo de aplicação destas novas regras foi o caso do Iraque.
A Comissão não é
contrária ao alívio da dívida a favor de países com rendimentos médios, e apoia a abordagem Evian do Clube de Paris, que tem em consideração a situação financeira de cada um dos países, em vez de estabelecer termos-padrão, como se fez no caso do Iraque. O Iraque não é devedor à Comissão. Todavia, em sinal de solidariedade com o povo iraquiano, a Comunidade prometeu formalmente na Conferência de Madrid um contributo de 200 milhões de euros para o Fundo Internacional de Reconstrução do Iraque. Contudo, a Comissão não deseja que, quer através do alívio da dívida, quer através de outros mecanismos, a ajuda ao Iraque seja concedida a expensas dos países mais pobres.
Mais recentemente, o RU e os EUA requereram o cancelamento de 100% da dívida multilateral dos países de baixo rendimento, muito embora com diferentes abordagens relativamente ao seu financiamento. A proposta de cancelamento total pode parecer atraente, mas implica riscos, em termos de atribuição da ajuda.
O estudo financeiro levado a cabo pela Comissão demonstra que a iniciativa PPAE já distorceu a atribuição de ajuda porque os níveis de alívio de débito não constituem indicadores de pobreza, nem – o que é muito importante – reflectem capacidade de fazer frente à pobreza. Os países que mais beneficiam da iniciativa de modo algum são os que têm melhor desempenho ou os mais pobres do grupo.
Seguem-se alguns exemplos que ilustram a minha afirmação. O país que, numa base
mais beneficia da redução da dívida dos PPAE é a Guiana, que recebeu 769 USD
e ocupa o 92º lugar no Índice de Desenvolvimento Humano. Todavia, a Nigéria, que ocupa o 174º lugar nesse mesmo índice, recebe apenas 48 USD de redução
.
A anulação total da dívida de todos os países africanos levaria a desigualdades consideráveis entre eles na distorção da ajuda, medida pelos seus níveis relativos de pobreza. A Eritreia – um dos países mais pobres de África – receberia 56 USD
enquanto a República das Seicheles, um dos países mais ricos do continente, receberia 2572 USD
o que constitui uma diferença enorme.
Maior alívio da dívida poderia levar a maiores distorções da atribuição de ajuda. Num mundo de recursos limitados, o alívio da dívida concedido a países de rendimento médio não devia reduzir o montante disponível para os mais necessitados."@pt17
"Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@sk18
"Mr President, we all agree that for some developing countries external indebtedness is a major obstacle for growth and development. We should acknowledge the merits of the debt relief initiative currently applied, the Highly Indebted Poor Countries – or HIPC –Initiative, which was launched in 1996. This is the most comprehensive debt relief initiative ever taken. It will reduce the debt burden of the highly indebted poor countries by approximately two-thirds, demonstrating a commitment to poverty reduction.
So, debt relief is a bad aid allocation mechanism, but it can be a good way of delivering aid, as it provides a quick method of disbursement, ensuring a predictable flow of resources directly into the budget with limited transaction costs.
It could also be used to protect vulnerable, low-income countries from the effect of exogenous shocks. In these cases, some sort of temporary relief of the debt could help mitigate the adverse effects of external shocks on the poverty-reduction strategies of beneficiary countries. That is also the case as regards the moratoriums, which, as already mentioned, were discussed today by the presidency in Paris in relation to the tsunami-affected countries.
To sum up, debt relief is not a panacea which by itself creates new resources, nor does it automatically translate into services for poor people or economic growth. However, it may be an effective way to deliver support and a good way to provide swift assistance after shocks. To tackle poverty and to attain the Millennium Development Goals, the real challenge is to ensure appropriate levels of development financing. We need to reach agreement on new and sufficiently ambitious targets for official development assistance by 2009 for us to have a real prospect of attaining those goals. Debt relief can be a useful tool in that quest, but it can by no means offer a really full response.
The Commission and the Member States have gone beyond the HIPC requirements. Most Member States have committed themselves to cancelling 100% of the bilateral claims. The Commission has done the same for all special loans in least developed countries eligible for HIPC debt relief. However, it is now widely recognised that HIPC relief will fail to ensure long-term debt sustainability. It is clear that more needs to be done for the poor countries that benefit from the HIPC Initiative. Pressure is increasing to extend debt relief to the other developing countries.
The World Bank and the IMF are developing a new framework for long-term debt sustainability in low-income countries. This should help to prevent the accumulation of new debt. The Commission is following this debate closely to ensure the transparency of the decision-making process. The Paris Club of creditor governments has developed the so-called Evian approach to deal with non-HIPC countries. It takes into account debt sustainability considerations, allowing the Paris Club to adopt its response to the financial situation of the debtor country and to make the resolution of crises more orderly, timely and predictable. One application of these new rules was the Iraqi case.
The Commission is not
against debt relief in favour of middle-income countries. It supports the Evian approach of the Paris Club, which looks at the financial situation of each country rather than defining standard terms as has been done in the case of Iraq. Iraq is not indebted to the Commission but, as a sign of solidarity with the Iraqi people, the Community pledged a contribution of EUR 200 million to the Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq at the Madrid Conference. However, the Commission does not want assistance for Iraq, whether through debt relief or other mechanisms, to be given at the expense of the poorest countries.
More recently, the UK and the US have both called for 100% cancellation of multilateral debt for low-income countries, although with different approaches towards its financing. The proposal of full cancellation may appear attractive, but it entails risks in terms of aid allocation.
The Commission's finance study demonstrates that the HIPC Initiative has already distorted the allocation of aid because the levels of debt relief are not related indicators of poverty, nor – and this is very important – do they reflect performance in tackling poverty. The countries benefiting most from the initiative are by no means the best performers or the poorest countries within the group.
Some examples will illustrate my point. The country benefiting most on a per capita basis from HIPC debt relief is Guyana, with USD 769 per capita received. It ranks 92nd in the Human Development Index. However, Niger, which ranks 174th in that index, receives only USD 48 per capita relief.
The total cancellation of debt for all African countries would lead to considerable inequalities in the distortion of aid among them, measured by their relative poverty levels. Eritrea – one of the poorest countries in Africa – would receive USD 56 per capita, while the Seychelles, one of the richest countries of the continent, would receive USD 2 572 per capita, which makes a huge difference.
Further debt relief could lead to further distortions in aid allocation. In a world of limited resources, debt relief granted to middle-income countries should not detract from the amounts available to the neediest ones."@sl19
".
Herr talman! Vi är alla eniga om att den externa skuldsättningen är ett stort hinder för tillväxten och utvecklingen i en rad utvecklingsländer. Vi bör erkänna fördelarna med det initiativ för skuldlättnad som för närvarande tillämpas, dvs. initiativet för de kraftigt skuldtyngda fattiga länderna, även kallat HIPC-initiativet, som inleddes 1996. Detta är det mest omfattande initiativ för skuldlättnad som någonsin har tagits. Det kommer att minska skuldbördan för de kraftigt skuldtyngda fattiga länderna med ungefär två tredjedelar och är ett bevis för viljan att minska fattigdomen.
Skuldlättnad är alltså en dålig mekanism för biståndsfördelning men kan vara ett bra sätt att leverera bistånd, eftersom det är en snabb metod för utbetalning som medför begränsade transaktionskostnader och garanterar ett förutsebart flöde av medel direkt till budgeten.
Skuldlättnad kan också användas för att skydda utsatta låginkomstländer från effekterna av externa kriser. I sådana fall kan någon form av tillfällig skuldlättnad bidra till att lindra de externa krisernas negativa effekter på de mottagande ländernas strategier för fattigdomsminskning. Detta är också fallet med det betalningsanstånd som ordförandeskapet som vi hörde har diskuterat i Paris i dag med avseende på de länder som har drabbats av flodvågen.
Sammanfattningsvis är skuldlättnad inte en patentlösning som skapar nya resurser av sig själv, och inte heller omvandlas skuldlättnad automatiskt till tjänster för fattiga människor eller ekonomisk tillväxt. Emellertid kan det vara ett effektivt sätt att leverera stödet och ett bra sätt att tillhandahålla snabbt bistånd efter kriser. Om vi skall kunna bekämpa fattigdomen och uppnå millennieutvecklingsmålen är den verkliga utmaningen att garantera en tillräcklig nivå på biståndsfinansieringen. Vi måste enas om nya och tillräckligt ambitiösa mål för det offentliga utvecklingsbiståndet senast 2009 om vi skall ha verkliga utsikter att uppnå millennieutvecklingsmålen. Skuldlättnad kan vara ett användbart verktyg i detta arbete men kan under inga omständigheter utgöra det enda svaret.
Kommissionen och medlemsstaterna har sträckt sig längre än HIPC-kraven. De flesta medlemsstaterna har åtagit sig att avskriva 100 procent av de bilaterala skulderna. Kommissionen har gjort detsamma för alla särskilda lån i de minst utvecklade av de länder som är berättigade till skuldlättnad inom ramen för HIPC. Emellertid erkänns det numera allmänt att skuldlättnaden genom HIPC-initiativet inte kommer att garantera en långsiktigt hållbar skuldnivå. Det står klart att mer behöver göras för de fattiga länder som omfattas av HIPC-initiativet. Trycket ökar på att utsträcka skuldlättnaden till övriga utvecklingsländer.
Världsbanken och Internationella valutafonden (IMF) håller på att utveckla en ny ram för en långsiktigt hållbar skuldnivå i låginkomstländerna. Detta bör bidra till att förhindra en ackumulering av nya skulder. Kommissionen följer noggrant debatten för att försäkra sig om insyn i beslutsprocessen. Parisklubben, som består av de kreditgivande länderna, har utvecklat den s.k. Evianstrategin för länder som inte omfattas av HIPC. Strategin utgår från en hållbar skuldnivå och ger Parisklubben möjlighet att anpassa sina åtgärder till den finansiella situationen i det skuldsatta landet och att hantera kriser på ett mer metodiskt, snabbare och mer förutsebart sätt. Dessa nya regler har till exempel tillämpats i fallet Irak.
Kommissionen är inte principiellt emot skuldlättnader till förmån för medelinkomstländerna. Kommissionen stöder Parisklubbens Evianstrategi, som i stället för att definiera standardvillkoren tar hänsyn till varje enskilt lands finansiella situation, vilket man har gjort i fallet Irak. Irak står inte i skuld till kommissionen, men som ett tecken på sin solidaritet med det irakiska folket utlovade gemenskapen vid Madridkonferensen ett bidrag på 200 miljoner euro till fonden för Iraks återuppbyggnad. Emellertid vill kommissionen inte att det bistånd som ges till Irak i form av skuldlättnad eller på annat sätt skall ges på bekostnad av de fattigaste länderna.
På senare tid har både Förenade kungariket och Förenta staterna föreslagit att de multilaterala skulderna för låginkomstländerna skall avskrivas till 100 procent, men man har föreslagit olika metoder för finansieringen av detta. Förslaget om en fullständig avskrivning kan förefalla lockande men medför risker för biståndsfördelningen.
Av kommissionens undersökning av finansieringen framgår att HIPC-initiativet redan har snedvridit fördelningen av stöd, eftersom nivån på skuldlättnaden inte har något samband med fattigdomsindikatorerna. En annan mycket viktig sak är att den inte heller speglar resultaten av fattigdomsbekämpningen. De länder som har störst nytta av initiativet är inte alls de som uppvisat bäst resultat eller tillhör de fattigaste i gruppen.
Några exempel får belysa vad jag menar. Det land som vinner mest per capita på skuldlättnaden inom ramen för HIPC är Guyana, som får 769 US-dollar per capita. Guyana ligger på 92:a plats i indexet över mänsklig utveckling. Niger däremot, som återfinns på 174:e plats i indexet, får endast 48 US-dollar per capita i skuldlättnad.
En fullständig avskrivning av skulderna för alla afrikanska länder skulle leda till avsevärda orättvisor genom en snedvridning av biståndet till dem i förhållande till deras relativa fattigdomsnivåer. Eritrea, som är ett av de fattigaste länderna i Afrika, skulle få endast 56 US-dollar per capita, medan Seychellerna, som är ett av kontinentens rikaste länder, skulle få 2 572 US-dollar per capita, vilket är en enorm skillnad.
Ytterligare skuldlättnader kan leda till ytterligare snedvridningar i biståndsfördelningen. I en värld med begränsade resurser bör skuldlättnader för medelinkomstländerna inte leda till minskat bistånd för de mest behövande."@sv21
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