Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-12-02-Speech-4-020"
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"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@en4
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"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@cs1
"Hr. formand, for 10 år siden var jeg ordfører for decharge, og dengang hævdede jeg, at vi aldrig vil få en positiv revisionserklæring - DAS. Det sagde jeg, fordi vi uanset Kommissionens fejl eller andre uregelmæssigheder dengang kunne se meget klart, at der var to uforenelige systemer: det system, som Revisionsretten anvender til sin revision, og det system, som Kommissionen anvender.
Jeg har en sidste bemærkning. Jeg er heldigvis med i det midlertidige udvalg om de nye finansielle overslag. Vi bør ikke vedtage nye finansielle overslag, før vi har løst dette problem med medlemsstaternes pålidelighed og ansvarlighed.
Der er sket ændringer i de sidste 10 år. Revisionsretten har ændret sine metoder - den er gået over til systemet med fire søjler - og Kommissionen har gennemført Kinnock-reformerne, men jeg er stadig overbevist om, at vi ikke får en positiv revisionserklæring, så længe tingene er organiseret, som de er, ikke engang efter den 1. januar næste år, hvor den nye finansforordning og de nye regnskabssystemer træder i kraft. Jeg vil gerne sige en enkelt ting til hr. Titford. I vores eget land er ministeriet for social sikrings regnskaber ikke blevet afsluttet i de sidste 14 år. Regnskaberne i forbindelse med det amerikanske budget er ikke blevet afsluttet i de sidste seks år. Dette er ikke en enestående organisation, og det ville have hjulpet, hvis De, hr. Titford, rent faktisk havde deltaget i alle de seks høringer, vi holdt. I det mindste dukkede hr. Mote op ved nogle af dem og stillede spørgsmål, men hr. Mote er jo også mere uafhængig end hr. Titford, selv om de begge kommer fra Det Forenede Kongeriges Uafhængighedsparti.
Men tilbage til manuskriptet. Det, Kommissionen siger, at den anvender regnskabsafslutning, fordi det står i finansforordningen. På den måde kontrollerer den sådan noget som landbrugsudgifterne. Holdningen er altså, at de kan inddrive midlerne - hvorfor tager Revisionsretten ikke det med i sin revisionserklæring? Det er værd at bemærke, at ved regnskabsafslutning inddrives pengene faktisk fra medlemsstaterne. De inddrives ikke fra landbrugerne eller de organisationer, som har modtaget dem, hvilket betyder, at de nationale skatteborgere betaler for enhver form for uregelmæssigheder og svig.
Derefter siger Revisionsretten, at det er godt at inddrive midler, men vi burde have et system, hvor det ikke er nødvendigt at inddrive midler. Systemet burde være bedre. Jamen, det er da fuldt forståeligt. Så siger Kommissionen: Ja, men hvis vi skal gøre, hvad Revisionsretten ønsker, vil det være så dyrt, at det simpelthen ikke er omkostningseffektivt. Det kan jeg også godt forstå.
Jeg vil se nærmere på en række konklusioner fra Budgetkontroludvalgets seks høringer af kommissærerne og Revisionsretten. Det er indlysende for alle, at et af de største problemer er problemet med delt forvaltning. Som et af Revisionsrettens medlemmer sagde under høringerne, drejer problemet sig ikke om kontrol eller revision, men om forvaltning. Jeg begynder derfor at tro, at vi behøver et system, der gør medlemsstaternes bemyndigende organer ansvarlige for erklæringerne om lovlighed og formel rigtighed.
Det virker underligt, at kun halvdelen af deltagerne i et system med delt forvaltning skal være ansvarlige. Det kræver ændringer i lovgivningen og samarbejde fra Rådets og medlemsstaternes side. Hvad angår Revisionsretten, mangler jeg stadig at blive overbevist om, at to af de fire søjler, som hr. Fabra Vallés nævnte, er pålidelige.
Jeg er meget bekymret over antallet af transaktioner, som er kontrolleret, og jeg sætter også spørgsmålstegn ved, om andre revisorers arbejde inddrages i tilstrækkeligt omfang. Vi har brug for en regelmæssig aktivitetsrapport om de nationale revisioner for at være sikre på, at de fire søjler giver en gennemsigtig revisionserklæring. Der er også Parlamentets anmodning gennem flere år om, at Revisionsretten skal opdele sin revisionserklæring i afdelinger, så budgetmyndigheden ved, nøjagtig hvor problemerne ligger.
Vi er i en situation, hvor Revisionsretten har et sæt regler, som Kommissionen aldrig kan efterleve, uden at omkostningerne bliver for store, uanset hvad den gør. Dette skal ses over for de fordele, som kan opnås. Jeg forsøger ikke at omgå reglerne, jeg forsøger at tilpasse dem. Jeg beder Revisionsretten prøve at etablere et sæt regler, man kan spille efter. Forestil Dem, at Barcelona spiller mod Manchester United i finalen i Europamesterskaberne. Der er 70.000 tilskuere, og alles øjne hviler på banen og spillerne. Hele Europa ser på. Så kommer dommeren ind, han går ind midt på banen og lægger en rugbybold, ikke en fodbold, for fødderne af Wayne Rooney. Spillerne prøver at påpege de problemer, de kan få med en oval bold, men dommeren siger: Pyt med bolden, bare spil!
Det er, for at sige det rent ud, Revisionsrettens holdning til bestræbelserne på at ændre systemet. Holdningen er pyt med bolden, bare spil. Men vi skal lige have én ting på det rene: Denne analog betyder ikke, at Kommissionen og medlemsstaterne skal ses som eliten inden for offentlig forvaltning."@da2
"Herr Präsident, vor zehn Jahren war ich Berichterstatter für die Entlastung, und vor zehn Jahren erklärte ich, dass wir nie eine positive Zuverlässigkeitserklärung – ZVE – haben werden. Ich sagte das, weil wir unabhängig von irgendwelchen Schwachstellen innerhalb der Kommission oder potenziellen Unregelmäßigkeiten vor zehn Jahren bereits klar sehen konnten, dass wir es mit zwei nicht kompatiblen Systemen zu tun hatten, und zwar dem System, mit dem der Rechnungshof seine Rechnungsprüfungen vornimmt, und dem System, das der Arbeitsweise der Kommission zugrunde liegt.
Ich möchte einen letzten Punkt ansprechen. Ich bin froh, dass ich Mitglied des nichtständigen Ausschusses für die neue Finanzielle Vorausschau bin. Wir sollten keine neue Finanzielle Vorausschau vereinbaren, solange wir das Problem der Zuverlässigkeit und der Rechenschaftspflicht der Mitgliedstaaten nicht geklärt haben.
In den letzten zehn Jahren hat sich einiges verändert. Der Rechnungshof hat seine Methodik geändert und ist zu einem Vier-Säulen-System übergegangen, und Herr Kinnock hat die Kommission reformiert. Dennoch bin ich überzeugt davon, dass auch ab 1. Januar des kommenden Jahres trotz neuer Finanzvorschriften und neuer Rechnungsführungssysteme auf Grund der Art und Weise, in der die Dinge organisiert sind, noch immer keine positive Zuverlässigkeitserklärung erteilt werden kann. Ich möchte an dieser Stelle eine Bemerkung an Herrn Titfords Adresse richten. In Ihrem Heimatland hat das Department of Social Security, also das Ministerium für soziale Sicherheit, seit 14 Jahren keine Bestätigung für seine Jahresabschlüsse erhalten. Für den amerikanischen Bundeshaushalt wurde seit sechs Jahren keine Bestätigung erteilt. Unsere Organisation ist kein Einzelfall, und es wäre durchaus hilfreich gewesen, Herr Titford, wenn Sie an unseren Anhörungen teilgenommen hätten, von denen es immerhin sechs gab. Herr Mote ist wenigstens zu einigen aufgetaucht und hat einige Fragen gestellt, aber Herr Mote ist ja auch ein unabhängiger britischer Unabhängiger und kein solcher britischer Unabhängiger wie Herr Titford.
Doch zurück zu dem, was ich eigentlich sagen wollte. Es ist jedenfalls so, dass die Kommission sagt, dass sie mit dem Rechnungsabschluss arbeitet, weil die Haushaltsordnung das so vorsieht. Auf diese Art und Weise kontrolliert sie Dinge wie die Agrarausgaben. Sie vertritt also die Ansicht, dass sie Gelder wieder einziehen kann. Wieso berücksichtigt der Rechnungshof das nicht in der Zuverlässigkeitserklärung? Dabei ist zu bedenken, dass bei der Arbeit mit dem Rechnungsabschluss tatsächlich Mittel aus den Mitgliedstaaten zurückgefordert werden. Sie werden aber nicht von den Landwirten oder den Empfängerorganisationen zurückgefordert. Das bedeutet, dass die nationalen Steuerzahler in Fällen von Unregelmäßigkeiten und Betrug die Zeche zahlen.
Der Rechnungshof sagt, es sei gut, Mittel zurückzuholen, aber wir sollten über ein System verfügen, bei dem das nicht notwendig ist. Das System sollte besser sein. Nun, das ist durchaus verständlich. Daraufhin sagt die Kommission: Ja, aber wenn wir tun, was der Rechnungshof will, dann kostet das so viel Geld, dass es einfach nicht kostengünstig ist. Das kann ich ebenfalls verstehen.
Ich werde auf einige Schlussfolgerungen eingehen, zu denen der Ausschuss für Haushaltskontrolle bei seinen sechs Anhörungen mit Kommissionsmitgliedern und dem Rechnungshof gekommen ist. Es liegt auf der Hand, dass die geteilte Verwaltung eines der Hauptprobleme ist. Wie ein Vertreter des Rechnungshofs bei den Anhörungen sagte, ist es kein Problem der Kontrolle, es ist kein Problem der Rechnungsprüfung, sondern es ist ein Problem der Verwaltung. Mir drängt sich der Gedanke auf, dass wir ein System brauchen, bei dem die Genehmigungsbehörden in den Mitgliedstaaten dafür verantwortlich sind, die Zuverlässigkeit von Rechtmäßigkeit und Regelmäßigkeit zu erklären.
Es ist doch merkwürdig, dass bei einem System der geteilten Verwaltung nur die eine Seite der Partnerschaft die Verantwortung tragen soll. Das bedeutet Veränderungen in der Gesetzgebung und das bedeutet Zusammenarbeit zwischen dem Rat und den Mitgliedstaaten. Was den Standpunkt des Rechnungshofes betrifft, so bin ich noch nicht davon überzeugt, dass zwei der vier von Herrn Fabra Vallés erwähnten Säulen zuverlässig sind.
Ernsthafte Sorge bereitet der Umfang der kontrollierten Transaktionen, und ich stelle auch das Ausmaß, in dem die Arbeit anderer Rechnungsprüfer herangezogen wird, in Frage. Wir brauchen regelmäßige Aktivitätsberichte über die geleistete Arbeit im Zusammenhang mit nationalen Rechnungsprüfungen, um sicherzugehen, dass die vier Säulen zu einer transparenten Zuverlässigkeitserklärung führen. Außerdem wird das Parlament den Rechnungshof wie in jedem Jahr bitten, die Zuverlässigkeitserklärung zu unterteilen, damit die Haushaltsbehörde genau ersehen kann, wo Probleme auftreten.
Wir befinden uns jetzt in einer Situation, in der es der Kommission gänzlich unmöglich ist, die vom Rechnungshof aufgestellten Regeln bei vertretbaren Kosten im Vergleich zum erwarteten Nutzen zu erfüllen. Ich versuche nicht, die Regeln zu umgehen, sondern ich versuche, sie passend zu machen. Ich bitte den Rechnungshof, ein Regelwerk aufzustellen, mit dem man arbeiten kann. Stellen Sie sich vor, Barcelona spielt im Europacup-Endspiel gegen Manchester United. Es sind 70 000 Leute angereist, und aller Augen ruhen auf dem Spielfeld und den Spielern. Ganz Europa schaut zu. Der Schiedsrichter kommt auf das Feld. Er geht zur Mittellinie und legt Wayne Rooney keinen Fußball, sondern einen Rugbyball vor die Füße. Während die Spieler zu erklären versuchen, dass sie mit einem ovalen Ball möglicherweise ein Problem haben, sagt der Schiedsrichter: „Kümmert Euch nicht um den Ball, spielt endlich.“
Das ist, offen gesagt, die Einstellung, die der Rechnungshof gegenüber Bemühungen um eine Änderung des Systems vertritt. „Kümmert Euch nicht um den Ball, spielt endlich.“ Seien wir uns aber über eines im Klaren: Das bedeutet nicht, dass die Kommission oder die Mitgliedstaaten als die Stars der öffentlichen Verwaltung anzusehen sind."@de9
"Κύριε Πρόεδρε, πριν από μία δεκαετία, ήμουν ο εισηγητής της απαλλαγής και πριν από μία δεκαετία, είχα δηλώσει ότι ποτέ δεν θα λάβουμε θετική δήλωση αξιοπιστίας (DAS). Είχα προβεί σε αυτήν τη δήλωση διότι, παρά τις αποτυχίες στο εσωτερικό της Επιτροπής ή τυχόν παρατυπίες, μπορούσαμε να διακρίνουμε ξεκάθαρα πριν από μία δεκαετία ότι υπήρχαν δύο ασυμβίβαστα συστήματα: το σύστημα που χρησιμοποιούσε το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο για την εκτέλεση των ελέγχων του και το σύστημα που χρησιμοποιούσε η Επιτροπή με τον τρόπο που λειτουργούσε.
Και ένα τελευταίο σημείο. Ευτυχώς συμμετέχω στην προσωρινή επιτροπή για τις νέες δημοσιονομικές προοπτικές. Δεν πρέπει να συμφωνήσουμε σε νέες δημοσιονομικές προοπτικές έως ότου λυθεί αυτό το πρόβλημα αξιοπιστίας και λογοδοσίας από τα κράτη μέλη.
Σημειώθηκαν αλλαγές κατά την τελευταία δεκαετία. Το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο έχει αλλάξει τη μεθοδολογία του –υιοθέτησε το σύστημα των τεσσάρων πυλώνων– και η Επιτροπή υιοθέτησε τις μεταρρυθμίσεις Kinnock· ωστόσο, διατηρώ ακόμη την πεποίθηση ότι, από 1ης Ιανουαρίου του επόμενου έτους, με την έναρξη ισχύος των νέων δημοσιονομικών κανονισμών και των νέων λογιστικών συστημάτων, δεν πρόκειται να λάβουμε θετική DAS λόγω του τρόπου οργάνωσης των πραγμάτων. Θα ήθελα να απευθύνω μια παρατήρηση στον κ. Titford. Στην ίδια σας τη χώρα, το Τμήμα Κοινωνικής Ασφάλισης απέτυχε να λάβει έγκριση των λογαριασμών του τα τελευταία 14 έτη. Ο αμερικανικός ομοσπονδιακός προϋπολογισμός απέτυχε να λάβει έγκριση των λογαριασμών του τα τελευταία έξι έτη. Δεν πρόκειται για έναν και μόνο οργανισμό και θα βοηθούσε, κύριε Titford, αν είχατε όντως συμμετάσχει και στις έξι ακροάσεις που πραγματοποιήθηκαν. Τουλάχιστον ο κ. Mote εμφανίστηκε σε ορισμένες περιπτώσεις και έθεσε ορισμένες ερωτήσεις· ωστόσο, ο κ. Mote είναι μη εγγεγραμμένος ανεξάρτητος βρετανός βουλευτής και όχι βρετανός βουλευτής της Ομάδας για την Ανεξαρτησία, όπως ο κ. Titford.
Τέλος πάντων, επιστρέφω στο χειρόγραφό μου. Έχουμε τη δήλωση της Επιτροπής ότι χρησιμοποιεί την εκκαθάριση των λογαριασμών επειδή αυτό ορίζεται στον δημοσιονομικό κανονισμό. Κατ’ αυτόν τον τρόπο ασκεί έλεγχο σε στοιχεία όπως οι γεωργικές δαπάνες. Επομένως, η θέση της είναι ότι μπορεί να ανακτήσει τους πόρους – γιατί το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο δεν συμπεριλαμβάνει αυτήν τη θέση στη DAS; Ένα σημείο το οποίο αξίζει να επισημανθεί είναι ότι, όταν χρησιμοποιείται η εκκαθάριση των λογαριασμών, τα χρήματα επιστρέφονται στην ουσία από τα κράτη μέλη. Δεν επιστρέφονται από τους γεωργούς ή τους αποδέκτες οργανισμούς, πράγμα το οποίο σημαίνει ότι οι φορολογούμενοι πολίτες πληρώνουν τον λογαριασμό για τυχόν παρατυπίες ή περιπτώσεις απάτης.
Εν συνεχεία, το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο δηλώνει ότι η ανάκτηση είναι καλή, ωστόσο θα πρέπει να διαθέτουμε ένα σύστημα όπου δεν θα χρειάζεται ανάκτηση. Το σύστημα πρέπει να βελτιωθεί, πράγμα απολύτως κατανοητό. Και η Επιτροπή, με τη σειρά της, δηλώνει σύμφωνη, ωστόσο η υλοποίηση της επιθυμίας του Ελεγκτικού Συνεδρίου θα στοιχίσει τόσα πολλά χρήματα ώστε να καθίσταται, απλώς, ασύμφορη. Και αυτό είναι απολύτως κατανοητό.
Θα αναφερθώ σε μια σειρά συμπερασμάτων από τις έξι ακροάσεις της Επιτροπής Ελέγχου του Προϋπολογισμού με τους Επιτρόπους και το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο. Είναι προφανές στον καθένα μας ότι ένα από τα κύρια προβλήματα είναι η κοινή διαχείριση. Όπως δήλωσε ένα από τα μέλη του Ελεγκτικού Συνεδρίου στις ακροάσεις, δεν πρόκειται για πρόβλημα ελέγχου, ούτε για πρόβλημα λογιστικού ελέγχου· πρόκειται για πρόβλημα διαχείρισης. Συνεπώς, αρχίζω να σκέπτομαι ότι χρειαζόμαστε ένα σύστημα το οποίο θα καθιστά υπεύθυνα τα εξουσιοδοτημένα όργανα των κρατών μελών στο να παρέχουν βεβαίωση για τη νομιμότητα και την κανονικότητα.
Φαίνεται περίεργο το γεγονός ότι σε ένα σύστημα κοινής διαχείρισης μόνον οι μισοί από τους εταίρους απαιτείται να είναι υπεύθυνοι. Αυτό θα σηματοδοτήσει αλλαγές στη νομοθεσία, καθώς και την ανάγκη συνεργασίας μεταξύ του Συμβουλίου και των κρατών μελών. Από την άποψη του Ελεγκτικού Συνεδρίου, δεν έχω πεισθεί ακόμη για την αξιοπιστία των δύο εκ των τεσσάρων πυλώνων, στους οποίους αναφέρθηκε ο κ. Fabra Vallés.
Διατηρώ σοβαρές ανησυχίες για το ποσό των συναλλαγών που επιθεωρήθηκαν, ενώ αμφιβάλλω και για τον βαθμό στον οποίο χρησιμοποιήθηκε το έργο άλλων ελεγκτών. Χρειαζόμαστε μια τακτική έκθεση δραστηριοτήτων επί των πεπραγμένων στους εθνικούς λογιστικούς ελέγχους προκειμένου να διασφαλίσουμε ότι οι τέσσερις πυλώνες παρέχουν μια DAS που διέπεται από διαφάνεια. Θα τεθεί επίσης το μόνιμο αίτημα του Κοινοβουλίου ότι το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο θα πρέπει να κατηγοριοποιήσει τις DAS τις οποίες παρέχει, προκειμένου η αρμόδια για τον προϋπολογισμό αρχή να γνωρίζει πού ακριβώς εμφανίζονται τα προβλήματα.
Βρισκόμαστε αντιμέτωποι με μια κατάσταση κατά την οποία μια σειρά κανόνων του Ελεγκτικού Συνεδρίου δεν πρόκειται ποτέ να ικανοποιηθούν από την Επιτροπή, ό,τι κι αν κάνει, με ένα εύλογο κόστος σε σύγκριση με τα οφέλη που αποκομίζονται. Δεν επιθυμώ την παράβαση των κανόνων αλλά την προσαρμογή τους. Ζητώ από το Ελεγκτικό Συνέδριο να προβεί στη θέσπιση ενός συνόλου εφαρμόσιμων κανόνων. Φαντασθείτε την ομάδα της Barcelona να παίζει ενάντια στην ομάδα της Manchester United στον τελικό του Ευρωπαϊκού Κυπέλλου. Έχει συγκεντρωθεί ένα πλήθος 70 000 θεατών και όλα τα μάτια είναι στραμμένα στον αγωνιστικό χώρο και στους παίκτες. Ολόκληρη η Ευρώπη έχει την προσοχή της στραμμένη στον αγώνα. Βλέπουμε τον διαιτητή να πηγαίνει στο κέντρο του γηπέδου και να τοποθετεί στα πόδια του Wayne Rooney όχι μια μπάλα ποδοσφαίρου αλλά μια μπάλα του ράγκμπι. Καθώς οι παίκτες προσπαθούν να εντοπίσουν τα προβλήματα που ενδέχεται να αντιμετωπίσουν με μια οβάλ μπάλα, ο διαιτητής τούς λέει να μην δίνουν σημασία στη μπάλα και να συνεχίσουν τον αγώνα!
Αυτή, με κάθε ειλικρίνεια, είναι η στάση του Ελεγκτικού Συνεδρίου απέναντι σε προσπάθειες αλλαγής του συστήματος. Υπαγορεύει να μην δίνουμε σημασία στη μπάλα και να συνεχίσουμε τον αγώνα. Ωστόσο, ας είμαστε ειλικρινείς: αυτή η αναλογία δεν σημαίνει ότι η Επιτροπή ή τα κράτη μέλη θα πρέπει να θεωρηθούν η αφρόκρεμα της δημόσιας διοίκησης."@el10
"Señor Presidente, hace diez años fui ponente para la aprobación de la gestión del presupuesto y hace diez años dije que nunca conseguiríamos una declaración de fiabilidad positiva. Y lo dije porque, al margen de las deficiencias en el seno de la Comisión o los problemas que había con las irregularidades, hace diez años ya sabíamos perfectamente que había dos sistemas incompatibles: el sistema utilizado por el Tribunal para hacer su auditoría y el sistema utilizado por la Comisión por el modo en que funcionaba.
Quiero hacer un último comentario. Por suerte, estoy en la comisión temporal encargada de las nuevas perspectivas financieras. No debemos aprobar nuevas perspectivas financieras hasta que no hayamos resuelto este problema de fiabilidad y responsabilidad de los Estados miembros.
En los últimos diez años se han producido algunos cambios. El Tribunal ha cambiado su metodología, pasando a un sistema de cuatro pilares, y la Comisión ha emprendido las reformas Kinnock, pero yo sigo convencido de que, ni siquiera a partir del 1 de enero del año que viene, con el nuevo Reglamento financiero y con los nuevos sistemas contables, conseguiremos una declaración de fiabilidad positiva tal como están organizadas las cosas. Quiero dirigir un comentario al señor Titford. En su país, el Departamento de Seguridad Social no ha conseguido la aprobación de sus cuentas desde hace 14 años. El presupuesto federal norteamericano tampoco ha conseguido la aprobación de sus cuentas en los últimos seis años. La nuestra no es una organización única y hubiera sido conveniente, señor Titford, que hubiera participado usted en las audiencias que celebramos, seis en total. Por lo menos el señor Mote apareció en alguna ocasión y formuló alguna pregunta, pero el señor Mote es un Independiente británico independiente, y no un Independiente británico a secas como es el señor Titford.
Pero no nos desviemos del tema. Por un lado, tenemos a la Comisión que dice que utiliza la liquidación de cuentas porque así lo establece el Reglamento financiero. Así es como controla cosas como el gasto en agricultura. Su actitud es, por tanto, que los fondos pueden recuperarse. ¿Por qué el Tribunal de Cuentas no incluye eso en la declaración de fiabilidad? Conviene recordar que cuando se utiliza la liquidación de cuentas es cuando se recuperan realmente los fondos de los Estados miembros. No se recuperan de los agricultores ni de las organizaciones que los reciben, lo que significa que los contribuyentes nacionales son los que pagan por las irregularidades o los casos de fraude.
Luego el Tribunal dice que no hay nada de malo en recuperar fondos, pero que deberíamos tener un sistema en el que eso no fuera necesario. El sistema debería mejorar. Bueno, eso es fácil de entender. Así que la Comisión responde: bueno, pero hacer lo que el Tribunal dice costaría tanto dinero que no valdría la pena. Eso también lo puedo entender.
Comentaré algunas de las conclusiones de las seis audiencias que la Comisión de Control Presupuestario ha celebrado con los Comisarios y el Tribunal. Es evidente para todo el mundo que uno de los principales problemas es la gestión compartida. Como dijo uno de los miembros del Tribunal en las audiencias, no es un problema de control, no es un problema de auditoría, sino que es un problema de gestión. Estoy empezando a pensar que necesitamos un sistema que responsabilice a los órganos que autorizan la gestión en los Estados miembros de garantizar la legalidad y la ausencia de irregularidades.
Parece extraño que, en un sistema de gestión compartida, solo una de las partes tenga que rendir cuentas. Eso supondrá cambios en la legislación y exigirá la cooperación del Consejo y los Estados miembros. Desde el punto de vista del Tribunal, todavía me tienen que convencer de la fiabilidad de dos de los cuatro pilares mencionados por el señor Fabra Vallés.
Me preocupa realmente el número de transacciones inspeccionadas y cuestiono también la medida en que se utiliza el trabajo de otros auditores. Necesitamos un informe periódico de la actividad relacionada con el trabajo de las auditorías nacionales para tener la seguridad de que los cuatro pilares proporcionen una declaración de fiabilidad transparente. El Parlamento seguirá pidiendo, como siempre, que el Tribunal desglose la declaración de fiabilidad para que la autoridad presupuestaria sepa exactamente dónde están los problemas.
Nos encontramos en una situación en que el Tribunal establece una serie de reglas que la Comisión, haga lo que haga, nunca podrá cumplir a un coste razonable en comparación con el posible beneficio. No estoy tratando de doblegar las reglas, sino de ajustarlas. Pido al Tribunal que trate de establecer un conjunto de reglas que sean aplicables. Imaginen al Barcelona jugando contra el Manchester United en la Final de la Copa de Europa. Los 70 000 espectadores que llenan el estadio tienen los ojos fijos en el campo y en los jugadores. Toda Europa está viendo el partido. Cuando aparece el árbitro, camina hacia el centro del campo y coloca a los pies de Wayne Rooney no una pelota de fútbol, sino una pelota de rugby. Mientras los jugadores tratan de señalar los problemas que pueden tener con una pelota ovalada, el árbitro dice: ¡No se preocupen por la pelota y pónganse a jugar!
Esa, francamente, es la actitud del Tribunal ante los esfuerzos por cambiar el sistema. La pelota no importa, pongámonos a jugar. Pero que quede claro: esta analogía no significa que la Comisión o los Estados miembros deban considerarse la elite de la administración pública."@es20
"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@et5
"Arvoisa puhemies, toimin kymmenen vuotta sitten vastuuvapautta käsittelevänä esittelijänä ja annoin tuolloin lausunnon, jonka mukaan emme koskaan saisi myönteistä tarkastuslausumaa eli DASia. Totesin näin, koska komissiota koskevista puutteista tai kaikista sääntöjenvastaisuuksiin liittyvistä epäkohdista huolimatta saatoimme nähdä kymmenen vuotta sitten aivan selvästi, että unionissa oli kaksi yhteensopimatonta järjestelmää: tilintarkastustuomioistuimen tarkastustensa suorittamiseen käyttämä järjestelmä ja komission silloisessa toiminnassaan käyttämä järjestelmä.
Esitän lopuksi vielä yhden huomautuksen. Olen onneksi uusia rahoitusnäkymiä käsittelevän väliaikaisen valiokunnan jäsen. Meidän ei pitäisi sopia uusista rahoitusnäkymistä ennen kuin olemme ratkaisseet tämän jäsenvaltioiden luotettavuutta ja vastuuta koskevan ongelman.
Viimeisten kymmenen vuoden aikana on tapahtunut muutoksia. Tilintarkastustuomioistuin on muuttanut menetelmiään, muun muassa siirtynyt neljän pilarin järjestelmään, ja komissiossa on toteutettu Neil Kinnockin käynnistämiä uudistuksia. Olen kuitenkin edelleen vakuuttunut siitä, ettemme saa 1. tammikuuta 2005 alkaen sovellettavista varainhoitoa koskevista uusista säännöksistä ja uusista kirjanpitojärjestelmistä huolimatta edelleenkään myönteistä tarkastuslausumaa, mikä johtuu tavasta, jolla asioita organisoidaan. Haluan osoittaa yhden huomautuksen jäsen Titfordille. Kotimaanne Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan sosiaaliturvaministeriö ei ole onnistunut saamaan tileilleen hyväksyntää viimeiseen 14 vuoteen. Yhdysvaltojen liittovaltion budjetin tilejä ei ole hyväksytty viimeiseen kuuteen vuoteen. Euroopan unioni ei siis ole tässä suhteessa ainutkertainen organisaatio. Jäsen Titford, olisi ollut hyödyllistä, jos olisitte todellakin osallistuneet järjestämiimme kuulemisiin, nimittäin kaikkiin kuuteen niistä. Jäsen Mote oli sentään läsnä joissakin kuulemisissa ja esitti muutamia kysymyksiä, mutta jäsen Mote edustaakin Euroopan parlamentissa Sitoutumattomia eikä Itsenäisyys/demokratia-ryhmää, kuten jäsen Titford, vaikka molemmat ovatkin Yhdistyneen kuningaskunnan itsenäisyyspuolueen jäseniä.
Yhtä kaikki, varsinaiseen asiaan palatakseni toteaisin, että komissio ilmoittaa käyttävänsä tilien tarkastamis- ja hyväksymismenettelyä, koska varainhoitoasetuksessa säädetään niin. Näin komissio valvoo esimerkiksi maatalousmenoja. Komission asenne on siis se, että he voivat periä varat takaisin. Miksei tilintarkastustuomioistuin sisällytä tätä DASiin? Haluan korostaa, että tilien tarkastamis- ja hyväksymismenettelyä käytettäessä rahat peritään itse asiassa takaisin jäsenvaltioilta. Rahoja ei peritä takaisin maanviljelijöiltä tai edunsaajajärjestöiltä, mikä tarkoittaa sitä, että jäsenvaltioiden veronmaksajat maksavat kaikista sääntöjenvastaisuuksista tai petoksista aiheutuvan laskun.
Tilintarkastustuomioistuin toteaa tältä osin, että takaisinperintä on hyvä asia mutta että meillä pitäisi olla järjestelmä, jossa takaisinperintään ei ole tarvetta. Järjestelmän pitäisi siis olla parempi. Tämä on hyvin ymmärrettävää. Komissio puolestaan sanoo olevansa samaa mieltä mutta ilmoittaa samalla, että tilintarkastustuomioistuimen toiveiden toteuttaminen maksaa niin paljon, ettei se ole yksinkertaisesti kustannustehokasta. Tämä on minusta myös ymmärrettävää.
Tarkastelen seuraavaksi useita eri päätelmiä, jotka perustuvat talousarvion valvontavaliokunnassa järjestettyihin kuuteen komission jäsenten ja tilintarkastustuomioistuimen kuulemiseen. Kaikille on ilmiselvää, että yksi tärkeimmistä ongelmista koskee jaettua hallinnointia. Kuten yksi tilintarkastustuomioistuimen jäsenistä totesi kuulemisten kuluessa, ongelmana ei ole valvonta eivätkä tarkastukset vaan hallinnointi. Alankin uskoa, että tarvitsemme järjestelmän, jossa jäsenvaltioiden tarkastuselimet tehdään vastuullisiksi toimien laillisuutta ja asianmukaisuutta koskevan lausuman antamisesta.
Vaikuttaa oudolta, että jaetun hallinnoinnin järjestelmässä vain toisen osapuolen on kannettava vastuu. Tämä merkitsee muutoksia lainsäädäntöön ja neuvoston ja jäsenvaltioiden välistä yhteistyötä. Tilintarkastustuomioistuimen osalta minut on vielä vakuutettava siitä, että kaksi presidentti Fabra Vallésin mainitsemista neljästä pilarista ovat luotettavia.
Olen todella huolestunut tarkastettujen toimien määrästä ja kyseenalaistan myös sen, miten laajasti muiden tarkastajien työtä on hyödynnetty. Tarvitsemme säännöllisesti esitettävän toimintakertomuksen, jossa käsitellään kansallisten tarkastuselinten kanssa tehtyä yhteistyötä, jotta voimme olla varmoja, että neljä pilaria tuottavat avoimen ja läpinäkyvän tarkastuslausuman. Parlamentti myös pyytää tilintarkastustuomioistuinta toistuvasti jakamaan tarkastuslausumansa osiin niin, että budjettivallan käyttäjä tietää täsmälleen, missä ongelmat ovat.
Olemme tilanteessa, jossa tilintarkastustuomioistuin asettaa lukuisia sääntöjä, joita komissio ei voi koskaan noudattaa kohtuullisin kustannuksin säännöistä saatavaan hyötyyn verrattuna, vaikka se tekisi mitä tahansa. En yritä venyttää sääntöjä vaan saada ne sopimaan. Pyydän tilintarkastustuomioistuinta laatimaan säännöt, joita voidaan noudattaa. Kuvitelkaa Barcelona ja Manchester United pelaamassa Eurooppa-cupin finaalissa. Katsomossa on 70 000 ihmistä, ja kaikkien katse on kiinnittynyt kenttään ja pelaajiin. Koko Eurooppa seuraa kentän tapahtumia. Sitten kentälle tulee erotuomari, joka kävelee keskiympyrään ja asettaa Wayne Rooneyn jalkoihin jalkapallon sijasta rugby-pallon. Kun pelaajat yrittävät huomauttaa ongelmista, joita soikealla pallolla pelaaminen heille aiheuttaisi, erotuomari toteaa vain, että älkää välittäkö pallosta, jatkakaa peliä!
Tällainen on suoraan sanottuna asenne, jonka tilintarkastustuomioistuin on omaksunut järjestelmän muuttamista koskeviin pyrkimyksiin. Siis älkää välittäkö pelivälineestä vaan jatkakaa peliä. Haluan kuitenkin tehdä yhden asian selväksi: tämä analogia ei tarkoita, että komissiota tai jäsenvaltioita tulisi pitää julkishallinnon eliittinä."@fi7
"Monsieur le Président, il y a dix ans, j’étais rapporteur sur la décharge et, il y a dix ans également, j’ai affirmé que nous n’obtiendrions jamais de déclaration d’assurance (DAS) positive. Si j’ai tenu de tels propos à l’époque, c’est que, indépendamment des manquements au niveau de la Commission et quelles que soient les erreurs en matière d’irrégularités, nous pouvions clairement voir il y a dix ans que nous étions face à deux systèmes incompatibles: celui utilisé par la Cour pour réaliser son audit et celui utilisé par la Commission pour son fonctionnement.
Une dernière chose: je fais heureusement partie de la commission temporaire en charge des nouvelles perspectives financières. N’allons pas convenir d’une nouvelle perspective financière tant que nous n’avons pas résolu ce problème de fiabilité et de responsabilité de la part des États membres.
Des changements sont intervenus au cours des dix dernières années. La Cour a changé de méthodologie - pour passer au système à quatre piliers - et la Commission a entrepris les réformes Kinnock. Je reste cependant convaincu que, même après le 1er janvier prochain, date à laquelle entreront en vigueur les nouveaux règlements financiers et le nouveau système de comptabilité, nous n’obtiendrons toujours pas de DAS positive en raison de la manière dont les choses sont organisées. Je voudrais adresser un commentaire à M. Titford. Dans votre pays, le département de la sécurité sociale n’a pas obtenu d’apurement de ses comptes au cours des 14 dernières années. Il en va de même pour le budget fédéral américain de ces six dernières années. Notre organisation n’est pas unique, et il aurait été utile, Monsieur Titford, que vous preniez part à l’ensemble des six auditions que nous avons réalisées. Au moins M. Mote s’y est-il présenté en certaines occasions et a-t-il posé quelques questions - mais, là encore, M. Mote est un Indépendant britannique indépendant, pas un Indépendant britannique comme l’est M. Titford.
Ceci étant dit, j’en reviens à mon intervention. Nous sommes face à une Commission qui affirme recourir à l’apurement des comptes parce que c’est ce qui est stipulé dans le règlement financier. C’est la manière dont elle contrôle certains éléments tels que les dépenses agricoles. Son attitude consiste donc à dire qu’elle peut récupérer les fonds. Alors pourquoi diable la Cour des comptes n’inclut-elle pas cet élément dans la DAS? Il est utile de signaler que, lorsque la procédure d’apurement des comptes est utilisée, l’argent est en fait repris aux États membres. Il n’est pas repris aux agriculteurs ou aux organisations bénéficiaires, ce qui signifie que les contribuables nationaux payent le prix de toute fraude ou irrégularité.
La Cour affirme de son côté que le recouvrement est une bonne chose, mais que nous devrions bénéficier d’un système où il ne serait pas nécessaire de procéder à des recouvrements. Le système devrait être amélioré. On le conçoit aisément. La Commission dit alors: certes, mais concrétiser toutes les exigences de la Cour serait tellement onéreux que l’opération ne serait pas rentable. Je peux également le comprendre.
J’examinerai une série de conclusions issues des six auditions des commissaires et de la Cour réalisées par la commission du contrôle budgétaire. Il est clair pour tout le monde que l’un des principaux problèmes est celui de la gestion partagée. Comme l’a affirmé l’un des membres de la Cour durant les auditions, il ne s’agit pas d’un problème de contrôle ni d’un problème d’audit, mais bien d’un problème de gestion. J’en viens donc à me dire que nous avons besoin d’un système qui rendrait les organismes d’ordonnancement des États membres responsables de l’octroi d’une assurance sur la légalité et la régularité.
Il semble étrange que, dans un système de gestion partagée, un seul des partenaires doive être responsable. Ce point nécessitera des modifications de la législation et impliquera une coopération entre le Conseil et les États membres. Concernant la Cour, je ne suis pas encore convaincu que deux des quatre piliers soient fiables, comme le mentionnait M. Fabra Vallés.
Je suis réellement préoccupé par la quantité de transactions contrôlées, et je me demande également dans quelle mesure les travaux des autres auditeurs sont utilisés. Nous avons besoin d’un rapport d’activité régulier sur le travail réalisé à partir des audits nationaux, afin de nous assurer que les quatre piliers offrent une DAS transparente. Viendra ensuite l’éternelle requête du Parlement invitant la Cour à fractionner sa DAS, afin que l’autorité budgétaire puisse exactement situer les problèmes.
Nous sommes face à une situation dans laquelle une série de règles fixées par la Cour ne pourront jamais être appliquées par la Commission, quoi qu’elle fasse, sans engendrer de frais excessifs par rapport aux bénéfices potentiels. Je ne tente pas de contourner les règles, j’essaye juste de les rendre applicables. Je demande à la Cour de faire son possible pour instaurer des règles pouvant être respectées. Imaginez un match entre Barcelone et Manchester United en finale de la Coupe d’Europe. Avec 70 000 personnes, le stade est bondé, et tous les regards sont rivés sur le terrain et sur les joueurs. L’Europe entière regarde ce match. L’arbitre arrive, il marche jusqu’au centre du terrain et place aux pieds de Wayne Rooney non pas un ballon de football, mais un ballon de rugby. Alors que les joueurs tentent de faire valoir les problèmes qu’ils pourraient rencontrer en jouant avec un ballon ovale, l’arbitre rétorque: «Peu importe le ballon, commençons le jeu!»
Honnêtement, c’est là l’attitude de la Cour face aux tentatives de réforme du système. Peu importe le ballon, commençons le jeu! Soyons clairs, cependant: cette analogie ne doit pas laisser penser que la Commission ou les États membres doivent être considérés comme l’élite de l’administration publique."@fr8
"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@hu11
"Signor Presidente, dieci anni fa sono stato relatore per il discarico e in tale occasione ho affermato che non avremo mai una dichiarazione di affidabilità positiva, la cosiddetta DAS. Ho fatto questa affermazione perché, a prescindere dalle mancanze della Commissione e da errori imputabili a irregolarità, dieci anni fa si vedeva con grande chiarezza la coesistenza di due sistemi incompatibili: quello utilizzato dalla Corte dei conti per effettuare i controlli e quello che disciplinava il funzionamento della Commissione.
Ho un’ultima osservazione. Fortunatamente faccio parte della commissione temporanea per le nuove prospettive finanziarie. Non dovremmo concordare una nuova prospettiva finanziaria finché non avremo risolto il problema dell’affidabilità e dell’attribuzione delle responsabilità agli Stati membri.
Negli ultimi dieci anni sono stati effettuati cambiamenti. La Corte dei conti ha cambiato la sua metodologia passando al sistema dei quattro pilastri e la Commissione ha conosciuto le riforme Kinnock. Resto tuttavia persuaso che neppure dal primo gennaio del prossimo anno, nonostante i nuovi regolamenti finanziari e i nuovi sistemi di contabilità, avremo una DAS positiva a causa del modo in cui sono organizzate le cose. Vorrei fare un appunto all’onorevole Titford. Nel suo paese il dipartimento di sicurezza sociale non ha mai ottenuto la liquidazione dei conti negli ultimi 14 anni. Il bilancio federale americano non ha ottenuto la liquidazione dei conti negli ultimi sei anni. L’Unione europea non è un caso isolato e sarebbe stato utile se lei avesse effettivamente partecipato a tutte e sei le audizioni che abbiamo organizzato. Almeno l’onorevole Mote si è fatto vivo in alcune occasioni e ha fatto delle domande, ma di nuovo l’onorevole Mote dimostra di essere un membro indipendente dell’
invece che un deputato dipendente dall’
come l’onorevole Titford.
Comunque sia ritorno al mio discorso. La Commissione dice che si avvarrà della facoltà di liquidare i conti in quanto prassi prevista dal regolamento finanziario. Questo è il modo in cui la Commissione controlla ad esempio la spesa agricola. La Commissione ritiene pertanto di riuscire a recuperare i fondi. Perché allora la Corte dei conti non include tale obiettivo nella DAS? Va detto che di fatto i soldi per la liquidazione dei conti vengono recuperati dagli Stati membri, non dagli agricoltori o dalle organizzazioni destinatarie. Ne consegue che sono i contribuenti nazionali a sobbarcarsi l’onere finanziario delle irregolarità e delle frodi.
La Corte dei conti dunque afferma che il recupero è positivo, ma che dovrebbe esserci un sistema che lo renda superfluo. Il sistema dovrebbe essere migliore. Ebbene, tale auspicio è del tutto comprensibile. La Commissione obietta però che la spesa necessaria per dare seguito alle richieste della Corte è tale da non essere efficiente in termini di costi. Posso capire anche questa obiezione.
Passerò ora alle varie conclusioni delle sei audizioni dei Commissari e della Corte dei conti svoltesi in seno alla commissione per il controllo dei bilanci. E’ noto a tutti che uno dei principali problemi è la gestione condivisa. Come ha affermato durante le audizioni uno dei membri della Corte dei conti, il problema non riguarda né il controllo né l’
bensì la gestione. Sto quindi cominciando a pensare che ci sia bisogno di un sistema che attribuisca la responsabilità di garantire la legittimità e la regolarità della gestione agli enti degli Stati membri preposti al rilascio delle autorizzazioni.
E’ strano che in un sistema di gestione condivisa sia responsabile solo metà dei membri. Occorreranno cambiamenti legislativi e la cooperazione del Consiglio e degli Stati membri. Per quanto riguarda la posizione della Corte dei conti non sono ancora convinto che due dei quattro pilastri siano affidabili, come ha affermato il Presidente Fabra Vallés.
Sono realmente preoccupato per il numero di operazioni oggetto di indagine e mi chiedo in quale misura si ricorra al lavoro di altri revisori. Occorrono regolari relazioni di attività sul lavoro svolto mediante i controlli nazionali affinché i quattro pilastri producano una DAS trasparente. Vi sarà inoltre la reiterata richiesta del Parlamento alla Corte dei conti di dividere in sezioni la DAS cosicché l’autorità di bilancio sappia con precisione dove stanno i problemi.
Attualmente la Corte ha stabilito una serie di regole che la Commissione, qualsiasi iniziativa decida di intraprendere, non riuscirà mai soddisfare sostenendo costi ragionevoli in rapporto ai vantaggi ottenuti. Non sto cercando di forzare le norme a mio piacimento, ma di renderle adeguate. Chiedo alla Corte dei conti di elaborare un pacchetto di norme applicabili. Si immagini il Barcellona che gioca contro il
nelle finali della Coppa dei Campioni. C’è una folla di 70 000 persone e tutti gli occhi sono puntati sui giocatori e sul campo. Tutta l’Europa sta assistendo alla partita. Arriva l’arbitro, cammina fino a centrocampo e colloca ai piedi di Wayne Rooney un pallone da
invece che da calcio. Quando i giocatori cercano di far notare che potrebbero avere dei problemi a giocare con un pallone ovale, l’arbitro risponde di non badare alla palla, ma di andare avanti con il gioco!
In tutta sincerità questo è l’approccio con cui la Corte dei conti concepisce gli sforzi volti a cambiare il sistema. Non importa quale pallone si usa, l’importante è andare avanti con il gioco. Occorre tuttavia fare una precisazione: l’analogia non significa che la Commissione o gli Stati membri siano le
della pubblica amministrazione."@it12
"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@lt14
"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@lv13
"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@mt15
"Mijnheer de Voorzitter, tien jaar geleden was ik rapporteur voor de kwijting en tien jaar geleden voorspelde ik dat we nooit een positieve betrouwbaarheidsverklaring (DAS) zouden krijgen. Ik zei dat omdat we tien jaar geleden, afgezien van de tekortkomingen binnen de Commissie of wat er verder nog mis was in termen van onregelmatigheden, vrij duidelijk inzagen dat er sprake was van twee onverenigbare systemen: enerzijds het systeem dat de Rekenkamer gebruikte bij haar controle en anderzijds het systeem zoals de Commissie dat gebruikte.
Ik heb nog een laatste punt: gelukkig zit ik in de tijdelijke commissie voor de nieuwe financiële vooruitzichten. We zouden niet moeten instemmen met nieuwe financiële vooruitzichten zolang we dit betrouwbaarheids- en verantwoordelijkheidsprobleem van de lidstaten niet hebben opgelost.
De afgelopen tien jaar zijn er dingen veranderd: de Rekenkamer heeft haar methodologie verandert – zij is overgestapt op het systeem van vier pijlers – en de Commissie heeft de Kinnock-hervormingen gehad, maar ik blijf bij mijn overtuiging dat we, zelfs als met ingang van 1 januari volgend jaar de nieuwe financiële voorschriften en de nieuwe boekhoudsystemen van kracht worden, nog steeds geen positieve DAS zullen krijgen, gezien de manier waarop de zaken zijn geregeld. Ik zou graag een opmerking willen richten aan de heer Titford. In uw eigen land heeft het Ministerie van Sociale Zekerheid al 14 jaar geen goedkeuring van de rekeningen verkregen. De Amerikaanse federale begroting heeft de afgelopen zes jaar ook geen goedkeuring van de rekeningen verkregen. Onze organisatie is dus niet uniek en het zou geholpen hebben, mijnheer Titford, als u ook daadwerkelijk deelgenomen had aan de zes door ons georganiseerde hoorzittingen. De heer Mote is tenminste nog een paar keer op komen dagen en heeft toen een aantal vragen gesteld, maar de heer Mote is dan ook een echt onafhankelijk lid van de UK Independence Party, in tegenstelling tot de heer Titford.
Hoe dan ook, om terug te komen bij mijn verhaal: we hebben te maken met een Commissie die zegt gebruik te maken van de goedkeuring van de rekeningen omdat dat zo in het Financieel Reglement staat. Zo oefent zij controle uit op zaken als de landbouwuitgaven. Haar opvatting is dus dat het geld kan worden teruggevorderd – waarom neemt de Rekenkamer dat niet mee in de DAS? Het verdient de aandacht te vermelden dat in het systeem van goedkeuring van de rekeningen, het geld in werkelijkheid wordt teruggevorderd van de lidstaten en dus niet van de boeren of de begunstigde organisaties, hetgeen betekent dat de nationale belastingbetalers opdraaien voor eventuele onregelmatigheden of fraude.
Vervolgens zegt de Rekenkamer dat terugvorderen op zich een goede zaak is, maar dat we eigenlijk een systeem zouden moeten hebben waarbij het terugvorderen überhaupt niet nodig is. Het systeem moet gewoon beter. Dat is goed te begrijpen. Maar dan zegt de Commissie: jawel, maar als we doen wat de Rekenkamer eigenlijk wil, dan kost dat zo veel geld dat de kosteneffectiviteit verloren gaat. En ook dat kan ik begrijpen.
Ik wil ingaan op een aantal conclusies van de zes hoorzittingen van de Commissie begrotingscontrole met de Europese commissarissen en de Rekenkamer. Het is iedereen helder dat een van de hoofdproblemen gelegen is in het gedeeld beheer. Zoals een van de leden van de Rekenkamer tijdens de hoorzittingen zei: het is geen toezichtprobleem, het is geen controleprobleem, het is een beheerprobleem. Bij mij rijst dan ook de gedachte dat we een systeem nodig hebben waarin de opdrachtgevers in de lidstaten de verantwoordelijkheid krijgen over het geven van goedkeuring inzake wettigheid en regelmatigheid.
Het lijkt vreemd dat in een systeem van gedeeld beheer slechts één helft van het partnerschap verantwoordelijkheid hoeft te dragen. Dat betekent dat de wetgeving zal moeten worden veranderd en dat de Raad en de lidstaten zullen moeten samenwerken. Uit het oogpunt van de Rekenkamer ben ik nog niet overtuigd van de betrouwbaarheid van twee van de vier door de heer Fabra Vallès genoemde pijlers.
Ik maak me werkelijk zorgen over de hoeveelheid transacties die zijn onderzocht en ik vraag me ook af in hoeverre van het werk van andere controleurs gebruikgemaakt is. We hebben behoefte aan een periodiek uit te brengen activiteitenverslag over het werk dat is verricht met de accountantscontroles in de lidstaten, om er zeker van te zijn dat de vier pijlers een transparante DAS opleveren. Daarnaast is er nog het terugkerende verzoek van het Parlement aan de Rekenkamer om de DAS in verschillende secties te verdelen, zodat de begrotingsautoriteit precies weet waar het misgaat.
In de huidige situatie hebben we te maken met een pakket regels van de Rekenkamer waaraan de Commissie hoe dan ook nooit kan voldoen tegen kosten die in een redelijke verhouding staan tot de te behalen baten. Ik probeer de regels niet te verdraaien, ik probeer ze passend te maken. Ik verzoek de Rekenkamer om te proberen een pakket bruikbare spelregels vast te stellen. Stelt u zich voor: Barcelona speelt de Europacupfinale tegen Manchester United. Er zitten 70 000 toeschouwers op de tribunes en alle ogen zijn gericht op het veld en op de spelers. Heel Europa kijkt. Dan komt de scheidsrechter het veld op, loopt naar de middenstip en legt geen voetbal voor de voeten van Wayne Rooney, maar een rugbybal. Wanneer de spelers proberen te wijzen op de problemen die een ovale bal voor hen kan geven, zegt hij: niet op de bal letten, gewoon spelen!
Dat is kort gezegd de opstelling van de Rekenkamer ten opzichte van pogingen het systeem te veranderen. Het is: niet op de bal letten, gewoon verder spelen. Laat ik echter duidelijk zeggen dat deze analogie geenszins zou impliceren dat de Commissie of de lidstaten beschouwd moeten worden als de elitekorpsen van de overheidsdiensten."@nl3
"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@pl16
"Senhor Presidente, há dez anos fui relator para o processo de quitação e, na ocasião, afirmei que jamais teríamos uma declaração de fiabilidade, ou DAS, positiva. Se o afirmei foi porque, independentemente das falhas no interior da Comissão ou fosse o que fosse que estava errado e que provocou irregularidades, era perfeitamente óbvio, há dez anos, que existiam dois sistemas incompatíveis: o sistema utilizado pelo Tribunal de Contas para as suas operações de auditoria, e o sistema utilizado pela Comissão e a forma como este funcionava.
Há um último ponto que aqui quero focar. Felizmente, faço parte da comissão temporária sobre as novas Perspectivas Financeiras. Em minha opinião, não deveríamos aceitar as novas Perspectivas Financeiras até estar resolvido este problema da fiabilidade e da adequada prestação de contas por parte dos Estados-Membros.
Registaram-se mudanças nos últimos dez anos. O Tribunal modificou a sua metodologia, adoptando o sistema dos quatro pilares, e na Comissão foram introduzidas as reformas Kinnock. Continuo convencido, porém, de que mesmo após 1 de Janeiro do próximo ano, com a nova regulamentação financeira e os novos sistemas contabilistícos, continuaremos a não ter uma DAS positiva devido ao modo como as coisas são organizadas. Aproveitaria para dirigir uma observação ao senhor deputado Titford. No seu país, há catorze anos que o Departamento de Segurança Social não consegue fazer o apuramento das suas próprias contas. Os serviços responsáveis pelo orçamento federal Americano há seis anos que não conseguem fazer o apuramento das suas contas. Esta organização não é um caso único, e teria ajudado, Senhor Deputado Titford, se V. Exa. tivesse participado nas audições por nós realizadas, que ao todo foram seis. O senhor deputado Mote, pelo menos, compareceu algumas vezes e colocou algumas questões. Mas, lá está, sendo embora ambos membros do Partido para a Independência do Reino Unido, o senhor deputado Mote é um independente, o que não é o caso do senhor deputado Titford.
Mas, enfim, de volta ao meu argumento. O que temos é a Comissão a dizer que utiliza o apuramento de contas porque é o que está previsto no regulamento financeiro. Que é assim que controla, por exemplo, as despesas agrícolas. Por conseguinte, a postura da Comissão é a de que consegue recuperar as verbas – por que razão o Tribunal de Contas não inclui isso na DAS? Vale a pena salientar que, quando é utilizado o apuramento de contas, é do Estado-Membro que o dinheiro é recuperado. Não é recuperado dos agricultores nem das organizações recebedoras, o que significa que são os contribuintes quem paga as favas por irregularidades ou fraudes cometidas no seu país.
Depois o Tribunal afirma que é bom recuperar o dinheiro, mas que deveríamos dispor de um sistema em que não fosse necessário proceder a essa recuperação. Que o sistema deveria ser melhor. O que é bastante compreensível. Então, a Comissão responde que sim, mas que, para fazer o que o Tribunal quer, haverá que gastar tanto dinheiro que a solução não é, pura e simplesmente, viável em termos de custos. O que também é compreensível.
Irei analisar uma série de conclusões das seis audições realizadas pela Comissão do Controlo Orçamental junto dos Comissários e do Tribunal de Contas. É óbvio para todos que um dos principais problemas se prende com o sistema de gestão partilhada. Como afirmou nas audições um dos Membros do Tribunal de Contas, não se trata de um problema de controlo, nem de auditoria, mas sim de um problema de gestão. Começo portanto a pensar que necessitamos de um sistema em que as autoridades ordenadoras nos Estados-Membros sejam responsabilizadas por prestar garantias quanto à legitimidade e à exactidão das operações.
Não deixa de ser curioso que, num sistema de gestão partilhada, apenas metade das parcerias tenham de assumir as responsabilidades. Alterar isto implicará fazer mudanças e exigirá a cooperação do Conselho e dos Estados-Membros. Quanto ao ponto de vista do Tribunal de Contas, aqui expresso pelo Presidente Fabra Vallés, de que dois dos quatro pilares são fiáveis, é algo de que não estou tão certo assim.
Preocupa-me verdadeiramente a questão de saber qual a quantidade de transacções que terão sido objecto de fiscalização, bem como em que medida é utilizado o trabalho de outros auditores. Necessitamos de um relatório de actividades periódico sobre o trabalho desenvolvido com auditores nacionais, de modo a garantir uma DAS transparente relativamente aos quatro pilares. Haverá também o eterno pedido do Parlamento no sentido de o Tribunal de Contas dividir em secções a sua DAS, por forma a permitir à autoridade orçamental saber exactamente onde residem os problemas.
Estamos numa situação em que há um conjunto de regras propostas pelo Tribunal de Contas que a Comissão, faça o que fizer, jamais conseguirá cumprir numa proporção razoável entre os custos incorridos e as vantagens a obter. Não estou a procurar vergar as regras, mas tão-só a procurar adequá-las. Estou a pedir ao Tribunal que tente estabelecer um conjunto de regras com as quais possamos actuar. Imaginem o Barcelona a jogar contra o Manchester United no campeonato final da Taça da Europa. Os 70 000 espectadores estão de olhos postos no campo e nos jogadores. Toda a Europa está a assistir ao jogo. Entra o árbitro, dirige-se ao centro do campo e coloca aos pés de Wayne Rooney não uma bola de futebol, mas uma bola de râguebi. Quando os jogadores procuram chamar a sua atenção para os problemas com que se poderão deparar por a bola ser oval, o árbitro responde-lhes: Não importa a bola, toca a jogar!
Em rigor, é esta a atitude do Tribunal de Contas em relação aos esforços que visam mudar o sistema. É a de que não importa a bola, o que é preciso é jogar. De esclarecer, porém, que esta analogia não significa que devemos ver na Comissão ou nos Estados-Membros a elite da administração pública."@pt17
"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@sk18
"Mr President, ten years ago I was the rapporteur for the discharge and ten years ago I made the statement that we will never have a positive statement of assurance – DAS. I said that because, regardless of the failings within the Commission or whatever was wrong as regards irregularities, we could see quite clearly ten years ago that there were two incompatible systems: the system being used by the Court to do its audit and the system being used by the Commission in the way it functioned.
I have a final point. Thankfully I am on the temporary committee for the new financial perspectives. We should not agree a new financial perspective until we have resolved this problem of reliability and accountability from the Member States.
Changes have taken place over the last ten years. The Court has changed its methodology – it has moved to the four-pillar system – and the Commission has had the Kinnock reforms, but I still remain convinced that, even from 1 January next year with the new financial regulations and the new accounting systems, we will still not see a positive DAS because of the way things are organised. I would like to address one comment to Mr Titford. In your own country the Department of Social Security has failed to get clearance of its accounts for the last 14 years. The American federal budget has failed to get any clearance of its accounts for the last six years. This is not a unique organisation and it would have helped, Mr Titford, if you had actually taken part in the hearings we held – all six of them. At least Mr Mote turned up on some occasions and put some questions, but then again Mr Mote is an independent UK Independent, not a UK Independent as Mr Titford is.
But anyway, back to my script. What we have is the Commission saying that it uses the clearance of accounts because that is what it says in the financial regulation. That is how it controls such things as agricultural expenditure. So its attitude is that they can recover the funds – why does the Court of Auditors not include that in the DAS? A point worth making is that when the clearance of accounts is used the money is actually recovered from the Member States. It is not recovered from the farmers or receiving organisations, which means that national taxpayers foot the bill for any irregularities or fraud.
Then the Court says that to recover is good, but we should have a system where you do not need to recover. The system should be better. Well that is quite understandable. So the Commission then says: yes, but to do what the Court actually wants will cost so much money that it simply will not be cost-effective. That I can also understand.
I will be looking at a variety of conclusions from the Committee on Budgetary Control’s six hearings with the Commissioners and the Court. It is obvious to anyone that one of the main problems is that of shared management. As one of the Members of the Court said in the hearings, it is not a problem of control, it is not a problem of audit, it is a problem of management. So I am beginning to think that we need a system which makes the authorising bodies in the Member States responsible for giving assurance on legality and regularity.
It seems strange that in a shared management system only half of the partnership needs to be responsible. That will mean changes to legislation and it will mean the cooperation of the Council and the Member States. From the Court’s point of view I have yet to be convinced that two of the four pillars as mentioned by Mr Fabra Vallés are reliable.
I have real concerns about the amount of transactions inspected and I also question the extent to which other auditors’ work is used. We need a regular activity report on the work done with national audits to be sure that the four pillars give a transparent DAS. There will also be the perennial request from Parliament that the Court should sectionalise its DAS so that the budgetary authority knows exactly where the problems lie.
We are in a situation that sees a set of rules from the Court that can never be met by the Commission within reasonable costs no matter what it does, compared with the benefits to be gained. I am not trying to bend the rules, I am trying to make them fit. I am asking the Court to try to establish a set of rules that can be played by. Imagine Barcelona playing Manchester United in the European Cup Final. There is a crowd of 70 000 and all eyes are on the pitch and on the players. The whole of Europe is looking at this. On comes the referee, he walks to the centre spot and he places at the feet of Wayne Rooney not a football, but a rugby ball. As the players try to point out the problems that they may have with an oval ball, he says never mind the ball, get on with the game!
That, quite frankly, is the attitude that the Court has towards efforts to change the system. It is never mind the ball, get on with the game. However, let us be clear: this analogy does not mean that the Commission or the Member States should be seen as the elites of public administration."@sl19
"Herr talman! För tio år sedan var jag föredragande för ansvarsfriheten och för tio år sedan sade jag att vi aldrig kommer att få någon positiv revisionsförklaring, eller DAS. Det sade jag eftersom vi, oavsett bristerna inom kommissionen eller vilka oegentligheter som förekom, för tio år sedan ganska tydligt kunde se att det handlade om två oförenliga system: det system som Revisionsrätten använde för sin revision och det system som kommissionen använde, med dess funktionssätt.
Jag har en sista kommentar. Som tur är ingår jag i det tillfälliga utskottet för den nya budgetplanen. Vi borde inte enas om en ny budgetplan förrän vi löst det här problemet med tillförlitlighet och ansvarsskyldighet från medlemsstaternas sida.
Det har skett förändringar under de senaste tio åren. Revisionsrätten har ändrat sina metoder – den har övergått till systemet med fyra pelare – och kommissionen har haft sina Kinnockreformer. Jag är dock fortfarande övertygad om att vi inte ens efter den 1 januari nästa år med de nya budgetförordningarna och de nya revisionssystemen kommer att få uppleva en positiv revisionsförklaring, på grund av hur saker och ting är organiserade. Jag skulle vilja rikta en kommentar till Jeffrey William Titford. I ert land har socialdepartementet inte lyckats få ett godkännande av sina räkenskaper under de senaste 14 åren. I USA har räkenskaperna i den federala budgeten inte godkänts på sex år. Det här är ingen unik organisation och det skulle ha hjälpt, herr Titford, om ni verkligen hade deltagit i samtliga de sex utfrågningar som vi höll. Mote dök i alla fall upp vid några tillfällen och ställde några frågor, men Mote är ju också en oberoende ledamot från Förenade kungariket som är oberoende, och inte en oberoende ledamot från Förenade kungariket som Titford är.
Hur som helst, tillbaka till mitt manus. Det som nu sker är att kommissionen säger att den använder sig av räkenskapsavslutning eftersom det är vad som sägs i budgetförordningen. Det är så kommissionen kontrollerar sådant som jordbruksutgifter. Dess hållning är alltså att de kan återkräva medlen. Varför tar inte Revisionsrätten upp det i revisionsförklaringen? Något som är värt att nämna är att när räkenskapsavslutning används återkrävs egentligen medlen från medlemsstaterna. De återkrävs inte från lantbrukarna eller mottagarorganisationerna, vilket betyder att de nationella skattebetalarna står för notan för eventuella oegentligheter eller bedrägerier.
Sedan säger Revisionsrätten att återkrävande är bra, men att vi borde ha ett system där det inte behövs något återkrävande. Systemet borde vara bättre. Det är tämligen lätt att förstå. Sedan säger kommissionen: ja, men det kommer att kosta så mycket att göra det som Revisionsrätten vill göra, att det helt enkelt inte blir lönsamt. Det kan jag också förstå.
Jag kommer att ta upp flera olika slutsatser från budgetkontrollutskottets sex frågestunder med kommissionärerna och Revisionsrätten. Alla kan se att ett av huvudproblemen är delad förvaltning. Som en av Revisionsrättens ledamöter sade vid utfrågningarna, handlar det inte om ett kontrollproblem, eller om ett revisionsproblem, utan om ett förvaltningsproblem. Jag börjar alltså tro att vi behöver ett system som gör utanordnarna i medlemsstaterna ansvariga för att se till att lagar och regler följs.
Det verkar konstigt att bara halva partnerskapet behöver ta ansvar i ett system med delad förvaltning. Det kommer att innebära lagändringar och det kommer att innebära samarbete med rådet och medlemsstaterna. Ur Revisionsrättens synvinkel måste jag fortfarande övertygas om att två av de fyra pelare som Juan Manuel Fabra Vallés nämnde är tillförlitliga.
Jag är verkligt bekymrad när det gäller den mängd transaktioner som granskats, och jag ifrågasätter även den omfattning i vilken andra revisorers arbete används. Vi behöver en regelbunden verksamhetsberättelse om det arbete som gjorts i fråga om nationella revisioner för att vara säkra på att de fyra pelarna ger en insynsvänlig revisionsförklaring. Parlamentet begär dessutom varje år att Revisionsrätten borde dela in sin revisionsförklaring i sektioner så att budgetmyndigheten vet exakt var problemen ligger.
Vi befinner oss i en situation med ett antal regler från Revisionsrätten som kommissionen aldrig kommer att kunna följa till rimliga kostnader, vad den än gör, jämfört med de fördelar som kan vinnas. Jag försöker inte att tänja på reglerna, jag försöker få dem att passa. Jag ber Revisionsrätten att försöka införa regler som det går att följa. Tänk er att Barcelona spelar mot Manchester United i en Europacupfinal inför en publik på 70 000 personer som alla har ögonen riktade mot planen och spelarna. Hela Europa följer det här. Domaren kommer ut på planen, han går till mittpunkten och framför fötterna på Wayne Rooney lägger han inte ner en fotboll, utan en rugbyboll. När spelarna försöker att tala om vilka problem de kommer att ha med en oval boll, säger han: Bry er inte om bollen, sätt igång att spela!
Det är, rent ut sagt, så Revisionsrätten ställer sig till insatser för att förändra systemet. Revisionsrätten säger: Bry er inte om bollen, utan sätt igång att spela! Låt oss dock vara tydliga: den här analogin betyder inte att kommissionen eller medlemsstaterna skall ses som den offentliga förvaltningens elit."@sv21
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