Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-11-16-Speech-2-127"

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". Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@en4
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"Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@cs1
"Hr. formand, EU's forbindelser med Cuba styres af den fælles holdning, som oprindelig blev vedtaget af Rådet i 1996, og som er blevet opdateret og fornyet regelmæssigt. Den fælles holdning går ind for konstruktivt engagement med Cuba gennem en forbedret dialog med regeringen og det civile samfund med det formål at tilskynde til en fredelig overgang til et pluralistisk demokrati og respekt for menneskerettighederne og de grundlæggende frihedsrettigheder samt et holdbart økonomisk opsving og forbedring af levestandarden for det cubanske folk. Dette konstruktive engagement er stadig vores holdning. Efter fængslingen af et stort antal dissidenter i 2003 tog EU en række politiske skridt. I juni 2003 besluttede EU at begrænse bilaterale besøg på højt plan for at nedtone medlemstaternes profil med hensyn til deltagelse i kulturelle begivenheder, at invitere medlemmer af den fredelige opposition sammen med officielle repræsentanter for Cuba til fejring af medlemsstaternes nationaldage samt at tage den fælles holdning op til fornyet overvejelse før tiden. Den seneste genvurdering af den fælles holdning i juni i år bekræftede, at konstruktivt engagement fortsat er grundlaget for EU's politik over for Cuba. EU har gentagne gange understreget vigtigheden af en politisk dialog med de cubanske myndigheder og har erklæret sig villig til at genoptage en sådan dialog, når forholdene tillader det. Kommissionen tager afstand fra den cubanske regerings beslutning om at fastfryse forbindelserne med alle ambassaderne for de EU-lande, der har inviteret dissidenter med til deres nationaldage, samt med Kommissionens delegation i Havana, og fra de cubanske myndigheders afvisning af direkte bistand fra EU. Trods de cubanske beslutninger, der hindrer vores udviklingssamarbejde, er Kommissionen blevet ved med at finansiere ngo-aktioner og humanitære aktioner under ECHO. I oktober 2004 besluttede Kommissionen at yde 1 million euro i humanitær bistand til de mest sårbare ofre for orkanerne Ivan og Charlie i Cuba. Egentlig er det forkert at tale om humanitær bistand i denne sammenhæng, for vi ville under alle omstændigheder yde humanitær bistand uden at tage hensyn til politik. Den cubanske regerings beslutning om at løslade visse dissidenter af helbredsgrunde er en positiv gestus, som bidrager til at forbedre situationen, men som ikke er tilstrækkelig til at berettige fuld ophævelse af de foranstaltninger, som Kommissionen traf beslutning om i juni sidste år. Der sigtes fortsat mod løsladelse af alle politiske fanger i Cuba. Rådet er i øjeblikket ved at vurdere de foranstaltninger, der blev truffet i juni. Det Europæiske Råd ønsker at understrege, at resultatet af denne vurdering skal være i overensstemmelse med den fælles holdnings overordnede målsætninger og EU's menneskerettighedspolitik. Efter Kommissionens opfattelse kan dette danne grundlag for en konstruktiv og fremtidsorienteret EU-politik over for Cuba, som kan bidrage til at nå målene i den fælles holdning. Vi er blevet spurgt, om delegationen i Havana overhovedet kan fungere under de nuværende omstændigheder. Jeg vil gerne gøre det klart, at delegationen i Havana er afgørende for at kunne udføre de opgaver, som Europa-Parlamentet har bedt Kommissionen om at udføre. Vores tilstedeværelse på Cuba er vigtigere end nogensinde før. Delegationens vigtigste opgaver er at hjælpe med gennemførelsen af otte programmer og projekter, men også at fremme en politisk dialog med de cubanske myndigheder og det civile samfund, holde øje med menneskerettighedssituationen og beskytte medlemsstaternes handels- og investeringsinteresser. Det er en tung, betydningsfuld og undertiden vanskelig dagsorden, men den er afgørende, hvis vi ønsker at fremme politiske og økonomiske forbedringer i Cuba. Alt i alt vil jeg kalde 2003 et sørgeligt år for vores forbindelser med Cuba. Efter min mening gik Cuba og EU glip af en chance, da Cubas indlemmelse i Cotonou-aftalen gik i vasken. Jeg håber, at det, der skete i 2003, ikke viser sig at være uopretteligt. Jeg ser stadig cubansk medlemskab af Cotonou-aftalen som en vigtig ramme for vores forbindelser. Aftalen repræsenterer en grundlæggende struktur for, hvordan vi gerne vil organisere og forvalte nord-syd-forbindelser. Cubansk deltagelse i Cotonou betyder også, at Cuba vil blive udsat for gruppepres inden for aftalen. Jeg håber, at en åben tilgang stadig er mulig, men det gælder også i selve Cuba."@da2
". Herr Präsident! Die Beziehungen der Europäischen Union zu Kuba werden durch den Gemeinsamen Standpunkt bestimmt, der 1996 vom Rat festgelegt und in regelmäßigen Abständen aktualisiert und verlängert wurde. Der Gemeinsame Standpunkt steht für eine Politik des konstruktiven Engagements gegenüber Kuba durch die Intensivierung des Dialogs mit der Regierung und der Zivilgesellschaft mit dem Ziel, „einen Prozess des Übergangs in eine pluralistische Demokratie und die Achtung der Menschenrechte und Grundfreiheiten sowie eine nachhaltige Erholung und Verbesserung des Lebensstandards der kubanischen Bevölkerung zu fördern“. Dieses konstruktive Engagement ist nach wie vor unser Standpunkt. Infolge der zahlreichen Inhaftierungen von Dissidenten im Jahr 2003 traf die Europäische Union eine Reihe von politischen Maßnahmen. Im Juni 2003 beschloss die EU, bilaterale hochrangige Regierungsbesuche einzuschränken, die Teilnahme der Mitgliedstaaten an kulturellen Ereignissen weniger stark herauszustellen, kubanische Mitglieder der friedlichen Opposition zu den Feierlichkeiten anlässlich von Nationalfeiertagen einzuladen und den Gemeinsamen Standpunkt der Union vorzeitig neu festzulegen. Die jüngste Neubewertung des Gemeinsamen Standpunkts im Juni dieses Jahres bestätigte die Politik des konstruktiven Engagements als Grundlage für die politische Linie der EU gegenüber Kuba. Die EU hat die Bedeutung eines politischen Dialogs mit der kubanischen Regierung wiederholt unterstrichen und sich dazu bereit erklärt, einen solchen Dialog wieder aufzunehmen, wenn die Umstände es erlauben. Die Europäische Kommission bedauert die Entscheidung der kubanischen Regierung, die Beziehungen zu den Botschaften aller EU-Mitgliedstaaten, die Dissidenten zu ihren Nationalfeiertagen eingeladen haben, und zur Delegation der Kommission in Havanna einzufrieren und Direkthilfen von der Europäischen Union abzulehnen. Trotz der Entscheidungen Kubas, die unsere Tätigkeiten in der Entwicklungszusammenarbeit beeinträchtigen, hat die Kommission weiterhin Aktionen von NRO und von ECHO verwaltete humanitäre Maßnahmen finanziert. Im Oktober 2004 fasste die Kommission einen Beschluss über humanitäre Hilfe im Umfang von 1 Mio. EUR, um den am stärksten betroffenen Opfern der Orkane Ivan und Charlie in Kuba zu helfen. Wir sollten in diesem Zusammenhang eigentlich gar nicht von humanitärer Hilfe sprechen, da wir in jedem Fall humanitäre Hilfe leisten würden, ohne jegliche politische Überlegungen. Der Beschluss der kubanischen Regierung, einige Dissidenten aus gesundheitlichen Gründen freizulassen, ist ein positiver Beitrag zu einer besseren Lage, reicht jedoch nicht aus, um die vom Rat im Juni letzten Jahres getroffenen Maßnahmen vollständig zu widerrufen. Das Ziel bleibt die Freilassung aller politischen Gefangenen in Kuba. Die im Juni getroffenen Maßnahmen werden derzeit vom Rat überprüft. Der Europäische Rat möchte betonen, dass das Ergebnis dieser Überprüfung mit den allgemeinen Zielen des Gemeinsamen Standpunktes und der Menschenrechtspolitik der EU vereinbar sein muss. Nach Ansicht der Kommission könnte dies eine Grundlage für eine konstruktive und zukunftsorientierte Politik der EU gegenüber Kuba bilden, die der Erreichung der Ziele des Gemeinsamen Standpunktes förderlich wäre. Es wurde gefragt, ob die Delegation in Havanna unter den derzeitigen Umständen überhaupt sinnvolle Arbeit leisten kann. Ich möchte klarstellen, dass die Delegation in Havanna von größter Wichtigkeit für die Ausführung der Aufgaben ist, um deren Durchführung das Parlament die Kommission ersucht hat. Unsere Präsenz in Kuba ist heute wichtiger denn je. Zu den Hauptaufgaben der Delegation gehört es nicht nur, die Umsetzung von acht Programmen und Projekten zu unterstützen, sondern auch, den politischen Dialog mit der kubanischen Regierung und der Zivilgesellschaft zu fördern, die Menschenrechtslage zu beobachten und die Interessen der Mitgliedstaaten im Bereich Handel und Investitionen zu schützen. Dies ist ein umfangreiches, bedeutsames und manchmal schwer zu erfüllendes Programm, aber wir können darauf nicht verzichten, wenn wir politische und wirtschaftliche Verbesserungen in Kuba fördern möchten. Alles in allem würde ich sagen, dass das Jahr 2003 ein trauriges Jahr für unsere Beziehungen zu Kuba war. Meiner Ansicht nach wurde durch den fehlgeschlagenen Beitritt zum Cotonou-Abkommen eine Gelegenheit für Kuba und die EU vertan. Ich hoffe, dass das, was 2003 geschah, sich nicht als unwiderruflich erweisen wird. Ich betrachte Kubas Aufnahme in das Cotonou-Abkommen nach wie vor als sehr wichtige Grundlage für unsere Beziehungen. Es stellt das Gerüst für die Nord-Süd-Beziehungen dar, so wie wir sie gerne strukturieren und regeln würden. Kubas Einbeziehung würde auch bedeuten, dass es innerhalb des Cotonou-Abkommens einem Gruppendruck ausgesetzt wäre. Ich hoffe, dass es immer noch möglich ist, eine aufgeschlossene Einstellung zu bewahren, aber dies heißt auch Aufgeschlossenheit in Kuba selbst."@de9
". Κύριε Πρόεδρε, οι σχέσεις της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης με την Κούβα διέπονται από την κοινή θέση που αρχικά ενέκρινε το Συμβούλιο το 1996, η οποία εκσυγχρονίζεται και ανανεώνεται τακτικά. Η κοινή θέση συνηγορεί υπέρ μιας πολιτικής εποικοδομητικών σχέσεων με την Κούβα μέσω ενός ενισχυμένου διαλόγου με την κυβέρνηση και την κοινωνία των πολιτών, με στόχο την ενθάρρυνση “μιας διαδικασίας μετάβασης στην πλουραλιστική δημοκρατία και στον σεβασμό των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων και των θεμελιωδών ελευθεριών, καθώς επίσης και στη βιώσιμη οικονομική ανάκαμψη και βελτίωση των συνθηκών διαβίωσης του κουβανικού λαού”. Αυτή η εποικοδομητική σχέση παραμένει η θέση μας. Μετά τις πολυάριθμες φυλακίσεις αντιφρονούντων το 2003, η Ένωση έλαβε μια σειρά πολιτικών μέτρων. Τον Ιούνιο του 2003, η ΕΕ αποφάσισε να περιορίσει τις διμερείς επισκέψεις υψηλού επιπέδου ώστε να μειώσει το προφίλ της συμμετοχής των κρατών μελών σε πολιτιστικά γεγονότα, να προσκαλέσει μέλη της ειρηνικής αντιπολίτευσης της Κούβας στις εθνικές εορταστικές τους εκδηλώσεις από κοινού με εκπροσώπους της κυβέρνησης και να επαναξιολογήσει νωρίτερα την κοινή θέση. Η πιο πρόσφατη επαναξιολόγηση της κοινής θέσης που έγινε τον Ιούνιο του τρέχοντος έτους επιβεβαίωσε την πολιτική των εποικοδομητικών σχέσεων ως βάση της πολιτικής της ΕΕ απέναντι στην Κούβα. Η ΕΕ έχει επανειλημμένως τονίσει τη σημασία του πολιτικού διαλόγου με τις κουβανικές αρχές και έχει επιδείξει τη βούλησή της να αρχίσει εκ νέου έναν τέτοιο διάλογο όταν το επιτρέψουν οι συνθήκες. Η Ευρωπαϊκή Επιτροπή λυπάται για την απόφαση της κουβανικής κυβέρνησης να παγώσει τις σχέσεις με όλες τις πρεσβείες των κρατών μελών της ΕΕ που έχουν καλέσει αντιφρονούντες στις εθνικές τους εορτές και με την αντιπροσωπεία της Επιτροπής στην Αβάνα, καθώς και για την άρνηση άμεσης βοήθειας από την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Παρά τις αποφάσεις της Κούβας που εμποδίζουν τις δραστηριότητες αναπτυξιακής συνεργασίας, η Επιτροπή συνεχίζει τις χρηματοδοτικές δράσεις ΜΚΟ και τις ανθρωπιστικές δράσεις που διαχειρίζεται η ECHO. Τον Οκτώβριο του 2004, η Επιτροπή έλαβε την απόφαση να παράσχει 1 εκατ. ευρώ σε ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια προς τα πιο ευάλωτα θύματα των τυφώνων Ivan και Charlie στην Κούβα. Δεν θα πρέπει να μιλάμε πραγματικά για ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, διότι θα παρείχαμε ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια σε οποιαδήποτε περίπτωση, χωρίς πολιτικές σκέψεις. Η απόφαση της κουβανικής κυβέρνησης να απελευθερώσει ορισμένους αντιφρονούντες για λόγους υγείας αποτελεί θετική χειρονομία προς τη βελτίωση της κατάστασης, αλλά δεν είναι αρκετή για να εγγυηθεί την πλήρη ανάκληση των μέτρων που αποφάσισε το Συμβούλιο τον Ιούνιο του περασμένου έτους. Ο στόχος εξακολουθεί να είναι η απελευθέρωση όλων των πολιτικών κρατουμένων στην Κούβα. Τα μέτρα του Ιουνίου αναθεωρούνται επί του παρόντος από το Συμβούλιο. Το Ευρωπαϊκό Συμβούλιο επιθυμεί να τονίσει ότι το αποτέλεσμα αυτής της αναθεώρησης πρέπει να συνάδει με τους συνολικούς στόχους της κοινής θέσης και με την πολιτική ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων της ΕΕ. Κατά την άποψη της Επιτροπής, αυτό θα μπορούσε να αποτελέσει τη βάση για μια εποικοδομητική και προσανατολισμένη προς το μέλλον πολιτική της ΕΕ απέναντι στην Κούβα, η οποία θα συντελούσε στην επίτευξη των στόχων της κοινής θέσης. Ορισμένοι αναρωτιούνται εάν η αντιπροσωπεία στην Αβάνα μπορεί πραγματικά να λειτουργήσει σημαντικά υπό τις παρούσες συνθήκες. Θέλω να καταστήσω σαφές ότι είναι σημαντικό η αντιπροσωπεία στην Αβάνα να εκτελέσει τις εργασίες που το Κοινοβούλιο ζήτησε από την Επιτροπή να αναλάβει. Η παρουσία μας στην Κούβα είναι σήμερα πιο σημαντική παρά ποτέ. Τα βασικά καθήκοντα της αντιπροσωπείας δεν είναι μόνο η βοήθεια ως προς την εφαρμογή των οκτώ προγραμμάτων και σχεδίων, αλλά και η προώθηση ενός πολιτικού διαλόγου με τις αρχές και την κοινωνία των πολιτών της Κούβας, η παρακολούθηση των ζητημάτων που αφορούν τα ανθρώπινα δικαιώματα και η προστασία των εμπορικών και επενδυτικών συμφερόντων των κρατών μελών. Πρόκειται για μια φορτωμένη, σημαντική και ενίοτε δύσκολη ατζέντα, αλλά είναι σημαντική εάν θέλουμε να προωθήσουμε πολιτικές και οικονομικές βελτιώσεις στην Κούβα. Γενικότερα, θα πω ότι το 2003 ήταν ένα άσχημο έτος για τις σχέσεις μας με την Κούβα. Κατά την άποψή μου, το γεγονός ότι η Συμφωνία του Κοτονού δεν πέτυχε ήταν μια χαμένη ευκαιρία για την Κούβα και την ΕΕ. Ελπίζω πως ό,τι συνέβη το 2003 δεν θα αποδειχθεί αμετάκλητο. Εξακολουθώ να θεωρώ τη συμμετοχή της Κούβας στη Συμφωνία του Κοτονού ένα πολύ σημαντικό πλαίσιο για τις σχέσεις μας. Εκπροσωπεί τη βασική δομή του τρόπου με τον οποίο θα θέλαμε να οργανώσουμε και να διαχειριστούμε τις σχέσεις Βορρά-Νότου. Η συμμετοχή της Κούβας στο Κοτονού σημαίνει επίσης ότι η Κούβα θα υφίσταται πιέσεις από ομολόγους στο πλαίσιο της Συμφωνίας του Κοτονού. Ελπίζω ότι είναι ακόμα δυνατόν να διατηρήσουμε ανοικτούς ορίζοντες, αλλά αυτό σημαίνει και ανοικτούς ορίζοντες και εντός της Κούβας."@el10
". Señor Presidente, las relaciones de la Unión Europea con Cuba se rigen por la posición común adoptada inicialmente por el Consejo en 1996, y que se ha actualizado y renovado periódicamente. La posición común propugna una política de compromiso constructivo con Cuba a través de un diálogo reforzado con el Gobierno y la sociedad civil, con el objetivo de favorecer un proceso de transición hacia una democracia pluralista y el respeto de los derechos humanos y libertades fundamentales, así como una recuperación económica sostenible y una mejora del nivel de vida del pueblo cubano. Este compromiso constructivo sigue siendo nuestra posición. A raíz del encarcelamiento masivo de disidentes en 2003, la Unión Europea adoptó una serie de medidas políticas. En junio de 2003, la Unión Europea decidió limitar las visitas bilaterales de alto nivel a fin de rebajar el nivel de la participación de los Estados miembros en los acontecimientos culturales, invitar a los miembros cubanos de la oposición pacífica a las recepciones con motivo de las fiestas nacionales junto con representantes gubernamentales y someter la posición común a una nueva evaluación de forma anticipada. La última evaluación de la posición común, en junio de este año, vino a confirmar la política de compromiso constructivo como la base de la política de la Unión Europea con respecto a Cuba. La Unión Europea ha subrayado en repetidas ocasiones la importancia del diálogo político con las autoridades cubanas y ha manifestado su disposición a reanudar dicho diálogo cuando las circunstancias lo permitan. La Comisión Europea deplora la decisión del Gobierno cubano de congelar las relaciones con todas las embajadas de los Estados miembros de la Unión Europea que hubieran invitado a disidentes a la celebración de su fiesta nacional, y con la delegación de la Comisión en La Habana, así como de rechazar la ayuda directa procedente de la Unión Europea. A pesar de las decisiones cubanas que entorpecen nuestras actividades de cooperación al desarrollo, la Comisión ha continuado subvencionando actividades de las ONG y acciones humanitarias gestionadas por la ECHO. En octubre de 2004, la Comisión decidió entregar un millón de euros en concepto de ayuda humanitaria para las víctimas más desvalidas de los huracanes Iván y Charlie en Cuba. En realidad no deberíamos hablar de ayuda humanitaria en este contexto, ya que prestaríamos ayuda humanitaria en cualquier caso, al margen de toda consideración política. La decisión del Gobierno cubano de liberar a algunos disidentes por motivos de salud constituye un gesto positivo para mejorar las cosas, pero no es suficiente para justificar la revocación completa de las medidas aprobadas por el Consejo en junio del año pasado. El objetivo sigue siendo la liberación de todos los presos políticos en Cuba. Las medidas de junio están siendo revisadas actualmente por el Consejo. El Consejo Europeo desea subrayar que el resultado de esta revisión ha de ser coherente con los objetivos globales de la posición común y la política de derechos humanos de la Unión Europea. A juicio de la Comisión, todo ello podría sentar las bases para una política constructiva y orientada al futuro de la Unión Europea respecto de Cuba, y que favoreciera la consecución de los objetivos de la posición común. Algunas personas han cuestionado si la delegación en La Habana puede funcionar realmente de una manera provechosa en las circunstancias actuales. Quiero dejar claro que la delegación en La Habana es fundamental para llevar a cabo las tareas que el Parlamento ha solicitado que emprenda la Comisión. Nuestra presencia en Cuba es hoy más importante que nunca. Las tareas principales de la delegación no solo consisten en prestar ayuda con la ejecución de ocho programas y proyectos, sino también en promover el diálogo político con las autoridades y la sociedad civil cubanas, en hacer un seguimiento de las cuestiones de derechos humanos y en defender los intereses comerciales y las inversiones de los Estados miembros. Tiene una agenda cargada, importante y a veces difícil de cumplir, pero es fundamental si queremos fomentar mejoras políticas y económicas en Cuba. En conjunto, yo diría que 2003 fue un año funesto para nuestras relaciones con Cuba. A mi juicio se perdió una oportunidad para Cuba y la Unión Europea al no cuajar su adhesión al Acuerdo de Cotonú. Espero que lo ocurrido en 2003 no resulte ser irreversible. Sigo considerando que la incorporación de Cuba al Acuerdo de Cotonú sería un marco muy útil para nuestras relaciones. Representa la estructura básica de cómo nos gustaría organizar y conducir las relaciones Norte–Sur. La participación cubana en el Acuerdo de Cotonú significa asimismo que Cuba estaría sometida a la presión de sus homólogos en el seno de dicho Acuerdo. Espero que siga siendo posible mantener una actitud abierta, pero eso también requiere una actitud abierta en el interior de Cuba."@es20
"Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@et5
". Arvoisa puhemies, Euroopan unionin suhteita Kuubaan säännellään neuvoston alkujaan vuonna 1996 antamassa yhteisessä kannassa, jota on tarkistettu ja saatettu ajan tasalle säännöllisesti. Yhteisessä kannassa kannatetaan rakentavan sitoutumisen politiikkaa Kuuban suhteen ja tiivistetään vuoropuhelua hallituksen ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan kanssa tavoitteena "edistää siirtymistä monimuotoiseen demokratiaan sekä ihmisoikeuksien ja perusvapauksien kunnioittamiseen sekä edistää Kuuban kansan elinolojen kestävää elpymistä ja kohentumista". Rakentava sitoutuminen on edelleen kantanamme. Kun toisinajattelijoita vangittiin laajamittaisesti vuonna 2003, unioni toteutti joukon poliittisia toimenpiteitä. Kesäkuussa 2003 EU päätti rajoittaa kahdenvälisiä korkean tason vierailuja mataloittaakseen jäsenvaltioiden osallistumisprofiilia kulttuuritapahtumiin sekä kutsua Kuuban rauhanomaisen opposition jäseniä osallistumaan hallituksen edustajien ohella kansallispäivien juhlallisuuksiin ja arvioida yhteistä kantaa vastaisuudessa uudelleen. Uusimmassa yhteisen kannan uudelleenarvioinnissa tämän vuoden kesäkuussa toistettiin, että rakentava sitoutuminen muodostaa edelleen perustan EU:n Kuuban-politiikalle. EU on useaan otteeseen korostanut pitävänsä vuoropuhelua Kuuban viranomaisten kanssa tärkeänä ja osoittanut halukkuutensa sellaisen aloittamiseen heti, kun olosuhteet sen sallivat. Euroopan komissio pitää valitettavana Kuuban hallituksen päätöstä jäädyttää suhteensa kaikkien niiden EU:n jäsenvaltioiden edustustoihin, jotka ovat kutsuneet toisinajattelijoita kansallispäiviensä viettoon. Lisäksi se on katkaissut suhteensa komission edustustoon Havannassa ja kieltäytynyt Euroopan unionin suorasta avusta. Huolimatta Kuuban päätöksistä, jotka vaikeuttavat kehitysyhteistyötämme, komissio on rahoittanut edelleen ECHOn hallinnoimaa kansalaisjärjestötoimintaa ja humanitaarista toimintaa. Lokakuussa 2004 komissio päätti myöntää miljoona euroa humanitaarista apua Ivan- ja Charlie-hirmumyrskyjen heikoimmassa asemassa oleville uhreille Kuubassa. Humanitaarisesta avusta ei oikeastaan pitäisi keskustella tässä yhteydessä, koska annamme sitä joka tapauksessa poliittisista seikoista riippumatta. Kuuban hallituksen päätös vapauttaa eräitä toisinajoittelijoita terveydellisistä syistä on myönteinen ele tilanteen parantamiseksi, mutta se ei riitä neuvoston viime vuoden kesäkuussa päättämien toimenpiteiden kumoamiseen kokonaisuudessaan. Päämääränä on yhä kaikkien Kuuban poliittisten vankien vapauttaminen. Neuvosto arvioi parhaillaan kesäkuussa päätettyjä toimenpiteitä. Eurooppa-neuvosto on tähdentänyt, että arvioinnin tuloksen on oltava yhteisen kannan yleisten tavoitteiden ja EU:n ihmisoikeuspolitiikan mukainen. Komission näkemyksen mukaan tästä voi muodostua perusta rakentavalle ja tulevaisuuteen suuntautuvalle EU:n Kuuban-politiikalle, jonka avulla voidaan saavuttaa yhteisessä kannassa määritellyt tavoitteet. On kyselty, pystyykö Havannan edustusto tosiaankin toimimaan järkevällä tavalla nykyisissä olosuhteissa. Haluan tehdä selväksi, että Havannan edustustolla on olennainen tehtävä hoidettaessa niitä tehtäviä, joista komissio parlamentin pyynnöstä huolehtii. Läsnäolomme Kuubassa on entistäkin tärkeämpää. Edustuston päätehtävänä on avustaa kahdeksan ohjelman ja hankkeiden toteuttamisessa ja edistää poliittista vuoropuhelua Kuuban viranomaisten ja kansalaisyhteiskunnan kanssa, seurata ihmisoikeustilannetta ja suojata jäsenvaltioiden kaupallisia ja investointeihin liittyviä etuja. Tehtäväluettelo on laaja, merkittävä ja aika ajoin myös hankala toteuttaa. Tehtävät ovat kuitenkin ehdottoman tärkeitä, mikäli aiomme edistää poliittisia ja taloudellisia uudistuksia Kuubassa. Kaiken kaikkiaan on sanottava, että vuosi 2003 oli surullinen vuosi suhteissamme Kuubaan. Mielestäni oli menetys niin Kuuballe kuin EU:llekin, ettei maan liittyminen Cotonoun sopimukseen toteutunut. Toivon, että vuoden 2003 kehitys on käännettävissä. Pidän Kuuban liittymistä Cotonoun sopimukseen edelleenkin erittäin merkittävänä kehyksenä keskinäisille suhteillemme. Sopimus muodostaa rungon sille, miten haluamme järjestää ja hoitaa pohjoisen ja etelän väliset suhteet. Kuuban liittyminen Cotonoun sopimukseen aiheuttaisi lisäksi vertaispainetta muiden sopimuspuolten taholta. Toivon, että asiaan voidaan vastakin suhtautua avoimin mielin – myös Kuubassa."@fi7
". Monsieur le Président, les relations de l’Union européenne avec Cuba sont régies par la position commune adoptée à l’origine par le Conseil en 1996, qui a été actualisée et renouvelée régulièrement. Cette position prône une politique d’engagement constructif à l’égard de Cuba par le biais d’un dialogue renforcé avec le gouvernement et la société civile, en vue d’encourager «un processus de transition vers le pluralisme démocratique et le respect des droits de l’homme et des libertés fondamentales, ainsi qu’un relèvement [économique durable] et une amélioration (…) du niveau de vie du peuple cubain». Cet engagement constructif reste notre position. À la suite des incarcérations massives de dissidents en 2003, l’Union européenne a adopté une série de mesures politiques. En juin 2003, elle a décidé de limiter les visites bilatérales de haut niveau, de réduire le profil de participation des États membres aux événements culturels, d’inviter les membres cubains de l’opposition pacifique aux célébrations de leur fête nationale aux côtés des représentants des gouvernements et d’entamer plus tôt que prévu le réexamen de la position commune. Le dernier réexamen de cette position, en juin dernier, a réaffirmé la politique d’engagement constructif comme fondement de la politique de l’UE vis-à-vis de Cuba. L’UE a souligné à plusieurs reprises l’importance d’un dialogue politique avec les autorités cubaines et a fait part de sa volonté de relancer ce dialogue lorsque les conditions le permettront. La Commission européenne déplore la décision prise par le gouvernement cubain de geler les relations avec toutes les ambassades des États membres de l’Union qui ont invité des dissidents aux commémorations de leur fête nationale et avec la délégation de la Commission à La Havane, ainsi que le refus de recevoir toute aide directe de la part de l’Union européenne. Malgré ces décisions cubaines, qui entravent nos activités de coopération au développement, la Commission poursuit ses actions de financement d’ONG et d’actions humanitaires gérées par ECHO. En octobre 2004, la Commission a décidé de débloquer 1 million d’euros d’aide humanitaire pour les victimes les plus vulnérables des ouragans Ivan et Charlie à Cuba. Nous ne devrions pas vraiment parler d’aide humanitaire dans ce contexte, car nous aurions de toute façon apporté une telle aide, indépendamment de toute considération politique. Si la décision du gouvernement cubain de libérer certains dissidents pour des raisons de santé est un geste positif en vue d’une amélioration de la situation, elle ne suffit pas à garantir une pleine révocation des mesures adoptées par le Conseil en juin dernier. L’objectif reste la libération de tous les prisonniers politiques à Cuba. Les mesures prises en juin sont actuellement examinées par le Conseil. Ce dernier tient à souligner que les résultats de cet examen doivent être cohérents par rapport aux objectifs généraux de la position commune et de la politique de l’UE en matière de droits de l’homme. Pour la Commission, ceci pourrait servir de base à une politique européenne constructive et orientée vers l’avenir vis-à-vis de Cuba, ce qui permettrait d’atteindre les objectifs définis dans la position commune. Certains se sont demandés si la délégation à La Havane pouvait vraiment fonctionner correctement dans les circonstances actuelles. Je tiens à dire clairement que cette délégation est essentielle pour mener à bien les missions que le Parlement a assignées à la Commission. Notre présence à Cuba est plus importante que jamais. Les principales missions de la délégation ne sont pas seulement d’aider à la mise en œuvre de huit programmes et projets, mais aussi de promouvoir un dialogue politique avec les autorités cubaines et la société civile, de surveiller les questions relatives aux droits de l’homme et de protéger les intérêts des États membres en matière de commerce et d’investissements. Il s’agit d’un programme lourd, important et parfois difficile à appliquer, mais il est essentiel si nous voulons promouvoir les améliorations politiques et économiques à Cuba. Globalement, je dirais que 2003 était une année bien triste pour nos relations avec Cuba. À mon sens, l’échec de l’adhésion de Cuba à l’accord de Cotonou fut une occasion manquée aussi bien pour le pays que pour l’UE. J’espère que les événements de 2003 ne s’avéreront pas irréversibles. Je continue de considérer l’adhésion de Cuba à l’accord de Cotonou comme un cadre tout à fait pertinent pour nos relations. Cet accord symbolise la manière fondamentale dont nous souhaiterions organiser et gérer les relations Nord-Sud. La participation de Cuba à cet accord implique également qu’il serait sujet à la pression des pairs dans le cadre de ce dernier. J’espère qu’il est encore possible de garder un esprit ouvert - et qui le serait donc également à Cuba même."@fr8
"Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@hu11
". Signor Presidente, le relazioni dell’Unione europea con Cuba sono ispirate dalla posizione comune originariamente adottata dal Consiglio nel 1996, che è stata regolarmente aggiornata e rinnovata. La posizione comune sostiene una politica di impegno costruttivo con Cuba attraverso il miglioramento del dialogo con il governo e la società civile con l’obiettivo di incoraggiare “il processo di transizione verso una democrazia pluralistica e il rispetto dei diritti all’uomo e delle libertà fondamentali, nonché un ricupero e un miglioramento sostenibile per quanto riguarda le condizioni di vita del popolo cubano”. Questo impegno costruttivo continua a rappresentare la nostra posizione. A seguito dei massicci arresti di dissidenti nel 2003, l’Unione ha adottato una serie di misure politiche. Nel mese di giugno 2003, l’Unione europea ha deciso di limitare le visite bilaterali ad alto livello per ridurre il profilo della partecipazione degli Stati membri agli eventi culturali, di invitare i rappresentanti cubani dell’opposizione pacifica alle celebrazioni delle feste nazionali, insieme ai rappresentanti governativi, e di rivalutare la posizione comune con un certo anticipo sui tempi. L’ultima rivalutazione della posizione comune, effettuata a giugno di quest’anno, ha riaffermato la politica di impegno costruttivo come base della politica comunitaria nei confronti di Cuba. L’Unione europea ha ripetutamente sottolineato l’importanza del dialogo politico con le autorità cubane e ha manifestato la propria disponibilità a riavviare tale dialogo quando le condizioni lo consentiranno. La Commissione europea deplora la decisione del governo cubano di congelare le relazioni con tutte le ambasciate degli Stati membri dell’Unione europea che hanno invitato dissidenti alle proprie feste nazionali e con la delegazione della Commissione all’Avana, nonché il rifiuto di aiuti diretti dall’Unione europea. Nonostante le decisioni di Cuba che ostacolano le nostre attività nel settore della cooperazione allo sviluppo, la Commissione ha continuato a finanziare le azioni delle ONG e le azioni umanitarie gestite da ECHO. Nell’ottobre 2004, la Commissione ha preso la decisione di stanziare 1 milione di euro in aiuti umanitari alle vittime più vulnerabili degli uragani e a Cuba. Non dovremmo in realtà parlare di aiuti umanitari in questo contesto, poiché forniremmo aiuti umanitari in ogni caso, a prescindere dalle considerazioni di carattere politico. La decisione del governo cubano di liberare certi dissidenti per motivi di salute è un gesto positivo verso il miglioramento della situazione, ma non è sufficiente a garantire la completa revoca delle misure stabilite dal Consiglio nel giugno dello scorso anno. L’obiettivo continua a essere la liberazione di tutti i prigionieri politici a Cuba. Le misure di giugno sono attualmente in corso di revisione da parte del Consiglio. Il Consiglio europeo desidera sottolineare che il risultato di questo riesame deve essere coerente con gli obiettivi generali della posizione comune e della politica in materia di diritti umani dell’Unione europea. Secondo la Commissione, questa potrebbe essere la base per una politica costruttiva e orientata al futuro dell’Unione nei confronti di Cuba, che potrebbe contribuire alla realizzazione degli obiettivi della posizione comune. Alcuni hanno chiesto se la delegazione all’Avana può realmente funzionare in modo concreto nelle circostanze attuali. Desidero precisare che la delegazione all’Avana è essenziale per svolgere i compiti che il Parlamento ha chiesto alla Commissione di intraprendere. La nostra presenza a Cuba è oggi più importante che mai. Tra i compiti principali della delegazione non c’è solo il contributo in vista dell’attuazione di otto programmi e progetti, ma anche la promozione di un dialogo politico con le autorità cubane e la società civile, per monitorare le problematiche inerenti i diritti umani e per proteggere il commercio e gli interessi in termini di investimenti degli Stati membri. E’ un programma oneroso, importante e talvolta difficile da portare avanti, ma è essenziale se vogliamo promuovere i miglioramenti politici ed economici a Cuba. Tutto sommato, direi che il 2003 è stato un anno triste per quanto riguarda le nostre relazioni con Cuba. A mio parere, la mancata adesione all’accordo di Cotonou è stata un’occasione persa sia per Cuba che per l’Unione europea. Spero che quanto è avvenuto nel 2003 non si riveli irreversibile. Continuo a ritenere che l’adesione di Cuba all’accordo di Cotonou costituisca un quadro estremamente significativo per le nostre relazioni. Rappresenta la struttura di base e il modello per l’organizzazione e la gestione delle relazioni nord-sud. La partecipazione di Cuba a Cotonou implicherebbe anche che Cuba sarebbe soggetta alla pressione del gruppo in seno all’accordo di Cotonou. Spero che sia ancora possibile seguire un approccio aperto, ma ci vuole apertura anche all’interno di Cuba."@it12
"Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@lt14
"Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@lv13
"Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@mt15
". Mijnheer de Voorzitter, de betrekkingen van de Europese Unie met Cuba worden bepaald door het gemeenschappelijk standpunt dat oorspronkelijk in 1996 door de Raad is aangenomen en dat sindsdien regelmatig is geactualiseerd en vernieuwd. In het gemeenschappelijk standpunt wordt gepleit voor een beleid van constructieve betrokkenheid bij Cuba via een uitgebreide dialoog met de regering en de maatschappelijke organisaties, met als doel het bevorderen van “een overgangsproces naar een pluralistische democratie en eerbiediging van de mensenrechten en de fundamentele vrijheden, alsook een duurzaam herstel en een verbetering van de levensstandaard van het Cubaanse volk”. Deze constructieve betrokkenheid is altijd ons standpunt gebleven. Naar aanleiding van de grootschalige gevangenneming van dissidenten heeft de Unie in 2003 een reeks politieke maatregelen genomen. In juni 2003 besloot de EU de bilaterale regeringsbezoeken op hoog niveau te beperken, de omvang van de deelname van de lidstaten aan culturele evenementen te beperken, Cubaanse dissidenten uit te nodigen voor de vieringen van nationale feestdagen en het gemeenschappelijk standpunt van de EU vroegtijdig opnieuw te bezien. Tijdens de meest recente herziening van het gemeenschappelijk standpunt in juni van dit jaar werd het beleid van constructieve betrokkenheid opnieuw bevestigd als basis van het EU-beleid ten aanzien van Cuba. De EU heeft herhaaldelijk het belang onderstreept van het onderhouden van een politieke dialoog met de Cubaanse autoriteiten en zij heeft blijk gegeven van haar bereidheid om opnieuw een dergelijke dialoog aan te gaan zodra de omstandigheden dat toelaten. De Europese Commissie betreurt het besluit van de Cubaanse regering tot opschorting van de betrekkingen met alle ambassades van EU-lidstaten die dissidenten hebben uitgenodigd voor de viering van hun nationale feestdagen en met de delegatie van de Commissie in Havana, almede de weigering van Cuba rechtstreekse hulp van de Europese Unie te accepteren. Hoewel de Cubaanse besluiten onze activiteiten op het gebied van ontwikkelingssamenwerking belemmeren, is de Commissie doorgegaan met het financieren van acties van NGO’s en humanitaire acties onder beheer van ECHO. In oktober 2004 heeft de Commissie het besluit genomen om 1 miljoen euro aan humanitaire hulp ter beschikking te stellen aan de kwetsbaarste slachtoffers van de orkanen Ivan en Charlie op Cuba. Eigenlijk moeten we het in dit verband niet over humanitaire hulp hebben, omdat we dergelijke humanitaire hulp sowieso verlenen, zonder dat politieke overwegingen daarbij een rol spelen. Het besluit van de Cubaanse regering om bepaalde dissidenten om gezondheidsredenen vrij te laten is een positief gebaar dat wijst op verbetering van de situatie, maar het is niet voldoende om de volledige intrekking te rechtvaardigen van de maatregelen waartoe de Raad in juni vorig jaar heeft besloten. Het doel blijft immers de vrijlating van alle politieke gevangenen op Cuba. De maatregelen van juni worden momenteel door de Raad opnieuw bekeken. De Europese Raad wil benadrukken dat het resultaat van deze beoordeling moet stroken met de algemene doelen, die in het gemeenschappelijk standpunt zijn vastgelegd, en met het mensenrechtenbeleid van de EU. De Commissie is van mening dat dit resultaat een basis zou kunnen vormen voor een constructief en toekomstgericht EU-beleid ten aanzien van Cuba, dat een bijdrage zal leveren aan het realiseren van de doelstellingen in het gemeenschappelijk standpunt. Een aantal mensen heeft gevraagd of de delegatie in Havana onder de huidige omstandigheden eigenlijk wel op een zinvolle manier kan functioneren. Ik wil nadrukkelijk stellen dat de delegatie in Havana essentieel is voor het uitvoeren van de taken die de Commissie op verzoek van het Parlement vervult. Onze aanwezigheid op Cuba is vandaag de dag belangrijker dan ooit. De voornaamste taken van de delegatie zijn namelijk niet alleen het verlenen van assistentie bij de tenuitvoerlegging van acht programma’s en projecten, maar ook het bevorderen van een politieke dialoog met de Cubaanse autoriteiten en het maatschappelijk middenveld, het volgen van mensenrechtenkwesties en het beschermen van de handels- en investeringsbelangen van de lidstaten. Dit is een zware, belangrijke en soms moeilijk na te streven agenda, maar wel een agenda die van cruciaal belang is als we de politieke en economische verbeteringen op Cuba willen blijven bevorderen. Al met al zou ik zeggen dat 2003 een triest jaar was voor onze betrekkingen met Cuba. Ik ben van mening dat Cuba en de EU een kans hebben gemist doordat de toetreding van Cuba tot de Overeenkomst van Cotonou niet kon worden gerealiseerd. Ik hoop dat de gebeurtenissen van 2003 niet onomkeerbaar zullen blijken. Ik ben nog altijd van mening dat de Overeenkomst van Cotonou een buitengewoon belangrijk kader zou kunnen zijn voor onze betrekkingen met Cuba. Deze overeenkomst geeft immers op fundamentele wijze structuur aan de wijze waarop wij de betrekkingen tussen het Noorden en het Zuiden willen organiseren en vormgeven. De Cubaanse deelname aan de Overeenkomst van Cotonou zou verder betekenen dat Cuba in het kader van Cotonou blootgesteld zou worden aan onderlinge druk van partners. Ik hoop dat het nog altijd mogelijk is onbevooroordeeld te blijven, maar dat betekent wel dat men dat ook van Cubaanse zijde moet zijn."@nl3
"Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@pl16
"Senhor Presidente, as relações da União Europeia com Cuba são regidas pela posição comum que foi originalmente adoptada pelo Conselho em 1996 e tem sido regularmente actualizada e renovada. Essa posição comum defende uma política de compromisso construtivo com Cuba através de um diálogo reforçado com o Governo e a sociedade civil, com o objectivo de incentivar um processo de transição para uma democracia pluralista e respeitadora dos direitos humanos e das liberdades fundamentais, bem como uma recuperação económica sustentável e a melhoria do nível de vida do povo cubano. A nossa posição tem-se pautado por esse princípio do compromisso construtivo. A seguir às detenções em grade escala de dissidentes em 2003, a União adoptou uma série de medidas políticas. Em Junho de 2003, decidiu limitar as visitas bilaterais de alto nível a fim de reduzir a visibilidade da participação dos Estados-Membros em eventos culturais, bem como convidar membros cubanos da oposição pacífica para as celebrações dos dias nacionais juntamente com representantes do Governo e antecipar a reavaliação da posição comum. A última reavaliação da posição comum, efectuada em Junho deste ano, reiterou a política de compromisso construtivo como base da política da UE em relação a Cuba. A UE salientou reiteradamente a importância do diálogo político com as autoridades cubanas e declarou-se disponível para reatar esse diálogo assim que as condições o permitirem. A Comissão Europeia lamenta a decisão do Governo cubano de congelar as relações com todas as embaixadas dos Estados-Membros da UE que convidaram dissidentes para as comemorações dos seus dias nacionais, bem como com a delegação da Comissão em Havana, e de recusar a ajuda directa da União Europeia. Apesar das decisões do Governo cubano que impedem as nossas actividades de cooperação para o desenvolvimento, a Comissão continuou a financiar as acções desenvolvidas pelas ONG e as acções humanitárias geridas pelo serviço ECHO. Em Outubro de 2004, a Comissão tomou uma decisão de fornecer 1 milhão de euros em ajuda humanitária às vítimas mais vulneráveis dos furacões Ivan e Charlie que atingiram Cuba. Na realidade, não deveríamos falar em ajuda humanitária neste contexto, já que prestaríamos sempre ajuda humanitária, sem quaisquer considerações de ordem política. A decisão do Governo cubano de libertar certos dissidentes por razões de saúde é um gesto positivo que contribui para melhorar a situação, mas não é suficiente para garantir a revogação total das medidas decididas pelo Conselho em Junho do ano passado. O objectivo continua a ser a libertação de todos os presos políticos existentes em Cuba. As medidas adoptadas em Junho estão agora a ser revistas pelo Conselho. O Conselho Europeu deseja salientar que o resultado desta revisão tem de ser consistente com os objectivos globais da posição comum e da política da UE em matéria de direitos humanos. No entender da Comissão, isto poderia servir de base para uma política construtiva e orientada para o futuro da UE em relação a Cuba, capaz de conduzir à concretização dos objectivos da posição comum. Houve quem perguntasse se, nas actuais circunstâncias, a delegação em Havana pode funcionar de forma verdadeiramente útil. Quero que fique claro que a delegação em Havana é essencial para a realização das tarefas que o Parlamento encomendou à Comissão. A nossa presença em Cuba é hoje mais importante do que nunca. As principais tarefas da delegação não consistem apenas em dar assistência à implementação de oito programas e projectos, incluem também a promoção de um diálogo político com as autoridades cubanas e a sociedade civil, o acompanhamento das questões dos direitos humanos e a protecção dos interesses comerciais e dos investimentos dos Estados-Membros. Trata-se de uma agenda pesada, importante, e por vezes difícil de prosseguir, mas que é essencial para podermos promover melhorias a nível político e económico em Cuba. Em termos globais, eu diria que 2003 foi um ano triste nas nossas relações com Cuba. A meu ver, foi uma oportunidade perdida para Cuba e para a UE o facto de ter fracassado a adesão deste país ao Acordo de Cotonu. Espero que aquilo que sucedeu em 2003 não venha a revelar-se irreversível. Continuo a considerar que a adesão de Cuba ao Acordo de Cotonu constitui um enquadramento muito útil para as nossas relações. Representa a estrutura básica do modo como gostaríamos de organizar e administrar as nossas relações Norte-Sul. A participação cubana em Cotonu significa igualmente que Cuba ficaria sujeita à pressão dos seus pares no âmbito do Acordo de Cotonu. Espero que ainda seja possível manter um espírito aberto, mas isso pressupõe também um espírito aberto dentro de Cuba."@pt17
"Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@sk18
"Mr President, the European Union's relations with Cuba are governed by the common position originally adopted by the Council in 1996, which has been updated and renewed regularly. The common position advocates a policy of constructive engagement with Cuba through enhanced dialogue with government and civil society with the objective of encouraging 'a process of transition to pluralist democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as a sustainable economic recovery and improvement in the living standards of the Cuban people'. This constructive engagement has remained our position. Following the large-scale imprisonment of dissidents in 2003, the Union took a series of political measures. In June 2003 the EU decided to limit bilateral high-level visits to reduce the profile of Member States' participation in cultural events, to invite Cuban members of the peaceful opposition to their national day celebrations alongside government representatives and to re-evaluate the common position ahead of time. The most recent re-evaluation of the common position in June this year re-affirmed the policy of constructive engagement as the basis of EU policy towards Cuba. The EU has repeatedly underscored the importance of political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and has indicated its willingness to restart such a dialogue when conditions permit. The European Commission deplores the Cuban Government's decision to freeze relations with all embassies of EU Member States that have invited dissidents to their national days and with the Commission delegation in Havana, as well as the refusal of direct aid from the European Union. Despite Cuban decisions which impede our development cooperation activities, the Commission has continued funding actions by NGOs and humanitarian actions managed by ECHO. In October 2004 the Commission took a decision to provide EUR 1 million in humanitarian assistance to the most vulnerable victims of hurricanes Ivan and Charlie in Cuba. We should not really talk about humanitarian assistance in this context because we would deliver humanitarian assistance in any case, without any political considerations. The decision by the Cuban Government to release certain dissidents on health grounds is a positive gesture to an improved situation, but not sufficient to warrant full revocation of the measures decided by the Council in June last year. The aim continues to be the release of all political prisoners in Cuba. The June measures are currently being reviewed by the Council. The European Council wishes to stress that the result of this review has to be consistent with the overall aims of the common position and the human rights policy of the EU. In the Commission's view, this could provide a basis for a constructive and future-oriented EU policy towards Cuba, which would be conducive to attaining the objectives of the common position. Some people have asked whether the delegation in Havana can really function meaningfully in the present circumstances. I want to make it clear that the delegation in Havana is essential to carry out the tasks that Parliament has asked the Commission to undertake. Our presence in Cuba is more important today than ever. The main tasks of the delegation are not only to assist with the implementation of eight programmes and projects, but also to promote a political dialogue with the Cuban authorities and civil society, to monitor human rights issues and to protect the trade and investment interests of Member States. This is a heavy, important, and sometimes difficult agenda to pursue, but it is essential if we wish to promote political and economic improvements in Cuba. All in all, I would say that 2003 was a sad year in our relations with Cuba. In my view, it was a lost opportunity for Cuba and the EU that membership of the Cotonou Agreement did not succeed. I hope that what happened in 2003 will not turn out to be irreversible. I still find Cuban membership of the Cotonou Agreement a very meaningful framework for our relations. It represents the basic structure of how we would like to organise and govern north-south relations. Cuban participation in Cotonou also means that Cuba would be subject to peer pressure within the Cotonou Agreement. I hope that it is still possible to keep an open mind, but that also means an open mind inside Cuba."@sl19
". Herr talman! Europeiska unionens förbindelser med Kuba styrs av den gemensamma ståndpunkt som ursprungligen antogs av rådet 1996 och som har uppdaterats och förnyats regelbundet. I den gemensamma ståndpunkten förespråkas ett konstruktivt engagemang för Kuba genom en fördjupad dialog med regeringen och det civila samhället. Målet är att uppmuntra en övergångsprocess till pluralistisk demokrati och respekt för mänskliga rättigheter och grundläggande friheter liksom en hållbar ekonomisk återhämtning och förbättring av det kubanska folkets levnadsstandard. Detta konstruktiva engagemang har hela tiden varit vår ståndpunkt. Till följd av fängslandet av ett stort antal dissidenter 2003 vidtog unionen en rad politiska åtgärder. I juni 2003 beslöt EU att begränsa bilaterala besök på hög nivå för att hålla en lägre profil på medlemsstaternas deltagande i kulturevenemang, att bjuda in kubanska medlemmar av den fredliga oppositionen till sina nationaldagsfiranden tillsammans med regeringsföreträdare och att omvärdera den gemensamma ståndpunkten i förtid. Den senaste omvärderingen av den gemensamma ståndpunkten i juni i år bekräftade återigen det konstruktiva engagemanget som basen för EU:s politik gentemot Kuba. EU har upprepade gånger betonat vikten av politisk dialog med de kubanska myndigheterna och har visat sin vilja att återuppta en sådan dialog när förhållandena så medger. Europeiska kommissionen beklagar djupt den kubanska regeringens beslut att frysa förbindelserna med ambassaderna för alla de EU-länder som har bjudit in dissidenter på sina nationaldagar och med kommissionens delegation i Havanna liksom vägran att ta emot direkt hjälp ifrån EU. Trots kubanska beslut som hindrar våra utvecklingssamarbetsaktiviteter har kommissionen fortsatt att finansiera insatser genom frivilligorganisationer och humanitära insatser som administreras av Europeiska gemenskapens kontor för humanitärt bistånd (ECHO). Under oktober 2004 fattade kommissionen beslut om att anslå 1 miljon euro i humanitärt bistånd till de mest utsatta offren för orkanerna Ivan och Charlie på Kuba. Vi skall egentligen inte tala om humanitärt bistånd i detta sammanhang eftersom vi skulle ge humanitärt bistånd i vilket fall som helst utan politiska hänsyn. Den kubanska regeringens beslut att släppa vissa dissidenter av hälsoskäl är en positiv gest mot en förbättrad situation men inte tillräckligt för att garantera ett fullständigt upphävande av de åtgärder som beslutades av rådet i juni förra året. Målet är fortfarande att alla politiska fångar i Kuba skall friges. Juni månads åtgärder granskas just nu av rådet. Europeiska rådet vill betona att resultatet av denna granskning måste överensstämma med de övergripande målen för den gemensamma ståndpunkten och EU:s människorättspolitik. Kommissionen anser att detta skulle kunna utgöra basen för en konstruktiv och framtidsorienterad EU-politik gentemot Kuba som skulle bidra till att uppnå målen för den gemensamma ståndpunkten. En del har ifrågasatt om delegationen i Havanna verkligen kan fungera på ett meningsfullt sätt under nuvarande omständigheter. Jag vill göra klart att delegationen i Havanna är absolut nödvändig för att utföra de uppgifter som parlamentet har bett kommissionen att sköta. Vår närvaro i Kuba är i dag viktigare än någonsin. Delegationens huvudsakliga uppgifter är inte bara att hjälpa till med genomförandet av åtta program och projekt utan också att främja en politisk dialog med de kubanska myndigheterna och det civila samhället, att övervaka frågor om mänskliga rättigheter och att skydda medlemsstaternas handels- och investeringsintressen. Detta är tunga, viktiga och ibland svåra uppgifter, men de är oundgängliga om vi vill främja politiska och ekonomiska framsteg i Kuba. Sammanfattningsvis skulle jag vilja säga att 2003 var ett sorgligt år för våra förbindelser med Kuba. Enligt min åsikt är det en förlorad möjlighet för Kuba och EU att Cotonouavtalet inte blev undertecknat. Jag hoppas att det som hände under 2003 inte kommer att visa sig vara oåterkalleligt. Jag anser fortfarande att Kubas undertecknande av Cotonouavtalet skulle utgöra en mycket betydelsefull ram för våra förbindelser. Det utgör den grundläggande strukturen för hur vi skulle vilja organisera och styra förbindelser mellan nord och syd. Ett kubanskt deltagande i avtalet innebär också att Kuba skulle utsättas för påtryckningar från andra länder som undertecknat Cotonouavtalet. Jag hoppas att det fortfarande är möjligt att vara vidsynt, men det innebär också vidsynthet inom Kuba."@sv21
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