Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-11-16-Speech-2-012"

Predicate	Value (sorted: default)
rdf:type	lpv_eu:Speech6
dcterms:Date	"2004-11-16"^^xsd:date6
dcterms:Is Part Of	lp_eu:7 - Relvamüük6
dcterms:Language	"en"^^xsd:language6
lpv:document identification number	"en.20041116.7.2-012"6
lpv:hasSubsequent	lp_eu:2004-11-16-Speech-2-0136
lpv:speaker	lp:Nicolaï6
lpv:spoken text	". Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@en4
lpv:translated text	"Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@cs1 "Hr. formand, det er et privilegium at være her i dag og drøfte et spørgsmål, som Parlamentet og det nederlandske formandskab tillægger stor betydning, nemlig våbeneksportpolitikken og EU-adfærdskodeksen for våbeneksport. Jeg vil indlede med nogle bemærkninger om betænkningen om Rådets femte årsberetning og forslaget til beslutning. Lad mig dog først komme med nogle generelle bemærkninger om adfærdskodeksen. Der er brugt megen tid på kodeksens stilling. Parlamentet udtaler sig i betænkningen klart til fordel for at gøre kodeksen juridisk bindende. Det skal bemærkes, at der ikke er enighed på dette punkt i Rådet, hvor omkring halvdelen af medlemsstaterne går ind for at gøre kodeksen juridisk bindende, mens den anden halvdel er imod. Der er dog ting, der er vigtigere, end hvorvidt kodeksen er politisk eller juridisk bindende, og det er kodeksens konkrete indhold og gennemførelse, fordi en ændring af retsstillingen i sig selv sandsynligvis kun vil få lille eller ingen betydning for de enkelte medlemsstaters våbeneksport. I Romeva i Rueda-betænkningen understreges betydningen af øget gennemskuelighed. Jeg er enig, og det glæder mig derfor, at Rådets årsberetning for 2004 vil blive mere gennemskuelig end tidligere. Vi håber, at vi allerede næste år kan nå endnu længere. Det er også vigtigt, at de nationale rapporter bliver gennemskuelige. Det nederlandske formandskab arrangerede sammen med SIPRI for nylig et møde med medlemsstaterne om mulighederne for at forbedre den nationale rapportering. Jeg er sikker på, at der vil blive fulgt op på dette initiativ under de kommende formandskaber. I beslutningen slås endvidere til lyd for et overvågningssystem til kontrol med det endelige anvendelsesformål. Det er et område, hvor der kan gøres en større indsats. En ny undersøgelse fra de amerikanske myndigheder viser, at for USA's vedkommende ender mellem 15 og 20 % af den tilladte eksport til såkaldte følsomme destinationer ikke hos de anførte slutbrugere. Vi har ingen tal for EU, men der er ingen grund til at tro, at de ville adskille sig væsentligt herfra. Vi vil derfor som et første skridt organisere et møde om efterfølgende kontrol, hvor de amerikanske myndigheder vil redegøre for deres erfaringer med programmer til efterfølgende kontrol. Det bringer mig til det nok politisk mest ømtålelige emne. Jeg er bekendt med, at EU's våbenembargo over for Kina tiltrækker sig særlig opmærksomhed i Europa-Parlamentet og i mange nationale parlamenter. Jeg har noteret mig henstillingen i beslutningen om ikke at ophæve denne våbenembargo. Denne våbenembargos fremtid drøftes stadig i Rådet. Det er derfor ikke muligt at gå ind i en mere detaljeret drøftelse om dette emne. Jeg må dog sige, at det nederlandske formandskab er bekendt med den foruroligelse, som forskellige parlamenter, offentligheden, ngo'er og vigtige partnere såsom USA og Japan har givet udtryk for. En del af denne foruroligelse kan tilskrives menneskerettighedssituationen i Kina. EU udnytter enhver mulighed for at drøfte menneskerettighedsspørgsmål med Kina og overvåger indgående udviklingen lokalt. Denne foruroligelse bliver der taget hensyn til i drøftelserne. Vi drøfter også supplerende foranstaltninger til kodeksen, der forventes at forhindre øget overførsel af våben og militærteknologi fra Europa til Kina, hvis embargoen ophæves. Disse foranstaltninger har til formål at skabe større gennemskuelighed og intensivere høringen af medlemsstaterne. Det vides endnu ikke, hvornår disse drøftelser afsluttes. Jeg må som konklusion sige, at det glæder det nederlandske formandskab, at Europa-Parlamentet tillægger politikken for våbeneksport, som er et meget vigtigt emne, så stor betydning. Som nævnt er det et af vores formandskabs målsætninger at udbygge dialogen mellem Rådet og Parlamentet om dette emne. Der kan eller vil kunne konstateres fremskridt på mange af de områder, der omhandles i betænkningen og beslutningen. Der er stadig områder, hvor vi kan gøre det bedre. Gennemskuelighed i de nationale indberetninger er et af dem, og harmoniseringen af fortolkningskriterierne er et andet. Men vi kan sige, at glasset allerede er mere end halvt fuldt. Jeg kan forsikre Dem om, at det nederlandske formandskab vil gøre sit bedste i de resterende seks ugers formandskab for at fylde glasset endnu mere. Adfærdskodeksen blev vedtaget i 1998, og det er ikke overdrevet at påstå, at den er blevet et af de mere vellykkede instrumenter inden for den fælles udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik. Våbeneksport har traditionelt været et område præget af stor fortrolighed. Den blev betragtet som en afgørende forudsætning for opretholdelsen af den nationale suverænitet og et område, hvor ekstern indblanding mildest talt ikke var velkommen. Siden 1998 har vi dog været vidne til større gennemskuelighed, øget mellemstatslig konsultation og øget harmonisering i EU. Det er imponerende fremskridt, og adfærdskodeksens succes fremgår også af den interesse, tredjelande har udvist for den. Jeg taler ikke kun om lande, der ønsker at blive medlemmer af EU, men også om andre lande. Adfærdskodeksen er et nyttigt redskab, der kan hjælpe dem med at iværksætte en effektiv og ansvarlig eksportkontrolpolitik. Det nederlandske formandskab tillægger det stor betydning, at der sker en yderligere harmonisering af den europæiske våbeneksportpolitik, og at den bliver endnu mere gennemskuelig. Et af de prioriterede områder under vores formandskab er afslutningen af den første revision af EU-adfærdskodeksen. Vi håber, at den kan afsluttes inden årets udgang. Jeg understreger, at jeg bruger ordene "første revision" helt bevidst. Det er vigtigt, at vi betragter kodeksen som et levende dokument, som regelmæssigt bør tages frem i lyset og vurderes på baggrund af interne og eksterne begivenheder og synspunkter. Derfor er jeg sikker på, at der ikke er tale om den sidste revision af kodeksen. I sine bestræbelser på at skabe større gennemskuelighed har det nederlandske formandskab også understreget, hvor vigtigt det er at forbedre dialogen med Europa-Parlamentet. Den 1. september holdt Udenrigsudvalget en drøftelse med den nederlandske formand for COARM-arbejdsgruppen om EU-adfærdskodeksen og den igangværende revision. Den 30. september deltog udvalgets ordfører, hr. Romeva i Rueda, i en konference i Haag om kodeksens revision. Vi har også indbudt hr. Romeva i Rueda til at deltage i et uformelt møde med COARM-arbejdsgruppen den 3. december for at drøfte Parlamentets betænkning. Derudover har vi indbudt hr. Romeva i Rueda til at deltage i et møde, som formandskabet afholder sammen med den tjekkiske regering i Prag for at informere kandidatlandene og Norge om kodeksens implementering. Vi mener, at det er vigtigt, at den europæiske våbeneksportpolitiks parlamentariske aspekt belyses i denne forbindelse. Jeg vil nu fremsætte nogle mere specifikke bemærkninger til udkastet til betænkning og forslaget til beslutning. I Europa-Parlamentets betænkning henvises til Rådets 2003-beretning. Der er sket meget siden da, især er adfærdskodeksen blevet underkastet revision. Nogle af de punkter, der omhandles i betænkningen, drøftes som led i denne revision. Jeg vil i denne forbindelse nævne følgende punkter. Europa-Parlamentet henviser i betænkningen til den fælles holdning om våbenmæglervirksomhed. Der er i forbindelse med den igangværende revision allerede enighed om at udvide kodeksen til også at omfatte våbenmæglervirksomhed. Det samme er tilfældet for produktion på licens i tredjelande og transport og omladning. Ansøgninger om tilladelse til denne form for virksomhed vil blive underlagt de kriterier og den praksis, der er fastlagt i adfærdskodeksen. Adfærdskodeksen vil desuden finde anvendelse i tilfælde af såkaldte immaterielle overførsler af teknologi. Ud over revisionen af adfærdskodeksen har vi i andre sammenhænge gjort fremskridt bl.a. angående samarbejde med tredjelande. Jeg har allerede nævnt seminaret i Prag i december. I september nåede medlemsstaterne til enighed om en mere kohærent tilgang til denne form for samarbejde. Rådets sekretariat vil føre en database over de enkelte medlemsstaters samarbejdsaktiviteter for at sikre en bedre samordning. Der er desuden sket fremskridt med hensyn til den videre udvikling af ordningen for meddelelse af afslag og høring - et af kodeksens nøgleelementer. Høringerne om afslag finder nu sted på en sådan måde, at alle medlemsstater bliver underrettet herom. Kun en medlemsstats endelige afgørelse om, hvorvidt den vil respektere afslaget, meddeles ikke automatisk alle parter. Derudover er Rådets sekretariat i færd med at oprette en database over de afslag, medlemsstaterne har indberettet, og information om de høringer, de har foretaget. Denne database vil i vid udstrækning bidrage til at gøre de bilaterale høringer mere effektive og resultaterne mere gennemskuelige."@da2 ". Herr Präsident, es ist eine ehrenvolle Aufgabe, heute hier mit Ihnen eine Aussprache zu einem Themenkomplex zu führen, dem dieses Parlament und die niederländische Präsidentschaft große Bedeutung beimessen, nämlich zur Waffenexportpolitik und zum EU-Verhaltenskodex für Waffenausfuhren. Ich möchte mit einigen Anmerkungen zum Bericht über den Fünften Jahresbericht des Rates und zum Entschließungsantrag beginnen. Bitte gestatten Sie mir, zunächst einige allgemeine Ausführungen über den Verhaltenskodex zu machen. Viel Zeit wurde der Frage des Status des Kodexes gewidmet. Das Parlament spricht sich in seinem Bericht ausdrücklich dafür aus, dem Kodex einen rechtsverbindlichen Status einzuräumen. Ihnen dürfte bekannt sein, dass es zu dieser Frage keinen Konsens im Rat gibt: Die Hälfte der Mitgliedstaaten spricht sich für einen rechtsverbindlichen Status des Kodexes aus, doch die andere Hälfte ist dagegen. Dennoch gibt es etwas Wichtigeres als die Frage, ob der Kodex nun politisch oder rechtlich verbindlich sein sollte. Ich meine den eigentlichen Inhalt des Kodexes und die Art und Weise seiner Umsetzung, denn die Änderung des Status allein hätte wahrscheinlich nur geringe oder gar keine Auswirkung auf die Waffenexportpolitik der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten. Im Bericht Romeva i Rueda wird die Wichtigkeit größerer Transparenz betont. Ich stimme dem zu und bin daher erfreut, dass der Jahresbericht des Rates von 2004 transparenter als vorherige Berichte sein wird. Wir hoffen, dass – vermutlich im nächsten Jahr – weitere Schritte ergriffen werden können. Zudem ist die Transparenz der nationalen Berichte von Bedeutung. Die niederländische Präsidentschaft und das SIPRI-Institut veranstalteten kürzlich gemeinsam ein Treffen mit den Mitgliedstaaten, bei dem es um die Verbesserung der nationalen Berichterstattung ging. Sicherlich werden nachfolgende Präsidentschaften diese Initiative weiterverfolgen. In der Entschließung wird auch ein System zur Kontrolle der Endverwendung befürwortet. An diesem Bereich könnte noch mehr gearbeitet werden. Aus jüngsten Untersuchungen der US-Regierung geht hervor, dass im Falle der USA zwischen 15 % und 20 % der genehmigten Ausfuhren in „politisch labile“ Abnehmerländer nicht in den Händen der angegebenen Endverwender landen. Für die EU liegen zwar keine Zahlen vor, doch es gibt keinen Grund zur Annahme, dass sich diese erheblich unterscheiden würden. Daher werden wir als ersten Schritt ein Treffen zum Thema Kontrolle der Endverwendung veranstalten, bei dem die US-Behörden von ihren Erfahrungen mit Programmen zur Überwachung des Verbleibs von Rüstungsgütern nach der Ausfuhr berichten werden. Hiermit bin ich dann bei der wahrscheinlich heikelsten politischen Frage angelangt. Mir ist bekannt, dass das EU-Waffenembargo gegenüber China von diesem Parlament und vielen nationalen Parlamenten besonders aufmerksam verfolgt wird. Ich nehme die in der Entschließung enthaltene Aufforderung zur Kenntnis, das Waffenembargo nicht aufzuheben. Die Frage der Zukunft des Waffenembargos wird im Rat noch immer erörtert. Deshalb ist es nicht möglich, die Problematik eingehend zu behandeln. Ich möchte jedoch zum Ausdruck bringen, dass der niederländischen Präsidentschaft die vielen Bedenken der Parlamente, der Öffentlichkeit, der NRO sowie wichtiger Partner wie USA und Japan sehr wohl bekannt sind. Eine der geäußerten Befürchtungen bezieht sich auf die Menschenrechtslage in China. Die EU nimmt jede Gelegenheit wahr, um Menschenrechtsfragen mit China zu besprechen, und verfolgt die Entwicklung vor Ort genau. All diesen Bedenken wird in den Diskussionen Rechnung getragen. Ferner erörtern wir gerade ergänzende Maßnahmen des Verhaltenskodexes, wodurch bei einer eventuellen Aufhebung des Embargos eine Zunahme des Transfers von Waffen und Wehrtechnik von Europa nach China verhindert werden sollte. Mithilfe dieser Maßnahmen soll die Transparenz erhöht und die Konsultation zwischen den Mitgliedstaaten intensiviert werden. Das Ende dieser Diskussion ist jedoch noch nicht absehbar. Abschließend möchte ich im Namen der niederländischen Präsidentschaft meine Freude darüber zum Ausdruck bringen, dass das Europäische Parlament der wichtigen Problematik der Waffenexportpolitik so viel Aufmerksamkeit widmet. Wie ich bereits zuvor erwähnte, stellt ein intensiverer Dialog zwischen dem Rat und dem Parlament über diese Frage eines der Ziele unserer Präsidentschaft dar. Bei vielen der im Bericht und in der Entschließung erwähnten Punkte wurden bereits Fortschritte erzielt oder es wird noch an ihnen gearbeitet. Auf einigen Gebieten sind noch weitere Fortschritte denkbar: zum einen bei der Transparenz der nationalen Berichte und zum anderen bei der Harmonisierung der Auslegung der Kriterien. Wir können jedoch sagen, dass das Glas bereits mehr als halbvoll ist. Ich versichere Ihnen, dass die Niederlande alles tun werden, was in ihrer Macht steht, um in den verbleibenden sechs Wochen ihrer Präsidentschaft das Glas noch weiter aufzufüllen. Der Verhaltenskodex für Waffenausfuhren wurde im Jahre 1998 angenommen, und es lässt sich wohl ohne Übertreibung feststellen, dass er sich zu einem der erfolgreichsten Instrumente unserer gemeinsamen Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik entwickelt hat. Über der Waffenexportpolitik hatte seit jeher ein Mantel des Schweigens gelegen. Sie wurde als wesentliches Element der uneingeschränkten nationalen Souveränität angesehen, so dass Eingriffe durch andere nicht – um es einmal milde auszudrücken – willkommen waren. Seit 1998 sind aber nun in der Europäischen Union eine zunehmende Transparenz, mehr bilaterale Konsultationen und eine größere Harmonisierung zu verzeichnen. Dies stellt einen beeindruckenden Fortschritt dar, wobei der Erfolg des Verhaltenskodexes auch durch das Interesse von Drittstaaten deutlich wird. Ich spreche nicht nur von Ländern, die die Mitgliedschaft in der Europäischen Union anstreben, sondern auch von anderen Staaten. Der Verhaltenskodex ist ein nützliches Instrument, das ihnen bei der Schaffung einer wirksamen und verantwortungsbewussten Waffenexportpolitik helfen kann. Die niederländische Präsidentschaft misst der weiteren Harmonisierung der europäischen Waffenexportpolitik und ihrer noch transparenteren Gestaltung große Bedeutung bei. Einer der Schwerpunkte unserer Präsidentschaft ist der Abschluss der ersten Überprüfung des EU-Verhaltenskodexes. Wir hoffen, dass wir diese Überprüfung Ende des Jahres abschließen können. Ich möchte betonen, dass ich die Worte „erste Überprüfung“ absichtlich verwende. Es ist wichtig, dass wir den Kodex als ein lebendiges Dokument ansehen, das regelmäßig durchleuchtet werden und internen und externen Entwicklungen und Ansichten Rechnung tragen sollte. Daher bin ich mir sicher, dass dies nicht die letzte Überprüfung des Kodexes darstellen wird. Bei ihren Bemühungen um eine größere Transparenz hat die niederländische Präsidentschaft auch die Bedeutung eines intensiveren Dialogs mit dem Europäischen Parlament betont. Am 1. September führte der Ausschuss für auswärtige Angelegenheiten eine Debatte mit dem niederländischen Vorsitzenden der Arbeitsgruppe „COARM“ über den EU-Verhaltenskodex und die aktuelle Überprüfung. Der Berichterstatter des Ausschusses, Herr Romeva i Rueda, nahm an einer Konferenz zur Überprüfung des Kodexes teil, die am 30. September in Den Haag stattfand. Ferner luden wir Herrn Romeva i Rueda zu einem informellen Treffen am 3. Dezember mit der Arbeitsgruppe „COARM“ ein, um den Bericht des Parlaments zu erörtern. Darüber hinaus haben wir Herrn Romeva i Rueda zu einem Treffen eingeladen, das die Präsidentschaft gemeinsam mit der tschechischen Regierung in Prag organisiert, um die Kandidatenländer und Norwegen über die Umsetzung des Kodexes zu informieren. Wir halten es für wichtig, auf diese Weise die Rolle des Parlaments bei der europäischen Waffenexportpolitik hervorzuheben. An dieser Stelle möchte ich konkretere Anmerkungen zum Berichtsentwurf und Entschließungsantrag machen. Der Bericht des Europäischen Parlaments nimmt auf den Bericht des Rates von 2003 Bezug. Seitdem ist viel passiert und nicht zuletzt eine Überprüfung des Verhaltenskodexes erfolgt. Im Rahmen dieser Überprüfung werden auch einige der im Bericht angesprochenen Punkte behandelt. Insofern möchte ich auf die folgenden Punkte näher eingehen. Im Bericht des Europäischen Parlaments wird der gemeinsame Standpunkt zur Waffenvermittlung begrüßt. Bei der gegenwärtigen Überprüfung besteht bereits ein Konsens darüber, dass die Anwendung des Kodexes auf Vermittlungstätigkeiten ausgeweitet werden sollte. Das Gleiche gilt für die Lizenzfertigung in Übersee, für die Beförderung und den Transitverkehr. Lizenzanträge für diese Tätigkeiten werden den Kriterien und Verfahren des Verhaltenskodexes unterzogen werden. Zudem sollte der Kodex auch bei Fällen des so genannten nicht gegenständlichen Technologietransfers angewendet werden. Abgesehen von der Überprüfung des Verhaltenskodexes haben wir auch Fortschritte in Bereichen wie der Einbeziehung von Drittstaaten („Outreach“) erzielt. Ich erwähnte bereits das im Dezember stattfindende Seminar in Prag. Im September einigten sich die Mitgliedstaaten auf ein einheitlicheres Vorgehen bei ihren Outreach-Aktivitäten. Das Generalsekretariat des Rates wird eine Datenbank über die Outreach-Aktivitäten der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten führen, um eine bessere Koordinierung zu erreichen. Des Weiteren wurden Fortschritte bei der Weiterentwicklung des Systems der Verweigerungsmitteilungen und Konsultationsverfahren – eines der Schlüsselelemente des Kodexes – erzielt. Konsultationsverfahren über Verweigerungen werden derzeit so durchgeführt, dass alle Mitgliedstaaten über das Konsultationsverfahren informiert werden. Nur die endgültige Entscheidung eines Mitgliedstaates, ob es die Verweigerung unterlaufen wird oder nicht, wird nicht automatisch allen Partnern mitgeteilt. Ferner baut das Generalsekretariat des Rates eine elektronische Datenbank auf, die die Verweigerungsmitteilungen der Mitgliedstaaten sowie Informationen über die von ihnen durchgeführten Konsultationsverfahren enthalten wird. Diese Datenbank wird in erheblichem Maße zur Effizienz der bilateralen Konsultationen und zur Transparenz ihrer Ergebnisse beitragen."@de9 "Κύριε Πρόεδρε, είναι προνόμιο για εμένα να βρίσκομαι σήμερα εδώ και να συζητώ μαζί σας ένα θέμα στο οποίο το παρόν Κοινοβούλιο και η προεδρία των Κάτω Χωρών προσδίδουν μεγάλη σημασία: την πολιτική εξαγωγής όπλων και τον Κώδικα Συμπεριφοράς της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης σχετικά με τις εξαγωγές όπλων. Θα αρχίσω με κάποια σχόλια για την έκθεση σχετικά με την Πέμπτη Ετήσια Έκθεση του Συμβουλίου και την πρόταση ψηφίσματος. Παρακαλώ επιτρέψτε μου να αρχίσω με κάποιες γενικές παρατηρήσεις για τον Κώδικα Συμπεριφοράς. Έχει αφιερωθεί πολύς χρόνος στο καθεστώς του Κώδικα. Το Κοινοβούλιο εκφράζει στην έκθεσή του τη σαφή προτίμηση να δοθεί στον Κώδικα νομικά δεσμευτικός χαρακτήρας. Ίσως γνωρίζετε ότι δεν υπάρχει συναίνεση όσον αφορά αυτό το θέμα στο Συμβούλιο: περίπου τα μισά κράτη μέλη είναι υπέρ του να καταστεί ο Κώδικας νομικά δεσμευτικός, αλλά τα άλλα μισά αντιτίθενται σε αυτό. Εντούτοις, υπάρχει κάτι σημαντικότερο από το εάν ο Κώδικας είναι πολιτικά ή νομικά δεσμευτικός. Πρόκειται για το πραγματικό περιεχόμενο του Κώδικα καθώς και τον τρόπο με τον οποίο εφαρμόζεται, διότι η αλλαγή του καθεστώτος αυτού καθ’ αυτού θα είχε πιθανότατα ελάχιστα ή καθόλου αποτελέσματα στην επιμέρους πολιτική εξαγωγών όπλων των κρατών μελών. Η έκθεση του κ. Romeva i Rueda τονίζει τη σημασία της αυξημένης διαφάνειας. Συμφωνώ και ως εκ τούτου εκφράζω την ικανοποίησή μου διότι η Ετήσια Έκθεση του Συμβουλίου του 2004 θα είναι πιο διαφανής από τις προηγούμενες. Ελπίζουμε να μπορέσουν να ληφθούν επιπλέον μέτρα, πιθανώς τον επόμενο χρόνο. Η διαφάνεια των εθνικών εκθέσεων είναι εξίσου σημαντική. Η προεδρία των Κάτω Χωρών, από κοινού με το SIPRI, διοργάνωσε πρόσφατα συνάντηση με κράτη μέλη όσον αφορά το πώς μπορεί να βελτιωθεί η υποβολή των εθνικών εκθέσεων. Είμαι βέβαιος ότι οι επόμενες Προεδρίες θα συνεχίσουν αυτή την πρωτοβουλία. Το ψήφισμα συνηγορεί επίσης υπέρ ενός συστήματος παρακολούθησης για τον έλεγχο της τελικής χρήσης. Αυτός είναι ένας τομέας στον οποίο μπορεί να γίνει περισσότερη δουλειά. Από πρόσφατη μελέτη της κυβέρνησης των ΗΠΑ προκύπτει ότι, στην περίπτωση των ΗΠΑ, το 15 με 20% των εγκεκριμένων εξαγωγών προς τους καλούμενους “ευάλωτους” προορισμούς δεν καταλήγουν στα χέρια του υποδεικνυόμενου τελικού αποδέκτη. Δεν διαθέτουμε στατιστικά στοιχεία για την ΕΕ, αλλά δεν υπάρχει λόγος να πιστέψουμε ότι υπάρχει δραματική διαφοροποίηση. Θα οργανώσουμε συνεπώς, σε πρώτη φάση, μία συνεδρίαση σχετικά με τους ελέγχους μετά την αποστολή στην οποία θα ενημερωθούμε από τις αρχές των Ηνωμένων Πολιτειών όσον αφορά την εμπειρία τους στα προγράμματα ελέγχου μετά την αποστολή. Αυτό με οδηγεί πιθανώς στο πλέον ευαίσθητο πολιτικό ζήτημα. Γνωρίζω ότι το Σώμα, όπως και πολλά εθνικά κοινοβούλια, αποδίδει ιδιαίτερη σημασία στο εμπάργκο όπλων της ΕΕ προς την Κίνα. Επισημαίνω στο ψήφισμα την έκκληση για άρση του εμπάργκο όπλων. Το ζήτημα της μελλοντικής εξέλιξης στο εμπάργκο όπλων βρίσκεται ακόμα υπό συζήτηση στο Συμβούλιο. Συνεπώς, δεν είναι δυνατό να συζητήσουμε το θέμα λεπτομερώς. Εντούτοις, επιτρέψτε μου να πω ότι η Προεδρία των Κάτω Χωρών έχει πλήρη επίγνωση των διαφόρων ανησυχιών που έχουν εκφραστεί από τα εθνικά κοινοβούλια, την κοινή γνώμη, ΜΚΟ καθώς και από σημαντικούς εταίρους όπως οι Ηνωμένες Πολιτείες και η Ιαπωνία. Μία από αυτές τις ανησυχίες είναι η κατάσταση των ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων στην Κίνα. Η ΕΕ δράττεται κάθε ευκαιρίας για να συζητήσει τα ζητήματα ανθρωπίνων δικαιωμάτων με την Κίνα, και ελέγχει προσεκτικά τις εξελίξεις επί τόπου. Όλες αυτές οι ανησυχίες λαμβάνονται υπόψη στη συζήτηση. Συζητούμε επίσης πρόσθετα μέτρα εκτός του Κώδικα Συμπεριφοράς τα οποία θα παρεμπόδιζαν μία αύξηση στη ροή των όπλων και της στρατιωτικής τεχνολογίας από την Ευρώπη προς την Κίνα σε περίπτωση άρσης του εμπάργκο. Ο σκοπός αυτών των μέτρων είναι η αύξηση της διαφάνειας και η ενίσχυση της διαβούλευσης μεταξύ των κρατών μελών. Δεν είναι ακόμα σαφές πότε θα περατωθεί αυτή η συζήτηση. Εν κατακλείδι, η Προεδρία των Κάτω Χωρών εκφράζει ικανοποίηση για το ότι το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο δίνει τόση προσοχή στο σημαντικό ζήτημα της πολιτικής εξαγωγών όπλων. Όπως προανέφερα, ο αυξημένος διάλογος σχετικά με το εν λόγω ζήτημα μεταξύ του Συμβουλίου και του Κοινοβουλίου αποτελεί έναν από τους στόχους της Προεδρίας μας. Έχει σημειωθεί πρόοδος ή πρόκειται να σημειωθεί σε αρκετά από τα σημεία που αναφέρονται στην έκθεση και το ψήφισμα. Υπάρχουν τομείς στους οποίους μπορεί να σημειωθεί περαιτέρω πρόοδος. Ένας από αυτούς είναι η διαφάνεια στις εθνικές εκθέσεις – άλλος ένας η εναρμόνιση της ερμηνείας των κριτηρίων. Εντούτοις, μπορούμε να πούμε ότι το ποτήρι είναι ήδη περισσότερο από μισογεμάτο. Να είστε βέβαιοι ότι οι Κάτω Χώρες θα καταβάλουν κάθε δυνατή προσπάθεια τις υπόλοιπες έξι εβδομάδες της Προεδρίας τους για να γεμίσει ακόμα περισσότερο το ποτήρι. Ο Κώδικας Συμπεριφοράς για τις Εξαγωγές Όπλων εγκρίθηκε το 1998, και δεν είναι υπερβολή να πούμε ότι έχει αναδειχθεί σε ένα από τα πιο επιτυχή μέσα της κοινής εξωτερικής πολιτικής και πολιτικής ασφαλείας. Η πολιτική εξαγωγών όπλων καλύπτονταν παραδοσιακά από ένα πέπλο μυστικότητας. Εθεωρείτο θεμελιώδες στοιχείο απαράγραπτης εθνικής κυριαρχίας στην οποία η παρέμβαση τρίτων ήταν κάθε άλλο παρά ευπρόσδεκτη. Εντούτοις, από το 1998 και μετά, διαπιστώνουμε αυξανόμενη διαφάνεια, αυξανόμενη διακρατική διαβούλευση και αυξανόμενη εναρμόνιση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση. Αυτό αποτελεί εντυπωσιακή πρόοδο, και η επιτυχία του Κώδικα Συμπεριφοράς καταδεικνύεται επίσης από το ενδιαφέρον τρίτων χωρών για αυτόν. Δεν μιλώ μόνο για χώρες που φιλοδοξούν να γίνουν κράτη μέλη της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης, αλλά και για άλλες. Ο Κώδικας Συμπεριφοράς είναι ένα χρήσιμο εργαλείο το οποίο μπορεί να τις βοηθήσει να παγιώσουν μία αποτελεσματική και αξιόπιστη πολιτική ελέγχου εξαγωγών. Η προεδρία των Κάτω Χωρών αποδίδει μεγάλη σημασία στην περαιτέρω εναρμόνιση της ευρωπαϊκής πολιτικής εξαγωγής όπλων και στο να καταστήσει ακόμη περισσότερο διαφανή αυτή τη διαδικασία. Μία από τις προτεραιότητες της Προεδρίας μας είναι η ολοκλήρωση της πρώτης αναθεώρησης του Κώδικα Συμπεριφοράς της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Ελπίζουμε να μπορέσουμε να οριστικοποιήσουμε αυτή την αναθεώρηση πριν το τέλος του χρόνου. Τονίζω ότι χρησιμοποιώ τις λέξεις “πρώτη αναθεώρηση” εσκεμμένα. Είναι σημαντικό ότι θεωρούμε τον Κώδικα ως ένα ζωντανό έγγραφο το οποίο πρέπει να επανεξετάζεται τακτικά, και να λαμβάνει υπόψη εσωτερικές και εξωτερικές εξελίξεις και απόψεις. Είμαι συνεπώς βέβαιος ότι αυτή δεν θα είναι η τελευταία αναθεώρηση του Κώδικα. Στις προσπάθειές της να ενισχύσει τη διαφάνεια, η προεδρία των Κάτω Χωρών τόνισε επίσης τη σημασία του αυξημένου διαλόγου με το Ευρωπαϊκό Κοινοβούλιο. Την 1η Σεπτεμβρίου η Επιτροπή Εξωτερικών Υποθέσεων συζήτησε με τον ολλανδό πρόεδρο της ομάδας εργασίας COARM για τον Κώδικα Συμπεριφοράς και την εν λόγω αναθεώρηση. Ο εισηγητής της επιτροπής, κ. Romeva i Rueda, συμμετείχε σε διάσκεψη σχετικά με την αναθεώρηση του Κώδικα στις 30 Σεπτεμβρίου στη Χάγη. Προσκαλέσαμε επίσης τον κ. Romeva i Rueda σε ανεπίσημη συνάντηση με την ομάδα εργασίας COARM στις 3 Δεκεμβρίου για να συζητήσουμε την έκθεση του Κοινοβουλίου. Επιπλέον, προσκαλέσαμε τον κ. Romeva i Rueda να συμμετάσχει σε συνάντηση την οποία διοργανώνει η Προεδρία, από κοινού με την τσεχική κυβέρνηση, στην Πράγα, για να ενημερώσει τις υποψήφιες χώρες και τη Νορβηγία σχετικά με την εφαρμογή του Κώδικα. Θεωρούμε σημαντικό να υπογραμμιστεί σχετικά ο ρόλος του Κοινοβουλίου στην πολιτική εξαγωγών όπλων. Σε αυτό το σημείο θα ήθελα να κάνω ορισμένες ειδικότερες παρατηρήσεις όσον αφορά το προσχέδιο της έκθεσης και τη πρόταση ψηφίσματος. Η έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου αφορά την έκθεση του Συμβουλίου του 2003. Έκτοτε, πολλά έχουν συμβεί, και σημαντικότερο όλων η αναθεώρηση του Κώδικα Συμπεριφοράς. Ορισμένα από τα σημεία που θίγονται στην έκθεση αποτελούν αντικείμενο συζήτησης στο πλαίσιο αυτής της αναθεώρησης. Σχετικά, οφείλω να αναφέρω τα ακόλουθα σημεία. Η έκθεση του Ευρωπαϊκού Κοινοβουλίου χαιρετίζει την κοινή θέση όσον αφορά τη διαμεσολάβηση με αντικείμενο όπλα. Στην παρούσα αναθεώρηση υπάρχει ήδη συναίνεση για επέκταση της εφαρμογής του Κώδικα στις δραστηριότητες διαμεσολάβησης Το ίδιο ισχύει για την εγκεκριμένη υπερπόντια παραγωγή, και τη μεταφορά και τη μεταφόρτωση. Οι αιτήσεις για τη χορήγηση άδειας για τις εν λόγω δραστηριότητες θα υπόκεινται στα κριτήρια και τις πρακτικές που προβλέπονται στον Κώδικα Συμπεριφοράς. Επιπροσθέτως, ο Κώδικας θα έπρεπε να είναι εφαρμόσιμος σε περιπτώσεις των λεγομένων μεταφορών άυλης τεχνολογίας. Εκτός του κειμένου της αναθεώρησης του Κώδικα Συμπεριφοράς, έχουμε σημειώσει πρόοδο σε τομείς όπως η επικούρηση. Έχω ήδη αναφέρει το σεμινάριο που θα λάβει χώρα στην Πράγα τον Δεκέμβριο. Τον Σεπτέμβριο, τα κράτη μέλη συμφώνησαν σε μία πιο συνεκτική προσέγγιση σχετικά με την επικούρηση. Η Γραμματεία του Συμβουλίου θα τηρεί μία βάση δεδομένων όσον αφορά τις δραστηριότητες επικούρησης των επιμέρους κρατών μελών προκειμένου να επιτύχει καλύτερο συντονισμό. Έχει επίσης σημειωθεί πρόοδος στην περαιτέρω ανάπτυξη του συστήματος αρνήσεων κοινοποίησης και διαβούλευσης – ένα από τα βασικότερα στοιχεία του Κώδικα. Οι διαβουλεύσεις σχετικά με τις αρνήσεις διεξάγονται κατά τέτοιο τρόπο ούτως ώστε όλα τα κράτη μέλη να ενημερώνονται σχετικά με τη διαβούλευση. Μόνο η τελική απόφαση ενός κράτους μέλους για το αν θα προσβάλει ή όχι την άρνηση δεν κοινοποιείται αυτόματα σε όλους τους εταίρους. Επιπροσθέτως, η Γραμματεία του Συμβουλίου αναπτύσσει μία ηλεκτρονική βάση δεδομένων , η οποία θα περιέχει τις κοινοποιηθείσες αρνήσεις των κρατών μελών, καθώς και πληροφορίες για τις αναληφθείσες διαβουλεύσεις. Η εν λόγω βάση δεδομένων θα συνεισφέρει τα μέγιστα στην αποτελεσματικότητα των διμερών διαβουλεύσεων και της διαφάνειας των αποτελεσμάτων τους."@el10 ". Señor Presidente, es un privilegio para mí encontrarme aquí hoy para debatir un asunto que para el Parlamento y la Presidencia neerlandesa es muy importante: la política de exportación de armas y el Código de conducta de la Unión Europea en materia de exportación de armas. Comenzaré con algunos comentarios sobre el quinto informe anual del Consejo y sobre la propuesta de resolución. Empezaré con algunas observaciones generales sobre el Código de conducta. Se ha dedicado mucho tiempo a la naturaleza del Código. En su informe, el Parlamento expresa una clara preferencia por que tenga carácter jurídicamente vinculante. Quizás sepan sus Señorías que no existe consenso en esta cuestión en el Consejo: cerca de la mitad de los Estados miembros están a favor de que el Código sea jurídicamente vinculante, mientras que la otra mitad se opone. No obstante, hay algo más importante que la cuestión de si el Código debe ser política o jurídicamente vinculante. Me refiero al contenido efectivo del mismo y la forma en que se aplica, ya que es probable que cambiar su naturaleza tenga como tal poco o ningún efecto en la política de exportación de armas de los Estados miembros individuales. El informe de Romeva i Rueda subraya la importancia de aumentar la transparencia. Estoy de acuerdo y, por tanto, me complace que el informe anual de 2004 del Consejo sea más transparente que los anteriores. Esperamos que se consiga avanzar más, probablemente el año que viene. La transparencia de los informes nacionales también reviste importancia. La Presidencia neerlandesa, junto con el SIPRI, organizó recientemente una reunión con Estados miembros sobre el modo de mejorar los informes nacionales. No me cabe duda de que las Presidencias posteriores seguirán esta iniciativa. La resolución también aboga por un sistema de control del uso final. Se trata de un terreno en el que se podría trabajar más. Un reciente estudio del Gobierno de los Estados Unidos demuestra que, en el caso de este país, entre el 15 y el 20 % de las exportaciones autorizadas a destinos denominados «vulnerables» no terminan en manos del usuario final designado. No tenemos cifras para la UE, pero no hay ningún motivo para pensar que serían muy distintas. Por tanto, como primer paso, organizaremos una reunión sobre controles posteriores al envío en la que autoridades estadounidenses nos informarán de sus experiencias con los programas de control posterior al envío. De este modo, llego al tema de probablemente más sensible desde el punto de vista político. Soy consciente de que el embargo de armas de la UE a China llama la atención especial de este Parlamento y de muchos Parlamentos nacionales. Tomo nota de la petición en la resolución de no levantar dicho embargo. El futuro del embargo de armas aún se está debatiendo en el Consejo. Por tanto, no es posible tratar esta cuestión en detalle. Sin embargo, la Presidencia neerlandesa tiene conocimiento de las preocupaciones expresadas por los Parlamentos, el público, diversas ONG y también socios importantes como los Estados Unidos y Japón. Una de estas inquietudes es la situación de los derechos humanos en China. La UE aprovecha cualquier oportunidad para debatir este tema con China y sigue muy de cerca los acontecimientos sobre el terreno. Todas estas preocupaciones se tienen en cuenta en el debate. Estamos discutiendo además sobre medidas suplementarias al Código de conducta con miras a evitar un aumento del flujo de armas y tecnología militar de Europa a China, si se levantase el embargo. El objetivo de estas medidas consiste en aumentar la transparencia e intensificar la consulta entre Estados miembros. Aún no está claro cuándo concluirá este debate. En conclusión, la Presidencia neerlandesa ve con agrado que el Parlamento Europeo preste tanta atención a la importante cuestión de la política de exportación de armas. Como he mencionado antes, uno de los objetivos de nuestra Presidencia es potenciar el diálogo sobre este tema entre el Consejo y el Parlamento. Se ha avanzado y se están tomando medidas en muchos de los puntos mencionados en el informe y la resolución. Hay aspectos en los que se pueden lograr mayores avances. La transparencia del informe nacional es una de ellas; la armonización de la interpretación de los criterios es otra. Sin embargo, podemos decir que el vaso está ya más que medio lleno. Tengan la absoluta seguridad de que los Países Bajos harán todo lo posible durante las seis semanas restantes de su Presidencia por que el vaso se llene aún más. El Código de conducta en materia de exportación de armas se adoptó en 1998, y no es ninguna exageración afirmar que se ha convertido en uno de los instrumentos más eficaces de nuestra política exterior y de seguridad común. Tradicionalmente, la política de exportación de armas se ha mantenido en secreto. Se consideraba un elemento fundamental de la soberanía nacional ilimitada, en que la interferencia de otros no era bienvenida, por decirlo suavemente. No obstante, desde 1998 hemos presenciado una creciente transparencia, una consulta más intensa entre Estados y una armonización cada vez mayor en la Unión Europea. Supone un avance impresionante, y el éxito de este Código de conducta queda ilustrado por el interés que han mostrado algunos países terceros por el mismo. No me refiero únicamente a países que aspiran a convertirse en Estados miembros de la Unión Europea, sino también a otros. El Código de conducta representa una herramienta útil que puede ayudarles a establecer una política de control de exportaciones eficaz y responsable. La Presidencia neerlandesa da mucha importancia a una armonización todavía mayor de la política europea sobre exportación de armas, así como a una mayor transparencia de la misma. Una de las prioridades de nuestra Presidencia es la conclusión de la primera revisión del Código de conducta de la UE. Esperamos poder terminar esta revisión antes de fin de año. Subrayo que he utilizado las palabras «primera revisión» a propósito. Es importante que contemplemos el Código como un documento vivo que debemos examinar a contraluz con regularidad, teniendo en cuenta los acontecimientos y puntos de vista internos y externos. Por tanto, tengo la certeza de que esta no será la última revisión del Código. En su esfuerzo por mejorar la transparencia, la Presidencia neerlandesa ha hecho hincapié también en la importancia de potenciar el diálogo con el Parlamento Europeo. El 1 de septiembre, la Comisión de Asuntos Exteriores mantuvo un debate con el presidente neerlandés del grupo de trabajo COARM sobre el Código de conducta de la UE y la revisión en curso. El ponente de la comisión, el señor Romeva i Rueda, participó en una conferencia sobre la revisión del código el 30 de septiembre en La Haya. Hemos invitado también al señor Romeva i Rueda a una reunión informal con el grupo de trabajo COARM el 3 de diciembre para debatir el informe del Parlamento. Asimismo, le hemos invitado a que participe en una reunión que está organizando la Presidencia, junto con el Gobierno checo, en Praga, para informar a los países candidatos y Noruega sobre la aplicación del Código. Nos parece importante destacar el papel parlamentario en la política europea de exportación de armas a este respecto. En este punto haré algunas observaciones más concretas sobre el proyecto de informe y la propuesta de resolución. El informe del Parlamento Europeo se refiere al informe del Consejo de 2003. Desde entonces han pasado muchas cosas, sobre todo la revisión del Código de conducta. Algunos puntos abordados en el informe se están debatiendo en el marco de esta revisión. A este respecto, mencionaré los siguientes puntos. El informe del Parlamento Europeo acoge con agrado la posición común sobre el corretaje en el comercio de armas. En la revisión actual ya hay consenso para ampliar la aplicación del código a las actividades de corretaje. Lo mismo cabe decir de la producción bajo licencia en el extranjero, el transporte y el trasbordo. Las solicitudes de licencia para estas actividades estarán sujetas a los criterios y prácticas establecidos en el Código de conducta. Además, el Código deberá aplicarse en los casos de la llamada transferencia inmaterial de tecnología. Fuera del contexto de la revisión del Código de conducta hemos avanzado en ámbitos como la extensión. Ya he mencionado el seminario de diciembre en Praga. En septiembre, los Estados miembros acordaron adoptar un enfoque más coherente con respecto a la extensión. La Secretaría del Consejo mantendrá una base de datos sobre las actividades de extensión de cada uno de los Estados miembros, con objeto de mejorar la coordinación. También se han producido avances en el desarrollo del sistema de consulta y notificación de denegaciones, uno de los elementos principales del código. Las consultas sobre denegaciones se están llevando a cabo de tal forma que todos los Estados miembros reciben información sobre las mismas. Lo único que no se comparte automáticamente con todos los socios es la decisión final de un Estado miembro de rebajar o no la denegación. Además, la Secretaría del Consejo está desarrollando una base de datos electrónica que incluirá las denegaciones notificadas por Estados miembros, así como información sobre las consultas realizadas. Esta base de datos contribuirá en gran medida a la eficacia de las consultas bilaterales y la transparencia de sus resultados."@es20 "Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@et5 ". Arvoisa puhemies, olen etuoikeutettu voidessani keskustella täällä tänään kanssanne aiheesta, joka on hyvin tärkeä sekä parlamentille että puheenjohtajavaltio Alankomaille: asevientiä koskevasta politiikasta ja aseiden vientiä koskevien Euroopan unionin käytännesääntöjen toimintaohjeiden 8 kohdasta. Aluksi esitän muutaman huomion neuvoston viidettä vuosikertomusta käsittelevästä mietinnöstä ja päätöslauselmaesityksestä. Jos sallitte, esitän ensimmäiseksi muutamia yleisiä huomioita käytännesäännöistä. Käytännesääntöjen aseman pohtimiseen on käytetty paljon aikaa. Parlamentti on todennut mietinnössään selvästi, että se haluaa tehdä käytännesäännöistä oikeudellisesti sitovat. Ehkä jo tiedättekin, että tästä kysymyksestä ei ole päästy neuvostossa yksimielisyyteen: noin puolet jäsenvaltioista kannattaa sitä, että käytännesäännöistä tehdään oikeudellisesti sitovat, mutta toinen puolikas vastustaa sitä. Yksi kysymys on kuitenkin tärkeämpi kuin se, ovatko käytännesäännöt poliittisesti tai oikeudellisesti sitovat, ja se koskee käytännesääntöjen varsinaista sisältöä ja niiden täytäntöönpanomenetelmää. Pelkällä aseman muuttamisella pystyttäisiin nimittäin todennäköisesti vaikuttamaan hyvin vähän – jos lainkaan – yksittäisten jäsenvaltioiden asevientiin. Romeva i Ruedan mietinnössä korostetaan paremman avoimuuden merkitystä. Olen samaa mieltä ja sen vuoksi tyytyväinen siihen, että neuvoston vuosikertomuksesta 2004 tulee edeltäjiään avoimempi. Toivomme, että lisäkehitystä saadaan aikaan mahdollisesti jo ensi vuonna. Myös kansallisten selvitysten avoimuus on tärkeää. Puheenjohtajavaltio Alankomaat ja SIPRI järjestivät äskettäin jäsenvaltioiden kanssa kokouksen, jossa käsiteltiin keinoja kansallisten selvitysten parantamiseksi. Olen varma, että tulevat puheenjohtajavaltiot jatkavat tätä aloitetta. Päätöslauselmaesityksessä puolletaan myös seurantajärjestelmää, jolla valvotaan loppukäyttäjiä. Tässä asiassa olisi enemmänkin tehtävää. Äskettäin julkaistu Yhdysvaltain hallituksen tutkimus osoittaa, että Yhdysvaltojen tapauksessa 15–20 prosenttia niin sanottuihin haavoittuviin kohteisiin luvallisesti viedyistä aseista ei päädy ilmoitetulle loppukäyttäjälle. Meillä ei ole EU:ta koskevia lukuja, mutta ei ole mitään syytä olettaa, että ne poikkeaisivat näistä olennaisesti. Sen vuoksi järjestämme ensimmäiseksi viennin jälkeistä valvontaa koskevan kokouksen, jossa Yhdysvaltain viranomaiset kertovat meille kokemuksistaan viennin jälkeistä valvontaa koskevissa ohjelmissaan. Tästä pääsemmekin kenties poliittisesti kaikkein arkaluonteisimpaan kysymykseen. Tiedän, että EU:n Kiinaa koskeva asevientikielto on Euroopan parlamentin ja monien kansallisten parlamenttien erityisen kiinnostuksen kohteena. Panen merkille päätöslauselmassa esitetyn vetoomuksen olla kumoamatta asevientikieltoa. Asevientikiellon tulevaisuus on kuitenkin edelleen neuvoston käsiteltävänä. Sen vuoksi emme voi keskustella aiheesta yksityiskohtaisesti. Totean kuitenkin, että puheenjohtajavaltio Alankomaat on tietoinen parlamenttien, suuren yleisön, kansalaisjärjestöjen sekä Yhdysvaltojen ja Japanin kaltaisten tärkeiden kumppaneiden monista huolenaiheista. Yksi näistä huolenaiheista on Kiinan ihmisoikeustilanne. EU hyödyntää kaikki tilaisuudet keskustella Kiinan kanssa ihmisoikeuskysymyksistä ja seuraa tarkasti käytännön kehitystä. Kaikki nämä huolenaiheet otetaan keskusteluissa huomioon. Käymme keskusteluja myös käytännesääntöihin liittyvistä lisätoimista, joiden tarkoituksena on estää Euroopasta Kiinaan suuntautuvan aseiden ja sotateknologian kulkeutumisen kasvu siinä tapauksessa, että asevientikielto kumottaisiin. Toimien tarkoituksena on parantaa avoimuutta ja tehostaa jäsenvaltioiden välistä neuvonpitoa. Vielä ei ole selvää, milloin keskustelut saadaan päätökseen. Lopuksi totean, että puheenjohtajavaltio Alankomaat on tyytyväinen nähdessään, että Euroopan parlamentti kiinnittää niin paljon huomiota tärkeään asevientipolitiikkaan. Kuten aiemmin totesin, asiaa koskevan vuoropuhelun lisääminen neuvoston ja parlamentin välillä on yksi puheenjohtajakautemme tavoitteista. Edistystä on tapahtunut tai on tapahtumassa monissa niistä kysymyksistä, jotka mainitaan mietinnössä ja päätöslauselmassa. Tietyillä alueilla on mahdollista saada aikaan edistystä. Yksi niistä on kansallisten selvitysten avoimuus, ja toinen on kriteerien tulkinnan yhdenmukaistaminen. Voimme kuitenkin todeta, että lasi on jo enemmän kuin puoliksi täynnä. Voin vakuuttaa teille, että puheenjohtajakautensa kuuden viimeisen viikon aikana Alankomaat tekee kaikkensa, jotta lasi täyttyisi vieläkin enemmän. Aseiden vientiä koskevat käytännesäännöt hyväksyttiin vuonna 1998, eikä ole liioiteltua todeta, että niistä on tullut yksi onnistuneimmista yhteisen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkamme välineistä. Asevientipolitiikka on perinteisesti pyritty pitämään salassa. Sitä pidettiin tärkeänä osana heikentymätöntä kansallista riippumattomuutta, johon puuttumista pidettiin lievästi sanottuna epämiellyttävänä. Vuodesta 1998 alkaen avoimuus, valtioiden välinen neuvonpito ja yhdenmukaistuminen Euroopan unionissa ovat kuitenkin lisääntyneet. Edistyminen on siis ollut vaikuttavaa, ja kolmansien maiden käytännesääntöjä kohtaan tuntema kiinnostus on myös merkki niiden onnistumisesta. En tarkoita vain Euroopan unionin jäseneksi pyrkiviä maita vaan myös muita. Käytännesäännöt ovat hyödyllinen väline, jonka avulla nämä maat voivat luoda tehokasta ja vastuullista vienninvalvontapolitiikkaa. Puheenjohtajavaltio Alankomaat pitää hyvin tärkeänä sitä, että Euroopan asevientipolitiikkaa yhdenmukaistetaan edelleen ja että tämän politiikan avoimuutta lisätään entisestään. Yksi puheenjohtajakauden ensisijaisista tavoitteista on Euroopan unionin käytännesääntöjen ensimmäinen tarkistus. Toivomme, että voimme saada käytännesääntöjen tarkistamisen päätökseen vuoden loppuun mennessä. Painotan, että käytän tarkoituksella ilmaisua "ensimmäinen tarkistus". On tärkeää, että pidämme käytännesääntöjä elävänä asiakirjana, joka pitäisi ottaa säännöllisesti tarkasteltavaksi ja jossa pitäisi huomioida ulkoiset ja sisäiset tapahtumat sekä näkemykset. Tästä syystä olen varma, että tämä ei ole käytännesääntöjen viimeinen tarkistus. Pyrkiessään lisäämään avoimuutta puheenjohtajavaltio Alankomaat on myös painottanut, että on tärkeää käydä laajempaa vuoropuhelua Euroopan parlamentin kanssa. Ulkoasiainvaliokunta keskusteli 1. syyskuuta COARM-työryhmän alankomaalaisen puheenjohtajan kanssa asevientiä koskevista EU:n käytännesäännöistä ja niiden käynnissä olevasta tarkistuksesta. Valiokunnan esittelijä Romeva i Rueda osallistui 30. syyskuuta Haagissa pidettyyn käytännesääntöjen tarkistusta koskevaan konferenssiin. Olemme myös kutsuneet Romeva i Ruedan 3. joulukuuta COARM-työryhmän kanssa pidettävään epäviralliseen kokoukseen, jossa keskustellaan parlamentin mietinnöstä. Lisäksi olemme pyytäneet Romeva i Ruedaa osallistumaan kokoukseen, jonka puheenjohtajavaltio järjestää Tšekin hallituksen kanssa Prahassa ja jossa ehdokasmaille ja Norjalle tiedotetaan käytännesääntöjen täytäntöönpanosta. Pidämme tärkeänä, että parlamenttien tehtävää Euroopan asevientipolitiikan toteutuksessa korostetaan tältä osin. Seuraavaksi haluaisin esittää hieman tarkempia mietintöluonnokseen ja päätöslauselmaesitykseen liittyviä huomioita. Euroopan parlamentin mietinnössä viitataan neuvoston vuonna 2003 antamaan kertomukseen. Sen jälkeen on tapahtunut monia asioita, joista tärkeimpänä haluan mainita käytännesääntöjen tarkistuksen. Joitakin näkökohtia käsitellään mietinnössä tämän tarkistuksen valossa. Tämän osalta haluaisin mainita seuraavat seikat. Euroopan parlamentti pitää aseiden välitystä koskevaa yhteistä kantaa myönteisenä. Käynnissä olevassa tarkistuksessa on jo päästy yksimielisyyteen siitä, että käytännesääntöjen soveltamisalaa laajennetaan välitystoimintaan. Sama koskee luvallista tuotantoa EU:n ulkopuolella sekä aseiden kuljetusta ja uudelleenlastausta. Näitä toimintoja koskeviin lupahakemuksiin sovelletaan jatkossa käytännesäännöissä esitettyjä perusteita ja käytäntöjä. Käytännesääntöjä pitäisi soveltaa myös niin sanotuissa aineettomissa teknologian siirroissa. Muissa kuin käytännesääntöjen tarkistukseen liittyvissä toimissa olemme edistyneet muun muassa tiedotuksen alalla. Mainitsin jo joulukuussa Prahassa pidettävän seminaarin. Syyskuussa jäsenvaltiot sopivat yhdenmukaisemmasta tiedotusmenetelmästä. Neuvoston sihteeristö pitää yllä yksittäisten jäsenvaltioiden tiedotustoimia koskevaa tietokantaa, jotta näitä toimia voitaisiin koordinoida paremmin. Edistystä on tapahtunut myös lupien epäämisilmoitusta ja neuvonpitoa koskevan järjestelmän kehittämisessä – tämä on yksi käytännesääntöjen keskeisistä elementeistä. Nyt epäämistä koskeva neuvonpito toteutetaan siten, että neuvonpidosta ilmoitetaan kaikille jäsenvaltioille. Ainoastaan jäsenvaltion päätöksestä ottaa tai olla ottamatta huomioon kielteistä päätöstä ei tiedoteta automaattisesti kaikille kumppaneille. Lisäksi neuvoston sihteeristö rakentaa elektronista tietokantaa, johon kootaan jäsenvaltioiden ilmoittamat epäämispäätökset sekä niihin liittyviä neuvonpitoja koskevia tietoja. Tietokannan avulla lisätään huomattavasti kahdenvälisten neuvonpitojen tehokkuutta ja niiden tulosten avoimuutta."@fi7 ". Monsieur le Président, c’est un privilège d’être dans cette Assemblée aujourd’hui pour examiner avec vous une question à laquelle ce Parlement et la présidence néerlandaise accordent une grande importance: la politique en matière d’exportations d’armements et le Code de conduite de l’Union européenne en matière d’exportations d’armements. Je commencerai par faire quelques commentaires concernant le rapport relatif au cinquième rapport annuel du Conseil, d’une part, et la motion de résolution, d’autre part. Permettez-moi de commencer par quelques remarques d’ordre général sur le Code de conduite. Le statut du Code a été longuement étudié. Dans son rapport, le Parlement est nettement favorable à ce que le Code soit juridiquement contraignant. Vous savez peut-être qu’il n’existe pas de consensus sur cette question au sein du Conseil: la moitié des États membres environ souhaite que le Code soit juridiquement contraignant, l’autre moitié s’y oppose. Il est toutefois un élément plus important que la question de savoir si le Code est politiquement ou juridiquement contraignant: son contenu proprement dit et la manière dont il est mis en œuvre, car un changement de statut n’aurait en soi probablement que peu d’effet, voire aucun, sur la politique en matière d’exportations d’armements des différents États membres. Le rapport Romeva i Rueda souligne l’importance d’améliorer la transparence. Je me range à cet avis et me réjouis dès lors que le rapport annuel 2004 du Conseil soit plus transparent que les précédents. Nous espérons que des progrès supplémentaires pourront être réalisés, dès l’année prochaine probablement. La transparence des rapports nationaux est également importante. La présidence néerlandaise et le SIPRI ont récemment organisé une réunion avec les États membres concernant la manière d’améliorer l’élaboration des rapports nationaux. Je suis persuadé que les présidences à venir donneront suite à cette initiative. La résolution demande également un système de surveillance permettant de contrôler l’utilisation finale. Il s’agit d’un domaine dans lequel davantage pourrait être fait. Une étude récente du gouvernement américain démontre que, dans le cas des États-Unis, entre 15 et 20% des exportations autorisées vers des destinations dites «vulnérables» n’aboutissent pas dans les mains des utilisateurs finaux indiqués. Nous ne disposons pas des chiffres pour l’Union, mais il n’y a aucune raison de croire qu’ils seraient fondamentalement différents. C’est pourquoi nous organiserons tout d’abord une réunion sur les contrôles post-livraisons. Les autorités américaines y présenteront leurs expériences en matière de programmes de contrôle post-livraisons. Ce qui m’amène à la question qui est probablement la plus sensible politiquement. Je sais que l’embargo européen sur les armes à destination de la Chine fait l’objet d’une attention particulière de la part de ce Parlement et de nombreux parlements nationaux. Je prends acte de la demande de maintien de l’embargo sur les armes formulée dans la résolution. La question de l’avenir de l’embargo sur les armes est toujours examinée par le Conseil. Il est dès lors impossible d’en discuter de manière détaillée. Permettez-moi néanmoins de dire que la présidence néerlandaise a pleinement conscience des différentes inquiétudes exprimées par les parlements, le public, les ONG ainsi que d’importants partenaires tels que les États-Unis et le Japon. L’une de ces inquiétudes est la situation des droits de l’homme en Chine. L’Union met à profit chaque opportunité d’évoquer les questions de droits de l’homme avec la Chine et surveille de près l’évolution sur le terrain. Toutes ces inquiétudes sont prises en considération dans la discussion. Nous étudions également des mesures additionnelles au Code de conduite, afin d’empêcher le flux d’armes et de technologie militaire entre l’Europe et la Chine d’augmenter si l’embargo venait à être levé. Ces mesures ont pour objet d’accroître la transparence et d’intensifier la concertation entre États membres. La date de conclusion de cette discussion n’est pas encore connue. Pour conclure, la présidence néerlandaise se réjouit de constater que le Parlement européen s’intéresse d’aussi près à l’importante question de la politique en matière d’exportation d’armements. Comme je l’ai indiqué précédemment, le renforcement du dialogue entre le Conseil et le Parlement sur ce dossier est l’un des objectifs de notre présidence. Des progrès ont été enregistrés ou sont en passe de l’être sur nombre de points mentionnés dans le rapport et dans la résolution. Des avancées supplémentaires sont possibles dans certains domaines. La transparence des rapports nationaux en fait partie, au même titre que l’harmonisation de l’interprétation des critères. Nous pouvons toutefois affirmer que le verre est d’ores et déjà plus qu’à moitié plein. Restez assurés que les Pays-Bas mettront tout en œuvre durant les six dernières semaines de leur présidence pour remplir le verre davantage encore. Le Code de conduite en matière d’exportations d’armements a été adopté en 1998. Il n’est pas exagéré de dire qu’il est devenu l’un des instruments les plus efficaces de notre politique étrangère et de sécurité commune. La politique dans le domaine des exportations d’armes était traditionnellement frappée du sceau du secret. Elle était considérée comme un élément essentiel à une souveraineté nationale totale et toute interférence de tiers était indésirable, c’est un euphémisme. Nous assistons pourtant à une amélioration de la transparence, de la concertation interétatique et de l’harmonisation dans l’Union européenne depuis 1998. C’est un progrès impressionnant et le succès du Code de conduite se reflète également dans l’intérêt affiché par certains pays tiers. Je ne fais pas uniquement référence à des États souhaitant rejoindre l’Union européenne, d’autres sont également dans ce cas. Le Code de conduite est un outil utile pouvant les aider à mettre en œuvre une politique de contrôle des exportations efficace et responsable. La présidence néerlandaise attache une grande importance à la poursuite de l’harmonisation de la politique européenne en matière d’exportations d’armements et au renforcement de la transparence de cette politique. L’une des priorités de notre présidence est la conclusion de la première révision du Code de conduite européen. Nous espérons être en mesure de finaliser cette révision avant la fin de l’année. Je souligne les mots «première révision». Il importe d’envisager le Code comme un document vivant devant régulièrement voir la lumière du jour et intégrer les évolutions et les points de vue internes et externes. C’est pourquoi je suis persuadé que ce n’est pas la dernière révision du Code. Dans ses efforts visant au renforcement de la transparence, la présidence néerlandaise a également souligné l’importance de renforcer le dialogue avec le Parlement européen. Le 1er septembre, la commission des affaires étrangères et le président néerlandais du groupe de travail COARM ont débattu du Code de conduite européen et de la révision actuelle. Le rapporteur de la commission, M. Romeva i Rueda, a pris part à une conférence relative à la révision du Code le 30 septembre à La Haye. Nous avons également invité M. Romeva i Rueda à une réunion informelle avec le groupe de travail COARM le 3 décembre afin de discuter du rapport du Parlement. Nous avons par ailleurs invité M. Romeva i Rueda à participer à une réunion organisée à Prague par la présidence, en collaboration avec le gouvernement tchèque, ayant pour objet d’informer les pays candidats et la Norvège sur la mise en œuvre du Code. Nous pensons que, sous ce rapport, il est important d’expliquer le rôle parlementaire dans le cadre de la politique européenne en matière d’exportations d’armes. Je voudrais maintenant formuler quelques remarques plus spécifiques sur le projet de rapport et sur la motion de résolution. Le rapport du Parlement européen fait référence au rapport du Conseil de 2003. Bien des choses sont arrivées depuis lors, la principale étant la révision du Code de conduite. Certains points abordés dans le rapport sont examinés dans le cadre de cette révision. À cet égard, je devrais mentionner les suivants. Le rapport du Parlement européen salue la position commune sur le courtage en matière d’armements. La révision actuelle se distingue d’ores et déjà par un consensus quant à l’extension du Code aux activités de courtage. C’est également valable pour la production sous licence à l’étranger, le transport et le transbordement. Les demandes d’autorisations relatives à ces activités seront soumises aux critères et aux pratiques définies dans le Code de conduite. Ce dernier doit également s’appliquer aux transferts immatériels de technologie. En dehors du cadre de la révision du Code de conduite, nous avons progressé dans des domaines tels que la décentralisation. J’ai déjà mentionné le séminaire qui se déroulera à Prague en décembre. En septembre, les États membres ont convenu d’une approche plus cohérente en matière de décentralisation. Le secrétariat du Conseil gérera une base de données relative aux activités décentralisées des différents États membres de manière à améliorer la coordination. Des progrès ont également été réalisés dans le développement accru du système de notification des interdictions et de consultation - l’un des éléments essentiels du Code. Les consultations relatives aux interdictions se déroulent actuellement d’une manière permettant à tous les États membres d’être informés de ces consultations. Seule la décision finale d’un État membre de contester ou non l’interdiction n’est pas automatiquement partagée avec l’ensemble des partenaires. Par ailleurs, le secrétariat du Conseil développe actuellement une base de données électronique. Elle contiendra les interdictions notifiées par les États membres, ainsi que les informations sur les consultations qu’ils ont entreprises. Cette base de données contribuera grandement à l’efficacité des consultations bilatérales et à la transparence de leurs résultats."@fr8 "Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@hu11 ". Signor Presidente, è un onore essere qui con voi oggi a discutere di una questione alla quale il Parlamento e la Presidenza olandese attribuiscono grande importanza: la politica di esportazione delle armi e il codice di condotta dell’Unione europea per le esportazioni di armi. Vorrei soffermarmi innanzi tutto sulla quinta relazione annuale del Consiglio e sulla proposta di risoluzione. Permettetemi di iniziare con alcune osservazioni di carattere generale sul codice di condotta. Si è dedicato molto tempo allo del codice. Nella sua relazione il Parlamento afferma chiaramente la propria preferenza a favore di un codice giuridicamente vincolante. Forse saprete che sulla questione non esiste alcun consenso in seno al Consiglio: circa la metà degli Stati membri è favorevole a rendere il codice giuridicamente vincolante, ma l’altra metà è contraria. Tuttavia, esprimersi a favore di un codice politicamente o giuridicamente vincolante è meno importante di un’altra questione, ovvero l’effettivo contenuto del codice e il modo in cui viene applicato. Infatti, di per sé la modifica dello avrebbe effetti scarsi o nulli sulla politica di esportazione delle armi dei singoli Stati membri. La relazione Romeva i Rueda evidenzia l’importanza di una maggiore trasparenza. Sono d’accordo e per questo sono lieto che la relazione annuale 2004 del Consiglio sarà più trasparente di quelle che l’hanno preceduta. Ci auguriamo che sia possibile avviare ulteriori azioni, possibilmente già l’anno prossimo. Anche la trasparenza delle relazioni nazionali è importante. La Presidenza olandese, unitamente al SIPRI, ha recentemente organizzato una riunione con gli Stati membri sul modo di migliorare le relazioni nazionali. Sono certo che le prossime Presidenze porteranno avanti questa iniziativa. La risoluzione auspica anche la creazione di un sistema di controllo dell’utilizzazione finale, settore, questo, in cui si potrebbe fare di più. Un recente studio del governo degli Stati Uniti rivela che, nel caso degli USA; il 15-20 per cento delle esportazioni autorizzate verso le cosiddette destinazioni “sensibili” non finisce nelle mani dell’utente finale indicato. Non disponiamo di dati relativi all’Unione europea, ma non vi è ragione di credere che siano nettamente diversi. Di conseguenza, come primo passo, organizzeremo una riunione sui controlli postspedizione in cui le autorità statunitensi ci esporranno le loro esperienze in materia di programmi di controllo postspedizione. Questo punto mi porta a parlare di quella che, probabilmente, è la questione più delicata dal punto di vista politico. So che l’ sulle armi imposto dall’Unione alla Cina sta particolarmente a cuore al Parlamento europeo e a molti parlamenti nazionali. Prendo nota dell’appello della risoluzione a non revocare l’ sulle armi. Il problema del futuro dell’ sugli armamenti è ancora oggetto di discussione in seno al Consiglio. Non è quindi possibile discutere approfonditamente la questione. Tuttavia, vorrei dire che la Presidenza olandese conosce benissimo le varie preoccupazioni espresse dai parlamenti, dai cittadini, dalle ONG e anche da importanti come gli Stati Uniti e il Giappone. Una di queste preoccupazioni è la situazione dei diritti umani in Cina. L’Unione europea coglie ogni occasione per discutere con la Cina di questioni relative ai diritti umani e controlla attentamente gli sviluppi . La discussione tiene conto di tutte queste preoccupazioni. Discutiamo anche di misure supplementari al codice di condotta, che dovrebbero evitare l’aumento del flusso di armi e di tecnologia militare dall’Europa alla Cina nel caso in cui l’ dovesse essere revocato. L’obiettivo di tali misure è aumentare la trasparenza e intensificare la consultazione tra gli Stati membri. Non si sa ancora quando questa discussione avrà termine. In conclusione, la Presidenza olandese è lieta di constatare che il Parlamento europeo presta grande attenzione all’importante questione della politica di esportazione delle armi. Come ho detto prima, intensificare il dialogo in materia tra Consiglio e Parlamento è uno degli obiettivi della nostra Presidenza. Sono stati realizzati o si stanno compiendo progressi su molti dei punti elencati nella relazione e nella risoluzione. Esistono aree in cui è possibile compiere ulteriori progressi. La trasparenza delle relazioni nazionali è una di queste; l’armonizzazione dell’interpretazione dei criteri è un’altra. Tuttavia, possiamo affermare che siamo più che a metà dell’opera. State certi che i Paesi Bassi, nelle restanti sei settimane di Presidenza, faranno tutto il possibile per compiere ulteriori progressi. Il codice di condotta per le esportazioni di armi è stato adottato nel 1998, e non è un’esagerazione affermare che è diventato uno degli strumenti più riusciti della nostra politica estera e di sicurezza comune. Tradizionalmente, la politica di esportazione delle armi è coperta da segretezza. Si è sempre ritenuto che si trattasse di una prerogativa essenziale di una forte sovranità nazionale in cui l’interferenza da parte di altri non era, per usare un eufemismo, bene accetta. Tuttavia, dal 1998 abbiamo assistito a un aumento della trasparenza, a una maggiore consultazione interstatale e a un incremento dell’armonizzazione nell’Unione europea. Si tratta di un progresso impressionante, e il successo del codice di condotta emerge anche dall’interesse che i paesi terzi hanno dimostrato nei suoi confronti. Non sto parlando solo di paesi che aspirano a diventare Stati membri dell’Unione europea, ma anche di altri. Il codice di condotta è uno strumento utile che può aiutarli a istituire una politica di controllo delle esportazioni efficace e responsabile. Per la Presidenza olandese è molto importante armonizzare ulteriormente la politica europea di esportazione delle armi e rendere tale politica ancora più trasparente. Una delle priorità della nostra Presidenza consiste nel portare a termine la prima revisione del codice di condotta dell’Unione europea. Speriamo di riuscire a concludere tale revisione entro la fine dell’anno. Vorrei sottolineare che uso volutamente l’espressione “prima revisione”. E’ importante considerare il codice come un documento vivente, che deve essere regolarmente esposto alla luce e prendere in considerazione gli sviluppi e i pareri interni ed esterni. Di conseguenza, sono certo che questa non sarà l’ultima revisione del codice. Nel tentativo di aumentare la trasparenza, la Presidenza olandese ha altresì sottolineato l’importanza di un maggiore dialogo con il Parlamento europeo. Il 1° settembre, la commissione per gli affari esteri ha tenuto un dibattito con il presidente olandese del gruppo di lavoro COARM sul codice di condotta dell’Unione europea e sulla revisione attuale. Il relatore della commissione, onorevole Romeva i Rueda, ha partecipato a una conferenza sulla revisione del codice svoltasi il 30 settembre, all’Aia. Abbiamo altresì invitato l’onorevole Romeva i Rueda a prendere parte a una riunione informale del gruppo di lavoro COARM il 3 dicembre per discutere sulla relazione del Parlamento. Inoltre, abbiamo invitato l’onorevole Romeva i Rueda a partecipare a una riunione che la Presidenza, assieme al governo ceco, sta organizzando a Praga, al fine di informare i paesi candidati e la Norvegia sull’attuazione del codice. Riteniamo che, a tale proposito, sia importante evidenziare il ruolo svolto dal Parlamento nella politica europea di esportazione delle armi. A questo punto vorrei soffermarmi in maniera più specifica sul progetto di relazione e sulla proposta di risoluzione. La relazione del Parlamento europeo si riferisce alla relazione del Consiglio del 2003. Da allora sono successe molte cose, la più importante delle quali è stata la revisione del codice di condotta. Nel quadro di questa revisione si stanno discutendo alcuni degli aspetti affrontati nella relazione. A tale proposito desidero soffermarmi sui seguenti punti. La relazione del Parlamento europeo accoglie con favore la posizione comune sull’intermediazione di armi. L’attuale revisione contiene già un consenso volto a estendere l’applicazione del codice alle attività di intermediazione, alla produzione autorizzata di armamenti oltremare, al trasporto e al trasbordo. Le domande di licenza per lo svolgimento di queste attività saranno soggette ai criteri e alle prassi esposte nel codice di condotta. Inoltre, il codice dovrebbe essere applicabile anche nei casi dei cosiddetti trasferimenti intangibili di tecnologia. Esternamente all’ambito della revisione del codice di condotta, abbiamo compiuto progressi in settori come l’ . Ho già parlato del seminario che si terrà a Praga a dicembre. A settembre, gli Stati membri hanno deciso di adottare un approccio più coerente sull’ . Il Segretariato del Consiglio terrà una banca dati sulle attività di dei singoli Stati membri al fine di ottenere un migliore coordinamento. Sono stati compiuti progressi anche nell’ulteriore sviluppo della notifica di rifiuto e del sistema di consultazione – uno degli elementi centrali del codice. Le consultazioni sui rifiuti ora avvengono in modo tale che tutti gli Stati membri siano informati della consultazione. Solo la decisione finale di uno Stato membro di concedere o meno un’autorizzazione malgrado un rifiuto precedente non viene automaticamente condivisa con tutti gli altri . Inoltre, il Segretariato del Consiglio sta creando una banca dati elettronica che conterrà i rifiuti notificati dagli Stati membri, nonché informazioni sulle consultazioni da loro avviate. Questa banca dati apporterà un enorme contributo all’efficienza delle consultazioni bilaterali e alla trasparenza dei loro esiti."@it12 "Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@lt14 "Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@lv13 "Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@mt15 "Mijnheer de Voorzitter, het is mij een eer hier vandaag te zijn om met u van gedachten te wisselen over een vraagstuk dat dit Parlement en het Nederlandse voorzitterschap na aan het hart ligt: het wapenexportbeleid en de gedragscode van de Europese Unie betreffende wapenuitvoer. Ik zal om te beginnen ingaan op het verslag over het vijfde jaarverslag van de Raad en op de ontwerpresolutie. Staat u mij toe allereerst een aantal algemene opmerkingen te maken over de gedragscode. Er is veel tijd besteed aan de vraag welke status de gedragscode dient te hebben. Het Parlement geeft er in zijn verslag duidelijk de voorkeur aan de gedragscode wettelijk bindend te maken. Zoals u zich wellicht realiseert, heerst hierover in de Raad geen consensus: ongeveer de helft van de lidstaten is er voorstander van de gedragscode wettelijk bindend te maken, maar de andere helft is daar tegen. Belangrijker dan de vraag of de gedragscode politiek bindend of wettelijk bindend moet zijn, is echter de feitelijke inhoud van de gedragscode en de wijze waarop hij ten uitvoer wordt gelegd. Waarschijnlijk zou het veranderen van de status op zich immers geen of vrijwel geen effect hebben op het wapenexportbeleid van de afzonderlijke lidstaten. De heer Romeva i Rueda benadrukt in zijn verslag het belang van een grotere transparantie. Ik ben het met hem eens en ik ben er dan ook mee ingenomen dat het jaarverslag van de Raad over 2004 transparanter zal zijn dan de voorgaande jaarverslagen. Naar wij hopen zullen er verdere stappen ondernomen kunnen worden, waarschijnlijk volgend jaar al. Het is ook van belang dat de nationale verslagen transparant zijn. Het Nederlandse voorzitterschap heeft onlangs, in samenwerking met het SIPRI, een bijeenkomst georganiseerd over de vraag hoe de nationale verslaglegging verbeterd kan worden. Ik twijfel er niet aan dat volgende voorzitterschappen op dit initiatief zullen inhaken. In de ontwerpresolutie wordt ook gepleit voor een toezichtsysteem in verband met de controle op het eindgebruik van wapens. Op dit gebied zou meer gedaan kunnen worden. Uit een recent onderzoek in opdracht van de Amerikaanse regering blijkt dat, in het geval van de VS, van de geautoriseerde wapenexporten naar zogeheten “kwetsbare” bestemmingen tussen de 15 en 20 procent uiteindelijk niet terechtkomt bij degene die als eindgebruiker is opgegeven. Wij beschikken niet over cijfers voor de EU, maar er is geen reden om te veronderstellen dat die heel anders zullen zijn. Daarom zullen wij, als eerste stap, een bijeenkomst organiseren over het uitvoeren van controles nadat de betreffende ladingen verzonden zijn; de Amerikaanse autoriteiten zullen ons daarbij op de hoogte brengen van hun ervaringen met programma’s voor controle na verzending. Hiermee kom ik op wat in politiek opzicht misschien wel het meest gevoelig ligt. Ik weet dat het embargo van de EU op de handel in wapens met China de bijzondere aandacht van dit Parlement en van veel nationale parlementen heeft. Ik neem nota van de oproep die in de ontwerpresolutie wordt gedaan om het wapenembargo niet op te heffen. De toekomst van het wapenembargo is nog steeds onderwerp van bespreking in de Raad. Ik kan dan ook niet uitvoerig ingaan op dit vraagstuk. Laat mij u echter verzekeren dat het Nederlandse voorzitterschap zich terdege bewust is van de diverse zorgen die geuit zijn door parlementen, burgers, niet-gouvernementele organisaties en ook door belangrijke partners als de VS en Japan. Een van de zaken waarover men zich zorgen maakt, is de mensenrechtensituatie in China. De EU benut iedere gelegenheid om mensenrechtenvraagstukken aan de orde te stellen bij China en houdt de ontwikkelingen ter plaatse nauwlettend in de gaten. Met al deze zorgen wordt in de discussie rekening gehouden. Wij beraden ons eveneens op maatregelen in aanvulling op de gedragscode die moeten voorkomen dat de stroom van wapens en militaire technologie vanuit Europa naar China toeneemt wanneer het embargo eventueel wordt opgeheven. Het doel van deze maatregelen is de transparantie te vergroten en het overleg tussen de lidstaten te intensiveren. Het is nog niet duidelijk wanneer deze discussie zal worden afgerond. Het stemt het Nederlandse voorzitterschap verheugd, tot besluit, dat het Europees Parlement zoveel aandacht besteedt aan het belangrijke vraagstuk van het wapenexportbeleid. Zoals ik eerder al heb aangegeven, is het een van de doelstellingen van ons voorzitterschap de dialoog over dit onderwerp tussen de Raad en het Parlement te versterken. Wat betreft veel van de punten die in het verslag en de ontwerpresolutie te berde worden gebracht, is er al heel wat bereikt of maken we vorderingen. Er zijn gebieden waar ruimte is voor verdere vooruitgang. Een daarvan is de transparantie van de nationale verslagen; een ander voorbeeld is de harmonisering van de wijze waarop de criteria worden geïnterpreteerd. We kunnen echter stellen dat het glas al meer dan half vol is. U kunt erop rekenen dat Nederland er in de resterende zes weken van zijn voorzitterschap alles aan zal doen om ervoor te zorgen dat het glas nog verder gevuld wordt. De gedragscode betreffende wapenuitvoer is in 1998 aangenomen en het is niet overdreven om te stellen dat de gedragscode inmiddels een van de meer geslaagde instrumenten is van ons gemeenschappelijk buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid. Van oudsher wordt wapenexportbeleid met geheimzinnigheid omgeven. Het werd beschouwd als een essentieel element van onaangetaste nationale soevereiniteit en inmenging van anderen op dat terrein was, zacht gezegd, niet welkom. Sinds 1998 zijn we echter getuige geweest van een toenemende transparantie, een toenemend overleg tussen staten en een toenemende harmonisering in de Europese Unie. Dat is een indrukwekkende vooruitgang en het succes van de gedragscode blijkt ook uit de belangstelling die derde landen ervoor hebben. Ik heb het niet alleen over landen die ernaar streven lid te worden van de Europese Unie, maar ook over andere landen. De gedragscode is een nuttig gereedschap dat hen kan helpen een efficiënt en verantwoord beleid voor wapenexportcontrole te ontwikkelen. Het Nederlandse voorzitterschap hecht grote waarde aan een verdere harmonisering van het Europese wapenexportbeleid en aan een nog grotere transparantie van dat beleid. Een van de prioriteiten van ons voorzitterschap is de afronding van de eerste herziening van de gedragscode. Wij hopen deze evaluatie vóór het einde van dit jaar te kunnen voltooien. Let wel, ik zeg met opzet “eerste herziening”. Het is van belang dat wij de gedragscode zien als een levend document dat regelmatig tegen het licht moet worden gehouden en dat we rekening houden met interne en externe ontwikkelingen en opvattingen. Ik ben er dan ook van overtuigd dat dit niet de laatste herziening van de gedragscode zal zijn. In zijn streven naar een grotere transparantie heeft het Nederlandse voorzitterschap voorts gehamerd op het belang van een geïntensiveerde dialoog met het Europees Parlement. Op 1 september heeft een discussie over de EU-gedragscode en de huidige herziening plaatsgehad tussen de Commissie buitenlandse zaken en de Nederlandse voorzitter van de COARM-werkgroep. De rapporteur namens de commissie, de heer Romeva i Rueda, heeft op 30 september deelgenomen aan een conferentie in Den Haag over de herziening van de gedragscode. Wij hebben hem tevens uitgenodigd op 3 december een informele bijeenkomst van de COARM-werkgroep bij te wonen waar het verslag van het Parlement zal worden besproken. Bovendien hebben wij de heer Romeva i Rueda uitgenodigd deel te nemen aan een bijeenkomst in Praag die door het voorzitterschap, samen met de Tsjechische regering, wordt georganiseerd en die als doel heeft de kandidaat-lidstaten en Noorwegen te informeren over de tenuitvoerlegging van de gedragscode. Naar onze mening is het van belang de rol van parlementen in het Europese wapenexportbeleid in dat opzicht goed uit de verf te laten komen. Dan wil ik nu enkele meer specifieke opmerkingen maken over het ontwerpverslag en de ontwerpresolutie. In het verslag van het Europees Parlement wordt verwezen naar het verslag van de Raad uit 2003. Er is sindsdien veel gebeurd, en de herziening van de gedragscode is wel de belangrijkste ontwikkeling. Over een aantal van de zaken die in het verslag aan de orde zijn gesteld, wordt in het kader van deze herziening gediscussieerd. Ik wil in dit verband de volgende punten noemen. In zijn verslag betuigt het Europees Parlement zijn instemming met het gemeenschappelijk standpunt over de tussenhandel in wapens. In de huidige herziening is men het er al over eens dat de gedragscode ook moet worden toegepast op activiteiten die verband houden met tussenhandel. Hetzelfde geldt voor de overzeese productie van wapens in licentie, en voor vervoer en overslag. Aanvragen voor een licentie voor deze activiteiten zullen in overeenstemming moeten zijn met de criteria en de praktijken die in de gedragscode worden beschreven. Verder moet de gedragscode ook kunnen worden toegepast in gevallen van zogeheten immateriële overdracht van technologie. Buiten het kader van de herziening van de gedragscode hebben wij vorderingen gemaakt op gebieden als voorlichting. Ik noemde zojuist al het seminar dat in december in Praag zal worden gehouden. In september zijn de lidstaten het eens geworden over een meer samenhangend communicatiebeleid. Het Secretariaat van de Raad zal een databank bijhouden van de activiteiten die de afzonderlijke lidstaten op dit gebied ontplooien, om aldus een betere coördinatie mogelijk te maken. Er is ook vooruitgang geboekt wat betreft de nadere uitwerking van het systeem voor kennisgevingen van weigeringen en raadplegingen – een van de kernelementen van de gedragscode. Raadplegingen over weigeringen vinden nu op een zodanige wijze plaats dat alle lidstaten over de raadpleging worden ingelicht. Alleen het definitieve besluit van een lidstaat om een weigeringsbeslissing al dan niet naast zich neer te leggen, wordt niet automatisch met alle partners gedeeld. Voorts wordt er een elektronische databank opgericht door het Secretariaat van de Raad, waarin de kennisgevingen van weigeringen door de lidstaten zullen worden opgenomen, alsook informatie over de raadplegingen die zij gehouden hebben. Deze databank zal in hoge mate bijdragen tot de efficiëntie van bilaterale raadplegingen en tot de transparantie van de resultaten daarvan."@nl3 "Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@pl16 "Senhor Presidente, é um privilégio estar aqui hoje para debater convosco um assunto a que este Parlamento e a Presidência neerlandesa atribuem grande importância: a política de exportação de armas e o Código de Conduta da União Europeia relativo à Exportação de Armas. Começarei por tecer alguns comentários sobre o relatório relativo ao Quinto Relatório Anual do Conselho e sobre a proposta de resolução. Permitam-me que comece por algumas observações gerais sobre o Código de Conduta. Tem sido dedicado muito tempo à questão do estatuto do Código. O Parlamento manifesta uma clara preferência, no seu relatório, pela atribuição de um carácter vinculativo ao Código. Como saberão, não existe consenso a este respeito no Conselho: cerca de metade dos Estados-Membros são favoráveis a que o Código passe a ser juridicamente vinculativo, mas a outra metade opõe-se a isso. No entanto, há um aspecto mais importante do que saber se o Código deve ser política ou juridicamente vinculativo. Refiro-me, concretamente, ao conteúdo do Código e à forma como este é executado, visto que mudar o seu estatuto, por si só, terá provavelmente escasso, ou mesmo nenhum, impacto na política de exportação de armas dos diversos Estados-Membros. O relatório Romeva i Rueda salienta a importância de uma transparência acrescida. Concordo e, por conseguinte, congratulo-me por o Relatório Anual do Conselho para 2004 ser mais transparente do que os anteriores. Esperamos que possam ser dados novos passos nesta área, provavelmente já no próximo ano. Igualmente importante será a transparência dos relatórios nacionais. A Presidência neerlandesa, juntamente com o SIPRI, organizou, recentemente, uma reunião com os Estados-Membros sobre a forma de melhorar os relatórios nacionais. Estou certo de que as Presidências subsequentes darão continuidade a esta iniciativa. Na resolução, advoga-se também a criação de um regime de controlo da utilização final. Esta é uma área em que será necessário desenvolver mais trabalho. Um recente estudo do Governo dos EUA revela que, no caso dos EUA, entre 15 e 20% das exportações autorizadas para os chamados destinos “sensíveis” não chegam às mãos do utilizador final indicado. Não dispomos de números relativos à UE, mas não há razão para pensar que seriam substancialmente diferentes. Por conseguinte, como primeiro passo, realizaremos uma reunião sobre controlos pós-exportação, durante a qual obteremos das autoridades dos EUA informações sobre a sua experiência em matéria de programas de controlo pós-exportação. Isto conduz-me àquele que é, provavelmente, o tema mais delicado em termos políticos. Estou ciente de que o embargo à venda de armas imposto pela UE à China merece uma atenção especial da parte deste Parlamento e de muitos parlamentos nacionais. Registo o apelo contido na resolução, no sentido de que não se levante esse embargo. A questão do futuro do embargo à venda de armas está ainda em discussão no Conselho. Por conseguinte, não é possível discuti-la em pormenor. Permitam, no entanto, que diga que a Presidência neerlandesa está plenamente ciente das diversas preocupações manifestadas pelos Parlamentos, pela opinião pública, por ONG e também por importantes parceiros, como os EUA e o Japão. Uma dessas preocupações prende-se com a situação dos direitos humanos na China. A UE aproveita todas as oportunidades para debater questões relacionadas com os direitos humanos com a China, acompanhando de muito perto a evolução no terreno. Todas estas preocupações são tidas em consideração na discussão. Estamos igualmente a debater medidas complementares ao Código de Conduta, que deverão permitir evitar um aumento do fluxo de armas e tecnologias militares da Europa para a China, caso o embargo venha a ser levantado. O objectivo destas medidas é aumentar a transparência e intensificar a consulta entre os Estados-Membros. Desconhecemos ainda quando ficará concluída esta discussão. Para concluir, a Presidência neerlandesa congratula-se com o facto de o Parlamento Europeu prestar tanta atenção à importante questão da política de exportação de armas. Como disse há pouco, um diálogo acrescido a este respeito entre o Conselho e o Parlamento é um dos objectivos da nossa Presidência. Já se concretizaram, ou estão em curso, progressos relativamente a muitos dos aspectos referidos no relatório e na resolução. Há domínios em que é possível avançar mais. Exemplo disso são a transparência dos relatórios nacionais, ou a harmonização da interpretação dos critérios. No entanto, é hoje possível afirmar que já enchemos mais de metade do copo. Posso assegurar que os Países Baixos envidarão os máximos esforços, nas seis semanas que restam da sua Presidência, para encher ainda mais esse copo. O Código de Conduta da União Europeia relativo à Exportação de Armas foi adoptado em 1998, e não será exagero afirmar que se tornou um dos instrumentos mais bem sucedidos da nossa Política Externa e de Segurança Comum. Tradicionalmente, a política de exportação de armas tem estado envolta em secretismo. Era considerada um elemento essencial de uma soberania nacional plena, relativamente ao qual a interferência de outros era, para o colocar de forma diplomática, não desejável. No entanto, deste 1998, temos vindo a assistir a um aumento da transparência, a um incremento das consultas inter-estatais e ao reforço da harmonização no âmbito da União Europeia. São progressos impressionantes, e o êxito do Código de Conduta é também ilustrado pelo interesse que despertou em países terceiros. Não me refiro apenas a países que aspiram vir a ser Estados-Membros da União Europeia, mas também a outros. O Código de Conduta é um instrumento útil, que pode ajudar a criar uma política eficaz e responsável de controlo das exportações. A Presidência neerlandesa atribui grande importância ao reforço da harmonização da política europeia de exportação de armas e ao aumento da sua transparência. Uma das prioridades da nossa Presidência é a conclusão da primeira revisão do Código de Conduta da UE. Esperamos conseguir terminar essa revisão antes do final do ano. Devo frisar que utilizei propositadamente a expressão “primeira revisão”. É importante que vejamos o Código como um documento vivo, que deverá ser criteriosamente analisado com regularidade e ter em conta as evoluções e visões internas e externas. Por conseguinte, estou certo de que esta não será a última revisão do Código. No âmbito dos seus esforços com vista ao aumento da transparência, a Presidência neerlandesa salientou também a importância de um diálogo acrescido com o Parlamento Europeu. Em 1 de Setembro, a Comissão dos Assuntos Externos realizou um debate com o Presidente neerlandês do Grupo da Exportação de Armas Convencionais (COARM) sobre o Código de Conduta da UE e a revisão em curso. E, em 30 de Setembro, o relator da comissão, o senhor deputado Romeva i Rueda, participou numa conferência na Haia sobre a revisão do Código. Convidámos, igualmente, o senhor deputado Romeva i Rueda para uma reunião informal com o Grupo de Trabalho COARM, realizada em 3 de Dezembro, para debater o relatório do Parlamento. E convidámo-lo também para participar numa reunião que a Presidência está a organizar em Praga, juntamente com o Governo checo, com vista a informar os países candidatos e a Noruega sobre a implementação do Código. Consideramos importante que o papel do Parlamento na política de exportação de armamento da UE seja posto em evidência neste domínio. Gostaria agora de passar a comentários mais específicos sobre o projecto de relatório e a proposta de resolução. O relatório do Parlamento Europeu refere-se ao relatório do Conselho de 2003. Desde então, já muito aconteceu e, acima de tudo, a revisão do Código de Conduta. Alguns dos aspectos abordados neste relatório estão a ser discutidos no âmbito desta revisão. A este respeito, devo referir o seguinte. No relatório, o Parlamento Europeu congratula-se com a posição comum relativa ao controlo da intermediação de armamento. Na actual revisão, existe já consenso quanto ao alargamento da aplicação do Código às actividades de intermediação. O mesmo se aplica à produção sob licença no estrangeiro, ao transporte e ao transbordo. Os pedidos de licenças para estas actividades passarão a estar sujeitos a critérios e práticas estabelecidos no Código de Conduta. Para além disso, o Código deverá também ser aplicável aos casos das chamadas transferências de tecnologias imateriais. Fora do contexto desta revisão do Código de Conduta, realizámos progressos em áreas tais como as da abertura . Referi já o seminário em Praga, em Dezembro. Em Setembro, os Estados-Membros chegaram a acordo quanto a uma abordagem mais coerente nessa matéria. O Secretariado do Conselho manterá uma base de dados sobre as actividades de abertura dos diversos Estados-Membros, de molde a conseguirmos uma maior coordenação. Foram ainda realizados progressos no desenvolvimento do sistema de consultas e de notificações de recusa – um dos elementos fulcrais do Código. Estão já em curso consultas sobre recusas, sendo que todos os Estados-Membros são mantidos ao corrente das mesmas. Só a decisão final de um Estado-Membro de conceder, ou não, uma autorização que outro Estado-Membro decidiu recusar não é partilhada automaticamente por todos os parceiros. Para além disso, está a ser criada, pelo Secretariado do Conselho, uma base de dados electrónica, que conterá as recusas notificadas pelos Estados-Membros, bem como a informação relativa às consultas que estes levaram a cabo. Esta base de dados contribuirá consideravelmente para a eficácia das consultas bilaterais e para a transparência dos seus resultados."@pt17 "Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@sk18 "Mr President, it is a privilege to be here today to discuss with you an issue to which this Parliament and the Dutch presidency attach great importance: arms export policy and the European Union Code of Conduct on Arms Exports. I shall begin with some comments on the report on the Council's Fifth Annual Report and on the motion for a resolution. Please allow me to start with some general remarks about the Code of Conduct. Much time has been devoted to the status of the Code. Parliament expresses a clear preference in its report for making the Code legally binding. You may be aware that there is no consensus on this issue in the Council: about half of the Member States are in favour of making the Code legally binding, but the other half opposes it. However, there is something more important than the question of whether the Code is politically or legally binding. That is the actual content of the Code and the way it is implemented, because changing the status in itself would probably have little or no effect on the arms export policy of individual Member States. The Romeva i Rueda report stresses the importance of increased transparency. I agree and am therefore pleased that the Council's 2004 Annual Report will be more transparent than previous ones. We hope that further steps can be taken, probably as soon as next year. The transparency of the national reports is also of importance. The Dutch presidency, together with SIPRI, recently organised a meeting with Member States on how to improve national reporting. I am sure that subsequent presidencies will follow-up this initiative. The resolution also advocates a monitoring system to control end-use. This is an area where more work could be done. A recent US Government study shows that, in the case of the US, between 15 and 20% of authorised exports to so-called 'vulnerable' destinations do not end in the hands of the indicated end-user. We have no figures for the EU, but there is no reason to think they would be dramatically different. We will therefore, as a first step, organise a meeting on post-shipment controls where we will be briefed by the US authorities on their experiences with post-shipment control programmes. This brings me to probably the most politically sensitive issue. I know that the EU arms embargo vis-à-vis China attracts the special attention of this Parliament and of many national parliaments. I take note of the appeal in the resolution not to lift the arms embargo. The issue of the future of the arms embargo is still under discussion in the Council. It is therefore not possible to discuss this issue in detail. However, let me say that the Dutch presidency is well aware of the various concerns expressed by parliaments, the public, NGOs and also by important partners like the US and Japan. One such concern is the human rights situation in China. The EU takes every opportunity to discuss human rights issues with China, and monitors carefully the developments on the ground. All these concerns are taken into account in the discussion. We are also discussing measures supplementary to the Code of Conduct that should prevent an increase in the flow of arms and military technology from Europe to China should the embargo be lifted. The aim of these measures is to increase transparency and intensify consultation among Member States. It is not yet clear when this discussion will be concluded. In conclusion, the Dutch presidency is pleased to see that the European Parliament pays so much attention to the important issue of arms export policy. As I said earlier, increased dialogue on this issue between the Council and Parliament is one of the objectives of our presidency. Progress has been made or is under way on many of the points mentioned in the report and the resolution. There are areas where further progress is possible. The transparency of the national reports is one; harmonisation of the interpretation of the criteria is another. However, we can say that the glass is already more than half full. Please be assured that the Netherlands will do its utmost in the remaining six weeks of its presidency to fill the glass even fuller. The Code of Conduct on Arms Exports was adopted in 1998, and it is no exaggeration to state that it has become one of the more successful instruments of our common foreign and security policy. Arms export policy has traditionally been veiled in secrecy. It was considered to be an essential element of undiminished national sovereignty in which interference by others was, to put it mildly, not welcome. However, since 1998 we have witnessed increasing transparency, increasing inter-state consultation and increasing harmonisation in the European Union. That is impressive progress, and the success of the Code of Conduct is also illustrated by the interest taken in it by third countries. I am not only talking about countries aspiring to become Member States of the European Union, but others too. The Code of Conduct is a useful tool that can help them establish an efficient and responsible export control policy. The Dutch presidency attaches great importance to further harmonisation of the European arms export policy and to making that policy even more transparent. One of the priorities of our presidency is the conclusion of the first review of the EU Code of Conduct. We hope to be able to finalise this review before the end of the year. I stress that I use the words 'first review' on purpose. It is important that we see the Code as a living document which should regularly be held up to the light, and take into consideration internal and external developments and views. Hence I am sure that this will not be the last review of the Code. In its endeavours to enhance transparency, the Dutch presidency has also stressed the importance of increased dialogue with the European Parliament. On 1 September the Committee on Foreign Affairs held a debate with the Dutch chairman of the COARM working group on the EU Code of Conduct and the current review. The committee's rapporteur, Mr Romeva i Rueda, participated in a conference on the review of the Code on 30 September in The Hague. We have also invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to an informal meeting with the COARM working group on 3 December to discuss Parliament's report. Furthermore, we have invited Mr Romeva i Rueda to participate in a meeting which the presidency is organising, together with the Czech Government, in Prague, to inform the candidate countries and Norway on the implementation of the Code. We think it is important that the parliamentary role in European arms export policy is highlighted in that regard. At this point I would like to make some more specific remarks on the draft report and on the motion for a resolution. The European Parliament report refers to the Council's 2003 report. Since then a lot has happened, most importantly the review of the Code of Conduct. Some of the points addressed in the report are being discussed in the framework of this review. In this respect I should mention the following points. The European Parliament report welcomes the common position on arms brokering. In the present review there is already consensus to extend the application of the Code to brokering activities. The same is true for licensed production overseas, and transport and trans-shipment. Licence applications for these activities will become subject to the criteria and practices set out in the Code of Conduct. Furthermore, the Code should also be applicable in cases of so-called intangible transfers of technology. Outside the context of the review of the Code of Conduct, we have made progress in areas such as outreach. I have already mentioned the seminar in Prague in December. In September, Member States agreed on a more coherent approach concerning outreach. The Council Secretariat will keep a database on the outreach activities of the individual Member States so as to achieve better coordination. Progress has also been made in the further development of the denial notification and consultation system – one of the core elements of the Code. Consultations on denials are now taking place in such a way that all Member States are informed about the consultation. Only the final decision of a Member State as to whether or not it will undercut the denial is not automatically shared with all the partners. Furthermore, an electronic database is being developed by the Council Secretariat, which will contain the denials notified by Member States, as well as information on the consultations they have undertaken. This database will contribute greatly to the efficiency of bilateral consultations and the transparency of their outcomes."@sl19 ". Herr talman! Det är ett privilegium att vara här i dag för att med er diskutera en fråga som Europaparlamentet och det nederländska ordförandeskapet fäster stort avseende vid: vapenexportpolitiken och Europeiska unionens uppförandekod för vapenexport. Jag skall börja med några kommentarer till betänkandet om rådets femte årliga rapport och till resolutionsförslaget. Låt mig börja med några allmänna synpunkter på uppförandekoden. Mycket tid har ägnats åt frågan om kodens status. Parlamentet uttrycker i sitt betänkande mycket klart att det föredrar att göra koden rättsligt bindande. Ni kanske är medvetna om att det inte råder någon samstämmighet i rådet kring denna fråga; omkring hälften av medlemsstaterna förespråkar att koden skall göras rättsligt bindande, medan den andra hälften motsätter sig detta. Men det finns någonting som är viktigare än frågan om huruvida koden är politiskt eller rättsligt bindande. Det är det faktiska innehållet i koden och det sätt den genomförs på, eftersom en förändring av kodens status i sig antagligen skulle få liten eller ingen effekt på enskilda medlemsstaters vapenexportpolitik. I Romeva i Rueda-betänkandet betonas vikten av ökad insyn. Jag håller med, och därför gläder det mig att rådets årliga rapport för 2004 kommer att vara mer öppen för insyn än de tidigare rapporterna. Vi hoppas att ytterligare steg kan tas, antagligen redan nästa år. Öppenheten i de nationella rapporterna är också viktig. Tillsammans med Stockholms internationella fredsforskningsinstitut (SIPRI) arrangerade det nederländska ordförandeskapet nyligen ett möte med medlemsstaterna om hur man kan förbättra den nationella rapporteringen. Jag är säker på att kommande ordförandeskap kommer att följa upp detta initiativ. I resolutionen förespråkas också ett övervakningssystem för att kontrollera slutanvändningen. Detta är ett område där man skulle kunna arbeta mycket mer. En undersökning som nyligen presenterades av USA:s regering visar att i USA:s fall mellan 15 och 20 procent av den godkända exporten till så kallade ”känsliga” mottagare inte hamnar i händerna på den uppgivna slutanvändaren. Vi har inga siffror för EU, men det finns ingen anledning att tro att de skulle vara dramatiskt annorlunda. Därför kommer vi som ett första steg att arrangera ett möte om efterföljande exportövervakning, där USA-myndigheterna kommer att informera oss om sina erfarenheter av system för efterföljande exportövervakning. Detta leder mig till den fråga som antagligen är den mest politiskt känsliga. Jag vet att EU:s vapenembargo mot Kina tilldrar sig särskild uppmärksamhet från Europaparlamentet och från många nationella parlament. Jag noterar vädjan i resolutionen om att inte häva vapenembargot. Frågan om vapenembargots framtid är fortfarande föremål för diskussion i rådet. Därför är det omöjligt att diskutera denna fråga i detalj. Men låt mig säga att det nederländska ordförandeskapet är väl medvetet om de olika farhågor som har uttryckts av parlament, allmänheten, icke-statliga organisationer men också av viktiga partner som USA och Japan. En sådan farhåga gäller situationen för de mänskliga rättigheterna i Kina. EU utnyttjar varje tillfälle att diskutera frågor om mänskliga rättigheter med Kina och övervakar noga utvecklingen på plats. Alla dessa farhågor beaktas i diskussionen. Vi diskuterar också åtgärder som kompletterar koden, åtgärder som bör förhindra en ökning av flödet av vapen och militär teknik från Europa till Kina om embargot skulle hävas. Syftet med dessa åtgärder är att öka insynen och stärka samrådet bland medlemsstaterna. Det är ännu inte klart när denna diskussion kommer att avslutas. Avslutningsvis vill jag säga att det nederländska ordförandeskapet med tillfredsställelse ser att Europaparlamentet ägnar så mycket uppmärksamhet åt frågan om vapenexportpolitiken. Som jag sade tidigare är en utökad dialog om denna fråga mellan rådet och parlamentet ett av målen för vårt ordförandeskap. Framsteg har gjorts eller görs på många av de punkter som nämns i betänkandet och resolutionen. Det finns områden där ytterligare framsteg är möjliga. Insynen i de nationella rapporterna är ett sådant område; harmoniseringen av tolkningen av kriterierna är ett annat. Men vi kan säga att glaset redan är mer än halvfullt. Ni kan vara förvissade om att Nederländerna kommer att göra sitt yttersta under sina sista sex veckor som ordförandeland för att fylla glaset till brädden. Uppförandekoden om vapenexport antogs 1998, och det är ingen överdrift att påstå att den har blivit ett av de mest framgångsrika instrumenten för vår gemensamma utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik. Vapenexportpolitiken har enligt tradition omgärdats med sekretess. Den ansågs vara ett mycket viktigt inslag i den oinskränkta nationella suveräniteten, i vilken inblandning från andra var, milt uttryckt, ovälkommen. Men sedan 1998 har vi kunnat se ökande insyn, ökande samråd mellan staterna och ökande harmonisering inom Europeiska unionen. Detta är imponerande framsteg, och framgången för uppförandekoden framgår också av det intresse för den som har visats av tredjeländer. Jag talar inte bara om länder som hoppas bli medlemsstater i Europeiska unionen utan också om andra. Uppförandekoden är ett användbart redskap som kan hjälpa dem att skapa en effektiv och ansvarsfull politik för exportkontroll. Det nederländska ordförandeskapet fäster stor vikt vid att ytterligare harmonisera den europeiska vapenexportpolitiken och vid att göra denna politik ännu mer öppen. En av prioriteterna under vårt ordförandeskap är att slutföra den första översynen av EU:s uppförandekod. Vi hoppas kunna avsluta denna översyn före årets slut. Jag betonar att jag använder orden ”första översyn” avsiktligt. Det är viktigt att vi betraktar koden som ett levande dokument som regelbundet bör hållas upp i ljuset och ta hänsyn till inrikespolitiska och utrikespolitiska utvecklingstendenser och åsikter. Därför är jag säker på att detta inte kommer att vara den sista översynen av koden. I sina strävanden att öka insynen har det nederländska ordförandeskapet också betonat vikten av en utökad dialog med Europaparlamentet. Den 1 september höll utskottet för utrikesfrågor en debatt med den nederländska ordföranden för arbetsgruppen för export av konventionella vapen (COARM) om EU:s uppförandekod och den pågående översynen. Utskottets föredragande Raül Romeva i Rueda deltog i en konferens om översynen av koden den 30 september i Haag. Vi har också inbjudit Romeva i Rueda till ett informellt möte med COARM-arbetsgruppen den 3 december för att diskutera parlamentets betänkande. Dessutom har vi inbjudit Romeva i Rueda att delta i ett möte som ordförandeskapet, tillsammans med den tjeckiska regeringen, arrangerar i Prag för att informera kandidatländerna och Norge om genomförandet av koden. Vi anser att det är viktigt att parlamentets roll i den europeiska vapenexportpolitiken uppmärksammas i detta avseende. Här skulle jag vilja göra några mer specifika påpekanden om förslaget till betänkande och om resolutionsförslaget. Europaparlamentets betänkande gäller rådets rapport för 2003. Sedan dess har mycket hänt, viktigast av allt översynen av uppförandekoden. Några av de punkter som tas upp i betänkandet diskuteras inom ramen för denna översyn. I detta sammanhang bör jag nämna följande punkter. I Europaparlamentets betänkande välkomnas den gemensamma ståndpunkten om vapenförmedling. I den nuvarande översynen råder det redan samstämmighet om att koden även skall gälla förmedlingsverksamhet. Den skall också gälla licenstillverkning utomlands och transport och återexport. Ansökningar om licenser för dessa verksamheter kommer att bedömas i enlighet med de kriterier och den praxis som föreskrivs i uppförandekoden. Dessutom bör koden också kunna tillämpas i fall med så kallade immateriella överföringar av teknik. Förutom de områden som omfattas av översynen av uppförandekoden har vi gjort framsteg på sådana områden som utåtriktad verksamhet. Jag har redan nämnt seminariet i Prag i december. I september kom medlemsstaterna fram till en mer samstämmig strategi i fråga om utåtriktad verksamhet. Rådets sekretariat kommer att ha en databas om utåtriktad verksamhet i de enskilda medlemsstaterna för att få till stånd en bättre samordning. Det har också gjorts framsteg i vidareutvecklingen av systemet för besked om avslag och samråd – ett av de viktigaste inslagen i koden. Samråd om avslag äger nu rum på ett sådant sätt att alla medlemsstater får information om samrådet. Men en medlemsstats slutgiltiga beslut om huruvida den kommer att acceptera avslaget eller inte förmedlas inte automatiskt till alla parter. Dessutom håller rådets sekretariat på att utveckla en elektronisk databas, som kommer att innehålla de avslag som anmälts av medlemsstaterna såväl som information om de samråd de har företagit. Denna databas kommer i hög grad att bidra till effektiviteten i de bilaterala samråden och till insynen i deras resultat."@sv21
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