Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-09-15-Speech-3-037"
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".
It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliché – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the well-being of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@en4
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"It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliche – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the wellbeing of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@cs1
"Det er næsten præcis fem år siden, at jeg stod frem her i Parlamentet ved høringen som indstillet kommissær. Siden da har jeg været heldig at deltage i bogstavelig talt massevis af forhandlinger - efter sigende flere end nogen anden kommissær. Det viser Parlamentets interesse for de eksterne forbindelser. Jeg vil gerne takke Parlamentet og parlamentsmedlemmerne for den høflighed, som jeg uvægerligt har fået udvist. Jeg har nydt at komme her. Det er efter min mening vigtigt at prøve at skabe demokratiske rødder i forbindelse med udenrigspolitikken. Det er ikke et område for offentlig politik, som skal overlades til de diplomatiske eksperter, hvis fortid i bedste fald er en smule blakket.
På længere sigt skal vi vurdere, hvordan Kommissionen bedst kan være repræsenteret på stedet. Det vil uden tvivl være vanskeligt, dyrt og muligvis farligt at sende en delegation. Det er vi dog villige til at overveje, hvis det står klart, at vi på den måde mere effektivt kan hjælpe det irakiske folk. Derfor vil jeg sige det rent ud. Vi vil arbejde på en bedre fremtid i Irak trods bitterheden fra tidligere tvister.
Jeg har dog et andet generelt punkt, som jeg gerne vil fremsætte, og som er opstået ud fra overvejelserne om Irak. Jeg håber, at Parlamentet vil bære over med mig, når jeg går lidt væk fra hovedemnet i det, der næsten helt sikkert er min sidste fremtræden i parlamentet over alle parlamenter. Da nogle af os for godt to år siden udtrykte bekymring over, at USA gik væk fra den form for multilateralisme, som har kendetegnet USA's udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik siden Anden Verdenskrig, blev vi mødt af kraftig kritik. Vi blev forsikret om, at USA stadig ønskede at samarbejde med de allierede, forudsat at de delte Washingtons syn på, hvordan man håndterer en farlig verden, og i det store og hele holdt eventuelle forbehold for sig selv.
Nogle allierede fulgte da også USA til Baghdad, en handling, der endnu ikke har givet - som vi har bemærket - de behagelige og gunstige konsekvenser, som blev forudsagt og lovet. Befrielse blev hurtigt vendt til besættelse - eller hvad der blev opfattet som besættelse - som mødte kraftig modstand med grusomhed efter grusomhed. Demokratiet rullede sig ikke ud som et orientalsk tæppe hen over de utaknemmelige ørkener i Mellemøsten. Frem for alt førte sejr i Baghdad ikke til fred i Jerusalem og Palæstina. Derfor blev vi for nylig underrettet om, at de allierede og multilateralisme igen var på mode i Washington, hvilket delvis skyldes, at den amerikanske neokonservative unilateralisme tydeligvis ikke var i stand til at oprette et område med fred, sikkerhed og demokrati. Selv FN mente, man kunne gøre nytte. Udenrigsministeriet leve!
Færdigt arbejde? Drager alle et lettelsens suk? Kan vi nu se frem til at genanvende den gammeldags opfattelse af, at allierede skal ledes og ikke kommanderes med, og at de multilaterale institutioner kan bruges til noget fornuftigt, selv af verdens eneste supermagt - at, med al respekt for Machiavelli, det er bedre at være respekteret og ikke kun frygtet?
Retorikken i den nuværende amerikanske valgkampagne rejser uundgåeligt nogle spørgsmål. Jeg vil ikke vælge side. USA vælger selv sin præsident og kongressen. Resten af verden er tilskuere. I Europa bør vi samarbejde så godt som muligt med den, der måtte vinde. Vi er ikke partisaner i processen, uanset vores private holdninger. Desuden er jeg ikke så naiv, at jeg forveksler valgretorik med en platonisk dialog. Jeg har trods alt selv været partiformand. Men valgretorik afspejler noget, og det, der afspejles her, er temmelig foruroligende.
Hvis man ønsker at få hurtigt bifald fra visse kredse i USA, skal man tilsyneladende bare gå løs på FN eller franskmændene, eller blot selve begrebet om, at de allierede har ret til at have en selvstændig holdning. Multilateralister, hører vi, vil outsource den amerikanske udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik til en flok hvidløgs- og ostespisende tøsedrenge. Befolkningens meninger, som USA's grundlæggere mente, deres land skulle kende og respektere, behandles med foragt, medmindre de omhyggeligt afspejler dagsordenen for
og
går jeg ud fra.
Hvad kan vi konkludere ud fra alt dette? For det første er multilateralisme frem for alt i USA's interesse, hvilket tidligere regeringer ikke ville have sat spørgsmålstegn ved, og hvilket de fleste politiske ledere ville have tilsluttet sig i de sidste 60 år. For det andet er det helt sikkert i supermagtens nationale interesse at lade de allierede stå for skud, ikke ved at anfægte deres ret til at blive hørt, men ved at undersøge, hvad de har at sige, og hvordan de har tænkt sig at gøre deres retorik om samarbejde til effektiv, ikke udpint, multilateralisme. For nu at nævne et indlysende punkt, hvordan har vi så tænkt os at dræne de sumpe, hvor terrorismen lever - for at bruge samme floskel - og samtidig skyde nogle af krokodillerne? Hvordan og hvornår vil vi i Europa støtte brugen af magt til at støtte det internationale retssamfund? Det er et spørgsmål, som vi i Europa ofte lister uden om.
Hvis den politiske kultur med amerikansk enegang udelukker at samarbejde og tale med fremmede, hvis upopularitet i udlandet opfattes som en udmærkelse, en kilde til stolthed, vil alt for mange europæere begå samme fejl og tro, at man ved at snigløbe USA har en europæisk udenrigs- og sikkerhedspolitik. Jeg er mest bekymret for, at vi på begge sider af Atlanten vil få det værste frem i vores normale samarbejdspartnere. Verden fortjener mere end testosteron på den ene side og hånlighed på den anden. De amerikanske og europæiske borgere har også gjort sig fortjent til noget bedre. De står trods alt over for de samme farer og de samme udfordringer. Jeg ønsker et Europa, som er en superpartner og ikke en superkritiker - en superpartner til en respekteret global leder. Alle alternativer hertil er blot udsigt til en farligere og mere kværulantisk fremtid.
Når jeg rider bort i solnedgangen, vil jeg dog gerne føre til protokols, at jeg har værdsat, at Parlamentet, ikke med stormskridt, men måske ad nødvendige snørklede veje, har medvirket til at udarbejde Europas fælles udenrigspolitik.
Det største kaos, som har overvældet os i de seneste fem år, har naturligvis været balladen omkring Irak. Jeg ønsker ikke at gentage gamle argumenter. Hvis vi har brug for en påmindelse om, at man ikke kan have en fælles politik, hvis de større medlemslande er dybt splittede, er dette beviset herpå. Andre beviser taler også tydeligt for sig selv. Den slags sker, som nogen engang sagde. Er verden i dag mere sikker, end før den forfærdelige Saddam blev væltet? Er den globale terrorisme på tilbagetog? Er vi tættere på at bygge bro mellem islam og Vesten? Er verdens eneste supermagt mere vidt respekteret? Er borgerne i vores demokratier blevet behandlet på en sådan måde, at de vil lade tvivlen komme regeringerne til gode, næste gang de får at vide, at der skal bruges magt til at foregribe en overhængende trussel? Jeg stiller blot spørgsmål. De ærede parlamentsmedlemmer har Deres egne svar.
Men her står vi nu: Saddam er væltet, volden hærger i størstedelen af det befriede land, regimet ændrede sig med en midlertidig regering, der forbereder demokratiske valg. Hvad end vores kritik har været tidligere, er vi nu alle ved at drukne i disse bestræbelser. Hvis det går dårligt i Irak, vil det gå ud over os alle sammen. Derfor bliver vi nødt til at prøve at samarbejde, så det demokratiske projekt forbliver intakt.
Hvad har vi har pligt til som Union, hvis vi ser bort fra de enkelte medlemsstaters bidrag? Vi har allerede givet tilsagn om og arbejder på at stille 200 millioner euro til rådighed i år. Jeg håber virkelig, at vi kan indgå en aftale om yderligere 200 millioner euro til næste år. Vi er ved at udvikle en god tradition for at udbetale denne bistand, da vi har betalt mere end 200 millioner euro til FN's og Verdensbankens trustfond i løbet af det seneste år. Vi har et godt samarbejde med FN og Verdensbanken, hvor vi hjælper med at sikre, at vores ressourcer udbetales hurtigt og på en god måde. Vi har i år målrettet vores bistand til tre områder, nemlig mod grundlæggende offentlige tjenesteydelser, dvs. sundhed, uddannelse, vand og sanitet, mod fattigdomsbekæmpelse og udvikling af befolkningens muligheder for at tjene til livets ophold samt mod ledelse og det civile samfund.
Jeg vil dog ikke påstå, at alt er godt. Hvordan skulle jeg kunne det? Den farlige sikkerhedssituation, som ikke mindst fremgår af den rystende række kidnapninger, senest af de humanitære hjælpearbejdere, der har helliget sig irakernes trivsel, og af gårsdagens forfærdelige grusomhed i Baghdad, begrænser tydeligvis udbetalingstempoet på samme måde som den kendsgerning, at vi arbejder sammen med en overgangsregering, som stadig føler sig frem inden for den offentlige forvaltning. Sådan er livet - i hvert fald i Irak - og vi vil fortsat bestræbe os på at gøre vores bedste, som situationen på stedet tillader det. Jeg kan dog kun sige, at jeg er helt overbevist om, at vores beslutning om at anvende en multilateral trustfond uden tvivl var rigtig. Det kan kun bekræftes ved at sammenligne vores udbetalingstempo med andre bilaterale bidragsyderes, herunder den allerstørste bidragsyder.
Da vi foreslog Parlamentet at give tilsagn om 200 millioner euro til Iraks genopbygning, hvilket får beløbet, som vi bruger i 2003-2004, til at stige til over 300 millioner euro, hævdede visse ærede parlamentsmedlemmer, at vi var sparsommelige. De mente, at vi burde gøre mere. De foreslog, at vi skulle bruge mindst 500 millioner euro, selv om de var tilbageholdende med at fortælle, hvor de ekstra penge skulle komme fra.
Her til morgen læste jeg med interesse en rapport fra BBC fra Washington. Ifølge rapporten ønsker den amerikanske regering at omfordele flere milliarder af USA's genopbygningsmidler til Irak og i stedet bruge dem på sikkerhed og andre kortsigtede behov. Amerikanske embedsmænd siger, at denne nye strategi er kommet på tale efter flere måneders undersøgelser. Endvidere fremgår det af rapporten, at skiftet af kritikere fortolkes som bevis på, at storstilede langsigtede planer om at omlægge økonomien simpelthen ikke var realistiske. Kritikere hævder også, at man i høj grad havde undervurderet intensiteten og potentialet for voldelig modstand. Jeg mener, at vi traf en rigtig afgørelse om, hvilke beløb det var fornuftigt at bruge på Irak, og jeg mener, at Parlamentet gjorde klogt i at støtte den afgørelse.
Inden for de kommende måneder vil vi fortsætte med at gennemføre forslagene fra meddelelsen af den 9. juni, som fik bred opbakning. Vi vil især fokusere på det væsentlige punkt med støtte til valgprocessen. Så snart den uafhængige valgkommission og FN har fastlagt nøjagtig, hvad de ønsker, er vi klar til at hjælpe - hvilket jeg vil fortælle den irakiske præsident, når jeg mødes med ham senere i dag. Men jeg vil gøre det klart, at vi under de nuværende omstændigheder hverken kan eller vil foreslå en almindelig valgobservationsmission - det vil simpelthen være umuligt, hvilket de ærede parlamentsmedlemmer, som selv har deltaget i valgobservationsmissioner, godt ved. Vi vil dog finde måder til at sikre, at vi fuldt ud hjælper med at få frie og retfærdige valg i Irak."@da2
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Es ist fast genau fünf Jahre her, seit in diesem Parlament die Anhörung meiner Person als designiertes Kommissionsmitglied stattfand. Seitdem hatte ich das Glück, wirklich zahllosen Debatten beiwohnen zu dürfen – häufiger als jedes andere Kommissionsmitglied, wie ich gehört habe. So stark ist das Interesse des Parlaments an den Außenbeziehungen. Ich möchte dem Parlament und seinen Abgeordneten für die liebenswürdige Aufnahme danken, die ich bei ihnen immer gefunden habe. Ich war gern hier. Meiner Ansicht nach ist es sehr wichtig, die Außenpolitik demokratisch zu verankern. Diesen Bereich der öffentlichen Politik sollte man nicht allein den Diplomaten überlassen, deren Bilanz doch recht durchwachsen ist.
Auf lange Sicht müssen wir überlegen, wie die Kommission am besten an der Basis vertreten werden kann. Eine Delegation zusammenzustellen, wäre offensichtlich schwierig, teuer und potenziell gefährlich. Jedoch sind wir bereit, diesen Weg zu wählen, wenn wir dadurch das irakische Volk eindeutig wirksamer unterstützen können. Lassen Sie mich daher ganz offen sagen: so bitter die vergangenen Debatten auch gewesen sein mögen – wir werden uns für eine bessere Zukunft im Irak engagieren.
Allerdings möchte ich im Rahmen dieser Überlegungen zum Irak noch eine weitere allgemeine Bemerkung machen. Ich hoffe, dass das Plenum so großzügig ist und mir eine kleine Abschweifung gestattet: es wird sicherlich mein letzter Auftritt in dieser Mutter der Parlamente sein. Als vor etwa zwei Jahren einige unter uns Bedenken darüber anmeldeten, dass die Vereinigten Staaten von jenem Multilateralismus abkämen, der seit dem Zweiten Weltkrieg deren Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik geprägt hatte, wurden wir scharf kritisiert. Amerika, so versicherte man uns, wolle weiterhin mit den Verbündeten kooperieren, sofern sie Washingtons Ansichten darüber, wie man sich in einer gefahrenträchtigen Welt bewegt, teilten und eventuelle Vorbehalte im Großen und Ganzen für sich behielten.
Einige Verbündete begleiteten die Amerikaner tatsächlich auf ihrem Weg nach Bagdad, bei einer Unternehmung, die – wie wir feststellen mussten –, noch nicht die segensreichen Wirkungen gezeitigt hat, die bekanntlich prophezeit und versprochen worden waren. Die Befreiung wurde sehr schnell zur Besetzung oder als solche empfunden und löste heftigen Widerstand mit einer Gräueltat nach der anderen aus. Die Demokratie hat sich leider nicht wie ein orientalischer Teppich über die undankbaren Wüsten des Nahen Ostens gelegt. Vor allem wurde durch den Sieg in Bagdad kein Frieden in Jerusalem und Palästina herbeigeführt. So wurden wir kürzlich darüber aufgeklärt, dass die Verbündeten und der Multilateralismus in Washington wieder
sind, zum Teil deshalb, weil der amerikanische neokonservative Unilateralismus eindeutig an der Aufgabe gescheitert ist, ein Reich des Friedens, der Freiheit und Demokratie zu errichten. Selbst den Vereinten Nationen wurde eine gewisse Brauchbarkeit zugestanden. Es lebe das State Department.
Ist also alles in Butter? Seufzer der Erleichterung allenthalben? Können wir nun mit der Rückbesinnung auf die altmodische Vorstellung rechnen, dass Verbündete geführt, aber nicht herumkommandiert werden sollten und dass multilaterale Einrichtungen eine wichtige Funktion erfüllen, selbst für die einzige Supermacht der Welt? Und dass es – ohne dem seligen Machiavelli zu nahe treten zu wollen – viel besser ist, bewundert als gefürchtet zu werden?
Die Rhetorik der derzeitigen Wahlkampagnen in den Vereinigten Staaten wirft unweigerlich einige Fragen auf. Ich möchte für niemanden Partei ergreifen. Amerika wählt seinen Präsidenten und sein Abgeordnetenhaus und die restliche Welt schaut zu. Wir Europäer sollten mit dem Sieger dieser Wahlen kooperieren so gut wir können. Unabhängig von unserer persönlichen Meinung sollten wir uns dabei nicht wie Parteigänger verhalten. Ferner bin ich nicht so naiv, Wahlkampfreden mit einem platonischen Dialog gleichzusetzen. Schließlich bin auch ich einst Parteivorsitzender gewesen. Jedoch sind die Wahlkampfreden Ausdruck bestimmter Geisteshaltungen, die nicht gerade ermutigend sind.
Wenn sie einige billige Lacher von bestimmten Personengruppen in Amerika einheimsen wollen, reicht es anscheinend schon, auf die Vereinten Nationen einzuschlagen, wahlweise auf die Franzosen, oder aber auf die Vorstellung, dass die Verbündeten ein Recht auf eine eigene Meinung haben könnten. Multilateralisten, so erfahren wir, wollen die Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik einem Haufen Knoblauch kauender, Käse mampfender Warmduscher überlassen. Die Meinungen anderer Völker, die nach Ansicht der Gründerväter der Vereinigten Staaten Beachtung und Respekt verdienten, sollen mit Verachtung gestraft werden, es sei denn, so nehme ich an, sie spiegeln getreu die Vorstellungen des American Enterprise Institute und von Fox TV wider.
Was sollen wir mit alldem anfangen? Zuallererst liegt der Multilateralismus im ureigensten Interesse der Vereinigten Staaten. In den vergangenen 60 Jahren hätten dies frühere US-Regierungen niemals in Frage gestellt, und auch die meisten politischen Führer hätten sich daran gehalten. Zweitens liegt es sicher im nationalen Interesse der Supermacht, ihre traditionellen Verbündeten zu zwingen, Farbe zu bekennen, aber nicht, indem sie ihr Recht auf Konsultation in Frage stellt, sondern herausfindet, was sie zu sagen haben und wie sie planen, ihre Kooperationsversprechen in einen effektiven und nicht zahnlosen Multilateralismus umzusetzen. Hier ein nahe liegender Punkt: Wie sollen wir die Sümpfe des Terrorismus trockenlegen – um das Klischee zu strapazieren –, ohne dabei einige Krokodile zu erschießen? Und wie und wann werden wir in Europa den Einsatz von Gewalt unterstützen, um das Völkerrecht durchzusetzen? Dieser Frage gehen wir in Europa regelmäßig aus dem Weg.
Wenn die politische Kultur des amerikanischen Exzeptionalismus den Dialog und die Zusammenarbeit mit Ausländern ausschließt, wenn Unbeliebtheit im Ausland als Zeichen der Anerkennung gilt, als Quelle des Stolzes, dann werden zu viele Europäer den falschen Umkehrschluss ziehen, dass es für eine europäische Außen- und Sicherheitspolitik ausreicht, Amerika zu kritisieren. Was mir am meisten Sorgen macht, ist die Tatsache, dass zu beiden Seiten des Atlantiks die schlechten Seiten langjähriger Partner hervorgekehrt werden. Die Welt hat etwas Besseres verdient als Kraftmeierei auf der einen und Hochmut auf der anderen Seite. Auch die amerikanischen und europäischen Bürger haben etwas Besseres verdient. Schließlich sehen sie sich mit den gleichen Gefahren und Herausforderungen konfrontiert. Ich wünsche mir ein Europa, das als Superpartner agiert, nicht als Superkritiker – als Superpartner einer geachteten globalen Führungsmacht. Jede Alternative dazu wäre mit mehr Gefahren, mit mehr Zank und Hader verbunden.
Bevor ich aus dem Amt scheide und dabei das Bild des Filmhelden vor Augen habe, der dem Sonnenuntergang entgegenreitet, möchte ich meiner Wertschätzung für die Rolle des Parlaments bei der Gestaltung der gemeinsamen europäischen Außenpolitik Ausdruck verleihen, die nicht in Sprüngen erfolgte, sondern – wohl zwangsläufig – stolpernd und tastend.
Der größte Scherbenhaufen, der in den letzten fünf Jahren angerichtet wurde, war sicherlich die Auseinandersetzung um die Irakpolitik. Ich möchte jetzt nicht den alten Streit neu entfachen. Wenn es eines Beweises bedurft hätte, dass man keine gemeinsame Politik betreiben kann, wenn die größeren Mitgliedstaaten tief gespalten sind, dann wurde er hier geliefert. Andere Fakten sprechen für sich, sagte doch einst jemand: „So'n Zeug passiert eben.“ Ist die Welt heute sicherer als vor dem Sturz des schrecklichen Saddam? Ist der Terrorismus weltweit auf dem Rückzug? Sind wir der Verständigung zwischen dem Islam und dem Westen ein Stück näher gekommen? Wird die einzige Supermacht der Welt jetzt mehr geachtet? Wurden die Bürger in unseren Demokratien so behandelt, dass sie ermutigt wurden, der Regierung im Zweifelsfall zu glauben, wenn sie ihnen das nächste Mal versichert, dass zur Bekämpfung einer drohenden Gefahr vorsorglich Gewalt eingesetzt werden muss? Ich stelle diese Fragen einfach in den Raum. Die Abgeordneten werden ihre Meinungen dazu haben.
Doch so sieht es jetzt aus: Saddam gestürzt, das befreite Land von Gewalt erschüttert, das Regime abgelöst durch eine Übergangsregierung, die den Weg zu demokratischen Wahlen vorbereitet. Was auch immer wir einst zu kritisieren hatten, wir stecken nun bis über beide Ohren in diesem Unterfangen. Unter einem Fehlschlag im Irak werden wir alle leiden. Daher sollten wir uns gemeinsam dafür einsetzen, dass das Demokratie-Projekt gelingt.
Was sollten wir als Union – abgesehen von den Beiträgen einzelner Mitgliedstaaten – dazu beisteuern? Wir haben in diesem Jahr bereits 200 Mio. EUR zugesichert und bemühen uns nachhaltig darum, sie einzusetzen. Ich hoffe sehr, dass wir die Zustimmung zu weiteren 200 Mio. EUR für das kommende Jahr erhalten werden. Die Auszahlung der Gelder ist sehr gut angelaufen, denn wir haben im Laufe des Jahres schon über 200 Mio. EUR an Treuhandfonds der UN und Weltbank überwiesen. Wir arbeiten mit den Vereinten Nationen und der Weltbank intensiv zusammen, um sicherzustellen, dass unsere Mittel schnell und ordnungsgemäß zur Auszahlung gelangen. Wir haben unsere diesjährige Hilfe auf drei Bereiche konzentriert: auf die wichtigsten öffentlichen Dienste – Gesundheitswesen, Bildung, Wasser und sanitäre Einrichtungen, auf die Linderung der Armut und die Schaffung von Existenzgrundlagen sowie auf gute Staatsführung und die Zivilgesellschaft.
Ich möchte jedoch nicht behaupten, dass alles gut läuft. Wie könnte ich auch? Durch die gefährliche Sicherheitslage – nicht zuletzt aufgrund der schrecklichen Serie von Entführungen, unlängst von Mitarbeitern humanitärer Organisationen, die sich um das Wohlergehen der Iraker gekümmert hatten, und angesichts des gestrigen Blutbads in Bagdad – verlangsamt sich natürlich das Tempo der Hilfezahlungen. Gleiches gilt für die Tatsache, dass wir es mit einer Übergangsregierung zu tun haben, die sich mit der Problematik der öffentlichen Verwaltung erst einmal vertraut machen muss. So ist das Leben – zumindest im Irak –, doch werden wir im Rahmen der uns durch die dortige Lage gesetzten Grenzen auch weiterhin unser Möglichstes tun. Ich möchte nachdrücklich betonen, dass nach meiner Überzeugung unsere Entscheidung, den multilateralen Weg eines Treuhandfonds zu wählen, absolut richtig war. Vergleicht man unsere Auszahlungsquote mit jener anderer bilateraler Geber, einschließlich des größten von allen, so wird dies bestätigt.
Als wir dem Parlament vorschlugen, 200 Mio. EUR für den Wiederaufbau des Irak vorzusehen, wobei wir im Zeitraum 2003-2004 letztlich auf eine Summe von über 300 Mio. EUR kommen werden, meinten einige Abgeordnete, wir wären kleinlich. Sie sprachen sich für eine höhere Summe aus. Nach ihren Vorschlägen sollten wir mindestens 500 Mio. EUR aufbringen, wobei sie sich aber um die Frage herumdrückten, woher wir die zusätzlichen Mittel nehmen sollten.
Heute Morgen habe ich einen interessanten Bericht der BBC aus Washington gelesen, in dem es heißt, dass die US-Regierung die Umverteilung von Milliarden von Wiederaufbaugeldern für den Irak plane, um diese stattdessen für Sicherheitsbelange und andere kurzfristige Erfordernisse auszugeben. US-Beamte erklärten, dass sich diese neue Strategie nach mehrmonatiger Prüfung ergeben habe. Weiter heißt es im Bericht, dass die Umverteilung von Kritikern ferner als Beweis dafür angesehen wird, dass groß angelegte Langzeitpläne zur Umgestaltung der Wirtschaft einfach nicht realistisch waren. Außerdem, so deren Vorwurf, seien Ausmaß und Intensität des gewalttätigen Widerstands sträflich unterschätzt worden. Ich denke, die Höhe des Betrags, den wir im Irak auf vernünftige Weise verwenden können, war richtig bemessen, und das Parlament hat unsere Einschätzung zu Recht geteilt.
In den kommenden Monaten werden wir die in unserer Mitteilung vom 9. Juni aufgeführten Vorschläge, die auf breite Unterstützung gestoßen sind, weiter umsetzen. Insbesondere werden wir uns auf die wichtige Frage der Unterstützung des Wahlprozesses konzentrieren. Sobald die Unabhängige Wahlkommission und die Vereinten Nationen genau ermittelt haben, was sie benötigen, können wir mit der Hilfe sofort beginnen – und dies werde ich dem irakischen Präsidenten auf unserer heutigen Zusammenkunft darlegen. Ich möchte jedoch klarstellen, dass wir unter den derzeitigen Bedingungen keine Wahlbeobachtung vorschlagen können und werden – das wäre schlicht unmöglich, wie jene Abgeordneten dieses Hauses wissen werden, die bereits Wahlbeobachtungen geleitet haben. Wir werden jedoch Mittel und Wege finden, um von unserer Seite sicherzustellen, dass im Irak freie und faire Wahlen stattfinden werden."@de9
"Έχουν περάσει σχεδόν πέντε χρόνια από τότε που εμφανίστηκα ενώπιον αυτού του Κοινοβουλίου για τις ακροάσεις επιβεβαίωσής μου ως Επίτροπος. Από τότε είχα την τύχη να συμμετάσχω σε πραγματικά πολυάριθμες συζητήσεις – περισσότερες, από όσο γνωρίζω, από οποιονδήποτε άλλο Επίτροπο, γεγονός που αποδεικνύει το ενδιαφέρον του Κοινοβουλίου για τις εξωτερικές σχέσεις. Θα ήθελα να ευχαριστήσω το Κοινοβούλιο και τους βουλευτές για την ευγένεια με την οποία πάντοτε με αντιμετώπισαν. Με ευχαριστεί να έρχομαι εδώ. Είναι σημαντικό, κατά την άποψή μου, να προσπαθούμε να δημιουργούμε δημοκρατικές ρίζες για την εξωτερική πολιτική. Δεν πρόκειται για έναν τομέα δημόσιας πολιτικής που θα πρέπει να αφήσουμε στους διπλωματικούς εμπειρογνώμονες, των οποίων το παρελθόν είναι τουλάχιστον αμφιλεγόμενο.
Μακροπρόθεσμα, θα πρέπει να εξετάσουμε τρόπους για τη βέλτιστη εκπροσώπηση της Επιτροπής στην περιοχή. Η αποστολή αντιπροσωπείας θα είναι προφανώς δύσκολη, δαπανηρή και ενδεχομένως επικίνδυνη. Ωστόσο, είμαστε πρόθυμοι να εξετάσουμε και αυτή την επιλογή αν αποδειχτεί σαφώς ότι θα βελτίωνε την αποτελεσματικότητά μας στην παροχή βοήθειας στον ιρακινό λαό. Επιτρέψτε μου λοιπόν να είμαι ευθύς:
θα προσπαθήσουμε για ένα καλύτερο μέλλον στο Ιράκ ανεξάρτητα από την πικρία των προηγούμενων διαφωνιών.
Υπάρχει, ωστόσο, άλλο ένα σημείο στο οποίο θα επιθυμούσα να αναφερθώ, κάτι που ανακινήθηκε από αυτούς τους συλλογισμούς για το Ιράκ. Ελπίζω ότι το Κοινοβούλιο θα φανεί γενναιόδωρο και θα μου επιτρέψει να επεκταθώ λίγο κατά την, όπως όλα δείχνουν
τελευταία μου εμφάνιση σε αυτή τη μητέρα των κοινοβουλίων. Όταν μόλις πριν από δύο χρόνια ορισμένοι από μας εκφράσαμε ανησυχίες ότι οι ΗΠΑ εγκατέλειπαν την πολυμερή προσέγγιση που χαρακτήριζε την εξωτερική πολιτική τους και την πολιτική ασφαλείας τους ύστερα από τον Δεύτερο Παγκόσμιο Πόλεμο, δεχτήκαμε σφοδρές επικρίσεις. Η Αμερική, μας διαβεβαίωσαν, εξακολουθεί να επιθυμεί να συνεργαστεί με τους συμμάχους, υπό την προϋπόθεση ότι εκείνοι συμμερίζονται την άποψη της Ουάσινγκτον σχετικά με τον τρόπο αντιμετώπισης ενός επικίνδυνου κόσμου και γενικά δεν αποκαλύπτουν τις επιφυλάξεις τους.
Oρισμένοι σύμμαχοι συνόδευσαν πράγματι την Αμερική στη Βαγδάτη, ένα εγχείρημα που δεν έχει ακόμη ευοδωθεί
όπως έχουμε επισημάνει– με τις εύκολες και θετικές συνέπειες που είχαν μεγαλόστομα προβλέψει και υποσχεθεί. Η απελευθέρωση μετατράπηκε γρήγορα σε κατοχή –ή κάτι που εκλαμβάνεται ως κατοχή– και συναντά σθεναρή αντίσταση, με τη μία φρικαλεότητα να διαδέχεται την άλλη. Η δημοκρατία δεν κατάφερε να απλωθεί σαν ανατολίτικο χαλί στις αγνώμονες ερήμους της Μέσης Ανατολής. Πάνω από όλα, η ειρήνη στην Ιερουσαλήμ και την Παλαιστίνη δεν επιτεύχθηκε με τη νίκη στη Βαγδάτη. Έτσι, μερικώς αφενός επειδή η νεο-συντηρητική μονομερής προσέγγιση των Αμερικανών
σαφώς απέτυχε να εγκαθιδρύσει μία αυτοκρατορία ειρήνης, ελευθερίας και δημοκρατίας, αντιληφθήκαμε πρόσφατα ότι οι σύμμαχοι και η πολυμερής προσέγγιση
επανήλθαν στη μόδα στην Ουάσινγκτον. Ακόμη και τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη θεωρείται ότι έχουν τη χρησιμότητά τους.
το Υπουργείο Εξωτερικών.
Είναι όλα εντάξει λοιπόν; Αναστεναγμοί ανακούφισης παντού; Μπορούμε τώρα να προσμένουμε την αποκατάσταση αυτής της παλιομοδίτικης αντίληψης ότι οι σύμμαχοι πρέπει να καθοδηγούνται και όχι να ποδηγετούνται, και ότι οι πολυμερείς οργανισμοί έχουν τη δική τους σημαντική χρησιμότητα, ακόμη και για τη μοναδική υπερδύναμη του κόσμου
ότι
Machiavelli, πολλά μπορούν να ειπωθούν για το ότι είναι προτιμότερο να προκαλείς θαυμασμό και όχι μόνο φόβο;
Η ρητορική της τρέχουσας προεκλογικής εκστρατείας στις ΗΠΑ προκαλεί αναπόφευκτα κάποια ερωτήματα. Δεν επιθυμώ να πάρω θέση. Η Αμερική εκλέγει τον Πρόεδρό της και το Κογκρέσο της. Ο υπόλοιπος κόσμος παρακολουθεί. Εμείς, στην Ευρώπη, πρέπει να συνεργαστούμε το ίδιο καλά ανεξάρτητα από το ποιος θα εκλεγεί. Δεν παίρνουμε θέση κατά τη διαδικασία, όποια και αν είναι η προσωπική μας άποψη. Επιπρόσθετα, δεν είμαι τόσο αφελής ώστε να μπερδέψω τη ρητορική μιας προεκλογικής ομιλίας με έναν πλατωνικό διάλογο. Υπήρξα, εξάλλου, και ο ίδιος πρόεδρος κόμματος. Όμως, οι προεκλογικές ομιλίες κάτι αντικατοπτρίζουν και αυτό που αντικατοπτρίζεται εδώ είναι αρκετά ανησυχητικό.
Αν θέλετε να κερδίσετε ανέξοδες επευφημίες από ορισμένα τμήματα της Αμερικής, φαίνεται ότι το μόνο που έχετε να κάνετε είναι να ταχθείτε κατά των Ηνωμένων Εθνών ή των Γάλλων, ή αυτής ταύτης της αντίληψης ότι οι σύμμαχοι δικαιούνται να έχουν τις δικές τους απόψεις. Οι υποστηρικτές της πολυμερούς προσέγγισης, από ό,τι γνωρίζουμε, θέλουν να εκχωρήσουν
την αμερικανική εξωτερική πολιτική και πολιτική ασφάλειας σε μία ομάδα από δειλούς που δεν κάνουν τίποτε άλλο από το να τρώνε σκόρδο και τυρί. Οι απόψεις της ανθρωπότητας, τις οποίες οι ιδρυτές των ΗΠΑ πίστευαν ότι πρέπει η χώρα τους να λαμβάνει υπόψη και να σέβεται, πρέπει να αντιμετωπίζονται με περιφρόνηση εκτός και αν, υποθέτω, αντικατοπτρίζουν πιστά τις θέσεις του American Enterprise Institute και του
Fox TV.
Τι συμπέρασμα μπορούμε να βγάλουμε από όλα αυτά; Πρώτον, η πολυμερής προσέγγιση
είναι πάνω από όλα προς το συμφέρον των ΗΠΑ, κάτι το οποίο οι προηγούμενες κυβερνήσεις δεν θα είχαν αμφισβητήσει και οι περισσότεροι πολιτικοί ηγέτες θα είχαν επιδοκιμάσει τα τελευταία 60 χρόνια. Δεύτερον, το εθνικό συμφέρον της υπερδύναμης είναι σίγουρα να τοποθετήσει τους παραδοσιακούς συμμάχους της στο επίκεντρο, όχι αμφισβητώντας το δικαίωμά τους σε διαβουλεύσεις, αλλά διερευνώντας τι έχουν να πουν και πώς σκοπεύουν να μετατρέψουν τη ρητορική τους για συνεργασία σε αποτελεσματική, όχι στείρα, πολυμερή προσέγγιση.
Πώς, για να χρησιμοποιήσουμε ένα προφανές παράδειγμα, σκοπεύουμε να προχωρήσουμε
όχι μόνο αποξηραίνοντας τα έλη στα οποία αναπαράγεται η τρομοκρατία –για να δανειστούμε την έκφραση– αλλά και πυροβολώντας κάποιους από τους κροκόδειλους;
Περαιτέρω, πώς και πότε θα επιδοκιμάσουμε εμείς στην Ευρώπη τη χρήση της ισχύος για να στηρίξουμε το διεθνές κράτος δικαίου; Αυτό είναι ένα ερώτημα που εμείς στην Ευρώπη συνήθως αποφεύγουμε.
Αν η πολιτική κουλτούρα της αμερικανικής αποστασιοποίησης δεν συμπεριλαμβάνει την έννοια της συνεργασίας και των συνομιλιών με ξένους, αν η αρνητική δημοτικότητα εκτός των συνόρων θεωρείται ένδειξη διαφοροποίησης, πηγή υπερηφάνειας, τότε πολλοί Ευρωπαίοι θα κάνουν το ίδιο λάθος να πιστέψουν ότι το να κατακρίνουν την Αμερική ισοδυναμεί με το να ασκούν ευρωπαϊκή εξωτερική πολιτική και πολιτική ασφάλειας. Αυτό που με ανησυχεί περισσότερο είναι ότι και στις δύο πλευρές του Ατλαντικού θα βγάλουμε στην επιφάνεια τα χειρότερα από τους παραδοσιακούς μας εταίρους. Ο κόσμος αξίζει περισσότερα από τεστοστερόνη στη μία πλευρά και υπεροψία στην άλλη. Οι αμερικανοί και οι ευρωπαίοι πολίτες αξίζουν επίσης περισσότερα. Εξάλλου, αντιμετωπίζουν τους ίδιους κινδύνους και τις ίδιες προκλήσεις. Θέλω μία Ευρώπη που να είναι υπερ-εταίρος και όχι υπερ-κατακριτής – υπερ-εταίρος ενός σεβαστού παγκόσμιου ηγέτη. Οποιαδήποτε εναλλακτική λύση δεν προσφέρει παρά μόνο την προοπτική ενός πιο επικίνδυνου και πιο μεμψίμοιρου μέλλοντος.
Εν πάση περιπτώσει, καθώς αποσύρομαι
θα ήθελα να εκφράσω την εκτίμησή μου στον ρόλο του Κοινοβουλίου στην ανάπτυξη, όχι με άλματα, αλλά ίσως αναπόφευκτα– σταδιακά
της κοινής πολιτικής εξωτερικών σχέσεων της Ευρώπης.
Τα χειρότερα εμπόδια που κληθήκαμε να υπερβούμε την τελευταία πενταετία, βέβαια, ήταν η διαμάχη γύρω από το Ιράκ. Δεν θέλω να επαναλάβω τις παλιές διαφωνίες. Αν χρειάζεται να υπενθυμίσουμε ότι δεν γίνεται να έχουμε κοινή πολιτική αν τα μεγαλύτερα κράτη μέλη είναι βαθιά διχασμένα, τότε αυτή είναι η απόδειξη. Άλλες αποδείξεις μιλούν ξεκάθαρα από μόνες τους. Όπως είπε κάποιος κάποτε, “αυτά συμβαίνουν”. Είναι ο κόσμος σήμερα ασφαλέστερος από ό,τι πριν από την ανατροπή του τρομακτικού Σαντάμ; Υποχωρεί η παγκόσμια τρομοκρατία; Βρισκόμαστε πιο κοντά στην γεφύρωση του χάσματος μεταξύ του Ισλάμ και της Δύσης; Γίνεται η μοναδική υπερδύναμη του κόσμου ευρύτερα σεβαστή; Αντιμετωπίζονται οι πολίτες των δημοκρατιών μας με τέτοιο τρόπο ώστε να ενθαρρύνονται να αναγνωρίσουν στις κυβερνήσεις το ευεργέτημα της απαλλαγής λόγω αμφιβολιών την επόμενη φορά που θα τους πουν ότι πρέπει να χρησιμοποιηθεί βία προληπτικά για να αντιμετωπιστεί μια επικείμενη απειλή; Απλώς θέτω τα ερωτήματα. Οι αξιότιμοι βουλευτές θα δώσουν τις δικές τους απαντήσεις.
Αλλά η κατάσταση έχει ως εξής: ο Σαντάμ ανετράπη, η βία μαίνεται στο μεγαλύτερο μέρος της απελευθερωμένης χώρας, το καθεστώς άλλαξε και μία προσωρινή κυβέρνηση προετοιμάζει το έδαφος για δημοκρατικές εκλογές. Όποιες και αν ήταν οι επικρίσεις μας στο παρελθόν, είμαστε τώρα όλοι αφοσιωμένοι πλήρως σε αυτή την προσπάθεια. Αν η κατάσταση στο Ιράκ εξελιχθεί άσχημα, θα υποφέρουμε όλοι. Άρα θα πρέπει να προσπαθήσουμε να συνεργαστούμε για να διατηρήσουμε το δημοκρατικό σχέδιο αλώβητο.
Τι έχουμε υποσχεθεί να κάνουμε ως Ένωση, πέρα από τη συμβολή κάθε κράτους μέλους μεμονωμένα; Έχουμε ήδη υποσχεθεί, και εργαζόμαστε σκληρά να συγκεντρώσουμε, 200 εκατ. ευρώ για εφέτος. Προσδοκώ ότι θα μπορέσουμε να εξασφαλίσουμε μία συμφωνία για επιπλέον 200 εκατ. ευρώ το επόμενο έτος. Έχουμε σημειώσει σημαντικά βήματα για την καταβολή αυτής της βοήθειας, έχοντας πληρώσει περισσότερα από 200 εκατ. ευρώ σε καταπιστεύματα
των Ηνωμένων Εθνών και της Παγκόσμιας Τράπεζας κατά τη διάρκεια του περασμένου έτους. Συνεργαζόμαστε αγαστά με τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη και την Παγκόσμια Τράπεζα, ώστε να βεβαιώσουμε ότι οι πόροι μας καταβάλλονται γρήγορα και σωστά. Επικεντρώσαμε εφέτος τη βοήθειά μας σε τρεις τομείς: στις απαραίτητες δημόσιες υπηρεσίες υγεία, εκπαίδευση, ύδρευση και αποχέτευση– στην καταπολέμηση της φτώχειας και την ανάπτυξη πόρων ζωής, καθώς και στη διακυβέρνηση και την κοινωνία των πολιτών.
Δεν θα προσποιηθώ, ωστόσο, ότι όλα είναι καλά. Πώς θα μπορούσα άλλωστε; Το επικίνδυνο κλίμα ασφάλειας –ενδεικτικό του οποίου είναι ιδίως ο συγκλονιστικός αριθμός των απαγωγών, πρόσφατα μάλιστα κάποιων εργαζομένων σε ανθρωπιστικές οργανώσεις που αφιερώνουν τη ζωή τους για να βοηθήσουν τους Ιρακινούς, καθώς και η χθεσινή φρίκη στη Βαγδάτη– επιβραδύνει προφανώς τον ρυθμό καταβολής των χρημάτων, όπως επίσης και το γεγονός ότι συνεργαζόμαστε με μία προσωρινή κυβέρνηση που ακόμη κάνει τα πρώτα της βήματα στη δημόσια διοίκηση. Αυτή είναι η ζωή –τουλάχιστον στο Ιράκ– και θα συνεχίσουμε να κάνουμε ό,τι καλύτερο μπορούμε στα πλαίσια των περιορισμών που θέτει η κατάσταση στην περιοχή. Αυτό που μπορώ να πω με βεβαιότητα είναι πως είμαι πεπεισμένος ότι η απόφασή μας να ακολουθήσουμε την οδό της πολυμερούς προσέγγισης μέσω καταπιστευματικού ταμείου, ήταν σίγουρα η ορθή. Μία σύγκριση μεταξύ του ρυθμού καταβολής μας με εκείνον των άλλων διμερών χορηγών, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του μεγαλύτερου χορηγού από όλους, επιβεβαιώνει ακριβώς αυτό.
Όταν προτείναμε στο Κοινοβούλιο να διαθέσει 200 εκατ. ευρώ στην ανασυγκρότηση του Ιράκ, αυξάνοντας το ποσό που θα δαπανηθεί την περίοδο 2003-2004 σε πάνω από 300 εκατ. ευρώ, κάποιοι αξιότιμοι βουλευτές ισχυρίστηκαν ότι γινόμαστε φειδωλοί. Ισχυρίστηκαν ότι θα πρέπει να κάνουμε περισσότερα: πρότειναν να ξοδέψουμε τουλάχιστον 500 εκατ. ευρώ, παρόλο που απέφυγαν να μας πουν πού θα βρίσκονταν τα επιπλέον χρήματα.
Σήμερα το πρωί μου κίνησε το ενδιαφέρον ένα ρεπορτάζ του BBC από την Ουάσινγκτον: “Η αμερικανική κυβέρνηση θέλει να αναδιανείμει δις δολαρίων, που προορίζονταν για την ανασυγκρότηση του Ιράκ, στην ασφάλεια και άλλες βραχυπρόθεσμες ανάγκες. Αμερικανοί αξιωματούχοι δήλωσαν ότι η εν λόγω στρατηγική προέκυψε μετά από μήνες μελέτης”. Το ρεπορτάζ συνέχιζε: “Η αλλαγή επίσης ερμηνεύεται από τους επικριτές ως ένδειξη ότι τα μεγαλεπήβολα μακροπρόθεσμα σχέδια για αναμόρφωση της οικονομίας απλώς δεν ήταν ρεαλιστικά. Αναφέρει επίσης ότι η ένταση και το μέγεθος της βίαιης αντίστασης είχαν υποτιμηθεί σοβαρά”. Νομίζω ότι είχαμε δίκιο στην κρίση μας για το ύψος του ποσού που μπορούμε λογικά να προσφέρουμε στο Ιράκ και πιστεύω ότι το Κοινοβούλιο ορθά στήριξε την εκτίμησή μας.
Tους επόμενους μήνες θα συνεχίσουμε να εφαρμόζουμε τις προτάσεις που αναφέρονται στο ανακοινωθέν της 9ης Ιουνίου και το οποίο επιδοκιμάστηκε ευρέως. Συγκεκριμένα, θα επικεντρωθούμε στο σημαντικό θέμα της υποστήριξης της εκλογικής διαδικασίας. Αμέσως μόλις η Ανεξάρτητη Εκλογική Επιτροπή και τα Ηνωμένα Έθνη προσδιορίσουν τι ακριβώς χρειάζονται, είμαστε έτοιμοι να βοηθήσουμε – όπως θα εξηγήσω στον ιρακινό πρόεδρο που θα συναντήσω αργότερα σήμερα. Ωστόσο, θα καταστήσω σαφές ότι υπό τις παρούσες συνθήκες δεν μπορούμε και δεν θα προτείνουμε μια συμβατική αποστολή παρακολούθησης της εκλογικής διαδικασίας – αυτό θα ήταν απλώς αδύνατο, όπως ασφαλώς γνωρίζουν οι αξιότιμοι βουλευτές του Κοινοβουλίου, οι οποίοι έχουν προεδρεύσει σε αποστολές παρακολούθησης εκλογικών διαδικασιών. Θα αναζητήσουμε όμως τρόπους που να διασφαλίσουν ότι θα έχουμε πρωταγωνιστικό ρόλο όσον αφορά τη διεξαγωγή ελεύθερων και αντιπροσωπευτικών εκλογών στο Ιράκ."@el10
".
Hace casi exactamente cinco años que intervine en este Parlamento para mis audiencias de confirmación como Comisario. Desde entonces he tenido la suerte de participar en muchos debates, según me han dicho más que ningún otro Comisario: esto demuestra el interés del Parlamento por las relaciones exteriores. Quisiera dar las gracias al Parlamento por la cortesía que me ha demostrado en todo momento. He disfrutado al venir aquí. Desde mi punto de vista, es importante tratar de establecer raíces democráticas en la política exterior. No se trata de un ámbito de la política pública que debe dejarse en manos de los expertos diplomáticos, cuyo historial es incompleto en el mejor de los casos.
A largo plazo, necesitaremos plantearnos cómo puede estar mejor representada la Comisión sobre el terreno. Está claro que abrir una delegación sería difícil, caro y potencialmente peligroso. Pero todos estamos dispuestos a considerar esa vía si queda claro que haría más efectiva nuestra ayuda al pueblo iraquí. Así que permítanme ser franco: trabajaremos por un futuro mejor en Iraq independientemente de la amargura de las disputas del pasado.
Sin embargo, quisiera hacer un comentario general, fruto de estas reflexiones sobre Iraq. Espero que la Asamblea sea generosa conmigo y me permita extenderme un poco en la que casi con absoluta seguridad será mi última intervención en esta madre de todos los Parlamentos. Cuando, hace más de dos años, algunos de nosotros expresamos nuestra preocupación con respecto a que los Estados Unidos estaban abandonando el multilateralismo que había caracterizado su política de exterior y de seguridad desde la Segunda Guerra Mundial, fuimos fuertemente criticados. Se nos aseguró que América todavía quería trabajar con los aliados, siempre que estos compartiesen el punto de vista de Washington respecto a cómo enfrentarse a un mundo peligroso, y en general se guardaban de expresar ninguna reserva.
De hecho, algunos aliados acompañaron a América a Bagdad, una iniciativa aún no bendecida –como hemos podido observar– por las fáciles y benignas consecuencias que notoriamente se predijeron y prometieron. La liberación se convirtió pronto en una ocupación –o fue vista como una ocupación– a la que se ofrecía resistencia, con una atrocidad tras otra. La democracia no se extendió como una alfombra oriental por los desagradecidos desiertos de Oriente Próximo. Sobre todo, la paz en Jerusalén y Palestina no se consiguió con la victoria en Bagdad. Así que, en parte debido a que el unilateralismo neoconservador norteamericano no había conseguido establecer un imperio de paz, libertad y democracia, hace poco se nos ha dicho que los aliados y el multilateralismo volvían a estar de moda en Washington. Incluso se consideró que las Naciones Unidas tenían su utilidad.
el Departamento de Estado.
¿Entonces está todo resuelto? ¿Suspiros de alivio por todas partes? ¿Podemos esperar ahora la restauración de la antigua noción de que los aliados deben ser liderados, no mandados, y que las instituciones multilaterales tienen sus funciones importantes, incluso para la única superpotencia mundial –que, con el respeto que me merece Maquiavelo, hay mucho que decir para ser admirado y no ser simplemente temido?
Es inevitable que la retórica de la actual campaña electoral estadounidense plantee varias preguntas. No pretendo tomar partido. América elige a su Presidente y a su Congreso. El resto del mundo observa. En Europa deberíamos trabajar tan bien como podamos con quien gane, sea quien sea. No formamos parte del proceso, independientemente de nuestras opiniones personales. Por otra parte, no soy tan ingenuo como para confundir la retórica de la campaña con un diálogo platónico. Después de todo, también he sido presidente de un partido. Pero la retórica de campaña refleja algo y en este caso se trata de algo muy inquietante.
Si lo que se quiere es conseguir una ovación barata de determinados sectores norteamericanos, parece que todo lo que hay que hacer es despotricar contra las Naciones Unidas o los franceses, o contra la idea misma de que los aliados tienen derecho a tener sus propias opiniones. Se nos dice que los multilateralistas quieren transferir la política exterior y de seguridad norteamericana a una banda de masticadores de ajo y comedores de queso. Supongo que las opiniones de la humanidad, que los padres fundadores de los Estados Unidos consideraron que su país debería tener presentes y respetar, deben ser tratados con desprecio a no ser que reflejen de forma fiel la agenda del American Enterprise Institute y la Fox TV.
¿Qué podemos hacer con todo esto? En primer lugar, el multilateralismo es, sobre todo, lo que más conviene a los Estados Unidos, un aspecto que las Administraciones anteriores ni se habrían cuestionado y al que la mayoría de los líderes políticos se habrían suscrito durante los últimos 60 años. En segundo lugar, seguramente el interés nacional de la superpotencia consiste en poner en su lugar a sus aliados tradicionales, no negando su derecho a consulta, sino sondeando qué tienen que decir y cómo pretenden convertir su retórica sobre cooperación en multilateralismo efectivo, no decadente. Por decirlo claramente, ¿cómo trataremos de ir más allá del mero drenaje de los pantanos en los que crece el terrorismo –tomando prestado el tópico–, abatiendo también a algunos de los cocodrilos? ¿Por otra parte, cómo y cuándo aceptaremos en Europa el uso de la fuerza para apoyar el Estado de Derecho internacional? Esta es una pregunta que en Europa solemos evitar.
Si la cultura política del excepcionalismo norteamericano excluye la noción de trabajar y conversar con los extranjeros, si la falta de popularidad en el extranjero se considera una marca de distinción, un motivo de orgullo, muchos europeos cometerán el error de la imagen refleja y pensarán que criticar a América es lo mismo que contar con una política exterior y de seguridad europea. Lo que más me preocupa es que a ambos lados del Atlántico sacaremos lo peor de nuestros socios tradicionales. El mundo se merece algo mejor que la testosterona por una parte y el desdén por otra. Los ciudadanos norteamericanos y europeos también se merecen algo mejor. Después de todo, ambos se enfrentan a los mismos peligros y a los mismos desafíos. Me gustaría una Europa que fuera un supersocio, no un supercriticador –un supersocio de un líder mundial respetado. Cualquier alternativa no abre más que la posibilidad de un futuro más peligroso y quejumbroso.
En cualquier caso, mientras cabalgo hacia el crepúsculo, quisiera hacer constar mi valoración del papel del Parlamento en el desarrollo, no precisamente a pasos agigantados, sino –quizás de forma inevitable– con bandazos y cambios de rumbo, de la política exterior europea común.
Por supuesto, los problemas que más nos han afectado en los últimos cinco años han sido los relacionados con Iraq. No me gustaría retomar viejas discusiones. Si era necesario recordar que no es posible contar con una política común si los principales Estados miembros están profundamente divididos, esta es la prueba. Hay otra prueba que también lo dice todo. Como alguien dijo en cierta ocasión, «las cosas suceden». ¿Es hoy el mundo un lugar mejor después de haber derrocado al terrible Sadam? ¿Se está replegando el terrorismo internacional? ¿Nos encontramos más cerca de construir puentes entre el islam y Occidente? ¿Se respeta más a la única superpotencia mundial? ¿Han recibido los ciudadanos de nuestras democracias un trato que les aliente a dar a los Gobiernos el beneficio de la duda en la próxima ocasión en que se les diga que es necesario utilizar la fuerza de forma preventiva para hacer frente a una amenaza inminente? Me limito a plantear estas preguntas, sus Señorías tendrán sus propias respuestas.
Pero aquí nos encontramos: Sadam derrotado, una violencia encarnizada en gran parte de la tierra liberada y un nuevo régimen con un Gobierno provisional que prepara el camino para unas elecciones democráticas. Fueran cuales fueran nuestras críticas en el pasado, ahora todos estamos metidos hasta las orejas en este empeño. Si Iraq va por mal camino, todos sufriremos. Por eso debemos tratar de trabajar juntos para mantener el proyecto democrático a pies juntillas.
¿Qué nos comprometemos a hacer como Unión, dejando a un lado la contribución de cada Estado miembro? Ya hemos prometido 200 millones de euros para este año y estamos realizando un gran esfuerzo por distribuirlos. Realmente espero que podamos garantizar un acuerdo para que se destinen otros 200 millones de euros el próximo año. Estamos consiguiendo buenos logros en la distribución de esta ayuda, después de haber pagado más de 200 millones de euros a los fondos fiduciarios de las Naciones Unidas y el Banco Mundial durante el año pasado. Estamos trabajando bien con las Naciones Unidas y el Banco Mundial, ayudando a garantizar que nuestros recursos se desembolsen correcta y rápidamente. Este año hemos centrado nuestra ayuda en tres áreas: en los servicios públicos esenciales –la salud, la educación, el agua y la salubridad; en el alivio de la pobreza y el desarrollo de medios de vida; así como en la gobernanza y la sociedad civil.
Sin embargo, no podría afirmar que todo está bien. ¿Cómo podría hacerlo? El peligroso clima de inseguridad –evidente no solo en la atroz serie de secuestros, recientemente de trabajadores humanitarios dedicados al bienestar de los iraquíes, y también evidente en la sobrecogedora atrocidad que tuvo lugar ayer en Bagdad– limita sin duda el ritmo del desembolso, al igual que lo hace el hecho de que estamos trabajando con un Gobierno provisional que todavía avanza a tientas en la administración pública. Así es la vida –al menos en Iraq– y seguiremos esforzándonos al máximo dentro de las limitaciones de la situación sobre el terreno. Lo que puedo decir con firmeza es que estoy convencido de que nuestra decisión de adoptar la ruta multilateral del fondo fiduciario fue totalmente acertada. Esto se confirma si comparamos nuestro porcentaje de desembolso con el de otros donantes bilaterales, incluido el mayor de todos.
Cuando propusimos al Parlamento comprometer 200 millones de euros para la reconstrucción de Iraq, y aumentar a más de 300 millones de euros la suma que gastaríamos en 2003-2004, algunos diputados argumentaron que estábamos siendo mezquinos. Manifestaron que deberíamos hacer más: propusieron que deberíamos gastar al menos 500 millones de euros, aunque no dijeron de dónde debería provenir el dinero adicional.
Esta mañana he leído con interés un informe elaborado por la BBC de Washington: «La Administración de los Estados Unidos quiere reasignar miles de millones de dólares destinados a la reconstrucción de Iraq y gastarlos en seguridad y otras necesidades a corto plazo. Funcionarios estadounidenses afirman que esta nueva estrategia es fruto de una revisión que ha llevado meses.» El informe continúa: «El cambio también está siendo interpretado por los críticos como una prueba de que los grandes planes para reformar la economía a largo plazo no eran realistas. También alegan que se infravaloró en gran medida la intensidad y el nivel de la resistencia violenta.» Creo que teníamos razón con nuestra valoración de la suma de dinero que podríamos asignar de forma sensata a Iraq y creo que el Parlamento estuvo acertado al apoyar esa valoración.
En los próximos meses seguiremos aplicando las propuestas que se establecen en nuestro comunicado del 9 de junio, que ha recibido un amplio respaldo. En concreto, nos centraremos en la cuestión esencial del apoyo al proceso electoral. Una vez que la Comisión electoral independiente y las Naciones Unidas hayan identificado exactamente qué necesitan, estaremos listos para ayudar, y así se lo explicaré al Presidente iraquí cuando me reúna hoy con él. Pero debe quedar claro que, en las circunstancias actuales, no podemos proponer y no propondremos una misión convencional de observación de las elecciones– eso sería simplemente imposible, como sabrán los diputados a esta Asamblea que han participado en misiones de observación electoral. Pero buscaremos modos de asegurar que cumplamos nuestra parte para ayudar a que se celebren elecciones libres y justas en Iraq."@es20
"It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliche – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the wellbeing of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@et5
"On kulunut lähes tarkalleen viisi vuotta siitä, kun olin parlamentissa kuultavana, jotta nimitykseni komission jäseneksi voitiin vahvistaa. Sen jälkeen minulla on ollut onni osallistua kymmeniin keskusteluihin – olen kuullut sanottavan, että useampiin kuin kukaan muu komission jäsen, mikä johtuu siitä, että parlamentti on hyvin kiinnostunut ulkosuhteista. Haluan kiittää parlamenttia ja sen jäseniä ystävällisestä kohtelusta, jota olen aina saanut. Minulle on ollut ilo tulla tänne. On mielestäni tärkeää yrittää vahvistaa ulkopolitiikalle demokraattinen perusta. Ulkopolitiikka ei ole sellainen julkisen politiikan ala, joka voitaisiin jättää diplomatian asiantuntijoille, joiden ansioluettelo parhaimmillaankin on jokseenkin hajanainen.
Pitkällä aikavälillä meidän on tarkasteltava, miten komissio on parhaiten edustettuna Irakissa. Lähetystön avaaminen olisi luonnollisesti vaikeaa, kallista ja luultavasti myös vaarallista. Olemme kuitenkin valmiit harkitsemaan sitä, jos se selvästi lisää Irakin kansalaisille tarjoamamme avun tehoa. Tiivistetysti sanottuna me siis työskentelemme Irakin paremman tulevaisuuden puolesta aikaisemmista katkerista kiistoista huolimatta.
Haluan kuitenkin mainita näiden Irakia koskevien pohdintojen perusteella yhden yleisen asian. Toivon, että parlamentti on jalomielinen ja sallii minun harhailla hieman tässä – lähes varmasti – viimeisessä puheenvuorossani Euroopan parlamentissa. Meitä arvosteltiin voimakkaasti vain kaksi vuotta sitten, kun jotkut meistä ilmaisivat huolensa siitä, että Yhdysvallat oli hylkäämässä sen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikkaa toisesta maailmansodasta alkaen leimanneen monenvälisyyden. Meille vakuutettiin, että Yhdysvallat haluaa edelleenkin tehdä yhteistyötä liittolaistensa kanssa edellyttäen, että liittolaiset olivat samaa mieltä Washingtonin kanssa siitä, miten vaarallisessa maailmassa olisi toimittava, ja etteivät ne ylipäänsä esitä mitään varauksia.
Kuten olemme havainneet, jotkut liittolaiset todellakin seurasivat Yhdysvaltoja Bagdadiin – mistä ei ole koitunut vielä mitään hyvää – sekä ennakoivat ja lupasivat suureen ääneen helppoja ja myönteisiä tuloksia. Vapauttaminen muuttui nopeasti miehitykseksi – tai sitä ainakin pidettiin miehityksenä – jota karvaasti vastustettiin ja jota julmuudet seurasivat toisensa perään. Demokratiaa ei voitu levittää itämaisen maton tapaan Lähi-idän epäkiitollisille autiomaille. Ennen kaikkea Jerusalemin ja Palestiinan rauhaa ei saavutettu Bagdadin voiton avulla. Näin ollen osittain siksi, että yhdysvaltalaisten uuskonservatiivinen unilateralismi oli selvästi epäonnistunut rauhan, vapauden ja demokratian imperiumin muodostamisessa, meille on äskettäin kerrottu, että liittoumat ja monenvälisyys ovat palaamassa muotiin Washingtonissa. Jopa Yhdistyneillä Kansakunnilla uskotaan jälleen olevan merkitystä. Eläköön Yhdysvaltain ulkoministeriö!
Onko kaikki nyt sitten taas kunnossa? Ovatko kaikki nyt helpottuneita? Voimmeko olettaa, että se vanhanaikainen periaate palautetaan, jonka mukaan liittolaisia on johdettava määräilyn sijaan ja jonka mukaan monenvälisillä instituutioilla on tärkeää käyttöä jopa maailman ainoalle suurvallalle – ja jonka mukaan, kaikki kunnia Machiavellille, on kuitenkin suureksi hyödyksi, jos valtiota ihaillaan eikä pelkästään pelätä?
Yhdysvalloissa parhaillaan käynnissä olevassa vaalikampanjoinnissa käytetty retoriikka herättää väistämättä joitakin kysymyksiä. Yhdysvallat valitsee vaalein presidenttinsä ja kongressinsa. Muu maailma seuraa tapahtumia sivusta. Euroopan olisi työskenneltävä parhaansa mukaan sen kanssa, joka voittaa. Emme ole prosessin partisaaneja omista mielipiteistämme riippumatta. En myöskään ole niin naiivi, että sekoittaisin toisiinsa vaalikampanjan retoriikan ja platonisen vuoropuhelun. Olen nimittäin itsekin ollut puolueen puheenjohtajana. Kampanjan retoriikka heijastelee kuitenkin jotakin levottomuutta herättävää.
Näyttää siltä, että tarvitsee vain solvata Yhdistyneitä Kansakuntia, ranskalaisia tai ajatusta siitä, että liittolaisilla on oikeus omiin mielipiteisiinsä, jos haluaa halvalla eläköön-huutoja Yhdysvaltojen joistakin kolkista. Meille sanotaan, että monenvälisyyden kannattajat haluavat ulkoistaa Yhdysvaltojen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan joukolle valkosipulia mutustavia ja juustoa syöviä nynnyjä. Oletan, että ihmiskunnan mielipiteitä, joita maan olisi Yhdysvaltojen perustajaisien mukaan kuunneltava ja kunnioitettava, on väheksyttävä, elleivät ne noudattele uskollisesti American Enterprise Instituten tai Fox TV:n näkemyksiä.
Mitä meidän olisi pääteltävä tästä kaikesta? Ensinnäkin monenvälisyys on ennen kaikkea Yhdysvaltojen parhaiden etujen mukaista. Aikaisemmat hallinnot eivät olisi kyseenalaistaneet sitä, ja useimmat poliittiset johtajat olisivat allekirjoittaneet sen viimeisen 60 vuoden ajan. Toiseksi supervallan kansallisten etujen mukaista on varmasti panna perinteiset liittolaisensa kovan paikan eteen, ei kyseenalaistaakseen niiden oikeuden tulla kuulluiksi vaan tutkiakseen, mitä sanottavaa niillä on ja miten ne aikovat muuttaa yhteistyölupauksensa tehokkaaksi monenvälisyydeksi väljähtyneen monenvälisyyden sijasta. Mainitsen esimerkkinä yhden ilmeisen seikan. Miten aiomme pyydystää myös joitakin saaliita sen lisäksi, että kuivatamme soita, jotka toimivat terrorismin kasvupohjana – kliseistä sanontaa käyttääkseni? Entä miten ja milloin käytämme Euroopan etujen ajamiseksi voimakeinoja, joilla tuetaan kansainvälisen oikeuden noudattamista? Tätä kysymystä me Euroopassa jatkuvasti välttelemme.
Jos yhdysvaltalaisessa äärimmäisyyksien poliittisessa kulttuurissa kieltäydytään työskentelemästä tai puhumasta ulkomaalaisten kanssa ja jos epäsuosio ulkomailla ymmärretään eroavaisuuden osoitukseksi ja ylpeyden lähteeksi, liian monet eurooppalaiset reagoivat ajattelemalla virheellisesti, että Yhdysvaltojen nälviminen varmistaa eurooppalaisen ulko- ja turvallisuuspolitiikan olemassaolon. Olen eniten huolissani siitä, että tuomme Atlantin molemmilla puolilla esiin perinteisten kumppaneidemme pahimmat puolet. Maailma ansaitsee parempaa kuin testosteroniryöpyn toisella puolella ja ylimielisyyden toisella. Myös Yhdysvaltojen ja Euroopan kansalaiset ansaitsevat parempaa. He kohtaavat loppujen lopuksi samoja vaaroja ja haasteita. Haluan Euroopan, joka ansioituu erinomaisena kumppanina eikä selkäänpuukottajana ja joka on kunnioitetun maailmanlaajuisen johtajan superkumppani. Mikä tahansa muu vaihtoehto johtaa ainoastaan nykyistä vaarallisempaan ja valitettavampaan tulevaisuuteen.
Ennen kuin "ratsastan auringon laskuun", haluan kuitenkin merkitä pöytäkirjaan arvostavani parlamentin työtä Euroopan yhteisen ulkosuhteiden politiikan kehittämisessä – ei harppauksin ja loikin vaan ehkäpä väistämättäkin hieman horjahdellen ja laahustaen.
Pahimmat kitkat välillemme ovat viimeisten viiden vuoden aikana aiheuttaneet tietenkin Irakia koskevat kiistat. En halua palata vanhoihin väittelyihin. Mikäli tarvitsimme muistutusta siitä, ettei yhteistä politiikkaa voi olla, jos suuret jäsenvaltiot ovat selkeästi jakautuneet, tämä oli osoitus siitä. Myös muu näyttö puhuu vakuuttavasti puolestaan. Kuten joku sanoi, "asioita tapahtuu". Onko maailma nyt turvallisempi kuin ennen kamalan Saddamin kukistamista? Onko maailmanlaajuinen terrorismi vähenemässä? Olemmeko pystyneet edistämään islamin ja lännen lähentymistä? Kunnioitetaanko maailman ainoaa supervaltaa nyt aiempaa laajemmalla alueella? Onko demokratioidemme kansalaisia kohdeltu tavalla, joka rohkaisee heitä joustamaan seuraavan kerran, kun heille kerrotaan, että välittömän uhan käsittelemiseksi on käytettävä ennaltaehkäiseviä voimakeinoja? Esitän ainoastaan kysymyksiä. Parlamentin jäsenillä on niihin omat vastauksensa.
Tilanne on kuitenkin tämä: Saddam on syrjäytetty, vapautetun maan monilla alueilla on väkivaltaisuuksia, hallinto on vaihtunut ja väliaikaishallitus valmistelee demokraattisia vaaleja. Huolimatta aikaisemmin mahdollisesti esittämästämme arvostelusta meillä on nyt täysi työ hoitaa tämä tilanne. Jos Irakin käy huonosti, me kaikki kärsimme siitä. Meidän on siksi pyrittävä yhteistyössä pitämään demokratiahanke koossa.
Mihin olemme sitoutuneet unionina, jos yksittäisten jäsenvaltioiden panosta ei oteta huomioon? Olemme jo sitoutuneet työskentelemään kovasti, niin kuin teemmekin, käyttääksemme 200 miljoonaa euroa tänä vuonna. Toivon todellakin, että voimme varmistaa sopimuksen 200 miljoonasta eurosta myös seuraavalle vuodelle. Olemme saavuttamassa hyviä tuloksia avun myöntämisessä, sillä olemme maksaneet yli 200 miljoonaa euroa Yhdistyneille Kansakunnille ja Maailmanpankin rahastoihin viime vuoden aikana. Teemme hyvää yhteistyötä Yhdistyneiden Kansakuntien ja Maailmanpankin kanssa varmistaaksemme, että varamme jaetaan nopeasti ja tehokkaasti. Olemme keskittäneet tämänvuotisen tukemme kolmelle alalle: ensisijaisesti julkisiin palveluihin – terveydenhuoltoon, koulutukseen ja viemäröintiin – köyhyyden poistamiseen ja toimeentulon kehittämiseen sekä hallintoon ja kansalaisyhteiskuntaan.
En kuitenkaan väittäisi, että kaikki on hyvin. En voisi sanoa niin. Vaarallinen turvatilanne – jonka etenkin järkyttävät, irakilaisten hyvinvoinnille työnsä omistaneisiin humanitaarisiin työntekijöihin äskettäin kohdistuneet kidnappaussarjat osoittavat ja jonka myös eiliset julmuudet Bagdadissa osoittavat – tietenkin hidastaa tuen maksamista, ja tuen maksu hidastuu myös siksi, että työskentelemme sellaisen väliaikaishallituksen kanssa, joka hakee edelleen paikkaansa julkishallinnossa. Sellaista elämä on – ainakin Irakissa – ja me teemme jatkossakin parhaamme Irakin tilanteen asettamissa rajoissa. Voin kuitenkin lujasti todeta olevani vakuuttunut, että päätöksemme toimia monenvälisten rahastojen kautta oli ehdottoman oikea. Myös maksuvauhtimme vertailu muiden kahdenvälisten rahoittajien, myös kaikkein suurimman rahoittajan, maksuvauhtiin vahvistaa tämän.
Kun ehdotimme parlamentille, että Irakin jälleenrakentamiseen sidottaisiin 200 miljoonaa euroa ja että käyttäisimme siihen siten vuosina 2003–2004 yhteensä yli 300 miljoonaa euroa, jotkin parlamentin jäsenet syyttivät meitä nuukuudesta. He olisivat halunneet meidän tekevän enemmän: he ehdottivat, että meidän pitäisi käyttää vähintään 500 miljoonaa euroa, mutta he eivät oikein suostuneet kertomaan, mistä nämä ylimääräiset varat olisi otettava.
Luin tänä aamuna Washingtonista mielenkiintoisen BBC:n raportin, jossa todettiin, että Yhdysvaltojen hallinto haluaa jakaa uudelleen Irakin jälleenrakentamiseen varatut dollarit ja käyttää ne jälleenrakentamisen sijasta turvallisuuteen ja muihin lyhyen aikavälin tarpeisiin. Raportin mukaan Yhdysvaltojen virkamiehet sanovat, että tähän uuteen strategiaan on päädytty kuukausien pohdinnan jälkeen. Raportissa todetaan lisäksi seuraavaa: "Kriitikot tulkitsevat määrärahojen kohteen siirron osoitukseksi siitä, etteivät suuret pitkän aikavälin suunnitelmat talouden uudelleenmuovaamiseksi olleet realistisia. Kriitikot väittävät lisäksi, että väkivaltaisen vastustuksen laajuus ja taso aliarvioitiin pahoin." Arvioimme mielestäni oikein summan, jonka voisimme järkevästi käyttää Irakissa, ja parlamentti oli mielestäni viisas tukiessaan arviotamme.
Jatkamme seuraavina kuukausina 9. kesäkuuta antamassamme tiedonannossa vahvistettujen ehdotusten toteuttamista. Tiedonantomme on saanut laajan kannatuksen. Keskitymme erityisesti keskeiseen kysymykseen eli vaaliprosessin tukemiseen. Sitten kun riippumaton vaalikomitea ja Yhdistyneet Kansakunnat ovat yksilöineet selvästi, mitä ne tarvitsevat, olemme valmiit auttamaan. Sanon tämän myös Irakin presidentille, jonka tapaan myöhemmin tänään. Minun on kuitenkin tehtävä selväksi, ettemme voi emmekä aio nykyoloissa ehdottaa tavanomaista vaalitarkkailijavaltuuskuntaa, sillä se olisi yksinkertaisesti mahdotonta, kuten ne parlamentin jäsenet, jotka ovat itse osallistuneet vallitarkkailutehtävien johtamiseen, tietävät. Pohdimme kuitenkin, miten voimme varmistaa täysimääräisen tukemme Irakin vapaille ja oikeudenmukaisille vaaleille."@fi7
".
Il y a presque exactement cinq ans, je me présentais devant ce Parlement pour mon audition de confirmation au poste de commissaire. Depuis lors, j’ai eu le privilège de prendre part à des dizaines et des dizaines de débats - plus qu’aucun autre commissaire, paraît-il: cela prouve le vif intérêt que porte le Parlement européen aux relations extérieures. Je tiens à remercier le Parlement et les députés pour la courtoisie que l’on m’a toujours témoignée. Ce fut un plaisir que de venir devant vous. Il importe à mes yeux de s’efforcer de donner des racines démocratiques à la politique étrangère. Ce domaine de politique publique ne doit pas être laissé aux experts diplomatiques, dont le CV est, au mieux, quelque peu inégal.
À plus long terme, il nous faudra déterminer la meilleure façon de représenter la Commission sur le terrain. Ouvrir une délégation serait évidemment difficile, onéreux et sans doute dangereux. Mais nous sommes disposés à envisager cette solution s’il apparaît clairement que l’aide que nous apportons au peuple irakien en serait d’autant plus efficace. Aussi, je serai franc: nous œuvrerons à un avenir meilleur en Irak, aussi âpres qu’aient pu être nos différends par le passé.
Il y a néanmoins un autre point d’ordre général que je souhaite souligner, dans la foulée de ces réflexions sur l’Irak. J’espère que l’Assemblée sera généreuse à mon égard et me permettra cette petite digression dans ce qui sera sans doute ma dernière intervention devant ce parlement incomparable. Il y a un peu plus de deux ans, lorsque certains d’entre nous se disaient inquiets de voir les États-Unis renoncer au genre d’approche multilatérale qui caractérisait leur politique étrangère et de sécurité depuis la Seconde Guerre mondiale, nous avons été sévèrement critiqués. Les États-Unis, nous assurait-on, entendaient toujours travailler avec leurs alliés, pour autant que ceux-ci partagent l’avis de Washington sur l’attitude à adopter face à un monde dangereux et que, globalement, ils gardent pour eux leurs éventuelles réserves.
Certains alliés ont effectivement accompagné les États-Unis à Bagdad, une entreprise qui n’a pas encore eu - comme nous l’avons vu - les conséquences agréables et salutaires que l’on prédisait et promettait à grands renforts de déclarations. La libération a rapidement dégénéré en une occupation - ou ce qui était perçu comme une occupation - qui a suscité une résistance farouche et entraîné atrocité sur atrocité. La démocratie ne s’est pas déroulée comme l’eût fait un tapis d’Orient sur les déserts ingrats du Moyen-Orient. Par-dessus tout, la paix à Jérusalem et en Palestine n’a pas été obtenue par la victoire à Bagdad. Aussi, en partie parce que l’unilatéralisme néoconservateur américain n’était pas parvenu à établir un empire de paix, de liberté et de démocratie, on nous a tout récemment avisés que les alliés et le multilatéralisme étaient à nouveau en odeur de sainteté auprès de Washington. Même les Nations unies étaient jugées utiles. Vive le ministère américain des affaires étrangères.
On passe l’éponge alors? Tout le monde est soulagé? Peut-on à présent s’apprêter à voir restaurer cette vieille idée que les alliés doivent être emmenés et non régentés, et que les institutions multilatérales peuvent être éminemment utiles, même pour la seule superpuissance du monde - que, n’en déplaise à Machiavel, il est bon d’être admiré et non pas seulement craint?
La rhétorique de l’actuelle campagne présidentielle américaine suscite inévitablement un certain nombre de questions. Je ne veux pas prendre parti. Les États-Unis élisent leur président et leur Congrès. Le reste du monde est dans l’expectative. L’Europe devrait coopérer du mieux qu’elle peut avec le vainqueur. Nous ne sommes pas partisans dans ce processus, quelles que soient nos opinions personnelles. Qui plus est, je ne suis pas naïf au point de confondre la rhétorique d’une campagne électorale et le dialogue platonicien. Après tout, n’ai-je pas été moi-même président de parti? Mais la rhétorique de campagne reflète quelque chose, et ce qui se reflète ici est assez troublant.
Dans certains quartiers aux États-Unis, si vous cherchez les applaudissements faciles, il semble qu’il vous suffise de démolir les Nations unies, les Français ou l’idée même que les alliés ont le droit d’avoir une opinion personnelle. Les multilatéralistes, nous dit-on, entendent délocaliser la politique étrangère et de sécurité américaine et la confier à une bande de poltrons chiqueurs d’ail et mangeurs de fromage. Les opinions de l’humanité - que les États-Unis devraient, selon les pères fondateurs du pays, prendre en considération et respecter - seront traitées avec mépris à moins, je suppose, qu’elles ne reflètent fidèlement le programme de l’
et de Fox TV.
Que signifie tout cela? Premièrement, que le multilatéralisme sert avant tout les intérêts des États-Unis, un point que les gouvernements précédents n’ont pas remis en question et auquel la plupart des dirigeants politiques ont souscrit ces 60 dernières années. Deuxièmement, l’intérêt national de la superpuissance est sans aucun doute de mettre ses alliés traditionnels devant le fait accompli, non pas en faisant l’impasse sur leur droit à être consultés, mais en les sondant sur ce qu’ils ont à dire et sur la manière dont ils entendent traduire leurs discours en matière de coopération en un multilatéralisme efficace, et non stérile. Comment, pour prendre un exemple, entendons-nous non seulement assécher les bourbiers qui nourrissent le terrorisme - pour emprunter un cliché -, mais aussi abattre quelques-uns des crocodiles? Ensuite, quand et comment l’Europe approuvera-t-elle le recours à la force pour soutenir l’État de droit international? C’est une question que nous éludons souvent en Europe.
Si la culture politique de l’exception américaine fait un sort à l’idée de collaborer et de dialoguer avec des étrangers, si l’impopularité, outre-Atlantique, est perçue comme un signe de distinction, une source d’orgueil, trop d’Européens feront la même erreur de croire qu’éreinter les États-Unis revient à avoir une politique étrangère et de sécurité européenne. Ce qui m’inquiète le plus, c’est que de part et d’autre de l’Atlantique, nous ferons ressortir le pire chez nos partenaires traditionnels. Le monde mérite mieux que la testostérone d’un côté et l’arrogance de l’autre. Les citoyens américains et européens méritent mieux aussi. Après tout, ils sont confrontés aux mêmes dangers et aux mêmes défis. Je veux que l’Europe soit un super-partenaire, pas un super-éreinteur - et le super-partenaire d’un
mondial respecté. Toute autre solution n’offre que la perspective d’un avenir périlleux et sombre.
En tout état de cause, tandis que je m’éloigne dans le soleil couchant, je tiens à dire que je sais gré au Parlement d’avoir tant contribué à développer - non pas par bonds et franches avancées mais, inévitablement sans doute, dans les embardées et la mêlée - la politique de relations extérieures commune de l’Europe.
La plus grosse pagaille à nous avoir assaillis ces cinq dernières années a bien sûr été le différend au sujet de l’Irak. Je ne veux pas revenir sur de vieilles disputes. Si nous ignorions encore qu’il est impossible d’avoir une politique commune si les grands États membres sont profondément divisés, nous en avons eu la preuve. D’autres preuves sont également éloquentes. Comme disait quelqu’un l’autre jour: «Ça arrive!». Le monde est-il plus sûr aujourd’hui qu’avant le renversement de l’épouvantable Saddam? Le terrorisme mondial est-il en recul? Sommes-nous plus près de jeter des ponts entre l’Islam et l’Occident? La seule superpuissance du monde est-elle plus largement respectée? Les citoyens de nos démocraties ont-ils été traités de telle sorte qu’ils seront enclins à accorder aux gouvernements le bénéfice du doute la prochaine fois qu’on leur dira que le recours préventif à la force est nécessaire pour éliminer une menace imminente? Je me contente de poser les questions. Les honorables députés y répondront eux-mêmes.
Mais nous voici aujourd’hui: Saddam est renversé, la violence fait rage à travers la plus grande partie du pays libéré, le régime a changé et le gouvernement provisoire ouvre la voie à des élections démocratiques. Quelles qu’aient été par le passé nos critiques, nous sommes tous engagés étroitement dans ce processus. Si l’Irak tourne mal, nous en souffrons tous. Nous devons donc nous efforcer de collaborer pour préserver l’unité du projet démocratique.
Hormis les contributions individuelles des États membres, que s’est engagée à faire l’Union européenne? Nous nous sommes engagés et œuvrons d’arrache-pied à déployer 200 millions d’euros cette année. J’espère sincèrement que nous parviendrons à dégager un accord pour 200 millions supplémentaires l’an prochain. Nos états de service en matière de versements de l’assistance sont exemplaires, car nous avons payé plus de 200 millions d’euros dans le cadre des fonds des Nations unies et de la Banque mondiale au cours de l’année écoulée. Notre collaboration avec les Nations unies et la Banque mondiale est bonne, et nous aidons à assurer une distribution rapide et correcte de nos ressources. Cette année, nous avons axé notre assistance sur trois domaines: les services publics fondamentaux - santé, éducation, eau et assainissement; la lutte contre la pauvreté et le développement des moyens de subsistance; la gouvernance et la société civile.
Je ne prétendrais toutefois pas que tout va bien. Comment le pourrais-je? Le climat d’insécurité - dont témoignent notamment les séries affolantes d’enlèvements, les derniers concernant des travailleurs humanitaires dévoués au bien-être des Irakiens, mais aussi l’atrocité survenue hier à Bagdad - freine évidemment le rythme des versements, au même titre que le fait que nous collaborons avec un gouvernement provisoire qui tâtonne encore en matière d’administration publique. C’est la vie - en Irak du moins -, et nous continuerons de faire de notre mieux dans les limites de la situation sur le terrain. Ce que je puis affirmer avec conviction, c’est que notre décision d’emprunter la voie multilatérale des fonds en fiducie était absolument la meilleure. La comparaison de notre taux de paiement avec celui d’autres donateurs bilatéraux, y compris celui du plus grand donateur de tous, ne fait que le confirmer.
Lorsque nous avons proposé au Parlement d’engager 200 millions d’euros pour la reconstruction de l’Irak, ce qui amenait à plus de 300 millions d’euros le montant que nous dépenserons en 2003-2004, certains honorables députés ont rétorqué que nous nous montrions parcimonieux. Ils avançaient que nous devrions faire davantage: ils affirmaient que nous devrions dépenser au moins 500 millions d’euros, mais se montraient évasifs sur la provenance de ces fonds supplémentaires.
Ce matin, j’ai lu avec intérêt un reportage de la BBC à Washington: «Le gouvernement américain souhaite réaffecter plusieurs milliards de dollars alloués à la reconstruction en Irak et les consacrer plutôt à la sécurité et à d’autres besoins immédiats. Les autorités américaines affirment que cette nouvelle stratégie s’est fait jour après plusieurs mois d’examen.» Le reportage poursuit: «Les critiques voient aussi dans cette réaffectation la preuve que les ambitieux projets à long terme pour refaçonner l’économie n’étaient tout simplement pas réalistes. Ils allèguent également que l’intensité et le degré de résistance violente ont été sérieusement sous-estimés.» Je pense que nous avons évalué correctement le montant que nous pouvions raisonnablement consacrer à l’Irak, et je pense que le Parlement a été inspiré de soutenir cette évaluation.
Au cours des prochains mois, nous continuerons de mettre en œuvre les propositions avancées dans notre communication du 9 juin, laquelle a reçu une très large adhésion. Nous nous concentrerons en particulier sur la question essentielle du soutien au processus électoral. Dès que la Commission électorale indépendante et les Nations unies auront identifié précisément ce dont elles ont besoin, nous sommes prêts à venir en aide - ainsi que je l’expliquerai au président irakien lorsque je le rencontrerai tout à l’heure. Mais je me dois d’être clair et de dire que, dans les circonstances actuelles, nous ne pouvons proposer et nous ne proposerons pas une mission d’observation électorale conventionnelle: cela serait tout simplement impossible, comme auront pu s’en rendre compte les honorables députés de cette Assemblée qui ont déjà conduit personnellement des missions d’observation électorale. Mais nous chercherons le moyen de contribuer pleinement à soutenir un processus électoral libre et équitable en Irak."@fr8
"It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliche – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the wellbeing of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@hu11
".
Sono passati quasi esattamente cinque anni dalla prima volta che mi sono presentato in Aula per la mia audizione di conferma in veste di Commissario. D’allora, ho avuto la fortuna di partecipare a decine e decine di dibattiti – più, mi dicono, di ogni altro Commissario, tanto è grande l’interesse del Parlamento per le relazioni esterne. Vorrei ringraziare il Parlamento e tutti i deputati per la cortesia che mi hanno immancabilmente dimostrato. E’ stato un piacere partecipare alle vostre sedute. E’ importante, a mio parere, cercare di stabilire radici democratiche per la politica estera. Non è un settore della politica pubblica da lasciare agli esperti diplomatici, i cui risultati nel migliore dei casi sono piuttosto disorganici.
A più lungo termine, dovremo riflettere sul modo migliore in cui la Commissione possa essere rappresentata
. Aprire una delegazione sarebbe ovviamente difficile, costoso e potenzialmente pericoloso. Siamo comunque disposti a prendere in considerazione tale possibilità, se risulterà evidente che ciò ci permetterà di assistere la popolazione irachena con maggiore efficacia. Permettetemi di essere schietto: lavoreremo per un futuro migliore in Iraq, nonostante l’acredine delle controversie passate.
Vorrei tuttavia affrontare un altro aspetto generale, emerso da queste riflessioni sull’Iraq. Spero che l’Assemblea sia generosa e mi permetta di fare una piccola digressione in quella che quasi sicuramente sarà la mia ultima esternazione nella madre di tutti i parlamenti. Quando, poco più di due anni fa, alcuni di noi espressero preoccupazione per il fatto che gli Stati Uniti stavano abbandonando il tipo di multilateralismo che aveva caratterizzato la loro politica estera e di sicurezza sin dalla Seconda guerra mondiale, fummo aspramente criticati. L’America, ci assicurarono, continuava a voler cooperare con gli alleati, purché essi condividessero il parere di Washington sul modo in cui affrontare un mondo pericoloso e, in generale, tenessero per sé qualsiasi riserva.
Alcuni alleati hanno effettivamente accompagnato l’America a Bagdad, un’impresa che non ha ancora la fortuna di godere – come abbiamo notato – delle semplici e benefiche conseguenze notoriamente previste e promesse. La liberazione si è rapidamente trasformata in occupazione – o in ciò che è stato percepito come un’occupazione – alla quale viene opposta un’acrimoniosa resistenza, con un’atrocità dopo l’altra. La democrazia non è riuscita a stendersi come un tappeto orientale sugli ingrati deserti del Medio Oriente. Soprattutto, la vittoria a Bagdad non ha portato la pace a Gerusalemme e in Palestina. Ora, in parte perché l’unilateralismo neoconservatore americano chiaramente non è riuscito a stabilire un impero di pace, libertà e democrazia, ci è stato recentemente comunicato che gli alleati e il multilateralismo sono tornati di moda a Washington. Si ritiene persino che le Nazioni Unite possano essere utili. Evviva il Dipartimento di Stato!
Tutto a posto, dunque? Sospiri di sollievo ovunque? Possiamo ora guardare avanti, al recupero di quella nozione antiquata secondo cui gli alleati devono essere guidati e non comandati a bacchetta, le istituzioni multilaterali hanno un ruolo importante da svolgere, anche per l’unica superpotenza del mondo, e, con buona pace di Machiavelli, vi sono molti vantaggi nell’essere ammirati e non solo temuti?
La retorica della campagna elettorale in corso negli Stati Uniti inevitabilmente solleva alcuni interrogativi. Non intendo schierarmi con l’una o con l’altra parte. L’America elegge il suo Presidente e il suo Congresso. Il resto del mondo sta a guardare. Noi in Europa dovremo collaborare nel miglior modo possibile con chiunque vinca. Non siamo faziosi in questo processo, a prescindere dalle nostre opinioni personali. Inoltre, non sono così ingenuo da confondere la retorica della campagna elettorale con un dialogo platonico. Dopo tutto, io stesso sono stato presidente di partito. Tuttavia, dalla retorica della campagna elettorale qualcosa emerge, e ciò che emerge è abbastanza sconcertante.
Se si vuole ottenere un facile plauso in alcuni ambienti in America, sembra sia sufficiente criticare aspramente le Nazioni Unite, o i francesi, o l’idea stessa che gli alleati abbiano il diritto di avere le proprie opinioni. I multilateralisti, ci dicono, vogliono appaltare la politica estera e di sicurezza americana a una combriccola di rammolliti masticatori di aglio e mangiaformaggio. Le opinioni dell’umanità, che i padri fondatori degli Stati Uniti ritenevano che il loro paese dovesse osservare e rispettare, devono essere trattate con disprezzo, a meno che, suppongo, non riflettano fedelmente il programma dell’
e della
.
Che cosa dobbiamo ricavare da tutto questo? In primo luogo, il multilateralismo è soprattutto nell’interesse degli Stati Uniti, elemento essenziale che le amministrazioni precedenti non avrebbero mai messo in discussione e la maggioranza dei
politici avrebbe sottoscritto negli ultimi sessant’anni. In secondo luogo, di sicuro l’interesse nazionale della superpotenza è mettere in difficoltà i suoi alleati tradizionali, non per contestare il loro diritto ad essere consultati, ma per saggiare ciò che hanno da dire e il modo in cui intendono tradurre la loro retorica sulla cooperazione in un efficace, e non sterile, multilateralismo. Per fare un esempio ovvio, come intendiamo muoverci e non solo prosciugare le paludi in cui il terrorismo si propaga – per prendere in prestito il
ma anche sparare a qualche coccodrillo? Come e quando in Europa approveremo l’uso della forza per sostenere lo Stato di diritto internazionale? Questo è un interrogativo cui in Europa evitiamo regolarmente di rispondere.
Se la cultura politica dell’eccezionalità americana esclude l’idea di collaborare e dialogare con gli stranieri, se l’impopolarità all’estero è considerata un segno distintivo, un motivo di orgoglio, troppi europei commetteranno l’errore speculare di pensare che sparare a zero sull’America equivalga ad avere una politica estera e di sicurezza europea. Ciò che più mi preoccupa è che su entrambe le sponde dell’Atlantico si dia risalto agli aspetti peggiori dei
tradizionali. Il mondo merita di meglio del testosterone da una parte e della supponenza dall’altra. Anche i cittadini americani ed europei meritano di meglio. Dopo tutto, devono affrontare gli stessi pericoli e le stesse sfide. Voglio un’Europa che sia un
non un superdenigratore: un
di un
globale rispettato. Qualsiasi alternativa offre solo la prospettiva di un futuro più pericoloso e lamentoso.
In ogni caso, mentre mi avvio verso il tramonto, vorrei esprimere il mio apprezzamento per il ruolo svolto dal Parlamento, non a passi da gigante, ma – forse inevitabilmente – con andatura vacillante e strascicata, nello sviluppo di una politica estera comune europea.
Il peggior marasma che ci ha travolti negli ultimi cinque anni è stato, come ben sapete, il putiferio che si è scatenato sull’Iraq. Non intendo rispolverare vecchie questioni. Se avevamo bisogno della conferma che non si può avere una politica comune se i grandi Stati membri sono profondamente divisi, questa è stata la prova. Altre prove parlano da sé. Come ha detto qualcuno, “le cose vanno a modo loro”. Oggi il mondo è più sicuro di prima della caduta del terrificante Saddam? Il terrorismo globale batte in ritirata? Siamo più vicini a costruire ponti fra l’
e l’Occidente? L’unica superpotenza del mondo gode di maggior rispetto? I cittadini delle nostre democrazie ricevono un trattamento che li incoraggerà a concedere ai governi il beneficio del dubbio la prossima volta che si sentiranno dire che è necessario l’uso preventivo della forza per rispondere a una minaccia imminente? Mi limito a sollevare gli interrogativi. Gli onorevoli deputati avranno le loro risposte.
Eccoci qui: cacciato Saddam, la violenza impazza in quasi tutto il territorio liberato, il regime è cambiato, con un governo provvisorio che prepara il paese alle elezioni democratiche. A prescindere dalle nostre critiche passate, siamo dentro fino al collo in questa impresa. Se la situazione in Iraq andrà male, pagheremo tutti le conseguenze. Dobbiamo quindi cercare di lavorare insieme per sostenere il progetto democratico.
Che cosa ci siamo impegnati a fare come Unione, a parte il contributo dei singoli Stati membri? Quest’anno abbiamo già stanziato 200 milioni di euro e stiamo lavorando sodo per utilizzarli. Mi auguro vivamente che riusciremo a raggiungere l’accordo sullo stanziamento di altri 200 milioni di euro per il prossimo anno. Stiamo ottenendo buoni risultati nell’erogazione di questi aiuti e in quest’ultimo anno abbiamo versato oltre 200 milioni di euro nei fondi fiduciari delle Nazioni Unite e della Banca mondiale. Lavoriamo bene con le Nazioni Unite e la Banca mondiale, contribuendo a garantire che le nostre risorse siano erogate rapidamente e correttamente. Quest’anno abbiamo concentrato la nostra assistenza su tre settori: servizi pubblici essenziali (sanità, istruzione, acqua e igiene), riduzione della povertà e sviluppo di mezzi di sostentamento
e società civile.
Non affermo tuttavia che tutto vada per il meglio. Come potrei? L’allarmante situazione della sicurezza – resa evidente non ultimo dalla spaventosa sequela di rapimenti, di recente di operatori umanitari che si dedicano al benessere degli iracheni, e dalle terrificanti atrocità commesse ieri a Bagdad – ovviamente rallenta gli esborsi, così come il fatto che stiamo lavorando con un governo provvisorio che procede ancora a tentoni nella pubblica amministrazione. Così è la vita – almeno in Iraq – e continueremo a fare del nostro meglio entro i limiti della situazione locale. Ciò che posso dire, senza esitazioni, è che sono convinto che la nostra decisione di optare per un fondo fiduciario multilaterale sia effettivamente la migliore. Un confronto fra il nostro tasso di spesa e quello di altri donatori bilaterali, compreso il maggiore donatore in assoluto, può solo confermarlo.
Quando abbiamo proposto al Parlamento di stanziare 200 milioni di euro per la ricostruzione dell’Iraq, portando ad oltre 300 milioni di euro la cifra che spenderemo nel periodo 2003-2004, alcuni deputati ci hanno accusato di essere avari. Hanno affermato che dovremmo fare di più e stanziare almeno 500 milioni di euro, anche se sono stati evasivi riguardo al modo in cui reperire i fondi supplementari.
Stamattina ho letto con grande interesse una notizia della BBC da Washington: “L’amministrazione USA intende stornare miliardi di dollari destinati alla ricostruzione dell’Iraq a favore di misure di sicurezza e altre esigenze a breve termine. Le autorità statunitensi affermano che questa nuova strategia è emersa dopo mesi di revisione”. Il resoconto prosegue: “Lo storno è anche interpretato dai critici come prova del fatto che i grandi piani a lungo termine volti a ricostruire l’economia erano semplicemente irrealistici. Rilevano inoltre che l’intensità e il livello di resistenza armata sono stati gravemente sottovalutati”. Ritengo che la nostra valutazione dell’importo ragionevole da destinare all’Iraq sia stata corretta e che il Parlamento sia stato saggio ad approvarla.
Nei prossimi mesi continueremo ad attuare le proposte descritte nella nostra comunicazione del 9 giugno, che ha ottenuto ampia approvazione. In particolare, ci concentreremo sulla questione essenziale del sostegno al processo elettorale. Siamo pronti a fornire il nostro aiuto, una volta che la commissione elettorale indipendente e le Nazioni Unite avranno individuato le loro esigenze precise, come spiegherò al Presidente iracheno, che incontrerò oggi pomeriggio. Vorrei tuttavia essere chiaro sul fatto che, nelle circostanze attuali, non possiamo né intendiamo proporre una missione tradizionale di osservazione delle elezioni: sarebbe semplicemente impossibile, come ben sanno gli onorevoli deputati che hanno condotto missioni di osservazione elettorale. Cercheremo comunque soluzioni che ci permettano di svolgere appieno il nostro ruolo e favorire elezioni libere ed eque in Iraq."@it12
"It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliche – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the wellbeing of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@lt14
"It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliche – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the wellbeing of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@lv13
"It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliche – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the wellbeing of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@mt15
".
Het is nu precies vijf jaar geleden dat ik voor dit Parlement verscheen voor mijn hoorzitting als commissaris. Sindsdien heb ik het genoegen mogen smaken deel te nemen aan werkelijk talloze debatten; mij is verteld dat ik er meer heb bijgewoond dan enige andere commissaris: zodanig is het belang dat het Parlement stelt in buitenlandse betrekkingen. Ik zou het Parlement en de parlementsleden willen bedanken voor de wellevendheid die ik hier steevast heb ondervonden. Ik kwam hier graag. Het is mijns inziens van belang om te proberen een democratische basis te leggen voor buitenlands beleid. Dit terrein van overheidsbeleid mag niet aan de deskundigen van de diplomatie worden overgelaten, daar hun reputatie toch op zijn best wat onevenwichtig is.
Op de lange termijn zullen we moeten nadenken over hoe de Commissie het best ter plaatse kan worden vertegenwoordigd. De instelling van een delegatie zal natuurlijk moeilijk, duur en mogelijk gevaarlijk zijn. Maar we zijn bereid die weg te overwegen, als duidelijk is dat dat zou bijdragen aan de effectiviteit van onze hulp aan de Irakese bevolking. Laat ik er maar geen doekjes om winden: we zullen werken aan een betere toekomst in Irak, ondanks de verbittering door eerdere ruzies.
Er is echter een ander algemeen punt dat ik, naar aanleiding van deze overwegingen over Irak, zou willen aanroeren. Ik hoop dat het Parlement zo genereus zal zijn mij toe te staan hierover uit te weiden nu ik welhaast zeker voor de laatste maal het woord voer in deze moeder aller parlementen. Toen sommigen van ons, nog maar twee jaar geleden, met bezorgdheid signaleerden dat de Verenigde Staten de multilaterale lijn, waar hun buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid sinds de Tweede Wereldoorlog door werd gekenmerkt, loslieten, kwam dat ons op veel kritiek te staan. Ons werd verzekerd dat Amerika nog altijd wenste samen te werken met bondgenoten, mits deze Washington’s opvatting over hoe met een gevaarlijke wereld moet worden omgegaan deelden en eventuele bedenkingen zo veel mogelijk voor zich hielden.
Sommige bondgenoten togen samen met Amerika naar Bagdad, een waagstuk dat – zoals is opgemerkt – nog niet de eenvoudige en gunstige resultaten hebben opgeleverd die uitdrukkelijk werden voorspeld en beloofd. De bevrijding sloeg snel om in een fel bevochten bezetting – of wat gezien werd als een bezetting – met een eindeloze opeenvolging van wreedheden als gevolg. Het bleek niet te lukken de democratie als een oosters tapijt uit te rollen over de ondankbare woestijnen van het Midden-Oosten. Bovenal leverde een overwinning in Bagdad geen vrede in Jeruzalem en Palestina op. Dus, deels omdat het Amerikaanse neoconservatieve unilateralisme duidelijk gefaald had in het vestigen van een rijk van vrede, vrijheid en democratie, werd ons later verteld dat de stemming in Washington weer was omgeslagen ten faveure van bondgenoten en het multilateralisme. Zelfs de Verenigde Naties zouden toch ergens goed voor zijn.
het Amerikaanse ministerie van Buitenlandse Zaken!
Is alles dan nu vergeven en vergeten? Zuchten van verlichting alom? Kunnen we nu eerherstel tegemoet zien voor de ouderwetse gedachte dat men bondgenoten met zachte hand moet leiden en niet moet commanderen, en dat multilaterale instellingen hun eigen belangrijk nut hebben, zelfs voor de enige supermacht in de wereld; dat er, met alle respect voor
Machiavelli
veel voor te zeggen is om te worden bemind in plaats van alleen te worden gevreesd?
De retoriek van de huidige verkiezingscampagne in de VS doet onvermijdelijk een aantal vragen rijzen. Ik ben niet van plan partij te kiezen. Amerika kiest zijn president en zijn congres, en de rest van de wereld kijkt toe. Wij in Europa zullen zo goed mogelijk met de winnaar, wie dat ook zal zijn, moeten samenwerken. Wij kiezen geen partij in het proces, wat voor mening we er privé ook op na mogen houden. Bovendien ben ik niet zo naïef dat ik campagneretoriek verwar met platonische dialoog. Ik ben per slot van rekening zelf ook partijleider geweest. Maar campagneretoriek is wel een afspiegeling ergens van, en deze afspiegeling is tamelijk verontrustend.
Als je makkelijk wilt scoren op bepaalde gebieden in Amerika dan lijkt het erop dat je alleen maar de vloer hoeft aan te vegen met de Verenigde Naties, de Fransen, of het hele idee dat bondgenoten het recht hebben er een eigen mening op na te houden. Ons wordt voorgehouden dat multilateralisten het Amerikaanse buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid willen uitbesteden aan een bende knoflook kauwende, kaas etende slappelingen. Voor de meningen van de mensheid, waarvan de
van de Verenigde Staten nochtans meenden dat hun land er aandacht en respect voor moest hebben, dien je je neus op te halen, behalve – neem ik aan – als die keurig in het straatje van het American Enterprise Institute en Fox TV passen.
Wat moeten wij daarvan denken? Ten eerste hebben de Verenigde Staten bovenal zelf belang bij een multilaterale koers, een punt dat eerdere regeringen nooit in twijfel zouden hebben getrokken en dat de meeste politieke leiders van de afgelopen zestig jaar zouden onderschrijven. Ten tweede is het nationale belang van de supermacht er zeker mee gediend wanneer zij druk uitoefent op haar traditionele bondgenoten zonder hun evenwel het consultatierecht te betwisten. Zij dient te peilen wat zij te zeggen hebben en hoe zij hun woorden over samenwerking denken om te zetten in daadwerkelijk effectief multilateralisme. Hoe, om een voor de hand liggen punt te noemen, denken wij – om maar een clichébeeld te gebruiken – de moerassen droog te leggen die broeinesten zijn van het terrorisme, en tegelijkertijd ook sommige krokodillen af te schieten? Bovendien, hoe en wanneer zullen wij in Europa het gebruik van geweld ondersteunen ten behoeve van de handhaving van het internationaal recht? Dat is een vraag die wij in Europa over het algemeen ontwijken.
Indien de politieke cultuur van het zogenaamde Amerikaans exceptionalisme geen ruimte biedt aan het idee van samenwerking en overleg met buitenlanders, indien overzeese impopulariteit als een teken van prestige wordt opgevat, iets om trots op te zijn, dan zullen maar al te veel Europeanen de spiegelbeeldige vergissing maken door te denken dat afgeven op Amerika hetzelfde is als het hebben van een Europees buitenlands en veiligheidsbeleid. Waar ik het meest bang voor ben is dat we aan weerszijden van de oceaan het slechtste in onze traditionele bondgenoten naar boven zullen brengen. De wereld verdient beter dan testosteron van de ene kant en hooghartigheid van de andere. En ook de Amerikaanse en Europese burgers verdienen beter. Zij zien zich per slot van rekening geconfronteerd met dezelfde gevaren en dezelfde uitdagingen. Ik wil een Europa dat een superpartner is en geen super-afkraker, de superpartner van een gerespecteerde wereldmacht. Elke andere weg leidt enkel tot meer gevaar en meer geruzie in de toekomst.
Hoe dan ook, nu ik mijns weegs ga zou ik graag mijn waardering willen laten blijken voor de rol van het Parlement in de ontwikkeling, niet met grote sprongen maar – misschien noodzakelijkerwijs – met horten en stoten, van Europa’s gemeenschappelijke beleid voor buitenlandse betrekkingen.
De ergste crisis die ons de afgelopen vijf jaar heeft overvallen is natuurlijk de ruzie over Irak geweest. Ik wil geen oude koeien uit de sloot halen. Als we al bewijs nodig hadden dat je geen gemeenschappelijk beleid kunt hebben als de grotere lidstaten diep verdeeld zijn, dan is dat hiermee geleverd. Ander bewijs spreekt ook luid en duidelijk voor zich. Zoals iemand ooit zei: “dingen gebeuren”. Is de wereld vandaag veiliger dan voordat het barbaarse regime van Saddam werd omvergeworpen? Is het wereldwijde terrorisme op zijn retour? Zijn er stappen gezet richting het bouwen van bruggen tussen de Islam en het Westen? Geniet de enige supermacht in de wereld breder respect? Zijn de burgers van onze democratieën zodanig behandeld dat zij zich aangemoedigd voelen hun regeringen het voordeel van de twijfel te gunnen als hun de volgende keer verteld wordt dat preëmptief geweld gebruikt moet worden om een naderende dreiging het hoofd te bieden? Ik stel die vragen alleen maar. De geachte afgevaardigden zullen hun eigen antwoorden hebben.
Maar zo liggen de kaarten nu: Saddam is weg, op een groot deel van het bevrijde grondgebied woedt geweld, er is een nieuw regime, met een interim-regering die voorbereidingen treft voor democratische verkiezingen. Wat voor kritiek we ook hadden, we zijn nu allemaal tot over onze oren betrokken bij deze onderneming. Als het slecht gaat met Irak dan lijden wij daar allemaal onder. Daarom moeten we samenwerken om het democratische project intact te laten.
Wat worden wij als Unie geacht te doen, afgezien van de bijdrage van de individuele lidstaten? We hebben toezeggingen gedaan en werken hard aan de inzet van 200 miljoen euro nog dit jaar. Ik hoop van harte dat we tot overeenstemming zullen komen voor nog eens 200 miljoen euro voor volgend jaar. We ontwikkelen een goede staat van dienst met deze steunverlening; we hebben het afgelopen jaar immers al meer dan 200 miljoen euro betaald aan de trustfondsen van de Verenigde Naties en de Wereldbank. We werken goed samen met de Verenigde Naties en de Wereldbank om te verzekeren dat onze middelen snel en goed worden besteed. We hebben onze bijstand dit jaar gericht op drie gebieden: elementaire overheidsdiensten – gezondheidszorg, onderwijs, water en sanitaire voorzieningen; de verlichting van armoede en de ontwikkeling van bestaansmiddelen; alsmede governance en het maatschappelijk middenveld.
Ik zou echter niet willen doen alsof alles koek en ei is. Hoe zou dat ook kunnen? Het is duidelijk dat het onzekere veiligheidsklimaat – dat onder andere blijkt uit de verschrikkelijke reeks ontvoeringen, de laatste keer van hulpverleners die opkomen voor het welzijn van de Irakezen, en ook uit de verschrikkelijke gruweldaad gisteren in Bagdad – de snelheid van uitbetaling beperkt, evenals het feit dat we met een interim-regering te maken hebben die haar weg in het openbaar bestuur nog moet vinden. Zo is het leven – in Irak tenminste – en we zullen ons uiterste best blijven doen, binnen de beperkingen van de situatie ter plaatse. Ik kan echter wel zeggen dat ik er stellig van overtuigd ben dat ons besluit om de multilaterale weg van de trustfondsen te kiezen absoluut goed was. Een vergelijking tussen hoe onze betalingen verlopen met die van andere bilaterale donoren, met inbegrip van de allergrootste donor, bevestigt dit alleen maar.
Toen wij het Parlement voorstelden 200 miljoen euro toe te wijzen aan de wederopbouw van Irak, waarmee het bedrag dat we in 2003-2004 zullen besteden boven de 300 miljoen euro uitkomt, waren sommige afgevaardigden van mening dat wij zuinig waren. Zij vonden dat wij meer zouden moeten doen; zij stelden voor om ten minste 500 miljoen uit te trekken, hoewel zij zich op de vlakte hielden als het erom ging waar dat extra geld vandaan zou moeten komen.
Vanmorgen heb ik met belangstelling een bericht uit Washington van de BBC gelezen: “De Amerikaanse regering wil miljarden aan wederopbouwgelden voor Irak ombuigen en deze in plaats daarvan besteden aan veiligheid en kortetermijnbehoeften. Volgens Amerikaanse functionarissen is deze nieuwe strategie voortgekomen uit maanden van overleg”. Het bericht vervolgt: “De koerswijziging wordt door critici ook wel geïnterpreteerd als bewijs dat grote langetermijnplannen om de economie te hervormen eenvoudig niet realistisch waren. Zij uiten bovendien de beschuldiging dat de intensiteit en de omvang van het gewelddadige verzet ernstig onderschat werd”. Ik denk dat ons oordeel over de hoeveelheid geld die redelijkerwijs in Irak kon worden gestoken juist was, en ik denk dat het Parlement er verstandig aan heeft gedaan dat oordeel te steunen.
De komende maanden zullen wij verder gaan met het implementeren van de voorstellen die wij hebben uiteengezet in onze mededeling van 9 juni, die op brede steun heeft kunnen rekenen. Wij zullen ons in het bijzonder richten op ondersteuning van het verkiezingsproces, een uiterst belangrijk punt. Zodra de onafhankelijke verkiezingscommissie van de Verenigde Naties heeft vastgesteld waar precies hun behoeften liggen, staan wij klaar om bij te springen, en dat zal ik de president van Irak vertellen tijdens mijn ontmoeting met hem later vandaag. Ik wil er echter duidelijk over zijn dat we onder de huidige omstandigheden niet kunnen en niet zullen voorstellen een conventionele waarnemersmissie naar de verkiezingen te sturen; dat zou eenvoudigweg onmogelijk zijn, zoals de geachte afgevaardigden in dit Parlement die zelf hebben deelgenomen aan waarnemingsmissies wel zullen weten. We zullen echter manieren zoeken om zeker te stellen dat wij onze volledige bijdrage leveren aan het ondersteunen van vrije en eerlijke verkiezingen in Irak."@nl3
"It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliche – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the wellbeing of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@pl16
"Passaram-se quase cinco anos desde que compareci neste Parlamento para a minha audição como Comissário indigitado. Desde então, tive a sorte de participar num sem número de debates – mais, segundo me foi dito, do que qualquer outro Comissário, o que prova o interesse do Parlamento pelas relações externas. Gostaria de agradecer ao Parlamento e aos seus membros a cortesia com que sempre fui tratado. Foi-me grato aqui vir. Sou de opinião que é importante procurar estabelecer raízes democráticas no plano da política externa. É uma área do domínio público que não deve ser deixada aos peritos em matéria de diplomacia, cujo desempenho é, na melhor das hipóteses, algo inconstante.
A mais longo prazo, teremos de ponderar qual a melhor forma de assegurar a representação da Comissão localmente. Abrir uma delegação seria obviamente difícil, dispendioso e potencialmente arriscado. Mas estaremos dispostos a ponderar essa solução se se tornar evidente que a eficácia da nossa acção em apoio do povo iraquiano seria reforçada dessa forma. Assim, e di-lo-ei sem rodeios, iremos trabalhar em prol de um futuro melhor para o Iraque, independentemente da maior ou menor severidade de anteriores divergências.
Existe, contudo, um outro aspecto de carácter geral que, induzido por estas reflexões sobre o Iraque, gostaria de aqui abordar. Espero que a Assembleia dê provas da sua generosidade para comigo permitindo que me alongue um pouco naquela que é, quase que certamente, a minha última comparência nesta mãe de todas as câmaras legislativas. Quando, há pouco mais de dois anos, alguns de nós manifestámos apreensão pelo facto de os Estados Unidos estarem a abandonar o tipo de multilateralismo que havia caracterizado a sua política externa e de segurança desde a Segunda Guerra Mundial, fomos fortemente criticados. A América, garantiram-nos, continuava a querer trabalhar com aliados, contanto que estes partilhassem o ponto de vista de Washington sobre como lidar com um mundo perigoso e, no geral, guardassem para si quaisquer reservas sobre a questão.
Alguns aliados acompanharam de facto a América a Bagdade, empreendimento este que – como temos constatado – ainda não foi abençoado com as consequências fáceis e benignas tão assertivamente previstas e prometidas. A libertação rapidamente se transformou numa ocupação – ou no que foi entendido como uma ocupação – à qual foi oferecida uma resistência implacável, em que as atrocidades se sucedem incessantemente. O processo democrático não conseguiu desenrolar-se como um tapete oriental através dos desertos, não gratos, do Médio Oriente. Acima de tudo, a vitória em Bagdade não trouxe a paz a Jerusalém e à Palestina. Assim, em parte porque o unilateralismo neoconservador dos EUA falhou nitidamente na criação de um império de paz, liberdade e democracia, fomos recentemente informados de que os aliados e o multilateralismo estão novamente em voga em Washington. Até mesmo as Nações Unidas foram consideradas como tendo a sua utilidade.
o Departamento de Estado.
Está tudo resolvido, então? Há uma sensação de alívio generalizada? Podemos agora aguardar com expectativa a reabilitação daquela velha noção de que os aliados devem ser conduzidos, não comandados, que as instituições multilaterais têm um papel de relevo a desempenhar, mesmo aos olhos da única superpotência mundial -, e que
Machiavelli, é muito importante ser admirado e não apenas temido?
A retórica da actual campanha eleitoral nos Estados Unidos suscita inevitavelmente algumas questões. Não pretendo tomar partido. A América elege o seu Presidente e o seu Congresso. O resto do mundo assiste. Nós, na Europa, deveríamos cooperar o melhor possível com o vencedor, seja ele quem for. Não somos partidários no processo, quaisquer que sejam as nossas posições particulares. Além do mais, não sou ingénuo ao ponto de confundir retórica eleitoral com um diálogo platónico. Afinal, também fui, eu próprio, presidente de um partido. A verdade, porém, é que a retórica eleitoral traduz alguma coisa, e é bastante inquietante o que é traduzido neste caso.
Ao que parece, se pretendermos um elogio fácil por parte de alguns quadrantes dos EUA, a única coisa que temos de fazer é criticar as Nações Unidas, ou os Franceses, ou simplesmente a ideia de que os aliados têm direito a ter as suas próprias opiniões. Os multilateralistas, dizem-nos, querem confiar a política externa e de segurança norte-americana a um bando de patetas que tresandam a alho e se alimentam de queijo. As opiniões da humanidade, que os fundadores dos Estados Unidos da América consideravam que o seu país deveria registar e respeitar, são tratadas com desdém, a menos que, suponho, reflictam na íntegra as prioridades do American Enterprise Institute e da Fox TV.
O que devemos concluir de tudo isto? Em primeiro lugar, o multilateralismo, acima de tudo, serve os melhores interesses dos Estados Unidos, uma realidade que as anteriores Administrações norte-americanas não teriam contestado e com a qual a maioria dos dirigentes políticos nos últimos sessenta anos teria concordado. Em segundo lugar, certamente que o interesse nacional da superpotência é poder contar prontamente com os seus aliados tradicionais, e não é contestando o seu direito a serem consultados que o consegue, mas antes sondando o que têm a dizer e como tencionam converter a sua retórica sobre cooperação num multilateralismo eficaz, e não estéril. Como, para dar um exemplo concreto e pertinente, tencionamos proceder de modo a não apenas secar os pântanos em que o terrorismo floresce – como alguém disse -, mas também alvejar alguns dos crocodilos? Mais, como e quando iremos, na Europa, apoiar o uso da força para defender o primado do direito internacional? Eis uma questão a que, normalmente, a Europa se esquiva.
Se a cultura política do excepcionalismo norte-americano exclui a noção de trabalhar e dialogar com estrangeiros, se a impopularidade noutras partes do globo é entendida como um sinal de distinção e uma fonte de orgulho, demasiados europeus cometerão o erro, de efeito ricocheteante, de pensar que atirar furtivamente contra a América equivale a ter uma política externa e de segurança europeia. O que mais me preocupa é que, em ambos os lados do Atlântico, faremos sobressair o pior nos nossos aliados tradicionais. O mundo merece mais do que testosterona de um lado e sobranceria do outro. E os cidadãos norte-americanos e europeus também merecem mais do que isso. Afinal, defrontam-se com os mesmos perigos e os mesmos desafios. Quero uma Europa que seja um super-parceiro, não um super-sniper. Um super-parceiro de um líder mundial respeitado. Qualquer alternativa a este cenário mais não oferece do que a perspectiva de um futuro mais perigoso e mais inquietante.
Seja como for, agora que me retiro, rumo ao ocaso, não quero deixar de expressar o meu apreço pelo papel que o Parlamento desempenhou, não a largas passadas mas – talvez inevitavelmente – com avanços e recuos, no desenvolvimento da política externa comum da União Europeia.
O que mais negativamente nos afectou nos últimos cinco anos foram, obviamente, as divergências em relação ao Iraque. Não pretendo retomar velhos argumentos. Se necessitássemos de confirmação de que é impossível ter uma política comum se os Estados-Membros de maior dimensão se encontrarem profundamente divididos, teríamos aí a prova evidente. E outras provas há que falam eloquentemente por si. Como alguém em tempos afirmou, “as coisas acontecem”. Estará o mundo hoje mais seguro do que antes do derrube do execrável Saddam? Estará o terrorismo internacional a diminuir? Teremos avançado no estabelecimento de laços entre o Islão e o Ocidente? Será a única superpotência mundial mais respeitada pelo resto do mundo? Terão os cidadãos nas nossas democracias sido tratados de uma forma que os incite a conceder aos governos o benefício da dúvida da próxima vez que estes lhes disserem que há que recorrer preventivamente ao uso da força para lidar com uma ameaça iminente? Limito-me a colocar as questões. Os senhores deputados terão as suas próprias respostas.
Mas a realidade dos factos é que Saddam foi deposto, a violência grassa numa grande parte do território libertado, o regime mudou, e há um governo provisório a preparar o caminho para a realização de eleições democráticas. Quaisquer que tenham sido as nossas críticas no passado, neste momento estamos todos firmemente empenhados nessas eleições. Se as coisas correrem mal no Iraque, todos sofreremos as consequências. Procuremos, pois, concertar esforços, de modo a contribuir para que o projecto democrático naquele país se mantenha de pé.
Que nos comprometemos a fazer enquanto União, independentemente do contributo individual de cada Estado-Membro? Já nos propusemos atribuir, este ano, 200 milhões de euros, e estamos activamente empenhados na execução desse compromisso. Espero sinceramente que a Comissão obtenha o acordo quanto à atribuição de mais 200 milhões de euros para o próximo ano. A União tem tido um bom desempenho na prestação da sua ajuda, tendo já contribuído, ao longo do ano passado, com mais de 200 milhões de euros para os fundos fiduciários das Nações Unidas e do Banco Mundial. Temos desenvolvido um bom trabalho com as Nações Unidas e o Banco Mundial, visando assegurar uma boa e rápida distribuição dos recursos por nós concedidos. Este ano, centrámos a nossa ajuda em três domínios específicos: os serviços públicos essenciais, nomeadamente, a saúde, a educação, o abastecimento de água e o saneamento básico; a redução da pobreza e o desenvolvimento de meios de subsistência; e o apoio à governação e à sociedade civil.
Não vou pretender, porém, que tudo está a correr bem. Quem me dera! Mas a verdade é que o clima de grande insegurança – patente, entre outras situações, na confrangedora sucessão de sequestros a que vimos assistindo, o mais recente de trabalhadoras humanitárias empenhadas em ajudar o povo iraquiano, e também patente nas terríveis atrocidades ontem cometidas na cidade de Bagdad –, aliado ao facto de estarmos a trabalhar com um governo provisório que ainda está a dar os primeiros passos no plano da administração pública, condiciona obviamente o ritmo de distribuição dos recursos. É assim a vida – pelo menos no Iraque -, e resta-nos continuar a dar o nosso melhor, dentro dos condicionalismos da situação local. O que posso afirmar com convicção, sim, é que a nossa decisão de adoptar a via multilateral do fundo fiduciário foi, sem qualquer sombra de dúvida, a decisão correcta. A confirmá-lo está o nosso ritmo de desembolso comparado com o de outros dadores bilaterais, e até com o do maior de todos os dadores.
Quando a Comissão propôs ao Parlamento a atribuição de uma verba de 200 milhões de euros como contribuição da UE para a reconstrução do Iraque, elevando a mais de 300 milhões de euros o montante total da nossa ajuda em 2003-2004, alguns membros da Assembleia argumentaram que a Comissão estava a ser parcimoniosa. Em seu entender, deveríamos ir mais longe: sugeriram que deveríamos contribuir com pelo menos 500 milhões de euros, embora se tenham mostrado reservados quanto a dizer-nos de onde deveriam vir esses recursos adicionais.
Esta manhã, li com interesse um relatório da BBC, de Washington: “A Administração norte-americana pretende reafectar milhões de dólares inicialmente previstos para a reconstrução do Iraque, investindo-os, em lugar disso, na segurança e outras necessidades de curto prazo. Responsáveis do executivo norte-americano afirmam que esta nova estratégia surgiu na sequência de meses de análise da situação”. O relatório prossegue, afirmando que "esta reorientação dos recursos está também a ser interpretada pelos críticos como uma prova de que os grandes planos a longo prazo de reconstrução da economia iraquiana careciam em absoluto de realismo. Aqueles criticam também o facto de ter sido seriamente subestimado o grau quer de intensidade quer de violência da resistência iraquiana”. Considero acertada a posição da Comissão quanto ao montante que seria sensato a UE disponibilizar a favor do Iraque, e creio que foi sensato da parte do Parlamento apoiar essa posição.
Nos próximos meses, continuaremos a levar a efeito as propostas constantes na nossa comunicação de 9 de Junho, que mereceu a aprovação generalizada. Daremos particular atenção à questão fundamental do apoio ao processo eleitoral. Uma vez que a Comissão Eleitoral Independente e as Nações Unidas tenham identificado as suas necessidades exactas, estaremos disponíveis para ajudar – conforme farei saber ao Presidente iraquiano, com quem ainda hoje me irei encontrar. Quero porém deixar bem claro que, nas actuais circunstâncias, não podemos, nem iremos, propor uma missão convencional de observação das eleições. É impossível fazê-lo, e os senhores deputados desta Assembleia que já chefiaram missões de observação de eleições sabem-no bem. Procuraremos, em todo o caso, formas de assegurar a nossa plena participação no apoio à realização de eleições livres e imparciais no Iraque."@pt17
"It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliche – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the wellbeing of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@sk18
"It is almost exactly five years since I appeared in this Parliament for my confirmation hearings as a Commissioner. Since then I have been fortunate to take part in literally scores of debates – more, I am told, than any other Commissioner: such is Parliament’s interest in external relations. I would like to thank Parliament and its Members for the courtesy that I have invariably been shown. I have enjoyed coming here. It is important, in my view, to try to establish democratic roots for foreign policy. It is not an area of public policy to be left to the diplomatic experts, whose record is at best somewhat patchy.
In the longer term, we will need to consider how best the Commission can be represented on the ground. Opening a delegation would obviously be difficult, expensive and potentially dangerous. But we are prepared to consider that route, if it is clear that it would add to our effectiveness in helping the Iraqi people. So let me be blunt: we will work for a better future in Iraq whatever the bitterness of past disputes.
There is, though, one other general point that I would like to make, triggered by these reflections on Iraq. I hope that the House will be generous to me in allowing me to stray a little on what is, almost certainly, my last outing in this mother of parliaments. When, just over two years ago, some of us expressed concerns that the United States was abandoning the sort of multilateralism which had characterised its foreign and security policy since the Second World War, we were strongly criticised. America, we were assured, still wished to work with allies, provided they shared Washington’s view of how to cope with a dangerous world, and by and large kept any reservations to themselves.
Some allies did indeed accompany America to Baghdad, a venture not yet blessed – as we have noted – with the easy and benign consequences that were famously predicted and promised. Liberation rapidly turned into an occupation – or what was seen as an occupation – bitterly resisted, with atrocity after atrocity. Democracy failed to roll out like an oriental carpet across the thankless deserts of the Middle East. Above all, peace in Jerusalem and Palestine was not accomplished by victory in Baghdad. So, partly because American neo-conservative unilateralism had clearly failed to establish an empire of peace, liberty and democracy, we have been more recently advised that allies and multilateralism were back in fashion in Washington. Even the United Nations was deemed to have its uses.
the State Department.
All done and dusted then? Sighs of relief all round? Can we now look forward to the restoration of that old-fashioned notion that allies have to be led not bossed, and that multilateral institutions have their important uses, even for the world’s only super-power – that
Machiavelli, there is much to be said for being admired and not just feared?
The rhetoric of the present United States election campaign inevitably raises a few questions. I do not seek to take sides. America elects its President and its Congress. The rest of the world looks on. We in Europe should work as well as we can with whoever wins. We are not partisans in the process, whatever our private opinions. Moreover, I am not so naïve as to confuse campaign rhetoric with a Platonic dialogue. I have, after all, been a party chairman myself. But campaign rhetoric reflects something and what is reflected here is pretty unsettling.
If you want to get a cheap cheer from certain quarters in America, it seems that all you have to do is to bash the United Nations, or the French, or the very idea that allies are entitled to have their own opinions. Multilateralists, we are told, want to outsource American foreign and security policy to a bunch of garlic chewing, cheese eating wimps. The opinions of mankind, which the founding fathers of the United States thought their country should note and respect, are to be treated with contempt unless, I suppose, they faithfully reflect the agenda of the American Enterprise Institute and Fox TV.
What are we to make of all this? First, multilateralism is, above all, in the best interests of the United States, a point which previous Administrations would not have questioned and most political leaders would have subscribed to for the past 60 years. Second, surely the national interest of the superpower is to put its traditional allies on the spot, not challenging their right to consultation, but probing what they have to say and how they intend to turn their rhetoric about cooperation into effective, not effete, multilateralism. How, to take one obvious point, do we intend to go about not just draining the swamps in which terrorism breeds – to borrow the cliche – but also shooting some of the crocodiles? Further, how and when will we in Europe countenance the use of force to support the international rule of law? That is a question which we in Europe regularly duck.
If the political culture of American exceptionalism excludes the notion of working with and talking to foreigners, if unpopularity overseas is taken as a mark of distinction, a source of pride, too many Europeans will make the mirror-image mistake of thinking that sniping at America is the same as having a European foreign and security policy. What I worry about most is that on either side of the Atlantic we will bring out the worst in our traditional partners. The world deserves better than testosterone on one side and superciliousness on the other. American and European citizens deserve better, too. After all, they face the same dangers and the same challenges. I want a Europe which is a super-partner not a super-sniper – a super-partner of a respected global leader. Any alternative to that offers only the prospect of a more perilous and more querulous future.
Anyway, as I ride off into the sunset, I should like to record my appreciation for Parliament’s role in developing, not by leaps and bounds but – perhaps inevitably – by lurches and shuffles, Europe’s common external relations policy.
The worst shambles to have overwhelmed us in the last five years has, of course, been the row over Iraq. I do not want to go back over old arguments. If we needed reminding that you cannot have a common policy if the larger Member States are deeply divided, then here was the evidence. Other evidence also speaks eloquently for itself. As someone once said, 'stuff happens'. Is the world today safer than before the overthrow of the appalling Saddam? Is global terrorism in retreat? Are we closer to building bridges between Islam and the West? Is the world’s only superpower more widely respected? Have the citizens in our democracies been treated in a way that will encourage them to give governments the benefit of the doubt next time they are told that force needs to be used pre-emptively to deal with an imminent threat? I simply pose the questions. Honourable Members will have their own answers.
But here we are: Saddam overthrown, violence raging across much of the liberated land, the regime changed, with an interim government preparing the way for democratic elections. Whatever our past criticisms, we are all now up to our ears in this endeavour. If Iraq goes badly, we all suffer. So we have to try to work together to hold the democratic project in one piece.
What are we pledged to do as a Union, leaving aside the contribution of individual Member States? We have already pledged, and are working hard to deploy, EUR 200 million this year. I very much hope that we will be able to secure agreement for a further EUR 200 million for next year. We are developing a good record in disbursing this assistance, having paid more than EUR 200 million into the United Nations and World Bank trust funds over the course of the past year. We are working well with the United Nations and the World Bank, helping to ensure that our resources are disbursed quickly and well. We have focused our assistance this year on three areas: on essential public services – health, education, water and sanitation; on poverty alleviation and the development of livelihoods; and on governance and civil society.
I would not pretend, however, that all is well. How could I? The hazardous security climate – evident not least in the appalling series of kidnappings, most recently of humanitarian workers dedicated to the wellbeing of Iraqis, and evident also in yesterday’s appalling atrocity in Baghdad – obviously limits the pace of disbursement, as does the fact that we are working with an interim government that is still feeling its way in public administration. That is life – at least in Iraq – and we will continue to do our utmost within the constraints of the situation on the ground. What I can say, firmly, is that I am convinced that our decision to take the multilateral, trust fund route was absolutely the right one. A comparison of our disbursement rate with that of other bilateral donors, including the largest donor of all, only confirms this.
When we proposed to Parliament committing EUR 200 million to the reconstruction of Iraq, bringing to over EUR 300 million the amount we will spend in 2003-2004, some honourable Members argued that we were being parsimonious. They argued that we should do more: they suggested that we should spend at least EUR 500 million, though they were coy about telling us where the extra money should come from.
This morning I was interested to read a report by the BBC from Washington: 'The US Administration wants to reallocate billions of reconstruction dollars for Iraq and spend them instead on security and other short-term needs. US officials say this new strategy has emerged after months of review.' The report goes on: 'The shift is also being interpreted by critics as proof that grand long-term plans to reshape the economy just were not realistic. They also charge that the intensity and level of violent resistance was severely underestimated.' I think we were right in our judgment about the amount of money that we could sensibly put into Iraq, and I think Parliament was wise to support that judgment.
In the coming months, we will continue to implement the proposals set out in our communication of 9 June, which has received widespread endorsement. In particular, we will focus on the essential issue of support to the electoral process. Once the Independent Electoral Commission and the United Nations have identified exactly what they need, we stand ready to help – as I shall explain to the Iraqi President when I meet him later today. But I should be clear that, under the current circumstances, we cannot and will not propose a conventional election observation mission – that would be simply impossible, as honourable Members in this Chamber who themselves have taken a lead in election observation missions will know. But we will seek ways to ensure that we play our full part in assisting free and fair elections in Iraq."@sl19
".
Det är nästan exakt fem år sedan jag inställde mig här i parlamentet för utfrågningen inför godkännandet som kommissionsledamot. Sedan dess har jag haft nöjet att delta i mängder av debatter – fler, har jag fått veta, än någon annan kommissionsledamot: så stort är parlamentets intresse för yttre förbindelser. Jag vill tacka parlamentet och dess ledamöter för det tillmötesgående som alltid har visats mig. Det har varit ett nöje att komma hit. Jag anser att det är viktigt att skapa demokratiska grunder för utrikespolitik. Det är inte ett offentligt politiskt område som bör överlåtas till diplomatiska experter, vars meritlistor i bästa fall är av tämligen blandad kvalitet.
På längre sikt måste vi överväga hur kommissionen bäst kan företrädas på plats. Att inrätta en delegation skulle givetvis vara svårt, dyrt och kanske farligt. Men vi är beredda att överväga den lösningen, om det står klart att detta skulle bidra till att vi effektivt kan bistå det irakiska folket. Så låt mig vara uppriktig: Vi kommer att arbeta för en bättre framtid i Irak, oavsett tidigare bittra kontroverser.
Jag vill emellertid säga något allmänt, med anledning av dessa funderingar kring Irak. Jag hoppas att parlamentet är generöst nog att låta mig avvika lite från ämnet vid detta framträdande, som sannolikt är mitt sista i parlamentet, denna förebild för alla andra parlament. När några av oss för bara drygt två år sedan gav uttryck för vår oro över att Förenta staterna var på väg bort från det slags multilateralism som har kännetecknat landets utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik sedan andra världskriget, kritiserades vi starkt. USA, försäkrade man oss, ville fortfarande samarbeta med sina allierade, på villkor att de delade Washingtons åsikt om hur man skall hantera dagens farliga värld. Eventuella reservationer höll amerikanerna i stort sett tyst om.
Några av de allierade följde faktiskt med USA till Bagdad och vi kan konstatera att denna satsning ännu inte har fått de enkla och goda resultat som förutsades och utlovades så fint. Befrielsen förvandlades snabbt till en ockupation – eller något som sågs som en ockupation – som det gjordes bittert motstånd mot, med illdåd efter illdåd. Försöket att rulla ut demokratin som en orientalisk matta över Mellanösterns otacksamma öknar misslyckades. Framför allt kunde inte fred nås i Jerusalem och Palestina med en seger i Bagdad. Därför, och delvis på grund av att USA genom sitt nykonservativa ensidiga agerande tydligt hade misslyckats med att upprätta ett imperium av fred, frihet och demokrati, har vi på senare tid fått höra att allierade och multilateralism åter är på modet i Washington. Till och med FN ansågs användbart. Leve
USA:s utrikesdepartement.
Betyder detta att allt är klappat och klart? Drar alla en lättnadens suck? Kan vi nu se fram emot återupprättandet av den omoderna uppfattningen att allierade skall ledas och inte kommenderas och att multilaterala institutioner har viktiga användningsområden, även för världens enda supermakt, och att det med all respekt för Machiavelli finns mycket som talar för att det är viktigt att vara älskad, inte bara fruktad?
Retoriken i den nu pågående valkampanjen i Förenta staterna ger oundvikligen upphov till vissa frågor. Jag försöker inte ta parti för någon. USA väljer sin president och sin kongress. Resten av världen ser på. Vi i Europa bör samarbeta så gott vi kan med vem som än vinner. Vi är inte delaktiga i processen, vilka privata åsikter vi än hyser. För övrigt är jag inte så naiv att jag blandar ihop kampanjretorik med en platonsk dialog. Jag har trots allt själv varit partiordförande. Men kampanjretorik avspeglar något, och det som avspeglas här är tämligen förvirrande.
Om man enkelt vill vinna bifall från vissa håll i USA tycks det räcka med att man ger sig på FN, eller fransmännen, eller blotta tanken att de allierade har rätt att ha sina egna åsikter. Multilateralister, får vi veta, vill överlåta amerikansk utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik till en skock vitlökstuggande, ostätande mesar. Människors åsikter, som Förenta staternas grundare ansåg att deras land skulle beakta och respektera, skall behandlas med förakt, såvida de inte, antar jag, troget avspeglar American Enterprise Institutes och Fox TV:s agendor.
Vad skall vi tro om allt detta? För det första ligger multilateralism framför allt i Förenta staternas intresse, en åsikt som föregående administrationer inte skulle ha ifrågasatt och som de flesta politiska ledare har delat under de senaste 60 åren. För det andra ligger det säkerligen i en supermakts nationella intresse att sätta sina traditionella allierade på det hala, inte genom att bestrida deras rätt till samråd, utan genom att undersöka vad de har att säga och hur de tänker omvandla sin retorik om samarbete till effektiv, inte kraftlös, multilateralism. För att nämna en uppenbar fråga: vad tänker vi göra för att rensa upp i de träsk där terrorismen frodas – om jag får låna den klichén – och framför allt också skjuta några av krokodilerna? Dessutom, hur och när kommer vi i Europa att tolerera att våld används för att upprätthålla den internationella rättsordningen? Detta är en fråga som vi i Europa vanligen undviker att besvara.
Om den amerikanska politiska utestängningskulturen undantar begreppet samarbete och dialog med utlänningar, om impopularitet utomlands uppfattas som ett uttryck för förnämhet och en källa till stolthet kommer alltför många européer att göra motsvarande misstag att tro att hackande på Amerika är samma sak som att ha en europeisk utrikes- och säkerhetspolitik. Det som oroar mig mest är att vi på båda sidor av Atlanten kommer att locka fram de sämsta sidorna hos våra traditionella partnerländer. Världen förtjänar bättre än testosteron på ena sidan och högdragenhet på den andra. Detsamma gäller de amerikanska och europeiska medborgarna. De står trots allt inför samma faror och utmaningar. Jag vill ha ett EU som är en superpartner, inte en superprickskytt, en superpartner till en respekterad global ledare. Alla andra alternativ kommer endast att leda till en farligare framtid med ännu fler gräl.
Hur som helst, när jag nu rider bort mot solnedgången vill jag ge uttryck för min uppskattning för parlamentets roll i att utveckla Europeiska unionens gemensamma politik för yttre förbindelser, vilket inte har skett med stormsteg utan – kanske oundvikligen – i kringelkrokar.
Det värsta bakslaget för oss under de fem senaste åren har, naturligtvis, varit bråket om Irak. Jag vill inte gå in på de gamla argumenten igen. Om vi skulle behöva en påminnelse om att man inte kan ha en gemensam politik om de större medlemsstaterna är djupt splittrade så är detta beviset. Det finns även andra mycket talande bevis. Som någon sade någon gång, ”det är sådant som händer”. Är dagens värld säkrare än innan den förfärlige Saddam störtades? Är den globala terrorismen på tillbakagång? Står vi närmare målet att bygga broar mellan islam och väst? Är världens enda supermakt mer allmänt respekterad? Har medborgarna i våra demokratier behandlats på ett sätt som uppmuntrar dem att hellre fria än fälla de styrande nästa gång de får veta att det är nödvändigt att använda våld i förebyggande syfte för att ta itu med ett överhängande hot? Jag bara frågar. Ni, ärade ledamöter, har era egna svar.
Men här är vi nu: Saddam har störtats, våldet härskar i en stor del av det befriade landet, regimen har bytts ut mot en övergångsregering som bereder vägen för demokratiska val. Oavsett vår tidigare kritik står vi nu upp över öronen i denna strävan. Om det går illa för Irak kommer vi alla att få lida för det. Vi måste följaktligen försöka samarbeta för att hålla ihop detta demokratiska projekt.
Vad är vi förpliktade att göra som en union, bortsett från enskilda medlemsstaters insatser? Vi har redan lovat att anslå 200 miljoner euro i år, och det arbetar vi hårt för. Jag hoppas innerligt att vi kommer att kunna säkra en överenskommelse om ytterligare 200 miljoner euro inför nästa år. Vi har lyckats bra när det gäller utbetalningarna av detta bistånd, eftersom vi betalade över 200 miljoner euro till FN:s och Världsbankens förvaltningsfonder under förra året. Vi har ett gott samarbete med FN och Världsbanken och bidrar till att se till att våra medel betalas ut snabbt och väl. I år har vi inriktat vårt bistånd på tre områden: grundläggande samhällsservice – hälso- och sjukvård, utbildning, vatten och sanitära anläggningar, fattigdomslindring och att ge människor inkomstmöjligheter – samt på styrelseformer och det civila samhället.
Jag vill dock inte låtsas som om allt är frid och fröjd. Hur skulle jag kunna göra det? Det riskabla säkerhetsklimatet – som inte minst framgår med all tydlighet av den skrämmande raden av kidnappningar, den senaste av biståndsarbetare som arbetar för irakiernas väl, och som även illustreras av gårdagens förfärliga illdåd i Bagdad – hämmar givetvis utbetalningstakten, som även begränsas av det faktum att vi samarbetar med en övergångsregering som fortfarande prövar sig fram när det gäller offentlig förvaltning. Sådant är livet – åtminstone i Irak – och vi kommer att fortsätta att göra vårt yttersta inom ramen för den ofrihet som läget på fältet medför. Det jag kan säga säkert är att jag är övertygad om att vårt beslut att välja alternativet med multilaterala förvaltningsfonder var absolut rätt. En jämförelse mellan vår utbetalningstakt och andra bilaterala givares, däribland den största givaren, bekräftar också detta.
När vi föreslog parlamentet att 200 miljoner euro skulle anslås till återuppbyggnaden av Irak, vilket innebär att det belopp som vi kommer att ta i anspråk 2003–2004 överstiger 300 miljoner euro, hävdade några av ledamöterna att vi var överdrivet sparsamma. De hävdade att vi borde göra mer: de föreslog att vi skulle använda minst 500 miljoner euro, även om de svarade undvikande på vår fråga om var de extra pengarna skulle komma från.
I morse läste jag med intresse följande i en BBC-rapport från Washington: ”Den amerikanska administrationen vill omfördela flera miljarder US-dollar som anslagits för återuppbyggnaden av Irak och i stället använda pengarna till säkerhetsfrågor och andra kortsiktiga behov. Amerikanska tjänstemän säger att denna nya strategi har utvecklats efter månader av granskning”. I rapporten sägs det vidare att ”kritiker tolkar även omfördelningen som ett bevis för att storslagna långsiktiga planer för att omdana ekonomin helt enkelt inte var realistiska. De hävdar även att intensiteten och omfattningen av det våldsamma motståndet var allvarligt underskattad”. Jag anser att vi hade rätt i vår bedömning av det belopp som var förnuftigt att anslå till Irak, och jag anser att parlamentet gjorde klokt i att stödja denna bedömning.
Under de närmaste månaderna kommer vi att fortsätta att genomföra de förslag som läggs fram i vårt meddelande av den 9 juni, som har fått brett stöd. I synnerhet kommer vi att inrikta oss på den grundläggande frågan om stöd till valprocessen. Så snart den oberoende valkommissionen och FN har fastställt exakt vad de behöver är vi redo att hjälpa till, vilket jag kommer att klargöra för Iraks president när jag träffar honom senare i dag. Men jag vill klargöra att vi under de nuvarande omständigheterna varken kan eller vill föreslå ett traditionellt valobservatörsuppdrag – detta skulle helt enkelt vara omöjligt, vilket de ärade parlamentsledamöter som själva har lett valobservatörsuppdrag säkert instämmer i. Men vi kommer att söka vägar för att se till att vi deltar fullt ut i arbetet med att organisera fria och rättvisa val i Irak."@sv21
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