Local view for "http://purl.org/linkedpolitics/eu/plenary/2004-09-14-Speech-2-183"
| Predicate | Value (sorted: default) |
|---|---|
| rdf:type | |
| dcterms:Date | |
| dcterms:Is Part Of | |
| dcterms:Language | |
| lpv:document identification number |
"en.20040914.11.2-183"6
|
| lpv:hasSubsequent | |
| lpv:speaker | |
| lpv:spoken text |
".
Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States and if the AU so requests to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@en4
|
| lpv:translated text |
"Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States - and if the AU so requests - to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas - they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@cs1
"Hr. formand, jeg er taknemmelig over at få mulighed for at tale om den krise, der har udviklet sig i Darfur, og for den interesse, Parlamentet og Udviklingsudvalget har vist for at gøre dette til den første mission i denne nye valgperiode.
På trods af operationens begrænsede omfang har resultaterne i marken været positive. Jeg tror fuldt og fast på, at kun et initiativ fra Den Afrikanske Unions side har den politiske vægt og relevans, der kan tvinge konfliktens parter, og især den sudanesiske regering, til at overholde deres forpligtelser. Dette betyder ikke, at andre ikke skal eller kan spille en meget væsentlig rolle. Partnerskab og ejerskab er ikke inkompatible størrelser, især ikke når partnerskabet er professionelt og afspejler det sunde princip om, at synlighed er godt, men gennemførlighed er bedre.
Det er klart, at nogle af de eksisterende organisationssvagheder, Den Afrikanske Union har oplevet, bør og skal afhjælpes gennem et tættere partnerskab med FN og EU, herunder med vores medlemsstater. Jeg mener dog også, som formanden også klart har givet udtryk for, at Den Afrikanske Union skal sidde i førersædet. Det er den, der skal tage initiativ til og styre missionen.
I den henseende er Kommissionen klar til sammen med medlemsstaterne - hvis AU anmoder om det - at overveje yderligere støtte via fredsfaciliteten til en velovervejet udvidelse af AU-missionen i Darfur.
Det vigtigste mål er klart at sikre maksimal beskyttelse af civilbefolkningen. Problemet med, om man skal vende hjem, og hvad man vender hjem til, afhænger mest af alt af folks følelse af, om de er i sikkerhed i situationen.
Vi skal være klar til i de rigtige fora at drøfte en mulig ændring af AU-missionens nuværende mandat med parterne, hvis ikke Sudans regering er villig eller i stand til at beskytte befolkningen i Darfur effektivt. Det er et
.
Det er også vigtigt at bemærke, at vi står over for en egentlig konflikt. Der er mere i det end en smule uorganiseret vold. Det er ikke kun et problem med Sudans regering. Der er også oprørsgrupper, der kæmper for deres dagsorden - de findes altså.
Derfor skal alt dette håndteres med udgangspunkt i et seriøst mæglingsarbejde, som lægger pres på samtlige parter.
Det er også vigtigt at understrege, at en bæredygtig politisk løsning i Darfur nødvendigvis skal formuleres og udarbejdes parallelt med og i relation til den globale Naivasha-proces. En løsning for Darfur alene løser ikke problemet som helhed. Faktisk kom problemet i Darfur ikke uventet, men som et resultat af problemerne i Sudan.
Der er blevet indgået en politisk aftale i Abuja, og det er en god start, men vi skal støtte alle dem, der arbejder for at skubbe situationen i den rigtige retning, og samtidig fokusere på det enorme stykke arbejde, der skal udføres for at forbedre den humanitære situation i området.
Delegationen er vendt tilbage med et klart billede af en kompleks situation og har udtrykt indignation over de forfærdelige ting, der fortsat sker i Darfur.
Kommissionen var aktivt engageret i at yde humanitær bistand til den vestlige del af Sudan, før krisen udviklede sig til det, den er i dag. Tingene er nu så skrækkelige, at vi til dato har mobiliseret 105 millioner euro. Størstedelen af dette beløb er gået til basal humanitær fødevarebistand, men vi prøver også at støtte den politiske proces. Beløbet svarer nogenlunde til 37 % af det, EU har bidraget med som helhed. Normalt ligger Kommissionens andel af støtte til disse humanitære kriser på omkring 20 % af det, medlemsstaterne giver tilsammen. Her vil jeg gerne tilføje, at vi ser en ret stor spredning, når vi sammenligner medlemsstaternes bidrag. Det nævner jeg, fordi jeg mener, at den kvalitative værdi af det, EU gør som helhed i en given situation, ikke blot hænger sammen med det, Kommissionen gør, eller det samlede beløb af det, vi gør, men også med det ægte engagement rundt omkring i Europa som helhed til støtte for vores aktiviteter.
Vi sender også penge og ressourcer til situationen i Tchad, idet vi giver omkring 200.000 flygtninge fra Darfur tag over hovedet.
I forbindelse med vores mobilisering af denne støtte er vi stødt på tilbagevendende administrative hindringer fra den sudanesiske regerings side og omfattende logistiske problemer, der har udmøntet sig i høje ekstraomkostninger. Over 25 % af omkostningerne til denne operation relaterer til logistikproblemerne.
De administrative problemer er gradvist ved at blive løst. Det skyldes efter min mening i vid udstrækning det internationale samfunds pres på Sudans regering. Hvad angår logistikken, åbner ECHO et teknisk kontor i Darfur og endnu et i Tchad for at forbedre koordineringen på området. De vil være operationelle i slutningen af indeværende måned, og vi planlægger i første omgang for en periode på 12 måneder.
Men der er stadig meget, der skal gøres. Det vurderes, at omkring 40 % af den berørte befolkning stadig ikke har adgang til humanitær bistand, og på trods af at der er sket forbedringer i visse områder, rapporteres der fortsat om vold, herunder systematisk voldtægt af kvinder. Jeg ved, at delegationen er vendt tilbage med beretninger om forfærdelig vold og megen frygt.
Det er vigtigt, at det internationale samfund forbliver mobiliseret, da de humanitære behov selv i det bedste tilfælde vil fortsætte endnu et år frem. Som vi har set, mærkes følgerne af disse kriser stadig, og vi skal organiseres os, så vi bliver bedre til at håndtere dem i fremtiden.
Parallelt med den humanitære bistand har EU været meget aktiv på det politiske plan. Vi har for første gang mobiliseret den EUF-finansierede afrikanske fredsfacilitet, som tilvejebringer den største del af budgettet for Den Afrikanske Unions mission. Dette har gjort det muligt for Den Afrikanske Unions Freds- og Sikkerhedsråd at komme med et hurtigt svar i kraft af en beslutning på rådets første officielle møde, der fulgte i kølvandet på den humanitære våbenhvileaftale i N'Djamena. Rådet har sendt ca. 150 observatører og en stærk militær beskyttelsesstyrke på 300 mand for at håndhæve våbenhvilen."@da2
".
Herr Präsident, ich bin dankbar für die Gelegenheit, auf die Krise in Darfur einzugehen, und für das vom Parlament und Entwicklungsausschuss bekundete Interesse, wurde doch die erste Delegation der neuen Wahlperiode dorthin entsandt.
Trotz des begrenzten Umfangs der Aktion sind die Ergebnisse vor Ort als positiv zu bezeichnen. Nach meiner festen Überzeugung wird nur eine Initiative der Afrikanischen Union politisch so gewichtig und zielgerichtet sein, dass sie die Konfliktparteien, insbesondere die Regierung des Sudan, zur Einhaltung ihrer Verpflichtungen veranlasst. Dies bedeutet nicht, dass sonst niemand eine wichtige Rolle spielen sollte oder kann. Partnerschaft und Zuständigkeit sind durchaus miteinander vereinbar, zumal wenn das partnerschaftliche Zusammenwirken professionell erfolgt und dem bewährten Grundsatz folgt, dass es gut ist, wenn man Flagge zeigt, aber noch besser, wenn man etwas zustande bringt.
Es liegt auf der Hand, dass die organisatorischen Schwächen der Afrikanischen Union zum Teil durch eine verstärkte Partnerschaft mit den Vereinten Nationen und mit der EU, einschließlich unserer Mitgliedstaaten, behoben werden könnten und sollten. Wie auch die Präsidentschaft heute klar zum Ausdruck brachte, habe ich volles Verständnis dafür, dass die Afrikanische Union das Heft in der Hand halten muss. Sie muss diese Mission in die Wege leiten und vorantreiben.
In diesem Zusammenhang ist die Kommission bereit, bei einem entsprechenden Ersuchen der AU in Abstimmung mit den Mitgliedstaaten zusätzliche Hilfen der Friedensfazilität für eine wohldurchdachte Erweiterung der AU-Mission in Darfur ins Auge zu fassen.
Das dringlichste Ziel ist natürlich der größtmögliche Schutz der Zivilbevölkerung. Die ganze Frage, ob die Flüchtlinge zurückkehren können oder nicht und wohin sie sich begeben sollen, hängt im Wesentlichen davon ab, ob sich die Menschen ausreichend sicher fühlen.
Wir müssen bereit sein, mit den Parteien in geeigneten Foren eine mögliche Änderung des derzeitigen Mandats der AU-Mission zu erörtern, sofern die sudanesische Regierung nicht willens oder fähig ist, die Bevölkerung in Darfur wirksam zu schützen. Dies ist unabdingbar.
Es gilt auch zu bedenken, dass es sich um einen echten Konflikt handelt. Es geht hier um mehr als sporadische Gewaltakte. Probleme bereitet uns nicht nur die Regierung des Sudan; vielmehr gibt es tatsächlich Rebellengruppen, die für ganz konkrete Ziele kämpfen.
Aus diesem Grunde müssen ernsthafte Anstrengungen unternommen werden, um zu vermitteln und dabei Druck auf alle Konfliktparteien auszuüben.
Zudem ist unbedingt zu berücksichtigen, dass eine tragfähige politische Lösung für Darfur parallel zum globalen Naivasha-Prozess und in enger Verknüpfung mit diesem gefunden und ausgestaltet werden muss. Eine Lösung für Darfur allein wird das Gesamtproblem nicht lösen. Schließlich kam der Darfur-Konflikt nicht aus heiterem Himmel, sondern war ein Ergebnis der im Sudan herrschenden Probleme.
In Abuja wurde eine gewisse politische Verständigung erreicht, sodass ein Anfang gemacht ist, doch müssen wir all jene Kräfte unterstützen, die sich dafür einsetzen, die Dinge in die richtigen Bahnen zu leiten, und uns zugleich der gewaltigen Aufgabe zuwenden, die humanitäre Lage vor Ort zu verbessern.
Die Delegation hat sich ein klares Bild von der komplizierten Lage verschafft und ihre Empörung über die furchtbaren Geschehnisse, die sich weiterhin in Darfur abspielen, zum Ausdruck gebracht.
Die Kommission war bereits vor der Zuspitzung der Krise aktiv an der humanitären Hilfe für den westlichen Teil des Sudan beteiligt. Angesichts der untragbaren Zustände haben wir bisher 105 Mio. EUR bereitgestellt. Diese Gelder wurden überwiegend für humanitäre Lebensmittelhilfe verwendet, doch bemühen wir uns auch darum, den politischen Prozess zu unterstützen. Der genannte Betrag macht etwa 37 % der insgesamt von der EU geleisteten Hilfe aus. Im Normalfall beläuft sich der Anteil der Kommission an Finanzhilfen bei humanitären Krisen auf 20 % des Gesamtbeitrags der Mitgliedstaaten. Ich möchte hinzufügen, dass die Beiträge der einzelnen Mitgliedstaaten ziemlich stark differieren. Dies erwähne ich deshalb, weil nach meiner Auffassung der qualitative Wert des Engagements der EU in einer bestimmten Situation nicht nur vom Tätigwerden der Kommission oder dem Gesamtbetrag abhängt, sondern auch davon, dass unsere Tätigkeit europaweit echten Rückhalt findet.
Mit Geld und mit Taten tragen wir auch zur Verbesserung der Lage im Tschad bei, wo wir für die Unterbringung von schätzungsweise 200 000 Flüchtlingen aus Darfur sorgen.
Bei der Erbringung unserer Hilfeleistungen sahen wir uns mit ständigen administrativen Behinderungen durch die sudanesische Regierung und mit erheblichen logistischen Problemen konfrontiert, was beträchtliche Zusatzkosten verursachte. Über 25 % der Kosten dieser Aktion sind auf die logistischen Probleme zurückzuführen.
Die verwaltungstechnischen Probleme werden allmählich gelöst, was nach meiner Ansicht größtenteils dem Druck der Völkergemeinschaft auf die sudanesische Regierung zu danken ist. Was die Logistik anbelangt, richtet ECHO sowohl in Darfur als auch im Tschad technische Außenstellen ein, um die Koordinierung in diesem Bereich zu verbessern. Sie werden Ende des Monats einsatzbereit sein und sind zunächst auf 12 Monate angelegt.
Der Handlungsbedarf ist aber noch viel größer. Schätzungsweise haben ca. 40 % der betroffenen Bevölkerung noch immer keinen Zugang zur humanitären Hilfe, und trotz einer Verbesserung der Lage in einigen Gebieten reißen die Meldungen über Gewaltakte nicht ab, wozu auch die systematische Vergewaltigung von Frauen zählt. Ich weiß sehr wohl, dass die Delegation über entsetzliche Mordtaten und ein Klima der Angst berichtet hat.
Die Völkergemeinschaft darf in ihren Bemühungen nicht nachlassen, denn selbst im günstigsten Falle wird noch ein Jahr lang humanitäre Hilfe benötigt. Wie sich gezeigt hat, machen sich die Folgen der Krisen weiterhin bemerkbar, und wir müssen uns organisatorisch besser darauf einstellen.
Die humanitäre Hilfe der EU ging mit intensiven politischen Aktivitäten einher. Zum ersten Mal wurden Mittel durch die vom EEF finanzierte Afrikanische Friedensfazilität bereitgestellt, die den größten Teil des Budgets der Beobachtermission der Afrikanischen Union ausmachen. Dadurch konnte der Friedens- und Sicherheitsrat der Afrikanischen Union schnell reagieren und nach der humanitären Waffenstillstandsvereinbarung von N’Djamena auf seiner ersten offiziellen Sitzung eine wichtige Entscheidung treffen. Er entsandte zur Überwachung des Waffenstillstands etwa 150 Beobachter und eine 300 Mann starke Schutztruppe."@de9
"Κύριε Πρόεδρε, σας είμαι ευγνώμων για την ευκαιρία που μου δίνετε να αναφερθώ στην κρίση που έχει δημιουργηθεί στο Νταρφούρ και για το ενδιαφέρον που επιδεικνύουν το Κοινοβούλιο και η Επιτροπή Ανάπτυξης να καταστήσουν αυτή την κρίση την πρώτη τους αποστολή σε αυτή τη νέα κοινοβουλευτική περίοδο.
Παρά την περιορισμένη κλίμακα αυτής της επιχείρησης, τα πρακτικά αποτελέσματα υπήρξαν θετικά. Πιστεύω ακράδαντα ότι μόνο μια πρωτοβουλία της Αφρικανικής Ένωσης θα έχει την πολιτική βαρύτητα και σπουδαιότητα για να υποχρεώσει τους εμπολέμους, και ιδιαίτερα την κυβέρνηση του Σουδάν, να συμμορφωθούν με τις δεσμεύσεις τους. Αυτό δεν σημαίνει ότι οι άλλοι δεν πρέπει και δεν μπορούν να διαδραματίσουν πολύ σημαντικό ρόλο. Η συνεργασία και η ιδιοκτησία δεν είναι ασυμβίβαστες, ιδίως όταν η συνεργασία αναπτύσσεται με επαγγελματικό τρόπο, αντικατοπτρίζοντας την ορθή αρχή πως το ορατό είναι καλό, αλλά το εφικτό καλύτερο.
Είναι σαφές πως μερικές από τις υπάρχουσες αδυναμίες στην οργάνωση που αντιμετωπίζει η Αφρικανική Ένωση θα μπορούσαν και θα έπρεπε να αντιμετωπιστούν μέσω της ενισχυμένης συνεργασίας με τον Οργανισμό Ηνωμένων Εθνών και την Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση στο σύνολό της, συμπεριλαμβανομένων των κρατών μελών της. Εντούτοις, πιστεύω, όπως δήλωσε ξεκάθαρα και ο Πρόεδρος σήμερα, πως η Αφρικανική Ένωση πρέπει να ηγείται της προσπάθειας. Αυτή πρέπει να ξεκινήσει και να καθοδηγήσει αυτή την αποστολή.
Σε αυτό το πλαίσιο, η Επιτροπή είναι έτοιμη, σε συνεργασία με τα κράτη μέλη –και εάν υποβληθεί σχετική αίτηση από πλευράς της Αφρικανικής Ένωσης– να εξετάσει το ενδεχόμενο πρόσθετης ενίσχυσης μέσω της ειρηνευτικής διευκόλυνσης σε μια καλά σχεδιασμένη διεύρυνση της αποστολής της Αφρικανικής Ένωσης στο Νταρφούρ.
Ο πιο επείγων στόχος είναι σαφώς να διασφαλιστεί η μέγιστη προστασία του άμαχου πληθυσμού. Το όλο πρόβλημα του εάν πρέπει να επιστρέψει ή όχι –και σε τι να επιστρέψει– εξαρτάται κυρίως από την αίσθηση ασφάλειας των ατόμων που βρίσκονται σε αυτή την κατάσταση.
Πρέπει να είμαστε έτοιμοι να συζητήσουμε με τα μέρη στα κατάλληλα βήματα διαλόγου το ενδεχόμενο τροποποίησης της τρέχουσας εντολής της αποστολής της Αφρικανικής Ένωσης, εάν η κυβέρνηση του Σουδάν είναι απρόθυμη ή ανίκανη να προστατεύσει αποτελεσματικά τον πληθυσμό του Νταρφούρ. Είναι υποχρέωσή μας.
Είναι επίσης σημαντικό να σημειώσουμε πως αντιμετωπίζουμε μια πραγματική σύγκρουση. Δεν πρόκειται απλώς για ανοργάνωτη βία. Δεν υφίσταται μόνο το πρόβλημα με την κυβέρνηση του Σουδάν· υπάρχουν ομάδες ανταρτών που πολεμούν για τα προγράμματά τους – αυτή είναι η πραγματικότητα.
Γι’ αυτόν τον λόγο, όλα αυτά πρέπει να αντιμετωπιστούν με σοβαρή προσπάθεια διαμεσολάβησης, ασκώντας πίεση σε όλα τα μέρη.
Είναι επίσης σημαντικό να τονιστεί ότι η διάρθρωση και η επεξεργασία μιας βιώσιμης πολιτικής λύσης για το Νταρφούρ πρέπει οπωσδήποτε να γίνει παράλληλα και σε σχέση με τη γενικότερη διαδικασία της Naivasha. Μια λύση μόνο για το Νταρφούρ δεν θα επιλύσει το ευρύτερο πρόβλημα. Στην πραγματικότητα, το πρόβλημα στο Νταρφούρ δεν εμφανίστηκε ξαφνικά, ήταν αποτέλεσμα των προβλημάτων στο Σουδάν.
Κάποιος βαθμός πολιτικής συμφωνίας έχει επιτευχθεί στην Abuja και αυτό είναι μια καλή αρχή, αλλά πρέπει να στηρίξουμε όλες τις δυνάμεις που εργάζονται για να ωθήσουν τα πράγματα προς τη σωστή κατεύθυνση και ταυτόχρονα να επικεντρωθούμε στο τεράστιο καθήκον της βελτίωσης της ανθρωπιστικής κατάστασης στην πράξη.
Η αποστολή επέστρεψε έχοντας μια ξεκάθαρη εικόνα αυτής της περίπλοκης κατάστασης και εξέφρασε αγανάκτηση για τα τρομερά γεγονότα που συνεχίζουν να διαδραματίζονται στο Νταρφούρ.
Η Επιτροπή συμμετείχε ενεργά στην παροχή ανθρωπιστικής βοήθειας στο δυτικό τμήμα του Σουδάν, πριν αποκτήσει αυτή η κρίση τις διαστάσεις που έχει τώρα. Τα πράγματα είναι τώρα τόσο τρομερά, ώστε έχουμε κινητοποιήσει μέχρι σήμερα 105 εκατομμύρια ευρώ. Τα χρήματα αυτά χρησιμοποιήθηκαν κατά κύριο λόγο για βασική ανθρωπιστική επισιτιστική βοήθεια, αλλά προσπαθούμε παράλληλα να στηρίξουμε και την πολιτική διαδικασία. Το εν λόγω ποσό αντιστοιχεί περίπου στο 37% της συνολικής συνεισφοράς της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης. Κανονικά, το μερίδιο της ενίσχυσης της Επιτροπής σε αυτές τις ανθρωπιστικές κρίσεις είναι γύρω στο 20% της συνολικής συνεισφοράς των κρατών μελών. Θα ήθελα να προσθέσω εδώ ότι βλέπουμε μια αρκετά μεγάλη ψαλίδα, όταν συγκρίνουμε τις συνεισφορές των διαφόρων κρατών μελών. Το αναφέρω αυτό επειδή πιστεύω ότι η ποιοτική αξία της δράσης της Ευρωπαϊκής Ένωσης ως συνόλου σε μια δεδομένη κατάσταση δεν έχει να κάνει μόνο με τις ενέργειες της Επιτροπής ή με το συνολικό ποσό στο οποίο αντιστοιχούν, αλλά και με τον αυθεντικό χαρακτήρα της δέσμευσης στο σύνολο της Ευρώπης υπέρ της δραστηριότητάς μας.
Καταβάλλουμε επίσης χρήματα και προσπάθειες για την κατάσταση στο Τσαντ, παρέχοντας καταφύγιο σε 200 000 περίπου πρόσφυγες από το Νταρφούρ.
Κατά την κινητοποίηση της βοήθειας, αντιμετωπίζουμε επίμονα διαχειριστικά εμπόδια από πλευράς της κυβέρνησης του Σουδάν και σημαντικά προβλήματα εφοδιαστικής, τα οποία καταλήγουν σε σημαντικά πρόσθετα έξοδα. Πάνω από το 25% του κόστους αυτής της επιχείρησης σχετίζεται με τα προβλήματα εφοδιαστικής.
Τα διοικητικά προβλήματα λύνονται σταδιακά, κατά την άποψή μου σε μεγάλο βαθμό χάρη στην πίεση της διεθνούς κοινότητας στη σουδανική κυβέρνηση. Όσο για την εφοδιαστική, η ECHO ανοίγει μια τεχνική αντένα στο Νταρφούρ και άλλη μία στο Τσαντ για να βελτιώσει τον συντονισμό επιτόπου. Θα έχουν τεθεί σε λειτουργία μέχρι το τέλος αυτού του μήνα, όπως σχεδιάζουμε, για μια αρχική περίοδο 12 μηνών.
Εντούτοις, υπάρχουν πολλά ακόμη που πρέπει να γίνουν. Υπολογίζεται πως το 40% περίπου του πληγέντος πληθυσμού δεν έχει ακόμη πρόσβαση στην ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια και, παρά τις βελτιώσεις σε ορισμένες περιοχές, υπάρχουν ακόμη αναφορές βιαιοπραγιών, συμπεριλαμβανομένου του συστηματικού βιασμού γυναικών. Γνωρίζω πως η αποστολή επέστρεψε με περιγραφές τρομερής βίας και μεγάλου φόβου.
Είναι σημαντικό να παραμείνει κινητοποιημένη η διεθνής κοινότητα, καθώς οι ανθρωπιστικές ανάγκες θα συνεχιστούν για άλλο ένα έτος, ακόμη και σύμφωνα με το καλύτερο σενάριο. Όπως είδαμε, τα αποτελέσματα αυτών των κρίσεων συνεχίζουν να γίνονται αισθητά και πρέπει να οργανωθούμε για να τα αντιμετωπίσουμε καλύτερα στο μέλλον.
Παράλληλα με την ανθρωπιστική βοήθεια, η Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση αναπτύσσει μεγάλη δράση και στην πολιτική σφαίρα. Κινητοποιήσαμε για πρώτη φορά τη Διευκόλυνση για την Ειρήνευση στην Αφρική, που χρηματοδοτείται από το Ευρωπαϊκό Ταμείο Ανάπτυξης και παρέχει το μεγαλύτερο μέρος του προϋπολογισμού της αποστολής της Αφρικανικής Ένωσης. Αυτό επέτρεψε την ταχεία αντίδραση του Συμβουλίου Ειρήνευσης και Ασφάλειας της Αφρικανικής Ένωσης μέσω μιας απόφασης που ελήφθη στην πρώτη επίσημη συνέλευσή του, μετά την ανθρωπιστική συμφωνία εκεχειρίας στη Ντζαμένα. Έστειλε 150 περίπου παρατηρητές και στρατιωτική προστατευτική δύναμη 300 ατόμων για να επιβλέπουν την εκεχειρία."@el10
".
Señor Presidente, agradezco la oportunidad de tratar la cuestión de la crisis que se ha desarrollado en Darfur, así como el interés mostrado por el Parlamento y por la Comisión de Desarrollo en que esta sea su primera misión de esta nueva legislatura.
A pesar del reducido tamaño de esta operación, los resultados sobre el terreno han sido positivos. Estoy convencido de que solo una iniciativa de la Unión Africana tendrá el peso y la relevancia políticos necesarios para obligar a los beligerantes, y sobre todo al Gobierno de Sudán, a cumplir sus compromisos. Eso no significa que otros actores no deban, y puedan, desempeñar un papel muy importante. La colaboración y la titularidad no son incompatibles, sobre todo cuando la colaboración se lleva a cabo de forma profesional, reflejando el sólido principio de que la visibilidad no está mal, pero la viabilidad es mejor.
Es evidente que parte de la actual debilidad organizativa que ha sufrido la Unión Africana podría y debería abordarse mediante una colaboración más profunda con las Naciones Unidas y con la Unión Europea como tal, incluidos nuestros Estados miembros. Sin embargo, sé, como también ha dicho hoy claramente la Presidencia, que la Unión Africana debe llevar las riendas. Esta organización debe ser la que inicie e impulse esta misión.
A este respecto, la Comisión está dispuesta, en colaboración con los Estados miembros –y si la UA así se lo pide–, a prever ayudas adicionales a través del fondo para la paz para una ampliación bien planificada de la misión de la UA en Darfur.
Por supuesto, el objetivo más urgente es garantizar la máxima protección para la población civil. Todo el problema del retorno o no de los refugiados y desplazados, y de lo que se encontrarán si vuelven, depende sobre todo de la sensación de seguridad de las personas en esa situación.
Tenemos que estar dispuestos a hablar con las partes en foros apropiados sobre una posible modificación del actual mandato de la misión de la UA, si el Gobierno de Sudán no está dispuesto o no puede proteger de forma eficaz a la población de Darfur. Esto es imperativo.
También es importante destacar que nos enfrentamos a un conflicto real. No se trata únicamente de violencia desorganizada. No solo nos enfrentamos al problema relativo al Gobierno de Sudán, sino que también hay grupos rebeldes que luchan para lograr sus objetivos, y esos grupos existen.
Por eso, es preciso abordar todo el conflicto mediante un esfuerzo serio de mediación y de presión sobre todas las partes.
También es importante recalcar que la articulación y la consecución de una política sostenible para Darfur deben realizarse necesariamente en paralelo y en relación con el proceso global de Naivasha. Una solución exclusivamente para Darfur no solucionará el problema general. De hecho, el problema de Darfur no salió de la nada, sino que surgió a raíz de los problemas existentes en Sudán.
En Abuja se ha alcanzado cierto grado de acuerdo político y eso es un buen comienzo, pero es preciso que apoyemos a todas las fuerzas que trabajan para avanzar por el buen camino en este problema y, al mismo tiempo, nos centremos en la complicada tarea de mejorar la situación humanitaria sobre el terreno.
La misión ha vuelto con una clara imagen de una situación compleja y ha expresado su indignación por los terribles acontecimientos que continúan desarrollándose en Darfur.
La Comisión había participado activamente en la prestación de ayuda humanitaria a la parte occidental de Sudán antes de que esta crisis se convirtiera en lo que es ahora. La situación actual es tan terrible que hemos movilizado ya 105 millones de euros, que se han gastado, en su mayoría, en ayuda humanitaria alimentaria básica, aunque también estamos intentando apoyar el proceso político. Este importe constituye aproximadamente el 37 % de la contribución de la UE en su conjunto. Normalmente, el porcentaje de la ayuda concedida por la Comisión en este tipo de crisis humanitarias asciende a aproximadamente el 20 % de lo que los Estados miembros prestan en total. Quisiera añadir que, si comparamos las contribuciones de los distintos Estados miembros, hay bastantes diferencias. Menciono esta cuestión porque considero que el valor cualitativo de lo que la UE en su conjunto hace en una situación concreta no solo está relacionado con lo que hace la Comisión o el importe total de nuestra ayuda, sino también con el verdadero compromiso que existe en Europa en su conjunto en apoyo de nuestra actividad.
También estamos dedicando dinero y esfuerzos a la situación en Chad, dando cobijo a unos 200 000 refugiados procedentes de Darfur.
Cuando movilizamos ayuda tenemos que enfrentarnos a persistentes bloqueos administrativos del Gobierno de Sudán y a importantes problemas logísticos que generan sustanciales costes adicionales. Más del 25 % de los costes de esta operación están relacionados con los problemas logísticos.
Los problemas administrativos se van solucionando, en mi opinión, sobre todo gracias a la presión que la comunidad internacional está ejerciendo sobre el Gobierno de Sudán. En lo que respecta a la logística, ECHO va a abrir una antena técnica en Darfur y otra en Chad para mejorar la coordinación sobre el terreno. Estarán en funcionamiento a finales de este mes y estamos realizando la planificación para un periodo inicial de 12 meses.
Sin embargo, sigue habiendo mucho que hacer. Se calcula que aproximadamente el 40 % de la población afectada sigue sin tener acceso a ayuda humanitaria y, a pesar de las mejoras en algunas zonas, se sigue informando de hechos violentos, incluidas violaciones sistemáticas de mujeres. Soy consciente de que la misión ha vuelto con relatos de una terrible violencia y mucho miedo.
Es importante que la comunidad internacional siga movilizada, ya que las necesidades humanitarias no desaparecerán antes de un año, incluso en el mejor de los supuestos. Como hemos visto, los efectos de estas crisis siguen notándose y debemos organizarnos para manejarlos mejor en el futuro.
En paralelo a la ayuda humanitaria, la Unión Europea se ha mostrado muy activa en el ámbito político. Hemos movilizado por primera vez el fondo africano para la paz, financiado con fondos FED, proporcionando la mayor parte del presupuesto de la misión de la Unión Africana. Esto ha permitido una rápida respuesta del Consejo de Paz y Seguridad de la Unión Africana mediante una decisión tomada en su primera reunión oficial y tras el acuerdo de alto el fuego humanitario de N’Djamena. La Unión ha enviado unos 150 observadores y una sólida fuerza militar de protección compuesta por 300 hombres para vigilar el alto el fuego."@es20
"Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States - and if the AU so requests - to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas - they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@et5
".
Arvoisa puhemies, olen kiitollinen saadessani tilaisuuden käsitellä Darfurin kriisitilannetta sekä parlamentin ja kehitysyhteistyövaliokunnan osoittamasta kiinnostuksesta ottaa tämä aihe ensimmäiseksi tehtäväksi uudella vaalikaudella.
Tämän operaation rajallisuudesta huolimatta kriisipaikalla on saavutettu myönteisiä tuloksia. Uskon vakaasti, että vain Afrikan unionin aloitteella on niin paljon poliittista painoarvoa ja merkitystä, että sodan osapuolet, etenkin Sudanin hallitus, saadaan velvoitettua noudattamaan sitoumuksiaan. Tämä ei tarkoita, ettei muilla pidä tai voi olla erittäin merkittävää asemaa. Kumppanuus ja osallisuus eivät ole ristiriitaisia käsitteitä etenkään silloin, kun kumppanuutta hoidetaan ammattimaisesti noudattaen järkevää periaatetta, jonka mukaan näkyvyys on hyvä asia mutta toteutettavuus vielä parempi.
On selvää, että Afrikan unionin heikkoa organisaatiota voidaan ja pitääkin korjata osittain tehostamalla sen kumppanuutta Yhdistyneiden kansakuntien ja koko EU:n, myös sen jäsenvaltioiden, kanssa. Ymmärrän kuitenkin, että Afrikan unionin on oltava johtavassa asemassa, kuten myös puheenjohtajavaltion edustaja tänään selvästi totesi. Sen on oltava aloitteentekijä ja veturi tässä tehtävässä.
Komissio onkin valmis yhdessä jäsenvaltioiden kanssa harkitsemaan rauhanrahastosta myönnettävää lisätukea hyvin suunnitellulle AU:n tehtävän laajentamiselle Darfurissa – jos AU pyytää sitä.
Kiireellisimpänä tavoitteena on selvästikin varmistaa mahdollisimman tehokas siviiliväestön suojelu. Koko siihen liittyvä ongelma, palatako vai ei ja mihin palata, riippuu ennen kaikkea ihmisten turvallisuuden tunteesta kyseisessä tilanteessa.
Meidän on oltava valmiita keskustelemaan osapuolten kanssa asianmukaisilla foorumeilla AU:n nykyisten toimivaltuuksien mahdollisesta muutoksesta, jos Sudanin hallitus ei halua tai ei pysty suojelemaan tehokkaasti Darfurin väestöä. Muuta vaihtoehtoa ei ole.
Lisäksi on tärkeää panna merkille, että kyse on todellisesta konfliktista eikä vain jostakin kaoottisesta väkivallasta. Ongelmana ei ole ainoastaan Sudanin hallitus vaan myös omien tavoitteidensa puolesta taistelevat kapinallisryhmät – niitä on todellakin olemassa.
Tästä syystä kaikkia näitä ongelmia käsiteltäessä on pyrittävä toden teolla sovittelemaan ja painostamaan kaikkia osapuolia.
Lisäksi on tärkeää korostaa, että Darfurin tilanteen kestävä poliittinen ratkaisu on ehdottomasti kehitettävä ja laadittava kokonaisvaltaisen Naivashan prosessin yhteydessä. Pelkästään Darfurin kriisin ratkaiseminen ei ratkaise laajempaa ongelmaa. Darfurin ongelma ei todellakaan syntynyt odottamatta, vaan sen taustalla ovat Sudanin yleiset ongelmat.
Abujassa saatiin aikaan poliittinen sopimus, mikä on hyvä alku, mutta meidän on tuettava kaikkia tahoja, jotka yrittävät viedä kehitystä oikeaan suuntaan, ja pyrittävä samalla parantamaan Sudanin humanitaarista tilannetta.
Valtuuskunta on palannut, ja sillä on selkeä kuva sekavasta tilanteesta. Se on myös ilmaissut närkästyksensä Darfurissa jatkuvista kauheista tapahtumista.
Komissio oli sitoutunut aktiivisesti toimittamaan humanitaarista apua Sudanin länsiosaan, ennen kuin tämä kriisi muuttui nykyiselleen. Tilanne on niin vakava, että olemme tähän mennessä ottaneet käyttöön 105 miljoonaa euroa. Nämä varat on käytetty pääasiassa humanitaariseen peruselintarvikeapuun, mutta pyrimme tukemaan myös poliittista prosessia. Tämä määrä on noin 37 prosenttia EU:n myöntämästä kokonaismäärästä. Tavallisesti komission osuus humanitaarisiin kriiseihin myönnettävästä tuesta on noin 20 prosenttia jäsenvaltioiden myöntämistä kokonaismäärästä. Totean vielä, että tässä on tapahtunut melkoinen kasvu verrattaessa siihen, mitä yksittäiset jäsenvaltiot ovat myöntäneet. Mainitsin tämän, koska koko EU:n tietyssä tilanteessa toteuttaman toiminnan laadullinen arvo ei mielestäni liity ainoastaan komission tekemisiin tai kokonaistoimintaamme vaan myös siihen, miten toimintaamme sitoudutaan tukemaan eri puolilla Eurooppaa.
Osoitamme varoja ja toteutamme toimia myös Tšadin tilanteen auttamiseksi tarjoamalla suojapaikan noin 200 000:lle Darfurista lähtöisin olevalle pakolaiselle.
Tukivarojen käyttöönottoa ovat vaikeuttaneet Sudanin hallituksesta johtuvat jatkuvat hallinnolliset esteet ja huomattavista lisäkustannuksista aiheutuvat suuret logistiikkaongelmat. Yli 25 prosenttia tämän operaation kustannuksista liittyy logistiikkaongelmiin.
Hallinnolliset ongelmat saadaan vähitellen ratkaistua, mikä johtuu nähdäkseni pääasiassa siitä, että kansainvälinen yhteisö on painostanut Sudanin hallitusta. Logistiikka-asioista puheen ollen ECHO perustaa teknisen sivutoimipisteen Darfuriin ja toisen Tšadiin parantaakseen koordinointia tapahtumapaikalla. Ne aloittavat toimintansa tämän kuun loppuun mennessä, ja olemme suunnitelleet niille aluksi 12 kuukauden toimintajaksoa.
On kuitenkin vielä paljon tehtävää. On arvioitu, että noin 40 prosenttia konfliktin vaikutuspiiriin kuuluvista ihmisistä jää edelleen ilman humanitaarista apua, ja vaikka tilanne onkin parantunut joillakin alueilla, raporteissa kerrotaan edelleen väkivallasta ja jatkuvasta naisten raiskaamisesta. Tiedän, että Sudanista palanneen valtuuskunnan selvityksessä kerrotaan hirvittävistä väkivaltaisuuksista ja suuresta pelosta.
On tärkeää, että kansainvälinen yhteisö pysyy toimintavalmiina, koska humanitaarista apua tarvitaan vielä seuraavanakin vuonna, vaikka tilanne kehittyisi parhaalla mahdollisella tavalla. Kuten olemme nähneet, tällaisten kriisien vaikutukset tuntuvat pitkään, ja meidän on järjestettävä toimintamme siten, että voimme käsitellä niitä jatkossa entistä paremmin.
Humanitaarisen avun lisäksi EU on ollut erittäin aktiivinen myös poliittisella alalla. Olemme ottaneet ensimmäistä kertaa käyttöön Euroopan kehitysrahastosta (EKR) rahoitettavan Afrikan rauhanrahaston, josta maksetaan suurin osa Afrikan unionin tehtävän määrärahoista. Tämän ansiosta Afrikan unionin rauhan ja turvallisuuden neuvosto on voinut N'djamenassa allekirjoitetun aseleposopimuksen jälkeen ryhtyä ripeästi toimiin, jotka perustuvat päätökseen, jonka se teki ensimmäisessä virallisessa kokouksessaan. Se on lähettänyt noin 150 tarkkailijaa ja 300 sotilaan suojelujoukot valvomaan aselevon toteutumista."@fi7
".
Monsieur le Président, je vous suis reconnaissant de pouvoir aborder la question de la crise qui s’est déclenchée au Darfour et de l’intérêt voué par le Parlement et la commission du développement à en faire la première mission de cette nouvelle législature.
En dépit de la portée limitée de cette opération, les résultats sur le terrain sont positifs. Je suis fermement convaincu que seule une initiative de l’Union africaine elle-même bénéficiera du poids et de l’importance politique nécessaires pour contraindre les belligérants, et en particulier le gouvernement soudanais, à respecter leurs engagements. Cela ne veut pas dire que d’autres ne devraient pas et ne sont pas en mesure de jouer un rôle très important. Partenariat et responsabilité individuelle ne sont pas incompatibles, surtout lorsque le partenariat est mis en œuvre de manière professionnelle, reflétant le principe indubitablement fondé selon lequel la visibilité, c’est bien; mais la faisabilité, c’est mieux.
Il est évident que certaines des faiblesses actuelles dont souffre l’Union africaine au niveau de l’organisation pourraient, et devraient, être réparées dans le cadre d’un partenariat renforcé avec les Nations unies et l’UE en tant que telle, dont nos États membres. Cependant, je suis conscient, comme la présidence l’a également clairement fait observer aujourd’hui, que l’Union africaine doit diriger les opérations. Ils doivent prendre les initiatives et mener la mission.
À cet égard, la Commission est prête, en collaboration avec les États membres et si l’UA le demande, à prévoir une aide supplémentaire à travers la facilité de soutien à la paix au profit d’une extension bien préparée de la mission de l’UA au Darfour.
L’objectif le plus urgent est manifestement de garantir à la population civile une protection maximale. L’ensemble du problème lié à la question de savoir s’il convient, oui ou non, de rentrer chez soi, et où aller dans ce cas, dépend essentiellement du sentiment de sécurité éprouvé dans cette situation.
Nous devons être prêts à débattre avec les parties d’une éventuelle modification du mandat actuel de la mission de l’UA, au sein du forum approprié, dans le cas où le gouvernement soudanais rechignerait ou ne serait pas en mesure de protéger efficacement la population du Darfour. C’est un devoir.
Il est également important de souligner que nous sommes confrontés à un véritable conflit, qui implique davantage qu’une certaine violence désorganisée. Il n’y a pas que le gouvernement soudanais qui pose problème, mais également les factions rebelles qui combattent pour leur propre compte. Elles existent bel et bien.
C’est pour cette raison qu’il est nécessaire d’aborder tout le problème par un véritable effort de médiation, en mettant la pression sur toutes les parties.
Il est également important de mettre en évidence qu’une solution politique durable au Darfour doit obligatoirement s’articuler et être élaborée en parallèle avec le processus international de Naivasha et en relation avec celui-ci. Dégager une solution à la question du Darfour seule ne résoudra pas le problème plus vaste. En effet, le problème au Darfour n’a pas surgi du néant, mais résulte des problèmes au Soudan.
Nous sommes parvenus à un certain accord politique à Abuja et c’est un bon début, mais nous devons soutenir toutes les forces qui s’efforcent de le faire avancer dans la bonne direction et, en même temps, nous concentrer sur l’énorme tâche qui consiste à améliorer la situation humanitaire sur le terrain.
La mission est revenue avec un tableau clair d’une situation compliquée et a fait part de son indignation face aux terribles événements qui se poursuivent au Darfour.
La Commission s’est engagée activement à acheminer une aide humanitaire à la partie occidentale du Soudan avant que la crise n’atteigne l’ampleur actuelle. La situation est si terrible à présent que nous avons mobilisé à ce jour 105 millions d’euros, qui ont servi dans leur plus grande partie à l’achat d’aliments de première nécessité, mais nous tentons également de soutenir le processus politique. Ce montant correspond à quelque 37% de la contribution de l’UE dans son ensemble. En règle générale, la part d’intervention de la Commission dans ces crises humanitaires atteint environ 20% du montant que les États membres dégagent au total. J’ajouterais en l’occurrence que nous observons une certaine répartition lorsque l’on compare les contributions des différents États membres. Je mentionne ce fait, car je considère que la valeur qualitative de la contribution de l’UE dans son ensemble dans une situation donnée est liée non seulement aux accomplissements et à la contribution totale de la Commission, mais également à l’authenticité de l’engagement à travers l’Europe dans son ensemble à soutenir notre action.
Nous orientons également des fonds et des efforts vers la situation au Tchad en assurant un abri à environ 200 000 réfugiés venus du Darfour.
Au cours de cette mobilisation de l’aide, nous nous sommes sans cesse heurtés aux barrières administratives posées par le gouvernement soudanais, ainsi qu’à de gros problèmes de logistique, qui ont entraîné des frais supplémentaires importants. Plus de 25% des frais nécessaires à cette opération sont liés aux problèmes de logistique.
Les problèmes administratifs sont résolus progressivement, une situation à mon sens rendue possible, dans une large mesure, grâce à la pression exercée par la communauté internationale sur le gouvernement soudanais. Quant à la logistique, ECHO ouvre en ce moment une antenne technique au Darfour et une autre au Tchad afin d’améliorer la coordination sur le terrain. Elles seront opérationnelles d’ici la fin du mois et nous prévoyons une période initiale de 12 mois.
Toutefois, la tâche demeure énorme. On estime qu’environ 40% de la population touchée n’ont toujours pas accès à l’aide humanitaire et, en dépit d’une amélioration de cette situation dans certaines régions, on recense encore des cas de violence, dont des viols systématiques de femmes. Je suis conscient de la terrible violence et de la grande crainte dont la mission revenue a été témoin.
Il est important que la communauté internationale reste mobilisée, étant donné que les besoins humanitaires seront prolongés d’un an supplémentaire, même dans le meilleur des cas. Comme nous l’avons vu, les effets de ces crises se font toujours ressentir et nous devons nous organiser de manière à mieux les traiter à l’avenir.
Parallèlement à l’aide humanitaire, l’UE s’est avérée très active dans la sphère politique. Nous avons mobilisé pour la première fois la facilité de soutien à la paix pour l’Afrique financée par le FED, apportant la plus grande part du budget de la mission de l’Union africaine, ce qui a permis au Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine de répondre rapidement par le biais d’une décision prise lors de sa première réunion officielle à la suite de l’accord de cessez-le-feu signé à N’Djamena. Elle a envoyé quelque 150 observateurs et un contingent de protection de 300 soldats afin de s’assurer du respect du cessez-le-feu."@fr8
"Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States - and if the AU so requests - to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas - they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@hu11
"Signor Presidente, sono grato per l’opportunità che mi è offerta di intervenire sulla crisi in corso nel Darfur e per l’interesse di cui il Parlamento e la commissione per lo sviluppo hanno dato prova svolgendo in questa regione la prima missione della nuova legislatura.
Nonostante la scala limitata di questa operazione, i risultati sul campo sono stati positivi. Sono fermamente convinto che soltanto un’iniziativa dell’Unione africana avrà il peso e la rilevanza politica per obbligare i belligeranti, e in particolare il governo del Sudan, ad ottemperare ai propri impegni. Ciò non significa che altri non debbano e non possano svolgere un ruolo importantissimo. Essere disponibile come
e rivendicare la paternità delle iniziative non sono due cose incompatibili, soprattutto laddove il partenariato è svolto in modo professionale, riflettendo il sano principio secondo cui la visibilità è bene ma la fattibilità è meglio.
E’ chiaro che alcune delle attuali debolezze organizzative dell’Unione africana potrebbero, e dovrebbero, essere affrontate in un partenariato rafforzato con le Nazioni Unite e l’Unione europea in quanto tale, Stati membri inclusi. Tuttavia, come la Presidenza ha chiaramente affermato oggi, apprezzo che l’Unione africana abbia la leva del comando: sta all’Unione africana lanciare e guidare questa missione.
In tal senso la Commissione, unitamente agli Stati membri – e se l’UA ne farà richiesta – è pronta a prevedere un sostegno aggiuntivo, tramite lo Strumento di pace, per ampliare in modo ben programmato la missione UA nel Darfur.
L’obiettivo più urgente è garantire la massima protezione per la popolazione civile. Il problema del ritorno, e a che cosa, dipende essenzialmente dalla percezione di sicurezza della gente rispetto alla situazione.
Dobbiamo essere disposti a discutere con le parti, nelle sedi adeguate, una possibile modifica all’attuale mandato della missione UA, se il governo del Sudan non è disponibile né capace di proteggere la popolazione civile nel Darfur. E’ un obbligo.
E’ altrettanto importante notare che ci troviamo di fronte ad un conflitto vero, ben diverso da episodi di violenza disorganizzata. Il problema non è soltanto il governo del Sudan, bensì anche i gruppi di ribelli che combattono per i propri obiettivi – esistono anche questi.
Per tale motivo tutto questo va gestito tramite un serio impegno di mediazione, esercitando pressioni su tutte le parti.
E’ altresì importante porre in rilievo che una soluzione politica sostenibile per il Darfur necessariamente deve articolarsi e prendere corpo parallelamente e in relazione al processo globale di Naivasha. Una soluzione soltanto per il Darfur non risolverà il problema più ampio. Il problema del Darfur, infatti, non è piovuto dal cielo, ma è il risultato dei problemi in Sudan.
Ad Abuja si è raggiunto un certo accordo politico, ed è un buon punto di partenza, ma dobbiamo sostenere tutte le forze che stanno lavorando per avanzare nella giusta direzione e allo stesso tempo concentrarci sull’enorme compito di migliorare la situazione umanitaria
.
La missione è rientrata con un’idea precisa di una situazione complessa e ha espresso indignazione per i terribili avvenimenti che continuano a verificarsi nel Darfur.
La Commissione ha partecipato attivamente, fornendo aiuto umanitario alle zone occidentali del Sudan, prima che la crisi assumesse le attuali proporzioni. La situazione è talmente terribile ormai che alla data odierna abbiamo mobilitato 105 milioni di euro, sostanzialmente in aiuto alimentare umanitario di base, ma ci stiamo altresì adoperando per appoggiare il processo politico. L’importo di cui sopra rappresenta circa il 37 per cento del contributo totale dell’Unione europea. Di norma la quota di sostegno offerta dalla Commissione in queste crisi umanitarie corrisponde a circa il 20 per cento del totale fornito dagli Stati membri. Indico questa cifra, perché ritengo che il valore qualitativo dell’intervento complessivo dell’Unione europea in una data situazione non sia riferito soltanto all’azione della Commissione o all’importo totale di quanto facciamo, bensì al carattere genuino dell’impegno in tutta Europa a supporto della nostra attività.
Stiamo anche destinando fondi ed energie alla situazione in Ciad, in quanto offriamo rifugio a circa 200 000 profughi provenienti dal Darfur.
Nel far giungere questi aiuti ci scontriamo con blocchi amministrativi persistenti da parte del governo del Sudan e con notevoli problemi logistici, che ingenerano costi aggiuntivi rilevanti: oltre il 25 per cento dei costi di quest’operazione è imputabile a problemi logistici.
I problemi amministrativi sono progressivamente in via di soluzione, a mio parere grazie, in larga misura, alle pressioni della comunità internazionale sul governo sudanese. Quanto alla logistica, allo scopo di migliorare il coordinamento
ECHO sta aprendo un’antenna tecnica in Darfur e un’altra in Ciad, che saranno operative entro la fine di questo mese, e la nostra programmazione coprirà un periodo iniziale di 12 mesi.
Tuttavia, rimane ancora molto da fare. Secondo le stime, circa il 40 per cento della popolazione colpita ancora non ha accesso all’aiuto umanitario e, nonostante il miglioramento in talune aree, continuano a giungere notizie di violenze, incluso di stupri sistematici delle donne. Sono consapevole che la missione è rientrata con storie di terribili violenze e di grande paura.
E’ importante che la comunità internazionale continui a mobilitarsi, poiché il fabbisogno umanitario permarrà per un altro anno, anche nella migliore delle ipotesi immaginabili. Come abbiamo visto, gli effetti di queste crisi continuano a farsi sentire e dobbiamo organizzarci per gestirli meglio in futuro.
Parallelamente all’aiuto umanitario, l’Unione europea è stata molto attiva nella sfera politica. Abbiamo mobilitato per la prima volta lo Strumento di pace per l’Africa, finanziato a titolo del FES, che costituisce la parte maggiore del bilancio della missione dell’Unione africana. Grazie a ciò è stata possibile una risposta rapida da parte del Consiglio di sicurezza e di pace dell’Unione africana tramite una decisione adottata alla sua prima riunione ufficiale e in seguito all’accordo di N’djamena per il cessate il fuoco umanitario. Sono stati inviati circa 150 osservatori e una forza di protezione militare di 300 uomini per vigilare sulla tregua."@it12
"Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States - and if the AU so requests - to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas - they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@lt14
"Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States - and if the AU so requests - to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas - they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@lv13
"Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States - and if the AU so requests - to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas - they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@mt15
".
Mijnheer de Voorzitter, ik dank voor de gelegenheid die mij wordt geboden om het woord te voeren over de crisis in Darfur. Ook dank ik voor de belangstelling van het Parlement en de Commissie ontwikkelingssamenwerking, die ervoor hebben gezorgd dat hun eerste missie in deze nieuwe zittingsperiode aan dit conflict werd gewijd.
Hoewel deze operatie een beperkte reikwijdte had, boekte zij ter plaatse goede resultaten. Ik ben er stellig van overtuigd dat uitsluitend de Afrikaanse Unie een initiatief kan nemen dat het politieke gewicht en de politieke relevantie heeft om de strijdende partijen, en met name de regering van Soedan, te dwingen zich aan hun beloften te houden. Daarmee is echter niet gezegd dat anderen geen zeer belangrijke rol moeten en kunnen spelen. Partnerschap en eigenaarschap zijn niet onverenigbaar, vooral niet als dat partnerschap wordt uitgevoerd op een professionele wijze, op een wijze die het gezonde principe huldigt dat zichtbaarheid goed is maar haalbaarheid beter.
Het staat buiten kijf dat een aantal van de huidige zwakke plekken in de organisatie van de Afrikaanse Unie aangepakt kunnen en moeten worden door middel van een versterkte samenwerking met de Verenigde Naties en met de EU als zodanig, met inbegrip van onze lidstaten. Ik ben mij er evenwel van bewust dat, zoals het voorzitterschap vandaag ook al duidelijk heeft aangegeven, de Afrikaanse Unie aan het roer moet staan. Zij dient in deze operatie het initiatief te nemen en de motor te zijn.
Daarom is de Commissie bereid om in nauwe samenwerking met de lidstaten - en indien de AU hierom vraagt - via de Vredesfaciliteit aanvullende steun te verlenen aan een weldoordachte uitbreiding van de AU-missie in Darfur.
Het behoeft geen betoog dat maximale bescherming van de burgerbevolking de hoogste prioriteit heeft. Of men wel of niet teruggaat en zo ja, waarheen, hangt immers in wezen geheel af van de vraag in hoeverre mensen zich veilig voelen in die situatie.
Wij moeten bereid zijn in de daartoe geëigende fora met de partijen overleg te plegen over een mogelijke wijziging van het huidige mandaat van de AU-missie, indien de regering van Soedan niet bereid of niet in staat zou zijn de bevolking van Darfur effectief te beschermen. Dat is een absolute noodzaak.
Het is eveneens belangrijk op te merken dat we te maken hebben met een daadwerkelijk conflict. Het gaat hier om meer dan wat ongeorganiseerd geweld. Niet alleen de regering van Soedan vormt een probleem, maar er zijn ook rebellengroepen die strijden om hun eigen agenda te verwezenlijken - die zijn er wel degelijk.
Daarom moeten wij dit alles aanpakken met een serieuze bemiddelingspoging en druk uitoefenen op alle partijen.
Voorts moet benadrukt worden dat de uitwerking van een duurzame politieke oplossing voor het conflict in Darfur noodzakelijkerwijs parallel moet lopen aan en verband moet houden met het algemene proces van Naivasha. Een oplossing voor alleen Darfur zal geen oplossing zijn voor het grotere probleem. Bovendien is het conflict in Darfur niet uit het niets ontstaan: het was een gevolg van de problemen in Soedan.
In Abuja is enige politieke overeenstemming bereikt en dat is een goed begin, maar we moeten onze steun geven aan alle krachten die deze situatie in de juiste richting duwen en tegelijkertijd ons concentreren op de verbetering van de humanitaire situatie ter plaatse, hetgeen een enorme opgave is.
De missie is teruggekeerd met een duidelijk beeld van de complexe situatie en heeft haar verontwaardiging geuit over de verschrikkelijke ontwikkelingen die ononderbroken plaatsvinden in Darfur.
De Commissie was actief betrokken bij het verlenen van humanitaire hulp aan het westelijk gedeelte van Soedan voordat deze crisis zijn huidige omvang bereikte. De situatie is op dit moment zo ernstig dat we tot op heden 105 miljoen euro hebben vrijgemaakt. Voor het grootste deel is dit bedrag besteed aan basale humanitaire voedselhulp, maar we trachten ook het politieke proces te ondersteunen. Dit bedrag is circa 37 procent van wat de EU in haar geheel heeft bijgedragen. Doorgaans is het aandeel van de Commissie aan de steun in dergelijke humanitaire crises ongeveer 20 procent van hetgeen de lidstaten in totaal geven. Ik zou hieraan willen toevoegen dat sprake is van een behoorlijke spreiding, als we de bijdragen van de verschillende lidstaten met elkaar vergelijken. Ik noem dit omdat de kwalitatieve waarde van hetgeen de EU in haar geheel doet in een bepaalde situatie mijns inziens niet alleen verband houdt met hetgeen de Commissie doet, of met het totaalbedrag van onze bijdragen, maar ook met de daadwerkelijke betrokkenheid in Europa ter ondersteuning van onze activiteiten.
Wij richten onze financiële bijdragen en inspanningen tevens op de situatie in Tsjaad, door naar schatting 200.000 vluchtelingen uit Darfur onderdak te bieden.
Tijdens het mobiliseren van de hulp werden wij voortdurend geconfronteerd met bureaucratische hindernissen die de regering van Soedan opwierp, en met grote logistieke problemen die de kosten aanzienlijk hebben opgedreven. Meer dan 25 procent van de aan deze operatie verbonden kosten heeft te maken met logistieke problemen.
Steeds meer bureaucratische hindernissen worden overwonnen, en dat is mijns inziens grotendeels te danken aan de druk die de internationale gemeenschap op de Soedanese regering uitoefent. Wat de logistiek betreft: ECHO opent een technische post in Darfur en één in Tsjaad, om de coördinatie ter plaatse te verbeteren. Tegen het einde van deze maand zullen zij operationeel zijn en wij gaan ervan uit dat zij om te beginnen 12 maanden zullen functioneren.
Er valt echter nog veel meer te doen. Naar schatting 40 procent van de getroffen bevolking heeft nog altijd geen toegang tot humanitaire hulp en, alle verbetering in bepaalde gebieden ten spijt, er komen nog steeds meldingen binnen van geweld, inclusief stelselmatige verkrachting van vrouwen. Ik weet dat de missie is teruggekeerd met verslagen van vreselijk geweld en grote angst.
Het is van belang dat de internationale gemeenschap paraat blijft, aangezien zelfs uitgaande van het meest rooskleurige scenario de humanitaire hulp nog minstens een jaar nodig zal zijn. Zoals we hebben gezien, blijven de gevolgen van deze crises voelbaar en we moeten ervoor zorgen dat we daar in de toekomst beter mee kunnen omgaan.
De EU is uiterst actief geweest op niet alleen het gebied van de humanitaire hulp maar ook op politiek vlak. Voor het eerst hebben we de door het EOF gefinancierde Afrikaanse Vredesfaciliteit ingezet, waarmee we het grootste deel van de begroting van de missie van de Afrikaanse Unie voor onze rekening namen. Dit stelde de Vredes- en Veiligheidsraad van de Afrikaanse Unie in staat snel te reageren en een besluit te nemen tijdens zijn eerste officiële bijeenkomst na de sluiting van de humanitaire staakt-het-vurenovereenkomst in N’Djamena. Er zijn ongeveer honderdvijftig waarnemers gestuurd, alsook een driehonderd man sterke militaire beschermingsmacht om toezicht te houden op de naleving van het staakt-het-vuren."@nl3
"Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States - and if the AU so requests - to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas - they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@pl16
"Senhor Presidente, agradeço não só a oportunidade de intervir sobre a crise que se desenhou em Darfur como o interesse que este Parlamento e a Comissão do Desenvolvimento mostrou em fazer disto a sua primeira missão desta nova legislatura parlamentar.
Apesar da escala limitada desta operação, os resultados no terreno foram positivos. Estou absolutamente convicto de que só uma iniciativa da União Africana terá não só o peso como a relevância política necessários para obrigar os beligerantes e, em especial, o Governo do Sudão, a honrar os seus compromissos. Não quer isto dizer que outros não devam e não possam desempenhar um papel extremamente importante. Parceria e apropriação não são incompatíveis, especialmente quando a parceria é exercida de forma profissional, reflectindo o sólido princípio de que a visibilidade é positiva, mas a viabilidade é melhor.
É óbvio que alguma da actual fraqueza da organização experimentada pela União Africana podia e devia ser contornada por uma parceria reforçada com as Nações Unidas e a UE enquanto tal, incluindo os nossos Estados-Membros. Contudo, compreendo, tal como a Presidência disse hoje muito claramente, que a União Africana tem de ocupar o lugar do condutor. Cumpre a esta organização ter iniciativa e levar por diante esta missão.
A esta respeito, a Comissão está pronta, em conjunto com os Estados-Membros – e se a UA assim o solicitar – a considerar um apoio suplementar, através da Facilidade para a Paz, a uma expansão bem programada da missão da UA em Darfur.
O objectivo mais urgente é obviamente garantir a máxima protecção à população civil. Todo o problema de regressar ou não regressar e de regressar para o quê depende, essencialmente, do sentimento de segurança das pessoas numa situação dessas.
Temos de estar dispostos a discutir com as partes, e em fóruns próprios, uma possível alteração do actual mandato da missão da UA, no caso de o Governo do Sudão não estar disposto ou não for capaz de, efectivamente, proteger a população de Darfur. Isto é imprescindível.
Importa também constatar que estamos diante de um verdadeiro conflito. O que se passa aqui vai além de uma violência desorganizada. O problema não é só com o Governo do Sudão, há também grupos de rebeldes lutando pelos seus objectivos – eles existem de facto.
Razão por que tudo isto deve ser conduzido por via de um esforço sério no sentido de mediar e de exercer pressão sobre todas as partes.
Importa também salientar que uma solução política duradoura para Darfur tem de ser articulada e negociada a par e à luz do processo global de Naivasha. Uma solução para Darfur apenas não resolverá o problema maior. De facto, o problema em Darfur não apareceu do nada, ele é realmente o resultado dos problemas no Sudão.
Chegou-se a um acordo político em Abuja, o que é um bom começo, mas temos de apoiar todas as forças activas a fim de levar as coisas a bom porto e, simultaneamente, concentrarmo-nos na enorme tarefa de melhorar a situação humanitária no terreno.
A missão regressou com uma noção clara da complexidade da situação e expressou a sua indignação face aos terríveis acontecimentos que continuam a desenrolar-se em Darfur
A Comissão estivera activamente empenhada em prestar ajuda humanitária à região ocidental do Sudão antes de a crise chegar onde chegou. Neste momento, as coisas assumiram contornos tão terríveis que mobilizámos, até à data, 105 milhões de euros. Um montante que, na sua maioria, foi despendido em ajuda alimentar e humanitária básica, embora estejamos também a tentar apoiar o processo político. O referido montante corresponde a alguns 37% da contribuição da UE no seu conjunto. Normalmente, a participação da Comissão para apoiar estas crises humanitárias é cerca de 20% da contribuição total dos Estados-Membros. Acrescentaria aqui que se assiste a uma certa disparidade quando comparamos as diferenças nas contribuições dos Estados-Membros. Menciono este facto, porque considero que, numa determinada situação, o valor qualitativo das acções da UE no seu conjunto está relacionado não só com o que a Comissão está a fazer ou o valor total do que faz, mas também com a genuinidade do compromisso que a Europa, no seu conjunto, assume ao apoiar a nossa actividade.
Estamos igualmente a direccionar esforços e dinheiro para a situação no Chade, providenciando abrigo aos refugiados vindos de Darfur, um número que se estima em 200 000.
Ao mobilizar ajuda, temos enfrentado constantes bloqueios administrativos da parte do Governo do Sudão, bem como grandes problemas de ordem logística, que acabam por resultar em custos suplementares substanciais. Mais de 25% dos custos desta operação está ligado a problemas logísticos.
Os problemas administrativos vão sendo resolvidos, o que fica a dever-se em grande parte, na minha opinião, à pressão da comunidade internacional sobre o Governo do Sudão. Quanto às questões logísticas, a ECHO está a abrir uma antena técnica em Darfur e outra no Chade para melhorar a coordenação no terreno. Estas estarão operacionais no final deste mês e estamos a pensar num período inicial de 12 meses.
Contudo, há ainda muito a fazer. Calcula-se que cerca de 40% da população afectada continua sem ter acesso à ajuda humanitária e, apesar de sinais de melhoria em algumas áreas, a violência, incluindo a violação sistemática de mulheres, continua a ser notícia. Estou ciente de que a missão regressou com histórias de terror e violência hediondas.
É importante que a comunidade internacional continue mobilizada, uma vez que as necessidades humanitárias far-se-ão sentir por mais um ano, mesmo no melhor dos cenários. Como vimos, os efeitos destas crises continuam a ter repercussões e temos de nos organizar para responder melhor a estas situações no futuro.
Paralelamente à ajuda humanitária, a UE tem estado extremamente activa na esfera política. Mobilizámos pela primeira vez a Facilidade para a Paz em África, financiada pelo FED, que responde pela maior parte do orçamento da missão da União Africana. Isto permitiu uma reacção rápida da parte do Conselho de Paz e Segurança da União Africana, por via de uma decisão tomada na sua primeira reunião oficial e na sequência do acordo de cessar-fogo de carácter humanitário em N'Djamena. Foram enviados 150 observadores e uma força de protecção militar composta por trezentos elementos para acompanhar o cessar-fogo."@pt17
"Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States - and if the AU so requests - to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas - they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@sk18
"Mr President, I am grateful for the opportunity to address the crisis which has developed in Darfur and for the interest shown by Parliament and the Committee on Development in making this its first mission of this new parliamentary term.
In spite of the limited scale of this operation, results in the field have been positive. I firmly believe that only an African Union initiative will have the political weight and relevance to oblige the belligerents, and in particular the Government of Sudan, to comply with their commitments. This does not mean that others should not and cannot play a very important role. Partnership and ownership are not incompatible, especially when the partnership is carried out in a professional manner, reflecting the sound principle that visibility is fine but feasibility is better.
It is clear that some of the existing weakness of the organisation experienced by the African Union could, and should, be addressed by an enhanced partnership with the United Nations and with the EU as such, including our Member States. However, I appreciate, as the presidency has also today clearly stated, that the African Union has to be in the driving seat. They have to initiate and drive this mission.
In this respect the Commission is ready, in liaison with the Member States - and if the AU so requests - to envisage additional support through the peace facility to a well-planned extension of the AU mission in Darfur.
The most urgent objective is clearly to ensure maximum protection for the civilian population. The whole problem of whether or not to return, and what to return to, essentially depends on people's feeling of security in that situation.
We have to be ready to discus with the parties in appropriate fora a possible amendment of the current mandate of the AU mission, if the Government of Sudan is unwilling or unable to effectively protect the population of Darfur. This is a must.
It is also important to note that we are facing a real conflict. There is more to this than some disorganised violence. There is not only the problem concerning the Government of Sudan, there are rebel groups fighting for their agendas - they do exist.
For that reason, all this has to be dealt with through a serious effort to mediate, putting pressure on all the parties.
It is also important to emphasise that a sustainable political solution for Darfur necessarily has to be articulated and worked out in parallel with and in relation to the global Naivasha process. A solution for Darfur alone will not solve the wider problem. In fact the problem in Darfur did not come out of the blue, it was a result of the problems in Sudan.
A measure of political agreement has been reached in Abuja and that is a good start, but we have to support all forces working to push this in the right direction and at the same time focus on the enormous task of improving the humanitarian situation in the field.
The mission has returned with a clear picture of a complex situation and has expressed indignation at the terrible events which continue to unfold in Darfur.
The Commission had been actively engaged in delivering humanitarian aid to the western part of Sudan before this crisis became what it has. Things are so terrible now that we have mobilised to date EUR 105 m. This has mostly been spent on basic humanitarian food aid, but we are also trying to support the political process. This amount corresponds to some 37% of what the EU as a whole has contributed. Normally, the Commission's share of support in these humanitarian crises is about 20% of what Member States give in total. I would add here that we see quite a spread when we compare what different Member States have contributed. I mention this because I find the qualitative value of what the EU as a whole is doing in a given situation is related not only to what the Commission is doing or the total amount of what we do, but also to the genuine character of commitment across Europe as a whole in support of our activity.
We are also directing money and effort to the situation in Chad, by providing shelter for an estimated 200 000 refuges from Darfur.
In mobilising aid we have been facing persistent administrative blockages from the Government of Sudan and major logistical problems resulting in substantial additional costs. More than 25% of the costs of this operation relates to the logistical problems.
The administrative problems are progressively being solved, in my view thanks to a large extent to the international community's pressure on the Sudanese Government. As to logistics, ECHO is opening a technical antenna in Darfur and another in Chad to improve coordination in the field. They will be operational by the end of this month and we are planning for an initial period of 12 months.
However, there is still a lot more to do. It is estimated that about 40% of the affected population still has no access to humanitarian aid and, in spite of improvement in some areas, violence, including systematic rape of women, is still being reported. I am aware that the mission has returned with accounts of terrible violence and great fear.
It is important for the international community to remain mobilised, as the humanitarian needs will continue for another year, even in the best-case scenario. As we have seen, the effects of these crises continue to be felt and we must organise ourselves to handle them better in future.
In parallel to humanitarian aid, the EU has been very active in the political sphere. We have mobilised for the first time the EDF-funded African Peace Facility, providing the bigger part of the budget of the mission of the African Union. This has allowed a rapid response from the African Union Peace and Security Council via a decision taken at its first official meeting and following the humanitarian ceasefire agreement in N'Djamena. It has sent some 150 observers and a 300 strong military protection force to monitor the ceasefire."@sl19
".
Herr talman! Jag är tacksam för möjligheten att diskutera den kris som har uppstått i Darfur och för det intresse som parlamentet och utskottet för utveckling har visat genom att göra detta till sitt första uppdrag under denna nya mandatperiod.
Trots att denna insats har varit begränsad i omfattning har resultaten på plats varit positiva. Jag är fullt övertygad om att endast ett initiativ från Afrikanska unionen kommer att få en sådan politisk tyngd och relevans att det kan tvinga de krigförande parterna, och särskilt Sudans regering, att uppfylla sina förpliktelser. Det betyder inte att andra inte bör och inte kan spela en mycket viktig roll. Partnerskap och äganderätt är inte oförenliga, i synnerhet inte när partnerskapet sköts på ett professionellt sätt och bygger på den sunda principen att synlighet är bra men genomförbarhet är bättre.
Det är uppenbart att några av de befintliga svagheterna i organisationen som Afrikanska unionen har upplevt skulle kunna, och bör, avhjälpas genom ett förstärkt partnerskap med Förenta nationerna och med EU som sådant, inbegripet våra medlemsstater. Men min bedömning är att Afrikanska unionen måste spela den ledande rollen, vilket också ordförandeskapet tydligt har påpekat i dag. Afrikanska unionen måste sätta i gång och styra detta uppdrag.
Om Afrikanska unionen begär det, är kommissionen i detta avseende beredd att i samverkan med medlemsstaterna överväga att utöka stödet, via det fredsbevarande organet, till en välplanerad utvidgning av Afrikanska unionens uppdrag i Darfur.
Det mest angelägna målet är uppenbart att garantera civilbefolkningen maximalt skydd. Hela problemet med om man skall återvända eller inte, och vad man skall återvända till, är i hög grad beroende av om människorna känner sig trygga i denna situation.
Vi måste vara redo att i lämpliga fora diskutera ett eventuellt tillägg till Afrikanska unionens nuvarande uppdrag med parterna, om Sudans regering är ovillig eller oförmögen att skydda befolkningen i Darfur effektivt. Detta är ett måste.
Det är också viktigt att notera att vi står inför en verklig konflikt. Det här handlar om mer än lite oorganiserat våld. Det gäller inte bara problemet med Sudans regering, det finns också rebellgrupper som slåss för sina mål – de finns verkligen.
Därför måste allt detta hanteras genom ett allvarligt försök till medling, genom att sätta press på alla parter.
Det är också viktigt att betona att en hållbar politisk lösning av Darfur-krisen med nödvändighet måste formuleras och utarbetas i överensstämmelse med och i relation till den globala Naivasha-processen. En lösning som enbart gäller Darfur kommer inte att lösa det mer omfattande problemet. Problemet i Darfur uppstod faktiskt inte ur tomma intet, det var ett resultat av problemen i Sudan.
Ett visst mått av politisk enighet har uppnåtts i Abuja och detta är en bra början, men vi måste stödja alla krafter som verkar för att styra denna situation i rätt riktning och samtidigt inrikta oss på den enorma uppgiften att förbättra den humanitära situationen på plats.
Delegationen har återvänt med en klar bild av en komplex situation och har uttryckt indignation över de fruktansvärda händelser som fortfarande äger rum i Darfur.
Kommissionen var aktivt engagerad i det humanitära biståndet till västra delen av Sudan innan denna kris utvecklade sig till vad den nu är. Situationen är nu så fruktansvärd att vi hittills har använt 105 miljoner euro. Denna summa har till största delen använts till grundläggande humanitärt livsmedelsbistånd, men vi försöker också stödja den politiska processen. Denna summa motsvarar ungefär 37 procent av EU:s sammanlagda bidrag. I normala fall är kommissionens andel av stödinsatserna i dessa humanitära kriser omkring 20 procent av medlemsstaternas sammanlagda bidrag. Här skulle jag vilja tillägga att vi ser en ganska stor spridning när vi jämför vad de olika medlemsstaterna har bidragit med. Jag nämner detta, eftersom jag anser att det kvalitativa värdet av vad EU som helhet gör i en given situation inte bara är beroende av vad kommissionen gör eller av vår sammanlagda insats, utan också av hela EU:s helhjärtade engagemang och stöd för vår verksamhet.
Vi satsar också pengar och arbete på situationen i Tchad, genom att erbjuda tak över huvudet för uppskattningsvis 200 000 flyktingar från Darfur.
Under genomförandet av biståndsinsatserna har vi stött på ständiga administrativa hinder från Sudans regering och betydande logistiska problem som har lett till stora extrakostnader. Mer än 25 procent av kostnaderna för denna insats är en följd av logistiska problem.
De administrativa problemen håller successivt på att lösas, enligt min mening i stor utsträckning tack vare världssamfundets påtryckningar på Sudans regering. När det gäller logistik håller ECHO på att inrätta ett tekniskt kontor i Darfur och ett annat i Tchad för att förbättra samordningen på plats. Dessa kontor kommer att vara i drift i slutet av den här månaden, och vi planerar för en första period på 12 månader.
Det återstår dock mycket mer att göra. Uppskattningsvis 40 procent av den drabbade befolkningen har fortfarande inte tillgång till humanitärt bistånd, och trots förbättringar i vissa områden kommer det fortfarande in rapporter om våld, inbegripet systematiska våldtäkter av kvinnor. Jag är medveten om att delegationen har kommit tillbaka med berättelser om fruktansvärt våld och stor fruktan.
Det är viktigt att världssamfundet är berett att handla även i fortsättningen, eftersom de humanitära behoven kommer att kvarstå under ännu ett år, även med det bästa tänkbara scenariot. Som vi har sett, är effekterna av dessa kriser fortfarande kännbara och vi måste ha en sådan organisation att vi kan hantera dem bättre i framtiden.
Vid sidan av det humanitära biståndet har EU varit mycket aktivt på det politiska området. Vi har för första gången utnyttjat den EUF-finansierade afrikanska fredsbevarande resursen, som finansierar merparten av Afrikanska unionens uppdrag. Detta har möjliggjort en snabb reaktion från Afrikanska unionens freds- och säkerhetsråd genom ett beslut som fattades vid dess första officiella sammanträde efter det humanitära eldupphöravtalet i N'Djamena. Detta råd har sänt ungefär 150 observatörer och en 300 man stark militär skyddsstyrka för att övervaka eldupphöravtalet."@sv21
|
| lpv:unclassifiedMetadata |
"Commission"5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,13,4
"EN"10
"Nielson,"5,19,15,1,18,14,16,11,10,13,4
|
Named graphs describing this resource:
The resource appears as object in 2 triples